Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused
Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal
Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven
Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others
Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy
Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution
Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned
Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered
Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge
Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself
Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when
Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES
Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness
Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial
Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses
Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses
Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate
Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office
Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate
Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault
Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing
Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity
Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts
Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion
Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion
Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely
Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises
Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies
Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction
Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin
Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it
Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly
Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal
Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused
Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments
Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself
Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing
Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering
Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery
Quaestio III: On Cursings
Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general
Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required
Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract
Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract
Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts
Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract
Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot
Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting
Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired
Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made
Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians
Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures
Disputatio III: On Promise
Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION
Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice
Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds
Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted
Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause
Disputatio IV: ON DONATION
Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what
Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations
Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling
Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are
Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell
Quaestio III: Which things can be sold
Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things
Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum
Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down
Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful
Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing
Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer
Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.
Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful
Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury
Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin
Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price
Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice
Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money
Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer
Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)
Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold
Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law
Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS
Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES
Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law
Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something
Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself
Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss
Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful
Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just
Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful
Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud
Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is
Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is
Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio XI: On Testaments
Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open
Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs
Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato
Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable
Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake
Disputatio XII: On Legacies
Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how
Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed
Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is
Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them
Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general
Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is
Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue
Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue
Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend
Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary
Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one
Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION
Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio III: ON PRAYER
Quaestio I: What Prayer is
Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER
Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary
Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer
Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded
Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray
Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to
Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray
Quaestio X: How one ought to pray
Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours
Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept
Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it
Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour
Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins
Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies
Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions
Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself
Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies
Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies
Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour
Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION
Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue
Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia
Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations
Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE
Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is
Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right
Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law
Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered
Disputatio VI: On Tithes
Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid
Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid
Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid
Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid
Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted
Tractatus IV: E VOTIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW
Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are
Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW
Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow
Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone
Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness
Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid
Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow
Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good
Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good
Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid
Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is
Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows
Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS
Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS
Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity
Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then
Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved
Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage
Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*
Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*
Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license
Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband
Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons
Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons
Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father
Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs
Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate
Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows
Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which
Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made
Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause
Question XXXIII
Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS
§ I: On the vows of Religious in common
Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows
Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious
Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy
Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion
Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows
Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion
Quaestio VII: On NOVICES
Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion
Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection
Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken
Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion
Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion
Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows
Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion
Quaestio XV: On Novices
Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion
Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection
Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken
Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion
Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled
Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels
Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.
Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands
Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business
Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE
Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows
Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion
Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things
Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate
Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin
Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty
Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow
Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent
Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty
Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments
Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty
Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated
Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium
Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor
Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III
Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely
Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor
Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY
You have the INCORRUPTIBLE Lily of Chastity, at once fragrant with the odor of purity and aflame with the ardor of heavenly things, in the Seraphic Doctor in the Dieta, tit. 4. cap. 4., where he pours forth the snowy leaves of this most beautiful flower, and the kindled crocus glinting among golden grains, into the chastity of the body and the cleanness of the mind; for unless the mind, kindled within by divine ardor, be made clean, in vain is chastity boasted of outwardly in the body: on account of this twofold purity of heart, and of flesh, Chastity is compared in the Songs to a garden enclosed, and a fountain sealed, as the Saintly Doctor notes at the place cited; for as nothing enters a well-closed garden except from on high, so into a chaste soul entrance plainly opens only from above, from Heaven: this closing of the soul is obtained especially by cloistered Chastity. I shall treat, therefore, here of this most preeminent dowry of the heavenly spouse, insofar as it is consecrated by Vow; but below, where I treat of temperance, I shall weigh it as a virtue moderating pleasure about touch. Here also I shall add certain things on the observance of the Cloister, which is the guardianship of Chastity.
Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity
The FIRST opinion is of certain Theologians, and of almost all the Canonists, whom Suarez lib. 9. on the vow of chastity reports, with Sancio lib. 7. disp. 27.: that the difference between the chastity professed by Clerics and by Religious is this: that the obligation of the latter is by force of the vow, but of the former by the virtue of an Ecclesiastical statute alone.
The SECOND opinion is that of D. Bonaventure, and of as many Ecclesiastical writers as wrote on the 37th distinction of the Sentences: that Ecclesiastical Chastity differs from that which is vowed solemnly in Cloisters in that the former is at once by reason of the statute and of an implicit vow; the latter, however, arises from an explicit vow alone. To this opinion Suarez subscribes at the place cited, Azor. tom 1. lib. 7. cap. 12. question 6. Vasquez tom. 3. on the 3. part, disp. 246. cap. 3. Sancius loc. cit., to whom add others reported everywhere by these authors.
I ASSERT with this opinion that Religious chastity differs from Ecclesiastical in this: that the latter had its origin from the statute of the Church, but now draws its obligation both from a vow and from the precept of the Church: but Religious Chastity has its origin and progress from solemn and express profession.
It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor here in the body, and in the doubts litt. by an efficacious reason, which the others who hold this opinion bring forward: He who receives the habit of Religion without any further express promise vows implicitly the chastity annexed to such a habit; therefore he who receives the Clerical order, to which perpetual continence is annexed by precept, vows it implicitly.
It is PROVED secondly from S. Bonaventure: where there intervenes a spontaneous promise, and the precept of a superior, there is found a twofold obligation, of vow and of statute; But in the continence of clerics there is a spontaneous promise, and a precept. The minor is proved by D. Bonavent. foundation 3., where he reports from Gregory, as is had in the letter: Let Bishops presume to make no Subdeacon except one who has promised that he will live chastely: Therefore the Saintly Doctor infers, he who promises himself into the hand of the Bishop vows continence: Hence of old they were not promoted to sacred Orders except those who, asked about keeping chastity, would promise it, as is clear from the Second Council of Arles cap. 2. Toledo II, cap. 1. Orange I. can. 22.
MOREOVER, in a Cleric the violation of Chastity has the malice of sacrilege, not precisely by reason of the Order — otherwise the Presbyters of the Eastern Church would be guilty of sacrilege as often as they approached their wives, which S. Bonaventure here in the body disapproves, since they use them licitly; nor yet precisely by reason of the precept, because thus only disobedience is committed: Therefore this malice is by reason of the Vow.
ADD that many Canons speak of the solemnization of the vow through the reception of Order, as Suarez notes after the Saintly Doctor in the body at the place cited, cap. 17. num. 4., as is clear from cap. unico on the vow, in 6., where a twofold solemn vow is enumerated, namely one of Order; another of Profession.
HENCE you have that in reality there is no difference between the Chastity of Clerics and of Religious, except that the former vow it implicitly, and by annexation; but these expressly, and with a certain principal intention.
There is however one notable difference: that from the beginning of the Church, the vow of religious chastity not only impeded a marriage to be contracted, but severed one already contracted; not so the Chastity annexed to the order made, as Bellarmine proves at the place cited, citing Suarez.
Likewise, that Religious Chastity is of such virtue that, while it is vowed, it dissolves a ratified marriage; not so the Chastity of sacred Order, nor even of the Episcopate itself; as is clear in the sole Extravag. on the vow under Ioan. XXII., as also all Theologians hold with D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 27. The reason of this difference shines forth principally from the will of the Church, which, as it could determine one, so also the other, and with the stronger right, because the Clerical state, at least in the Episcopate, is more perfect than the Monastic profession.
There are nevertheless several congruences why Chastity, which one vows in sacred Orders, is not of such efficacy as it is in Religion, for dissolving a ratified and unconsummated marriage. The first is taken from the repugnance of the Religious state with the use of marriage; since it makes its professor dead to the world: not so the Ecclesiastical state.
The second is taken from the perpetual tending of the Religious toward perfection, which would be too much retarded by the use of a wife. But Order, although out of the reverence due to it it requires separation from carnal acts, nevertheless does not of itself place man on the way, and in the tending, toward the state of perfection; and so it was not fitting that it should dissolve the bond of a ratified marriage; and although the Episcopate be at the very summit of perfection both exercised and acquired, since nevertheless it does not prescribe of itself the means for acquiring perfection, but only for exercising it; hence it is that it has not the virtue of vowing chastity to the prejudice of a ratified marriage; add that in Episcopal, or Priestly ordination no civil death intervenes through the abdication of one's own will.
There are also several other accidental differences in the modes, and means, by which the Chastity of either state is preserved unsullied, which are evident in practice.
Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage
From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage.
Those who deduce the incapacity for contracting marriage from the very nature of the solemn vow, by which the whole man is so alienated from himself and devoted to the divine service that he can do nothing regarding marriage, show that the antiquity of this diriment impediment is equal to that of the Religious state itself. Thus Sotus, de Iustitia, lib. 7, quaest. 2, art. 3, where he holds that he is not truly a Religious whose cause for dispensation from Chastity rests with the Supreme Pontiff; in such a way that he excludes from this state the Knights of S. John, who indeed observe Celibacy from a special Constitution of the Pontiff, not from the force of a vow.
But whatever may be said of this opinion, which we discussed above, where we treated of the dispensation of a vow.
The other opinion is that from the time of Innocent II alone, who obtained the Pontificate in the year 1140, this vow constantly dissolved marriage, whereas before it only impeded contracting it; so Suarez reports, cap. 21, where he adduces various Fathers and decrees of councils seemingly supporting this.
I assert, however, that from time immemorial, and therefore from the very beginning of the Church, this vow has had the force of dissolving a subsequent marriage.
It is proved by various Councils and Fathers, whom I shall cite in tomo 7, tract. ult., disp. 7, quaest. 7; which Fathers and Councils existed before Innocent II, and notably Innocent I, who in cap. 12 and 13, epist. 2, recalls that by the vow of solemn profession a subsequent marriage is made void.
It is proved secondly, because the adverse opinion is gathered from nothing else than a certain text of Innocent II, which reads thus: But such a union, which is known to have been contracted against the Ecclesiastical Rule, we do not judge to be marriages. But it is badly inferred from this text: Therefore. The minor is proved. Because wherever a declarative word is employed in some law, no new constitution is understood, but either a declaration or a renewal of the old: but in that text only a declarative word is employed; for instance, we judge (Censemus), therefore.
Nor does it stand in the way that the word Censeo in the Gloss on Clement. 1, de concess. praeb. suggests a new law; and also to censure (censere) in the law ff. de verborum signif. indicates the same as I command. For in the former passage the urgency is not pressing; because it signifies indeed a new law, which it supposes the old one to have been extinguished; and thus it can declare that it revived anew, and therefore constitute it anew.
But that in civil law Censeo signifies the same as I command cannot be drawn by any consequence to canonical law, in which the propriety and simplicity of words is more observed: properly, moreover, Censeo among Cicero and other experts of the Latin tongue denotes to opine, or to judge: Besides, I urge that strong Authority of D. Augustine: What the whole Church holds and is not held to have been instituted by any Council, is believed to be derived from Apostolic tradition; as is found in lib. 4, de Baptismo, cap. 24; but not even a trace is found in any Council in which this Chastity first dissolves marriage by Ecclesiastical institution; therefore it must be believed to be derived from the Apostles themselves: that the Church has always believed and held this is evident from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 9, saying of it that it has always been retained.
Nor is it credible that the Fathers, who cultivated chastity with such severity, could have, up to Innocent II, celebrated marriage, undissolved, for those bound by vows, or have been ignorant of its excellence: It is confirmed from D. Basil, lib. de vera virgine, where he upbraids adulteries and deflorations to women marrying after the profession of Virginity. Likewise from Chrysostom, epistola 6, ad Theodorum, where he speaks thus, for if a woman has not power over her own body, but the man; much more they who live more safely for Christ than for themselves cannot have the condition of their own body, which words splendidly show that before the times of Chrysostom it was in use that the profession of Chastity would leave no way open to marriage; and moreover that from the very origin of the Religious state this was customary: nor does the S. Doctor seem to me to disagree with this last opinion, who in dist. 37, art. 1, quaest. 2, teaches that sacred Order has the virtue of dissolving a subsequent marriage, with the reason of a vow, rather than by the obligation of an Ecclesiastical statute; as we saw in the preceding question, which difference he would not have indicated so expressly unless he had judged it to be intrinsic to the vow, that from the very instant at which it is solemnly emitted it draws with itself, by its own force, every incapacity for marriage: the opposite, however, I shall indicate probabiliter from his own mind in tomo 7, tract. ult., where we treat of the impediments of marriage.
Nor can it be objected that the aforesaid Fathers understood this of the simple vow of Chastity, whose violation even in a valid marriage can be called adultery, insofar as it alienates the faith given to Christ. I say this cannot be objected: For, as Suarez remarks, cited above, D. Ambrose, who spoke in the mind of the other Fathers, is understood signally of the solemn vow of virgins, cap. 5, ad virginem lapsam, where he has thus: She who has promised herself to Christ, and has received the sacred veil, has already married, has already been joined to an immortal spouse, where sacred veil denotes solemn and Religious Chastity; for in the simple vow no veil intervenes; as is known to all.
And although some Fathers, and Councils, even ancient ones, speak of the marriages of made Virgins only as illicit, not as void, as is seen in the Councils, Toletanum I, Arelatense II, and others in Suarez, loco cit., nevertheless nothing is concluded from that against the antiquity of this Chastity, since their authorities are only negative, not positive: Besides, it could happen that in the first centuries, while the power of pagan princes was flourishing and luxuriating, such marriages were tolerated; but that they were approved is found nowhere.
Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done
Whether one solemnly vowing Chastity dissolves a marriage, whether consummated or ratified only, and by what law and at what time this began to be done.
Heretics, who always dwell in extremes, are accustomed to harass the Church on both sides, as she holds the mean of virtue: for there were some, as Bellarmine reports, lib. 2, de Monach., cap. 38, who absurdly dreamt that not only a consummated but also a ratified marriage could be dissolved by the vow of religious chastity. But undeservedly is Justinian involved with those professing the former error, leg. ult., Cod. de Episcop. et Clericis, since that law can be understood either of sponsi de futuro, or of a marriage merely ratified; nor does anything sound there which by any legitimate consequence can be drawn to a consummated marriage.
Moreover, since almost this whole question pertains to the treatise on Marriage, I shall remit its former part to eo quaest. 16, where I shall prove that a consummated marriage is insoluble in every way: I shall treat the other part also in quaestione 15, in the same place, where I shall show that by natural and divine law the profession of Religious Chastity dissolves, or rather dissolves a ratified marriage.
There remains therefore one thing to be examined here, namely from what time it has been customary in the Church that the solemn and Religious vow of Chastity be of such virtue as to dissolve a ratified marriage. Now this can be established only by some example of antiquity, or by the Decree of some Pontiff. You have several examples in Suarez, cap. 24, but serving the matter little: For that D. John was sponsor at the marriage in Galilee, and rejected them, already ratified, in order to follow Christ, is not credible, since it rests on very slight conjectures; and from it would follow that Christ went there rather to condemn the marriage than to honor it with his presence: which repugns the whole catalogue of Fathers disputing against the heretics. Grant that D. Bonan. be adduced by S. Hieronym., 4. dist. 27, art. 3, quaest. 2; for he speaks not assertively but disputatively.
Nor likewise do the examples of Iphigenia, failing from the embraces of Hirtacius, press, since no marriage followed, but a preceding vow, which had impeded the ensuing marriage. Say the same of D. Caecilia, bound by a simple vow of Chastity; for by a Divine inspiration she foresaw that the marriage to be entered into with Valerian would serve only for his conversion, but would not break out into any carnal act: of Macarius, indeed, and Alexius it can be said that, through zeal for a more perfect life, embracing Celibacy or the hermitage, not religion, they left their spouses: For nowhere is it read of them that they professed the Religious life.
Nevertheless, not absurdly is it gathered from this that the examples of these induced posterity to send a messenger to a ratified marriage, and to pursue themselves with vows of higher perfection; although simpliciter, for the sake of greater perfection, no one can at his pleasure bid farewell to ratified nuptials; otherwise this would be licit even on account of the pursuit of simple celibacy; whereas it is not licit on account of the Episcopate, which in the apex of perfection surpasses the others.
Therefore only from the rescript of Eusebius the Pontiff do we have that this custom is most ancient, so that the special time at which it began occurs to no memory: For the said Pontiff says in Gratian, cap. desponsata, 27, quaest. 2: A betrothed girl may not be given by her parents to another man, yet she may choose a Monastery for herself. Now this Pope sat before the year 1300, yet that this custom is older is evident from his very words: For he does not speak as one newly statutes, but as one declaring what was already before statutes; otherwise he would not say: Licet, but rather, liceat, as Suarez subtly remarks, cap. 24.
Some difficulty can arise, from the fact that she is called desponsata, which particle can be understood of betrothal for the future, not of marriage for the present: This, however, does not press, if it be noted that the Pontiff there prescribes a single remedy for withdrawing from a marriage, that the girl enter a Monastery; but if she had been betrothed by words de futuro, it would not be so arduous a business as to require the judgment of the supreme Tribunal, since for dissolving betrothals relief is furnished by many other ways for a just cause.
Add that, by the perpetual consent of the Doctors, and by long custom, which interprets the law best, that text is explained of a ratified marriage, as Suarez notes, num. 2; whence it must be concluded, according to the rule of D. Augustine noted in the preceding question, that from Apostolic tradition this custom of dissolving a ratified marriage, annexed to the vows of Religion, has been derived down to our own times.
Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister
By what law and at what time Religious Chastity began to be sealed with enclosure.
Caramuel discusses this question in part, in sua Theologia moral., epist. 34, art. 8. But the difficulty is not about those promising perpetual enclosure under the fourth vow; for whatever we said above about the law by which vows obliges militates for them: truly, it also seems that the same law can be adduced for those vowing Chastity anew, where enclosure is observed by custom; for since means and end are prescribed by the same law, and by natural and divine precept one is bound to stand by one's vow, and since enclosure is the most efficacious means of conserving Chastity, it follows that enclosure obliges by an equal law.
That enclosure is a most efficacious means for professing the vow of unspotted Chastity the Seraphic Doctor demonstrates excellently, de professu Relig., lib. 1, cap. 39, et lib. 2, cap. 54. For the alienation and separation of women from men; and the companionship of the chaste, by whose example one is led by the hand to purity, is a most present remedy against the allurements of luxuriating flesh: But this is furnished by enclosure, in which no occasion either of touching or of seeing meets one, by which modes chastity is especially assailed; for as the S. Doctor notes excellently, lib. 2 cited: A coal, which seems extinguished, covered with a little ash, if touched, burns; but if left solitary, at last it is extinguished; truly if joined to another, both are kindled.
Besides, natural reason has always so persuaded all peoples that the wanderings of girls be curbed, that they may dwell more securely within than without; nor did the very Ethnici, or Heretics, who assailed the other rights of nature, praise the exits and excursions even of secular virgins; nor have the sectaries of our own time, who heaped the crimes of all centuries into the impiety of their heresies, inveighed against enclosure, insofar as it is a seal of Chastity; although against it, insofar as it casts aside every hope of future marriage so that the vow may be kept, they ejaculate not a few insults.
I assert, however, with the scandal of one's neighbor set aside, and the danger of falling, that enclosure is in precept only by Ecclesiastical law; it is evident from the Councils and Fathers to be cited below.
It is proved, because besides the solemnity of the vow, which pertains to the Church, the obligation before God is equal in the simple and in the solemn vow: But to the simple vow enclosure is not required. Therefore. It is confirmed, because although enclosure is a means conducive to this, we are not held to employ every means.
It is proved secondly from the various and frequent dispensations of this enclosure, by which nuns are indulged so as to remain for whole months and years in the houses of their parents for congruous causes only; indeed, some even, devoted for their whole lifetime to works of piety, serve in Zenodochia and other places.
As to the time at which enclosure was joined to the life of Monks, although it is most ancient, as is evident from the Rules of D. Basilii, D. Augustini, S. Benedicti, and the ancient Fathers; as we saw, d. 1, q. 2, nevertheless it does not seem to be a precept of any law other than legal justice, by which a subject is bound to stand by the mandates of his Superior; for thus all the Rules are interpreted by long custom. There are nevertheless held certain decrees of Councils which speak more strictly of this matter, as of the Council of Chalcedon, cap. 4, where it commands Monks, to remain in the places to which they have dedicated themselves to God, to which words it adds below: But those passing beyond these, we decree to be outside communion, lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed. To these consonant is the Decree of Alexand. II, cited in Suarez, tom. 4, tract. 8, lib. 1, cap. 6, in which it reads thus: According to the tenor of the excellent Council of Chalcedon, we command Monks, though Religious, to remain within the cloister according to the norm of S. Benedicti; we prohibit them to wander through villages, castles, cities.
Although these things are so, nevertheless no one has said that a Religious is held by common law, from which his Prelate cannot dispense, to perpetual enclosure: This is evident if we inspect somewhat more diligently the end and motives of those decrees: For since from the beginning Monks were ordained to a merely contemplative life to be spent perpetually in their cells, and were subject to no Ecclesiastical ministries, since for the most part they were not Priests, some began gradually to withdraw themselves from that discipline, and to lead the active life more freely in villages and districts for the sake of gain, rather to the ruin than to the edification of the people, because they were usurping Ecclesiastical ministries, being destined to them by no authority either of character or of mission: Whence Pope Eugenius, cap. placuit, 2, 16, quaest. 2, thus rescribed: It pleased our common Council that no one of the Monks should presume, with most nefarious daring, to go out of the Monastery for earthly gain, where the ministries then illicit for Monks are touched upon in the depraved end, namely earthly gain, and the nefarious motive or means, namely arrogating to themselves the Ecclesiastical ministry: But if the exit from the cloisters had been simply prohibited, it would have been intimated simply, also without specification of end or means.
It is confirmed efficaciously from the same chapter, where it is added, that the Brothers are not to bury anyone except him who has lived with them in the same convent, even if it should chance that another brother, who arrived there, die there; which supposes that the brothers had the faculty of receiving arrivals, as also of peregrinating. But if I were even to concede that enclosure, or the observance of the cloister, is of common law, and therefore indispensable by one's own superior; who would not admit the prescription of so many centuries against such a law, since even common law, by a similar custom duly introduced, lies proscribed: Let these things be said in passing of this matter, which many assail with taunts, but few with arguments.
As to the time at which the enclosure of Nuns began, the same must be stated as of the solemn vow of Chastity, insofar as it dissolves a preceding ratified marriage, or a subsequent one even consummated, as was said in the two preceding questions; for this laudable custom seems to have the very Apostles as its institutors; for in the Council of Carthaginense I, in the year 340 according to Baronius, or 330 according to others, it was declared, cap. 3: Those who wish to marry, and choose the better part of continence, ought to avoid these things, and not only not dwell together, but not even have access to themselves, but here by the particle ought (debent) it is declared what before seems to have been statutes; before this council, however, no other exists which speaks so expressly of this matter; see what was said of the origin of this vow, disput. 2, quaest. 3.
There follows the Council of Carthaginense III, in which it is enacted that the Bishop take care of those virgins who have vowed Chastity, and contain them in a Monastery, lest, wandering abroad, they be a scandal to the Church.
The same thereafter many Pontiffs renewed, as Leo III in the Council of Foroiuliense, or Adrianus III, as some will. Likewise Bonifacius in cap. periculo, de statu regular. enjoins a strict enclosure upon the Chastity of Nuns with these words: Wishing to provide for the perilous and detestable state of certain Nuns, we sanction by the present constitution, to prevail perpetually and irrefragably, that all and singular Nuns, present and future, of whatever Religion or Order they be, existing in whatever parts of the world, must remain under perpetual enclosure in their Monasteries, etc.; by which last words he indicates that only those are held by this precept who have emitted their vows in Monasteries where enclosure is kept.
But whatever the Councils and ancient Pontiffs left statutes about this, it was strictly renewed again in the Council of Trident., sess. 25, cap. 5, de regular., and more strictly in a certain Diplomate of Pius V, given the Calend. of June, in the year 1566, which begins: Circa Pastoralis officii, where he enjoins that they be held to observe rigid enclosure, although by force of the emitted promise they were not obliged to such observance, with these words: Although by force of the emitted, etc., he shows this enclosure to be for them Ecclesiastical, and able to be separated from the vow; as it is truly separated in male Religious.
And this precept is now observed with such rigor that neither is it licit for Nuns to go out without grave cause with the license of their superiors, nor is it permitted by law for others to suffer to enter them; whence there exists in Chrysostom. Henriquez, num. 35, pag. 321, a decree granted to the Mendicants 17 Calend. Septemb. 1567, where the Bishops are gravely reprehended, who are accustomed frequently to grant this license, or unduly seize it for themselves, since it pertains to other superiors; and these last words were said on account of the Monasteries of S. Clarae, which are subject to Regulars; the tenor of the Decree itself is thus described in Caramuel, loco cit.: The Bishops, or their Vicars, dare to give at their pleasure a license to whomsoever to enter whatever Monasteries of Nuns, even of S. Clarae, although they be subject to the care of Regulars; somewhat below the words of inhibition thus follow: Since it is dishonest for anyone to send a sickle into another's harvest, and since no one should presume to enter the Monasteries of Nuns except by the license of the Bishop or Superior, and in necessary cases, in sess. 25, can. 5 (supply: of Tridentini), it is prohibited, we will that this hold only in those Monasteries which are subject to the very Ordinaries by full law, in which in necessary cases they themselves can give the license, and not in other Monasteries, etc.
And indeed, although these things have been thus statutes in the service and custody of Chastity, S. Bonavent. shows that other advantages accrue to Nuns from the cloister, in libello Apolog., quaest. 18. For better and more easily are the spouses of Christ governed in one society, and are excited to the exercises of virtue by mutual examples; and the longer they are removed from the fruition of the age, the more ardently are they kindled in pious desires.
Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated
By what modes enclosure is violated.
This question touches both Monks and Nuns, since enclosure has been enjoined upon both in favor of Chastity, although it has been prescribed by stricter law to women on account of the greater urgency of danger, and Suarez notes, tom. 4, de Religione, tract. 9, lib. I, cap. 12, num. 3. But the difficulty can be divided in two for each sex, because enclosure is violated not only by the exit of those dwelling in the cloister, but by the entrance of others to whom it is prohibited. And first indeed I shall speak of the exit of Religious; afterwards I shall touch upon some things about the entrance of women to the cloisters of men; I shall also discuss similar things regarding the exit and entrance to Nuns.
By what modes a Religious going out violates the Cloister.
I suppose first that the obligation is grave in those who live a cenobitic life under the government of some Prelate, that they do not go out without his license; it is evident from the common practice and custom of all religions; and it is moreover confirmed from the Council of Tridentino, sess. 25, cap. 4, where it is thus had: It is not licit for Regulars to depart from their convents, even under pretext of approaching their Superiors, unless they have been sent or called by them. Hence Suarez says, loco citato supra, that, supposing the institution of this custom and of the Religious life, this obligation of not withdrawing oneself from the custody of the Prelate is not merely positive, but seems natural and divine, even if no depraved intention, or apostasy, or occasion of other danger should arise from it; and he exemplifies in a girl, who by a law more than positive is held, even with danger set aside, not to withdraw herself from the custody of her father or mother; and he concludes that Religious Chastity and its decency are not to be kept less. Besides, as S. Bonavent. says, lib. II. Pharet. cap. 32, from D. Bernardo: Nothing is more shameful than a Monk running about through cities and castles, unless charity compels this.
Hence the determination of Navarrus does not please me, which also displeases Suarez, by whom it is cited in the place cited, that an exit from the cloister has in its nature only a venial fault, and becomes mortal only per accidens by reason of scandal or other similar harm; for the Council of Tridentinum speaks under precept: It is not licit, and although it is specified there: Even under pretext of approaching their Superiors, that particle even (etiam) a fortiori denotes that other modes or pretexts of going out are less licit.
I suppose secondly that in this matter levity of matter can exist, by which the exit of a Religious without the license of the Prelate is reduced to a venial fault, as if it be done for a short time with the mind of soon returning; and this is true a potiori when it is established from the benignity of the Superior, who easily grants pardon, or if he is accustomed to know of the unlicensed exit and not disapprove: Suarez brings the reason of this thing, num. 10, because the withdrawal from the will of the Prelate is not grave; these things being supposed.
I assert that a Religious cannot go out of the Monastery publicly or furtively, for flight or apostasy, without mortal fault.
It is evident in itself, for there the grave observance is broken, and grave injury is inflicted on the Prelate; just as enormous scandal also threatens the others; wherefore among the cases reserved to the Supreme Pontiff by Clem. VIII, the third is placed: Nocturnal and furtive exit from the Monastery, even if done without the intention of apostatizing; but where there is a reserved case, there the commission of a mortal fault is supposed. But Suarez extends this case, num. 7, even to a diurnal exit, done with the intention of passing the night abroad; because in that decree of the Pontiff not the furtive mode of exiting, but the reason of existing outside furtively is reserved.
Hence you have that a Religious going out without license, on some hasty occasion of succoring a neighbor suffering grave spiritual or temporal necessity, does not sin, because in this case license is rightly presumed; although it ought to be asked, if time permits, at least if it be necessary to go farther away and be absent, because then scandal may impend over the other brothers.
In these cases, however, the custom of each Religion must be weighed: For among the Fratres Minores, on account of the frequent necessity of begging, as also of serving one's neighbor, enclosure is not observed so strictly; indeed often some, destined to such offices, go out at their pleasure, a general license for this having been given.
But a stricter reason must be had of Carthusians, Camaldulenses, and similar ones, serving only God and themselves: For with these one must stand by the rules and constitutions.
By what modes the enclosure of Religious is violated by the entrance of outsiders.
Then D. Bonavent. says, lib. 4. Pharet. cap. 18: Good honor is in the Church, if women are far from the company of Clerics, as D. Hieronymus admonishes in the S. Doctor there: Let the feet of women tread your little hostelry rarely, or never. But before the Pontificates of Pius V and Gregory XIII, various women of various even states could enter the cloisters of men, either by force of the faculties of prior Pontiffs, or by virtue of the Constitutions of certain Convents: But since from this occasions of scandals easily arose, the aforesaid Pontiffs issued their own Motus proprii (since in the law nothing express exists on this matter), by which entrance is interdicted to all women presuming under pretext of whatever faculty, under penalty of excommunication latae and reservatae, that they no longer attempt to enter the Houses of the Mendicants, or of the Carthusians, or of other whatever Regulars by force of any faculty: The Motus of Pius V is had in Bullario Roman. Constit. 22, and begins: Regularium personarum, in the year 1566, in which moreover the local Prelates are strictly prohibited, under the penalties of suspension from Divinis, privation of offices, and incapacity for them, that they do not receive the said women: But the Motus more properly of Gregory XIII is had in Constitut. 36, beginning: Ubi gratis.
But a grave doubt arose after those decrees were issued, whether also women entering the Monasteries of men, not by force of any faculty, would incur the censures; since Gregory XIII says, Inhibiting the same to those who obtained them. With which words Pius V issued other not dissimilar ones: Prohibiting the women pretending the aforesaid faculties and licenses, etc. On account of which words Suarez judged that the censuras regard only the women there noted, not others: But this Doubt was threshed out by another Decree, issued by the same Pius V, where he declares that he comprehends under the censuras the said women and all others whatever; which, when Suarez had seen this, he sang the palinode of the prior opinion, as P. Elizeus noster notes in methodo rerum Criminal., tract. 10, quaest. 23, where he teaches that the Decree begins, Decet Romanum.
Hence the assertion is certain, that a Prelate, and a fortiori any other Religious, sins by introducing into interior houses, or into the cloisters themselves, women comprehended in the said Decrees. It is evident from the penalties there indicted; which suppose a grave sin, and from the Council of Trident. granting the faculty of absolving from those censuras when they are occult, sess. 24, de reform., cap. 6. Therefore it supposes sin through the censuras.
Although in the aforesaid motus proprii women are specified of whatever status, grade, order, condition, and endowed with whatever dignity and pre-eminence, whether they be Comitissae, Marchionissae, or Ducissae; nevertheless it is not gathered from that that it is prohibited to admit Queens, and their daughters, or granddaughters, or even Foundresses of Coenobia. And this is true to such an extent, although Gregory XIII says, To whatever even Comitissae, Marchionissae, Ducissae, and others of whatever status, where the particle others (aliis) is ridiculously interpreted by descending, but is rightly understood by ascending to the higher grades, according to the rigor of the law, as Suarez aduerts, lib. 1, tract. 9, de Relig., cap. 7, num. 5. For since both Pontiffs speak in nearly the same mode, it is a sign that the intention of each is equal as to the specification of persons: But from Pius V it is in no way gathered that he comprehended foundresses, much less Queens, or their daughters, or granddaughters; since there he named the special persons whom he intended to be understood. Besides, Gregory XIII, below, treating the matter which pertained to Kings and Queens, names them. Moreover, the rule of law is, that in a general clause those things are not comprehended which require a special reason, especially when others of inferior note are specified in the same clause.
But that Queens and Foundresses have a special cause is evident first of all from the custom, which custom seeks out these Monasteries.
Then, Suarez verifies, according to the mind of the moderns, that after the Religious of the Order of Minimorum had consulted the Supreme Pontiff and the S. Congregation of Cardinals whether the aforesaid Decrees would exclude Queens and foundresses, they received the answer that no derogation had been made from the privileges which Queens and foundresses enjoyed.
Reason also favors these privileges as regards foundresses (for as regards Queens it is nowhere disputed). For since they are in a certain manner the Dominae and Patronae of the Monasteries which they themselves built, and since the Ius patronatus enjoys privileges in many places in law, it was becoming that they not be involved in the same prohibition as other women: But this presses more among the Minores, since the places constructed for them are under the Dominion of those who took care that they be constructed, unless by special mention such dominion be abdicated, and thus pass into things whose property pertains to the Pontiff; but the use alone pertains to the Brothers themselves.
And although the Monasteries be in the dominion of those Brothers who can truly possess them in common, nevertheless laws are not to be so interpreted as to wish benefactors to be withdrawn from benefacting, or the Brothers themselves to incur so great a note of ingratitude.
Hence one may conclude that women entering, with fraud, malice, presumption, or temerity set aside, do not violate the law of enclosure; because the Pontiff in the said Decrees uses the particle presuming (praesumentes), so that if they enter even from culpable ignorance, they are not judged to sin, and therefore to undergo no censure, as Pater Elizaeus notes excellently in the place cited, numero 2; a fortiori, say the same, if they enter on account of the infirmity of some Religious whom they can succor, or for Masses, sermons, and similar things: they are held, however, to go and return by the straight way, as the cited Elizaeus has, saying that even an ingested boy not pubescent does not violate this law, since in them the end of the law ceases, and the occasion of impudicity, against which these things are statutes.
But by CONSUETUDINE it is received that, the cloisters being destroyed, or lying open through grave fracture, that rigor is not observed; although it is advisable that, with the greater diligence that can be done, every access be precluded to seculars on account of the decency of the Religious state. Which decency also can oblige Prelates, that they do not admit even men into the interior houses at fixed times; although no special precept is given about this.
How the enclosure of Nuns is violated by exit.
I SUPPOSE the rigid precept given to Nuns, that once professed they contain themselves within the cloister, as was proved in quaest. 4, both from the ancient Constitutions of the Church and from the Council of Tridentino, which thus precepts: But let it be licit for no one of the Sanctimoniales after profession to go out of the Monastery, even for a brief time, under whatever pretext, except for some legitimate cause to be approved by the Bishop, any indults and privileges notwithstanding. Hence you have that only Nuns who have emitted the three vows are comprehended in this decree, not Tertiaries, or even Novices, as Suarez shows at length above; although regarding Tertiary Nuns there must be observed the Constitutio of Pius V, beginning: Circa pastoralis officii, namely that they be admonished by Prelates to emit the essential vows of Religion, and thereupon to observe enclosure; but if they should refuse to render this, let them be interdicted from admitting any more into their Congregation.
You HAVE also that Convers Sisters, duly professed, are included by that decree; since they are truly Nuns, differing from the others only as to certain servile ministries and the want of the Veil.
Yet Pius V, by the said Constitution, limited certain things around these, namely that in places where the other Nuns have need of being sustained by the alms of the faithful, certain ones from the conversae be deputed to collect those alms, and therefore may go out and dwell in a certain contiguous house, four conditions being kept. The first is, that they be at least in their fortieth year. The second, that the place in which they dwell be very near to the other nuns. The third, that they do not enter the Cloister of the Nuns (whom they are accustomed to call Choriste by difference from the Conversae) except in the cases named in that constitution. The last is, that they do not go out of their domiciles except with the license of the Superiors.
But if the religious women cannot be sustained otherwise than by the collection of alms, this faculty of going out ceases: wherefore Gregory XIII in his Constitution, beginning: Deo sacris, enjoins upon the Bishops or Ordinaries that they provide: for as S. Bonavent. relates, lib. 1, phar., cap. 37, from D. Cypriano: She is not to be counted a Virgin of Christ who so lives and goes about that she can be loved by men.
From these you have it concluded that a Nun going out against the tenor of the Decree of Tridentino and the limitations of Pius V sins most gravely; and that this is true also of the militant Orders, as P. Elizzus notes, tract. 10, de poenis et delictis, cap. 23, and Rodriguez, tom. 1, quaest. 49, art. ult., and Lezana, tom. 1, cap. 25, num. 19; for the Virgin seeking Christ (says D. Bonav., cited below, from D. Ambrosio) ought not to be vulgar, ought not to be in the forum, not in the streets.
But the CAUSES of going out are specified by Pius V in Constitutio 100, Decori, and are reduced to a great fire and infirmity, which is there called Epidemia, under which name Suarez understands not only that sickness which for the most part infects and kills others by its contagion, but any other whatsoever which can be a scandal or danger to the community. Likewise under the name of fire other dangers cognate to this can come, as war impending, a sudden inundation, and similar ones, which are scarcely met otherwise than by exit.
But P. Elizzus noster observes, in the place cited, from Gregory XIII, that a professed woman having gone out with both feet and body beyond the door violates the enclosure, even if it be for a short time; yet Diana excuses such a one, if she has gone out only by two or three palms, as is had in tract. 5, part. 5, resol. 22.
MOREOVER the aforesaid Constitutions are to be observed, according to the doctrine delivered by me in the treatise on laws, tomo 4; for they are not received everywhere, since in several Provinces, from even light causes, the exit of nuns and their dwelling for a long time in the houses of their parents is tolerated by the Ordinaries, I know not by what custom: And it seems iniquitous to the laws that they be more easily borne than cared to be kept, since nevertheless, as D. Bonavent. has in the cited place, it does not befit, is not expedient for, is not incumbent upon a Religious to be implicated in the obligations of his parents, or to be bound by the pernicious familiarity of strangers.
On the entrance into the cloisters of Nuns.
SINCE chastity is endangered not only by the exit of Nuns, but also by the entrance of others to them, therefore both are prohibited with an equal rigor of the laws; whence in the Council of Malisconense I, cap. 2, Arelatense IV, cap. 7, the Seventh Synod, sess. 7, can. 20, and before in the Council of Agathense, cap. 28, it was statutes under various limitations that the Monasteries of Nuns be guarded from the access and speech of men; that they be placed farther from the Monasteries of Monks, and that all be barred from access and entrance, unless paternal or fraternal urgency of kinship. But Bonifacius VIII, cap. unico, de statu regularium, in 6, more universally and strictly bore the precept on this matter, with these words: To no one whatsoever of dishonest person, nor even of honest, unless a reasonable and manifest cause exists, and with the special license of him to whom it pertains, let entrance or access lie open to the same. But since this law at length failed by custom, it is held renewed in the Council of Tridentino, sess. 25, cap. 5, where it is thus said: But let it be licit for no one to enter within the walls of the Monastery, of whatever kind or condition, sex, or age they be. And although the Council at the beginning of the said chapter says: The holy Synod renewing the Constitution of Bonifacii VIII, nevertheless afterwards it shows in what it renews, namely as to exit and entrance; but not as to access, as Suarez notes, loco citato, numero 26, where he also shows that other Constitutions observing a similar mode of speaking renew or intimate nothing about access. Much less are the Minores barred from approaching by force of the rule, since it only says: Let them not enter Monasteries, etc. Nevertheless the counsel of D. Bernardi is most excellent, in the S. Doctore, cap. 38, in the place cited, having regard to the virgin, that she beware of things to be feared, even to dread safe things.
Therefore only the entering within the walls of Nuns is prohibited by the said Decree. But there went out a Decree of the S. Congregat. in the year 1590, prohibiting not only entrance but access for the sake of speaking, to all Regulars, under penalty of privation of offices and of active, and at the same time passive, voice, to be incurred ipso facto; which prohibition is extended even to all Regulars wishing to address any other women whatsoever dwelling within the walls of the monastery: The same very prohibition, obliging under penalty of mortal sin even for a brief time, the sacred Congregation again declared on 11 Maii, in the year 1669, with the approval of the Supreme Pontiff Clemente IX.
Moreover, although the Council says, of whatever age, nevertheless it must not be believed that boys still infants are comprehended there, since they are incapable of precept; but those words seem to be employed on account of others, who by reason of old age or of more advanced age thought no danger impended over themselves or others. But boys, although they have not the liberty of sinning, can nevertheless fall under the end and motive of the law, wherefore those admitting or introducing them are not excused from sin, any more than from the censure, especially if they be of greater age, since by carrying themselves scurrilously and jocosely they can act against due honesty and decency.
But that precept also involved the prelates of the nuns themselves, as also of other Regulars, that they do not enter except under due conditions; wherefore the prelates of nuns entering in an undue mode, even if they flourish in pontifical dignity, are the first time interdicted from the church; for the second they are suspended; for the third truly they are excommunicated: But the prelates of Regulars are deprived of all offices and excommunicated, according to the Bull of Gregory XIII of the year 1581, which begins: Dubiis, quae emergunt; see Lezanam cited, cap. 16, num. 27, with Elizeo cit., num. 5.
Although it is strictly prohibited to the fratres Minores by the rule that they not enter the monasteries of Nuns; nevertheless Leo X conceded to them that, provided they were invited by the visitators of the nuns, they could enter there with the license of their superiors; which privilege P. Elizaeus shows still to prevail, notwithstanding every revocation by the oracle of the living voice, made by Urbano VIII, 2 decembris 1627, because Paulus V, in 1569, and Clemens VIII, in 1597, confirmed with various Bulls the privileges of the Capucins, so that they are no longer reckoned among the oracles of the living voice.
Moreover, in the same place P. Elizaeus reports that the said Urban VIII, before the then General of our order Ioan Maria a Nuto, declared that he had willed to innovate nothing as to the privileges granted to us.
Finally, it must be observed that he or she who, by entering or exiting, should attempt to surmount the claustral walls, although he would sin gravely, nevertheless does not incur the censures until he reaches the place in which he would truly be said to be within the cloister; because only then is that sin held to be consummated: but that place is held to be all the space deputed to enclosure, in which the nuns can freely station themselves, and outside of which they cannot remain without violation of the enclosure. Thus Bonacina, tract. de Clausura, q. 4, with others in common.
Hence you have that, whether a garden (viridarium) or other places even most remote from the coenobium of the nuns, they cannot be approached if they are within the walls of the monastery and deputed to enclosure; I say deputed to enclosure, because if the Monastery is only built, or the common accesses lie open and permit, such places are not held to be deputed to enclosure.
And although the end of the law ceases in a certain mode in women wishing to enter the monasteries of nuns, nevertheless they are not excluded from this law, even if they should wish to enter under religious habit; since it was said: to no one whatsoever of dishonest person, or even of honest, let entrance lie open, and this is extended to the nuns of other orders also, so that they can enter no cloister other than their own. The reason is, because they are externs to such a convent, and against them the same reason militates which excludes the other women; namely that the discipline of each convent be the better conserved without suspicion or scandal among the persons of the same order; wherefore if there be a nun not of another order, that she can licitly enter and be received by the Priorissa or Abbatissa, without any other faculty of the superior, Bonacina judges, loco cit., prop. 2, num. 3.
Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister
Whether a dispensation can fall upon religious chastity, and who can dispense in the matter of enclosure.
The first part of this question is easily resolved from what we said in the preceding disputation, question 20, where we abundantly elucidated the mind of the Seraphic Doctor on this matter; who, although he was most devoted to religious Chastity, does not nevertheless defend its indispensability with such tenacity as to deny that it can be released by the supreme power of the Pontiff, when a cause of greater benefit intervenes; see also what we said in the same disputation about the nature of a dispensation; whether it is a relaxation of the law, or rather a declaration; for from these one may easily conjecture whether some grave cause ought to precede a dispensation, so that it may be done licitly and validly.
This difficulty Suarez also solves in the same way, by referring to what he had said about the solemnity of vows, so that a valid consequence might allow arguing from genus to species; for if the Pontiff can dispense in solemn profession, which contains the three vows under itself, no one will doubt that he can also dispense in those vows.
But there turns upon the pivot of greater difficulty the question there treated by Suarez, cap. 26., namely whether, the other vows remaining, religious chastity can be dispensed in one or another act; a knot indeed hard to untie, and which therefore perhaps almost no Doctor has touched, as num. 7. intimates Suarez. But he, having premised the foundations of the negative opinion, which we lightly touched upon for the dispensation of solemn vows in the places already cited, concludes for the affirmative, persuaded by the example of the military religion, whose solemn virginal chastity was changed into conjugal.
But that example, as Suarez himself admits in the same place, militates for those who made profession after that institution, not however for the dispensation of those who had previously vowed religious and integral chastity solemnly, as is clear from the Bulls of Paul III and Gregory XIII.
Whatever indeed may be said of this opinion, which I remit to be discussed by a better judgment, those reasons can hardly be persuaded which Suarez heaps up at length, who admits two things which strongly impugn him, namely that the three solemn vows are of the essence of the religious state, among which Chastity will yield the last place to none, and no one will count conjugal chastity among those vows; then he confesses that this partial solution of a solemn vow suffers no small diminution of the religious state; whence someone may thus argue: By any addition, or subtraction of those things which pertain to the essence of any thing, the whole essence itself is lost, as is Aristotle's constant rule, who therefore says that essence is after the manner of a number, which with any unit added or subtracted passes wholly into another species, as is evident of itself; but not slightly is something subtracted from the essence of the Religious state, while its chiefest and purest vow, in one or another act, is not only mutilated, but changed wholly into another species: for as he who licitly consummates matrimony, although he excel in every chastity, no longer possesses virginal chastity; because they are two species, of which one is lost by the approach of the other. So, etc.
QUOD if the Pontiff should decree something similar, which we do not yet note as decreed, it would rather be a dispensation of the whole state for a brief time, and its subsequent reintegration; whence no inconvenience would follow.
QUOAD the other part of the question, it is resolved from those words of Boniface VIII, indicating that enclosure be kept, unless a grave cause intervene, and the special license of him to whom it pertains. For there are certain monasteries of nuns immediately subject to the Pontiff himself, who alone can dispense both in these and in the others absolutely and in perpetuity; Bishops, however, for the time being and for a reasonable cause, can dispense in enclosures subject to them, as the Council of Trent enjoins, sess. 25. de regularibus, cap. 5. in those words, without the license of the Bishop or superior, obtained in writing: and a little after: but the Bishop or superior alone ought to grant license in necessary cases, nor can anyone else in any way, etc. He says, however, the Bishop or superior, because certain monasteries are subject to Bishops as well as to regular prelates; and under the name of Bishop is comprehended his Vicar general, provided however that he have a special mandate for this, as the Congregation of Cardinals declares and modifies, cited by Suarez cap. 10. num. 11. tom. 4. de relig. lib. 1. de obligationibus religios. whence it is clear that this power is delegable, and therefore ordinary in the Bishop, under whose name comes also the Chapter during a vacant see, just as secular Abbots, holding a quasi-episcopal power in the monasteries subject to them.
DE Regular prelates, to whose direction certain exempt nuns are committed, this same thing is certain, since they are truly their superiors, and since the Council says the Bishop, as superior; for the verification of either part suffices for the truth of a disjunctive proposition; whence if license be necessary for entering, the approval alone of the regular prelate suffices; but if it be required for going out, the cause must be approved by the Bishop; since going out demands a graver cause, and sometimes redounds to public scandal, which the Bishop is bound to avert; see Suarez num. 11.
FURTHERMORE, although the Council uses the disjunctive particle vel, it does not however follow from this that the Bishop can dispense, or grant license for entering or leaving, monasteries whose care the Regulars have; otherwise these also could in turn render the like to them; whence not a few, nor small, inconveniences would follow; as Suarez well observed num. 15. Therefore the particle vel is to be understood according to an accommodation of division, that each may share and divide his own power; yet if it be otherwise established by custom, that be observed; since in a certain declaration of the Cardinals, cited by Suarez, it was so provided.
BY the name of regular prelate, more properly comes the Provincial, since he has power as it were episcopal; yet if others by force of rule, constitution, or custom have the care and jurisdiction over the Nuns, they will be superiors accordingly, and according to the mind of the Council will be able to dispense.
OTHER several things remain to be said about enclosure, concerning which Bonacina wrote an entire treatise, and Suarez also treats diffusely of the same matter: But since these are of no such weight, and are easily deduced from what has already been said, I remit the reader to the aforesaid Authors, and to others cited by them: What remains to be discussed concerning Chastity, below; where I shall examine it more fitly under Temperance.