Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

In which solemn vows differ from simple ones.

Famous is this question, and exceedingly necessary, all the more so as new decrees of the Pontiffs are in force for deciding it.

¶ The first opinion is, that Solemn and simple vows differ from the very nature of the vows themselves, with all ecclesiastical law set aside; and that the essence of solemn vows consists in the handing over of oneself and of one's goods into the hands of God and of those who act in God's place: Brought forward by Sanchez for this opinion are D. Thomas in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2. quaestiuncula 3., D. Bonaventura same dist. art. 2. quaest. 1., Durandus there quaest. 1. and 2., Richardus there art. 7., Mayro quaest. unic. part. 4., Capreolus 4. d. 33. quaest. unic. art. 1. concl. 2. and art. 3., Deca there quaest. unic. art. 3., Carthus. 4. d. 3. quaest. 2., Fortunius Garcia cap. 1. de pactu, num. 13., Turrecrem. cap. presbyterus, num. 1. and 2. d. 27., Tabiena dispensatio quaest. 7., Sotus 7. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 5. and 4. d. 38. quaest. 2. art. 1., Petrus Soto lect. 5. de matrim., Couarr. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 7. § 4. num. 7., Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 55. art. 5., Alex. Carterius lib. 3. de sponsal. cap. 6., Celatia 4. d. 37. quaest. 3. and d. 38. quaest. after the seventh argument, Viguerz Instit. cap. 16. § 7., Stunica lib. 5. recopil. tit. 1. rubr gloss. 1., Vega in summa, cap. 49., Henriquez lib. 1. de matrim. cap. 5., Barbosa Rubrica, ff. soluto matrimonio 2. part. from num. 93. up to 100., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7., Hugolinus de Sacramentis, where on marriage cap. 19., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 9. puncto 5. and 4. puncto d. 10. de matrimonio quaest. 5. puncto 3., Candelabr. p. p. num. 129., Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 53. art. 2., Barthol. Ledesma de matrim. dub. 32. and dub. 33., Ludovicus Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 48., Graffi 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 12., Vega 2. Tomo summa, cap. 57. casu 21.

¶ Certain other, older authors also acknowledged this same difference between a solemn and a simple vow, though they assert that the subsequent marriage can be dissolved by mere human law through the profession. These are Ioan. Andr. cap. unico de voto. in 6., there Abb. Anchar., Dominicus Archid., who has the same thing cap. finali. num. 5. d. 27., Cardin. Clementina unica de consang. num. 19. quaest. 42., Altisiodor. lib. 3. summae, Tract. 28. cap. 1. quaest. 3., and Brunellus de sponsal. concl. 31.

¶ As to D. Bonaventure, who is brought forward for this opinion, I say that in that question he only asserts that it cannot commonly be said that the Church dispenses in a solemn vow of chastity for entering marriage, and that therefore it seems false to him that its illegitimacy comes from her, because she can dispense in her own constitutions.

¶ But in question 1, proposing again: Whether the Church can dispense in solemn vows, as we said in the preceding disputation, quaest. 29., and reviewing the opinions on both sides, he does not dare to define, and candidly admits he does not know which is the truer opinion (for he records another besides these two) and he adds: Either can well be sustained, for I bring forward no decisive reason. As I noted above as well.

¶ But in the Dicta salutis lec. cit. he candidly admits that the solemnity of vows arose from the Church, as I shall say in the arguments. However that may be, no one insists on this first opinion, as it is commonly circulated. Rather he seems to embrace the second, which I shall report immediately; although he holds all vows to be of Divine law as regards their obligation, whence he uses a certain moderation in dispensation, as we saw; nothing against this; for that is common to simple vows.

The second opinion, therefore, is that solemn vows are distinguished from simple ones by the sole institution of the Church. So D. Bonaventure, reported above, whom Scotus follows in 4. d. 38. quaest. unica, and there Paludanus quaest. quart. 4. concl. 11. num. 49., Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7. dub. 1., Abul. quaest. 100. ad 30. Numer., Michael Medina de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 4. controv. 7. cap. 12., Guilielmus Vottilongo 4. d. quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 1. and there Palacios d. 1. concl. 1. 2. 3. and 4., Ouandus there quaest. unica prop. 16., Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 6. quaestio 1. and all these are they, who assert that the marriage bond can be dissolved by mere ecclesiastical law through the profession of religion, whom I shall report below; and Valentia says this opinion is probable 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

¶ Finally this opinion is excellently defended by Ribadeneira in libro de Instit. Societatis Iesu, cap. 15., Vasquez p. 2. d. 165., Sanchez lib. 7. de matrimonio, d. 25. and lib. 5. summae mor. cap. 1., Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 4. num. 63., citing all the Canonists, D. Thomas, Aragonius quaest. 88. art. 7., Suarez Tom. 2 de religione, cap. 14., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 14., Bellarminus lib. 1. de matrimonio, cap. 21., Vasquez d. 165. cap. 2. and with him Abulensis, Pelag. Ledesma, Corduba, and others: So too the Scotists in Mastrius Tom. 4. d. 7. num. 438.

¶ I assert that solemn vows differ from simple ones by the tradition of the Church, probably.

¶ It is proved first from D. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 51. from D. Bernard tract. de praecepto, et dispens. before the middle, where he says; Let consideration be with the Abbot, that this or that should be in the providence, or judgment, or disposition of the Abbot; Yet that he may change anything of the rule at his own will, I do not recall reading there: nay rather let all follow the mistress rule, nor let anyone rashly depart from it: Therefore not even the Abbot himself. Let all follow the mistress rule, therefore no one his own will; and a little later: We are founded upon the transgressions of brothers, not upon the traditions of the Fathers, whence the Abbot is chosen, a keeper of commandments, an avenger of vices. Where the Abbot asserts that the observance of the rule belongs to the traditions of the Fathers: Therefore of the Church.

PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta salutis, titulo 4. cap. 1., because although in ancient times Samuel, Elias, and Eliseus gathered disciples for perfection, and John the Baptist educated disciples, as is had in 1. Reg. 10. 4. Reg. 4. Ioan. 1., and Christ chose disciples and Apostles, as is had in Matth. 4.; nevertheless those who first together instituted the religious life were the Apostles Actorum 4., where no one said that anything was his own, but all things were common; as also D. Mark in Alexandria. For from there the Monks arose, of whom there were three kinds, that is, of Caenobites, who lived in common, Remobath, who dwelt two or three together, and Anchoretes, who lived alone in the desert, whose Prince was John the Baptist. But that Religious Orders began from the Apostles, as D. Bonaventure says, is proved from Eusebius lib. 2. historiae, cap. 16., Jerome de viris illustribus on Philo., Augustine sermone 2. de vita communi clericorum., Possidius in vita Augustini., Isidore l. 2. de off. cap. 15., Cassian collat. 18., as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de monach. cap. 5.

This is what Boniface VIII cap. unico de voto, in 6. declares, that the solemnity of a vow was found to be from the sole institution of the Church.

And Gregory XIII in his Extravagant Ascendente Domino, in order to refute those saying that those making simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus are not religious, gives the reason for their error, namely that they did not consider that the solemnity of a vow was found by the sole constitution of the Church.

But these Bulls were issued after the time of D. Bonaventure, as clearly appears; therefore it is no wonder if D. Bonaventure seemed to incline also to the other opinion, which was the older; for this opinion first had as its defender Scotus, who lived long after D. Bonaventure; the other, however, many ancients, reported above.

THEY ANSWER, however, that the solemnity of vows which is from ecclesiastical tradition is that which was instituted so that the profession may be manifest in the face of the Church and cannot be denied; but essentially, insofar as it speaks of the handing over of oneself into the hands of the prelate, it is from the very law of solemn vows; Just as the solemnity of marriage, that it be made before witnesses and the Pastor, is necessary from the institution of the Church, so that if it is lacking the marriage is rendered void; but no one will deny that the essential solemnity of marriage is by natural Divine law; for it consists in the mutual handing over of bodies: which the anxious [provision] of the Council of Trent suffices for the validity of marriage. This answer is gathered in D. Bonaventure loc. cit. in corpore.

Sanchez loc. cit. de matrimonio, num. 2. strives to refute this answer thus, because Boniface VIII deduces from it that only two vows annul marriage; for since the nature of a solemn vow depends on the sole institution of the Church, and the Church admitted that a vow made in Profession and in Order is solemn, therefore the solemn vow is only twofold; which reasoning would collapse if it were understood of a merely accidental solemnity; for that thing was not to be defined from accidents.

Yet this answer is blunted by the example brought forward of marriage; for even the Council of Trent annuls marriages lacking that accidental solemnity superinduced, because that solemnity was added as necessary thereafter; and therefore it does not stand in the manner of an accident. It is enough, therefore, if it be deduced thus: Because there are only two vows solemn according to the decrees of the Church; therefore according to the same decrees we will that they annul marriage. Nay, I urge: If he defined that by force of solemn vows marriage is annulled, whose bond is of the law of nature, because essential vows are by ecclesiastical law alone, essentially it would follow that the reasoning of the Pontiff is weakened, and that from a mere impediment of ecclesiastical law the annulment is introduced of a thing which is of the law of nature. I know that the reasoning is not drawn from there: for since marriage is also a contract, it can be compelled to certain necessary conditions, by whose failure it becomes annulled. So from the defect of the Church's solemnity it is annulled newly by the Council of Trent, although before it was valid, just as it is also valid in places where the Holy Council has not been received.

MORE FORCEFULLY, therefore, the Pope will argue: A solemn vow is such essentially by natural Divine law, and this is twofold: Therefore it will suffice for annulling the contract of marriage if it is introduced.

Vasquez brings forward other arguments loc. cit. from num. 14. up to 18. in order to make the opinion seated in these decrees immovable; but with peace to all, let it be only probable.

PROVED third from Sanchez lib. 5. de variis, cap. 1. num. 6., because although in the vows of poverty and chastity that transfer of dominion takes place, and the incapacity for marriage; yet in the vow of obedience it is not present; for after the vow he can still freely will and do many things, and against the precept of the superior: here the just man, lest he vow, or do an act for another, can still act validly. Similarly the vow of the Minims concerning the forty-day fast is at the same time solemn, although in this there is not given that handing-over depriving of dominion, even with the contrary faculty of acting validly.

This reasoning is weak, for the Pontiff argues (and deservedly) the annulment of marriage from the solemn vow insofar as it is a handing-over of dominion, implicated with the conjugal handing-over; but we are invited in vain to this handing-over of the Minims as regards Lenten foods, and the vow of obedience in certain things: yet it is necessary that liberty be present even in other things implicated with the law of matrimony.

PROVED fourth from Sanchez. No handing-over can naturally annul marriage even if it be the greatest (except the bond of a preceding marriage still subsisting). It is proved; for servitude, which is the greatest of all handings-over, does not impede a future marriage.

This reasoning is weak, as D. Bonaventure has it in 4. d. 38. art. 1. quaest. 3. in corpore. For servitude consists only in the service of the body with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord,, and it includes neither the will, nor cohabitation with the wife, if he has one to serve: Therefore servitude is not the greatest handing-over, as Sanchez himself admits in the summa, lib. 4. cap. 15.; which is proved from himself, for the spouse can annul all the vows of the wife (according to him:) but not so the Lord; the reason of the thing is, because the power of dominion, which the slave handed over, is less than others, and it requires at least some services of the body, owed to the Lord: but the vow of religion in many things obliges to subjection, as is clearer than the noonday light: even if in some respect servitude goes before in having something of one's own, which the religious cannot have.

PROVED fifth from Sanchez, because one vowing poverty is not by its nature made deprived of the dominion of his goods, nor incapable of acquiring dominion; for it is not any donation with another accepting; therefore it comes from the law of the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it comes from the very law of the vow, whereby it passes to the Prelate holding the place of God under the common life; but wherever the goods are diverted, it matters nothing; therefore, with ecclesiastical law set aside, dominion has been transferred by the very vower, at least to the heirs ab intestato.

Add, that testimonies intervene, which proceed from the counsel of God: Go, sell, etc.

PROVED sixth from Sanchez loc. cit., at least with respect to marriage, that the vower is not rendered solemnly incapable, because the will of any private person can be revoked by the same person through another contrary will, because the incapacity, being revoked, ceases: Therefore that incapacity does not come from the law of nature. It is confirmed; for by the ancient law it is probable that the professed had the dominion of certain goods, as Ribad., Vasquez, and Azorius prove at length. But these things are far weaker, for it is false that every handing-over (donation and conjugal handing-over excepted) can be validly revoked, human law being removed. But if that were true, even a dispensation by the Pontiff, given without cause in vows, especially of religion, would be valid; for the Pope could take away the annulment of human law, since he presides over all ecclesiastical constitutions, as D. Bonavent. loc. cit. in corpore. notes. Why then, with the religious himself willing, and the Church consenting, is the liberation from vows invalid, unless because, since dominion is transferred to God through the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, it cannot be validly revoked by the sole will of the vower, as Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 45. proves.

BUT that otherwise it would not be an entire handing-over of the dominion of temporal goods is frivolous, as is had in all the rules of the Patriarchs, and is gathered from 4. Actuum Apostolorum cited. Nay, by the ancient law no clerics were permitted to have anything of their own, as D. Bonavent. ad caput 1. Regulae, §. fine proprio. notes.

The same is PROVED also d. 25. septimi de matrimonio, first from cap. unico de voto, to which I answered.

THEN because Caelestinus III. cap. rursus, qui clerici, vel vou. says: A simple vow obliges no less before God than a solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is then answering the case in which someone had vowed chastity and afterwards had sworn to take a certain girl as wife: whether the oath was valid.

But he answers that it is evil, and he imposes penance, because the vow is a promise owed to God, just as the solemn one, and in this the oath can render both void, after it has been made. Therefore that (no less) signifies a comparison as it were proportional, so that nevertheless by its nature the solemn vow is the greater bond; which is proved, for he immediately adds: If he has hastened to these nuptials, he says the marriage is valid, because a simple vow impedes a marriage from being contracted, but does not dissolve a contract: Where note, the Pontiff says in the same way, A simple vow obliges before God, even if afterwards the contrary is sworn, just as the solemn vow also obliges, that is, by its nature; and to subjoin: the simple vow does not annul, just as the solemn one annuls, that is, by its nature; otherwise the Pontiff would not have spoken soundly.

He PROVES third, because before the times of Caelestinus III. cap. Rursus cited: and of Alexander III. cap. insinuante and cap. meminimus, same title. no mention of a simple and solemn vow was heard of in the Church. Wherefore D. Augustinus Psal. 75., recounting the species of vows, does not mention this one. Nor Hugo serm. 53. de Instit. Monast. and lib. 2. de Sacramentis, parte 12., where he only speaks of a vow secret and public. That S. Theodorus Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, who flourished in the year 690, mentions a simple vow, as it is reported cap. si vir, 27. dist., seems to be something added by someone, since it is not had in cap. si quis votum, 27. quaest. 1., where the same chapter is reported. Whence it is a sign that a mere institution of the Church imposed this distinction. It is confirmed, because in ancient times this form of profession did not exist, and it was invented by the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he has nothing firm; for the gloss on a simple vow was added in cap. si vir, where the whole canon is recited; but cap. si quis votum refers itself to the Canon Si vir, and only begins: Si quis votum virginitatis habens, etc., referring itself to the said chapter si vir, that it be a simple vow, as the marginalist and the Gloss note; therefore nothing to the point against the first opinion; nay, I refute it: the solemnity of the vow, which is from the institution of the Church, is added by Boniface VIII, who died in the year 1303, and reigned after S. Caelestinus V, who died in 1294; wherefore before that another essential solemnity was given, annulling marriage. Nor may you say that Boniface supposes it to be already so; for this is found nowhere.

AS TO the profession indeed, it is established from the rules of the Saints, Benedict, Augustine, Pachomius, Basil, that the same solemnity existed essentially, even if something of the words has been changed.

PROVED fourth, because the Church could decree that solemn vows should not annul marriage.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it; nor does Sanchez, at any rate, or anyone else prove it; nay, Sanchez himself admits it below in the answer to the argument from cap. Cum ad monasterium.

PROVED fifth, if someone, deceived, should vow solemnly in a religion not approved by the Church, he can, not being bound by those vows, [marry], the subsequent marriage, as is gathered from cap. unico de voto, in 6.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it does not prove; for the promise must be made to someone deputed in the name of God: but a prelate not legitimate is not deputed by God, nor indeed does one hand himself over as a slave to God, beating the air, as Sanchez supposes in the confirmation, but to someone acting in the place of God.

PROVED sixth, because someone could hand himself over to God, transferring the dominion of his own will, and yet it will not be a vow of religion.

IT IS ANSWERED, that for the solemnity of the vow there is required the foundation of a perfect handing-over of all things, especially of obedience to a man, which should not be to God alone, to whom we are always bound.

One vowing chastity and afterwards fornicating sins; but he who vows to enter religion in the future does not sin by sacrilege; the reason is, because the former has already handed himself over to God; the latter not yet: Therefore in the simple vow there is a handing-over, and it does not differ in this from the solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that there is some handing-over in the vow of chastity, but not an adequate one, as I shall say below; nor of the whole of life, whence it is not to the point; nor should religion be understood as endowed with a single vow, since three are necessary for it. Moreover let there be a handing-over under some man, in the name of God; yet the obligation is still of Divine law; for that man is not the Lord of this vower by human law. By this the way is open to the rest.

NAY, I argue from the ninth argument of Sanchez, where he proves the assertion from this, that Gregory XIII defines that the simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus constitute a true religious. If those vows are newly decreed by the very ecclesiastical law, as the Pope admits, saying: We ordain that the three vows of this kind, although simple, by the institution of this See, and by our declaration and confirmation also, are truly substantial vows of religion, and in the said society, as in a religion approved by the same See, have been admitted and are, and are admitted by us; it follows therefore from ecclesiastical law that there is no difference, and that all are solemn; for the simple vows of the Society of Jesus have the same effect: therefore the difference must be found elsewhere.

He proves 10. A handing-over and a promise are contraries; but a solemn vow is a promise made to God; therefore it is not a handing-over.

This argument is frivolous; for it is called a promise with respect to the whole future life, to be led to that service; it is called a handing-over with respect to the present donation, which therefore has a promise joined to it, because the handing-over could be for the present.

PROVED eleventh, because the handing-over has the character of genus in the solemn vow; but the circumstances imposed by the Church the character of difference; but a thing has its being not from the genus, but from the difference: Therefore the solemn vow has its being from the ecclesiastical circumstances.

SURELY a FUTILE argument, begging the question; for this is the very thing to be proved, since the adversaries say that the ecclesiastical solemnities have only the character of an accident.

LASTLY he proves. A solemn oath differs from a simple one only because it has a certain formula prescribed by law: Therefore also the vow.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying the parity; indeed, in this way he would prove that a public and a private vow are the same thing; but the solemn one exhibits more, and more perfectly, than the private one.

I ASSERT second, that the former opinion is not to be disapproved.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure loc. cit.: Whatever things are of ecclesiastical law can be changed and dispensed by the Church; but in the solemn vow the Church cannot probably dispense for marriage, as Sanchez admits lib. 8. de matrimonio, d. 8. num. 5. Therefore the major is evident, and granted by all.

The minor is proved from cap. cum ad Monasterium toward the end of de statu Monachorum, where it is had: The keeping of chastity is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it.

Innocent answers there num. 31., the Cardinal num. ultimo., Durandus in 4. d. 28. quaest. 2., Pelagius de planctu Ecclesiae, lib. 1. art. 46., that the text says advisedly that the Pope cannot give a dispensation, and does not speak of dispensation, as if it said that he cannot at will and without just cause.

CONTRA, because, as the Abbot notes there, "licentia" comes from licet, which implies a just cause and a consistent reason, as with Bartolo leg. aliam, num. 8. ff. de alim. et cibar. and as others hand down, Menochius de arbitr. lib. 1. quaest. 8. num. 45., Naevo cap. 1. num. 110. de constit.

The Abbot answers there that the Pontiff cannot dispense easily with a cause; or cannot dispense, by changing into another good more acceptable to God.

But this answer does not please Sanchez himself. The reason may be, because the text is absolute.

Bartholomaeus Socinus consil. 91. num. 1. vol. 1., Richardus in 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1., Durandus loc. cit., Paludanus quaest. 4. art. 4. concl. 11., Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. and in opuscul. tom. 1. tit. 27. quaest. unica., Palud. dist. 3. quadrupl., Azorius lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 7. quaest. 1., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 7., Sanchez lib. 8. de matrim. d. 8. num. 12. ANSWER that the Pope cannot dispense a Monk in chastity in the composite sense, so that he takes a wife, remaining in the Monastic state, because it is against the essence of the Monastic state.

Sanchez ADDS another answer, that the Pope speaks in a kind of hyperbole; for since the Abbot wished it to be entirely within his power to dispense a Monk in retaining property, the Pope argues from the lesser to the greater; as if saying: Scarcely is there in me the power of dispensing, and it is greatly disputed; by what reasoning, then, do you usurp it to yourself?

TRUE, as the Gloss notes there, the Pope defines his opinion not hyperbolically; but seriously, and concluding adequately: Nor let the Abbot judge that he can dispense with any Monk in holding property, because the abdication of property, just like the keeping of chastity, is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it. But the reason of the Gloss is that which D. Bonaventure gives in 4. d. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore, because nothing worthy exists into which the state of solemn chastity could be changed, to which there is an allusion Ecclesiast. 26: All weight is not worthy of the soul of the continent, not because he could not be religious, for it is not at all established whether entire chastity is necessary for the religious state, as Sanchez admits cap. 1. num. 17.

NOR is that case relevant, that the Abbot presumed to grant the Monks property; nor does the Pontiff rebuke him, but he hands down many things necessary for observance, as is clear to the reader of his works. These things I have said probably. Therefore probable is the opinion which S. Bonaventure does not dare to reprove, namely that the solemn vow, which indeed is not such insofar as it is public, as some would have it, unless perhaps Hugo lib. 1. and others employ the word "public" for "solemn" — certainly he knew solemn vows, as is clear to the reader of his works. The vow, I say, is solemn differing by its nature from the simple one; that it is solemn is a translation of the dominion of the vower into the hands of the one accepting in the name of God, who accepts it, so that from this he is rendered incapable of transferring the same dominion to another by revoking it from the first legitimate possessor through marriage: but in the simple vow dominion is not transferred perfectly to God, but only as regards the non-use of venereal acts, therefore it can be validly transferred through marriage.

SIMILARLY in the solemn vow man is bound to man and to God at the same time, just as also in marriage; therefore there is an equal obligation on both sides, and an equal obligation does not dissolve the bond of the obligation of peace; therefore the obligation of the solemn vow cannot be broken by the supervening bond of marriage, but not so the simple one, which promises to God alone.

HENCE I seem to elicit some reason why Caelestinus III, cap. Rursus, qui clerici, vel voventes, defining that he who, after a simple vow of chastity, had sworn marriage to a girl is not bound to keep that oath, although it seemed a promise was made to God and to man, brings forward as the reason that a simple vow obliges before God no less than a solemn one; as if he said: The solemn vow is a promise made not only to God, but to men; therefore in this respect I compare the obligation of these vows only before God, for in the other respect the solemn vow excels; but the promise of the oath, made to that woman, is posterior, and inferior, to the promise made to God; nor could that other legitimate promise be made to God on any other foundation through that oath; he adds, nay rather it is an injury; therefore it does not stand, nor subsist.

I gather THE SAME difference of vows from cap. meminimus, same title, where the Pontiff defines: If anyone who has devoted himself to religion, and has made profession with the habit received, afterwards joins himself to some woman, he is compelled to withdraw from her, and to pass to the Church to which he applied himself without contradiction. But if he has received neither the habit, nor made the profession, but has only made a vow, and promised that he would pass to religion: Although he afterwards contracted marriage, he is not compelled to pass to religion and to rescind the marriage vow.

HERE the Pontiff clearly gives the reason of S. Bonaventure why the solemn vow, but not the simple vow, annuls marriage, namely because the solemn vow is by its nature the greater bond, namely a handing-over of the man made to God, but the simple vow is a promise to God alone. The same is intimated in cap. insinuante, same title.

NOW indeed the best reason is had for the first opinion, which D. Bonaventure seems to embrace. However much two things are equal: one does not act upon the other, as is had in sound Philosophy, but action must be upon an unequal inferior: but the bond of marriage and of religion are equal, for each hands itself over to God and to man; but the vow of chastity is an unequal inferior, because it is a handing-over to God alone: Therefore marriage cannot act to dissolve the bond of the solemn vow of religion, and it can act upon the simple vow. These things I would say, because the adversaries say that no reason is found for this opinion; but only that doctrine concerning the handing-over.

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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