Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.


Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

On the vows of Religious in general.

As in ancient times in the Mosaic law there were some sacrifices which the people offered to God in part, and others which they offered totally; so in the law of grace the Church dedicates some to God in part through simple vows, but devotes others totally through solemn vows; for those are accustomed to fall upon some particular thing; but these heal the whole man, by taking away those three sicknesses with which almost the whole world is infected, according to the saying of D. John, everything that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the eyes, or the concupiscence of the flesh, or the pride of life; yet the solemnity or simplicity of vows does not arise from this totality or partiality alone, as will be discussed shortly.

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

In which solemn vows differ from simple ones.

Famous is this question, and exceedingly necessary, all the more so as new decrees of the Pontiffs are in force for deciding it.

¶ The first opinion is, that Solemn and simple vows differ from the very nature of the vows themselves, with all ecclesiastical law set aside; and that the essence of solemn vows consists in the handing over of oneself and of one's goods into the hands of God and of those who act in God's place: Brought forward by Sanchez for this opinion are D. Thomas in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2. quaestiuncula 3., D. Bonaventura same dist. art. 2. quaest. 1., Durandus there quaest. 1. and 2., Richardus there art. 7., Mayro quaest. unic. part. 4., Capreolus 4. d. 33. quaest. unic. art. 1. concl. 2. and art. 3., Deca there quaest. unic. art. 3., Carthus. 4. d. 3. quaest. 2., Fortunius Garcia cap. 1. de pactu, num. 13., Turrecrem. cap. presbyterus, num. 1. and 2. d. 27., Tabiena dispensatio quaest. 7., Sotus 7. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 5. and 4. d. 38. quaest. 2. art. 1., Petrus Soto lect. 5. de matrim., Couarr. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 7. § 4. num. 7., Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 55. art. 5., Alex. Carterius lib. 3. de sponsal. cap. 6., Celatia 4. d. 37. quaest. 3. and d. 38. quaest. after the seventh argument, Viguerz Instit. cap. 16. § 7., Stunica lib. 5. recopil. tit. 1. rubr gloss. 1., Vega in summa, cap. 49., Henriquez lib. 1. de matrim. cap. 5., Barbosa Rubrica, ff. soluto matrimonio 2. part. from num. 93. up to 100., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7., Hugolinus de Sacramentis, where on marriage cap. 19., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 9. puncto 5. and 4. puncto d. 10. de matrimonio quaest. 5. puncto 3., Candelabr. p. p. num. 129., Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 53. art. 2., Barthol. Ledesma de matrim. dub. 32. and dub. 33., Ludovicus Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 48., Graffi 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 12., Vega 2. Tomo summa, cap. 57. casu 21.

¶ Certain other, older authors also acknowledged this same difference between a solemn and a simple vow, though they assert that the subsequent marriage can be dissolved by mere human law through the profession. These are Ioan. Andr. cap. unico de voto. in 6., there Abb. Anchar., Dominicus Archid., who has the same thing cap. finali. num. 5. d. 27., Cardin. Clementina unica de consang. num. 19. quaest. 42., Altisiodor. lib. 3. summae, Tract. 28. cap. 1. quaest. 3., and Brunellus de sponsal. concl. 31.

¶ As to D. Bonaventure, who is brought forward for this opinion, I say that in that question he only asserts that it cannot commonly be said that the Church dispenses in a solemn vow of chastity for entering marriage, and that therefore it seems false to him that its illegitimacy comes from her, because she can dispense in her own constitutions.

¶ But in question 1, proposing again: Whether the Church can dispense in solemn vows, as we said in the preceding disputation, quaest. 29., and reviewing the opinions on both sides, he does not dare to define, and candidly admits he does not know which is the truer opinion (for he records another besides these two) and he adds: Either can well be sustained, for I bring forward no decisive reason. As I noted above as well.

¶ But in the Dicta salutis lec. cit. he candidly admits that the solemnity of vows arose from the Church, as I shall say in the arguments. However that may be, no one insists on this first opinion, as it is commonly circulated. Rather he seems to embrace the second, which I shall report immediately; although he holds all vows to be of Divine law as regards their obligation, whence he uses a certain moderation in dispensation, as we saw; nothing against this; for that is common to simple vows.

The second opinion, therefore, is that solemn vows are distinguished from simple ones by the sole institution of the Church. So D. Bonaventure, reported above, whom Scotus follows in 4. d. 38. quaest. unica, and there Paludanus quaest. quart. 4. concl. 11. num. 49., Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7. dub. 1., Abul. quaest. 100. ad 30. Numer., Michael Medina de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 4. controv. 7. cap. 12., Guilielmus Vottilongo 4. d. quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 1. and there Palacios d. 1. concl. 1. 2. 3. and 4., Ouandus there quaest. unica prop. 16., Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 6. quaestio 1. and all these are they, who assert that the marriage bond can be dissolved by mere ecclesiastical law through the profession of religion, whom I shall report below; and Valentia says this opinion is probable 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

¶ Finally this opinion is excellently defended by Ribadeneira in libro de Instit. Societatis Iesu, cap. 15., Vasquez p. 2. d. 165., Sanchez lib. 7. de matrimonio, d. 25. and lib. 5. summae mor. cap. 1., Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 4. num. 63., citing all the Canonists, D. Thomas, Aragonius quaest. 88. art. 7., Suarez Tom. 2 de religione, cap. 14., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 14., Bellarminus lib. 1. de matrimonio, cap. 21., Vasquez d. 165. cap. 2. and with him Abulensis, Pelag. Ledesma, Corduba, and others: So too the Scotists in Mastrius Tom. 4. d. 7. num. 438.

¶ I assert that solemn vows differ from simple ones by the tradition of the Church, probably.

¶ It is proved first from D. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 51. from D. Bernard tract. de praecepto, et dispens. before the middle, where he says; Let consideration be with the Abbot, that this or that should be in the providence, or judgment, or disposition of the Abbot; Yet that he may change anything of the rule at his own will, I do not recall reading there: nay rather let all follow the mistress rule, nor let anyone rashly depart from it: Therefore not even the Abbot himself. Let all follow the mistress rule, therefore no one his own will; and a little later: We are founded upon the transgressions of brothers, not upon the traditions of the Fathers, whence the Abbot is chosen, a keeper of commandments, an avenger of vices. Where the Abbot asserts that the observance of the rule belongs to the traditions of the Fathers: Therefore of the Church.

PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta salutis, titulo 4. cap. 1., because although in ancient times Samuel, Elias, and Eliseus gathered disciples for perfection, and John the Baptist educated disciples, as is had in 1. Reg. 10. 4. Reg. 4. Ioan. 1., and Christ chose disciples and Apostles, as is had in Matth. 4.; nevertheless those who first together instituted the religious life were the Apostles Actorum 4., where no one said that anything was his own, but all things were common; as also D. Mark in Alexandria. For from there the Monks arose, of whom there were three kinds, that is, of Caenobites, who lived in common, Remobath, who dwelt two or three together, and Anchoretes, who lived alone in the desert, whose Prince was John the Baptist. But that Religious Orders began from the Apostles, as D. Bonaventure says, is proved from Eusebius lib. 2. historiae, cap. 16., Jerome de viris illustribus on Philo., Augustine sermone 2. de vita communi clericorum., Possidius in vita Augustini., Isidore l. 2. de off. cap. 15., Cassian collat. 18., as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de monach. cap. 5.

This is what Boniface VIII cap. unico de voto, in 6. declares, that the solemnity of a vow was found to be from the sole institution of the Church.

And Gregory XIII in his Extravagant Ascendente Domino, in order to refute those saying that those making simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus are not religious, gives the reason for their error, namely that they did not consider that the solemnity of a vow was found by the sole constitution of the Church.

But these Bulls were issued after the time of D. Bonaventure, as clearly appears; therefore it is no wonder if D. Bonaventure seemed to incline also to the other opinion, which was the older; for this opinion first had as its defender Scotus, who lived long after D. Bonaventure; the other, however, many ancients, reported above.

THEY ANSWER, however, that the solemnity of vows which is from ecclesiastical tradition is that which was instituted so that the profession may be manifest in the face of the Church and cannot be denied; but essentially, insofar as it speaks of the handing over of oneself into the hands of the prelate, it is from the very law of solemn vows; Just as the solemnity of marriage, that it be made before witnesses and the Pastor, is necessary from the institution of the Church, so that if it is lacking the marriage is rendered void; but no one will deny that the essential solemnity of marriage is by natural Divine law; for it consists in the mutual handing over of bodies: which the anxious [provision] of the Council of Trent suffices for the validity of marriage. This answer is gathered in D. Bonaventure loc. cit. in corpore.

Sanchez loc. cit. de matrimonio, num. 2. strives to refute this answer thus, because Boniface VIII deduces from it that only two vows annul marriage; for since the nature of a solemn vow depends on the sole institution of the Church, and the Church admitted that a vow made in Profession and in Order is solemn, therefore the solemn vow is only twofold; which reasoning would collapse if it were understood of a merely accidental solemnity; for that thing was not to be defined from accidents.

Yet this answer is blunted by the example brought forward of marriage; for even the Council of Trent annuls marriages lacking that accidental solemnity superinduced, because that solemnity was added as necessary thereafter; and therefore it does not stand in the manner of an accident. It is enough, therefore, if it be deduced thus: Because there are only two vows solemn according to the decrees of the Church; therefore according to the same decrees we will that they annul marriage. Nay, I urge: If he defined that by force of solemn vows marriage is annulled, whose bond is of the law of nature, because essential vows are by ecclesiastical law alone, essentially it would follow that the reasoning of the Pontiff is weakened, and that from a mere impediment of ecclesiastical law the annulment is introduced of a thing which is of the law of nature. I know that the reasoning is not drawn from there: for since marriage is also a contract, it can be compelled to certain necessary conditions, by whose failure it becomes annulled. So from the defect of the Church's solemnity it is annulled newly by the Council of Trent, although before it was valid, just as it is also valid in places where the Holy Council has not been received.

MORE FORCEFULLY, therefore, the Pope will argue: A solemn vow is such essentially by natural Divine law, and this is twofold: Therefore it will suffice for annulling the contract of marriage if it is introduced.

Vasquez brings forward other arguments loc. cit. from num. 14. up to 18. in order to make the opinion seated in these decrees immovable; but with peace to all, let it be only probable.

PROVED third from Sanchez lib. 5. de variis, cap. 1. num. 6., because although in the vows of poverty and chastity that transfer of dominion takes place, and the incapacity for marriage; yet in the vow of obedience it is not present; for after the vow he can still freely will and do many things, and against the precept of the superior: here the just man, lest he vow, or do an act for another, can still act validly. Similarly the vow of the Minims concerning the forty-day fast is at the same time solemn, although in this there is not given that handing-over depriving of dominion, even with the contrary faculty of acting validly.

This reasoning is weak, for the Pontiff argues (and deservedly) the annulment of marriage from the solemn vow insofar as it is a handing-over of dominion, implicated with the conjugal handing-over; but we are invited in vain to this handing-over of the Minims as regards Lenten foods, and the vow of obedience in certain things: yet it is necessary that liberty be present even in other things implicated with the law of matrimony.

PROVED fourth from Sanchez. No handing-over can naturally annul marriage even if it be the greatest (except the bond of a preceding marriage still subsisting). It is proved; for servitude, which is the greatest of all handings-over, does not impede a future marriage.

This reasoning is weak, as D. Bonaventure has it in 4. d. 38. art. 1. quaest. 3. in corpore. For servitude consists only in the service of the body with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord,, and it includes neither the will, nor cohabitation with the wife, if he has one to serve: Therefore servitude is not the greatest handing-over, as Sanchez himself admits in the summa, lib. 4. cap. 15.; which is proved from himself, for the spouse can annul all the vows of the wife (according to him:) but not so the Lord; the reason of the thing is, because the power of dominion, which the slave handed over, is less than others, and it requires at least some services of the body, owed to the Lord: but the vow of religion in many things obliges to subjection, as is clearer than the noonday light: even if in some respect servitude goes before in having something of one's own, which the religious cannot have.

PROVED fifth from Sanchez, because one vowing poverty is not by its nature made deprived of the dominion of his goods, nor incapable of acquiring dominion; for it is not any donation with another accepting; therefore it comes from the law of the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it comes from the very law of the vow, whereby it passes to the Prelate holding the place of God under the common life; but wherever the goods are diverted, it matters nothing; therefore, with ecclesiastical law set aside, dominion has been transferred by the very vower, at least to the heirs ab intestato.

Add, that testimonies intervene, which proceed from the counsel of God: Go, sell, etc.

PROVED sixth from Sanchez loc. cit., at least with respect to marriage, that the vower is not rendered solemnly incapable, because the will of any private person can be revoked by the same person through another contrary will, because the incapacity, being revoked, ceases: Therefore that incapacity does not come from the law of nature. It is confirmed; for by the ancient law it is probable that the professed had the dominion of certain goods, as Ribad., Vasquez, and Azorius prove at length. But these things are far weaker, for it is false that every handing-over (donation and conjugal handing-over excepted) can be validly revoked, human law being removed. But if that were true, even a dispensation by the Pontiff, given without cause in vows, especially of religion, would be valid; for the Pope could take away the annulment of human law, since he presides over all ecclesiastical constitutions, as D. Bonavent. loc. cit. in corpore. notes. Why then, with the religious himself willing, and the Church consenting, is the liberation from vows invalid, unless because, since dominion is transferred to God through the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, it cannot be validly revoked by the sole will of the vower, as Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 45. proves.

BUT that otherwise it would not be an entire handing-over of the dominion of temporal goods is frivolous, as is had in all the rules of the Patriarchs, and is gathered from 4. Actuum Apostolorum cited. Nay, by the ancient law no clerics were permitted to have anything of their own, as D. Bonavent. ad caput 1. Regulae, §. fine proprio. notes.

The same is PROVED also d. 25. septimi de matrimonio, first from cap. unico de voto, to which I answered.

THEN because Caelestinus III. cap. rursus, qui clerici, vel vou. says: A simple vow obliges no less before God than a solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is then answering the case in which someone had vowed chastity and afterwards had sworn to take a certain girl as wife: whether the oath was valid.

But he answers that it is evil, and he imposes penance, because the vow is a promise owed to God, just as the solemn one, and in this the oath can render both void, after it has been made. Therefore that (no less) signifies a comparison as it were proportional, so that nevertheless by its nature the solemn vow is the greater bond; which is proved, for he immediately adds: If he has hastened to these nuptials, he says the marriage is valid, because a simple vow impedes a marriage from being contracted, but does not dissolve a contract: Where note, the Pontiff says in the same way, A simple vow obliges before God, even if afterwards the contrary is sworn, just as the solemn vow also obliges, that is, by its nature; and to subjoin: the simple vow does not annul, just as the solemn one annuls, that is, by its nature; otherwise the Pontiff would not have spoken soundly.

He PROVES third, because before the times of Caelestinus III. cap. Rursus cited: and of Alexander III. cap. insinuante and cap. meminimus, same title. no mention of a simple and solemn vow was heard of in the Church. Wherefore D. Augustinus Psal. 75., recounting the species of vows, does not mention this one. Nor Hugo serm. 53. de Instit. Monast. and lib. 2. de Sacramentis, parte 12., where he only speaks of a vow secret and public. That S. Theodorus Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, who flourished in the year 690, mentions a simple vow, as it is reported cap. si vir, 27. dist., seems to be something added by someone, since it is not had in cap. si quis votum, 27. quaest. 1., where the same chapter is reported. Whence it is a sign that a mere institution of the Church imposed this distinction. It is confirmed, because in ancient times this form of profession did not exist, and it was invented by the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he has nothing firm; for the gloss on a simple vow was added in cap. si vir, where the whole canon is recited; but cap. si quis votum refers itself to the Canon Si vir, and only begins: Si quis votum virginitatis habens, etc., referring itself to the said chapter si vir, that it be a simple vow, as the marginalist and the Gloss note; therefore nothing to the point against the first opinion; nay, I refute it: the solemnity of the vow, which is from the institution of the Church, is added by Boniface VIII, who died in the year 1303, and reigned after S. Caelestinus V, who died in 1294; wherefore before that another essential solemnity was given, annulling marriage. Nor may you say that Boniface supposes it to be already so; for this is found nowhere.

AS TO the profession indeed, it is established from the rules of the Saints, Benedict, Augustine, Pachomius, Basil, that the same solemnity existed essentially, even if something of the words has been changed.

PROVED fourth, because the Church could decree that solemn vows should not annul marriage.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it; nor does Sanchez, at any rate, or anyone else prove it; nay, Sanchez himself admits it below in the answer to the argument from cap. Cum ad monasterium.

PROVED fifth, if someone, deceived, should vow solemnly in a religion not approved by the Church, he can, not being bound by those vows, [marry], the subsequent marriage, as is gathered from cap. unico de voto, in 6.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it does not prove; for the promise must be made to someone deputed in the name of God: but a prelate not legitimate is not deputed by God, nor indeed does one hand himself over as a slave to God, beating the air, as Sanchez supposes in the confirmation, but to someone acting in the place of God.

PROVED sixth, because someone could hand himself over to God, transferring the dominion of his own will, and yet it will not be a vow of religion.

IT IS ANSWERED, that for the solemnity of the vow there is required the foundation of a perfect handing-over of all things, especially of obedience to a man, which should not be to God alone, to whom we are always bound.

One vowing chastity and afterwards fornicating sins; but he who vows to enter religion in the future does not sin by sacrilege; the reason is, because the former has already handed himself over to God; the latter not yet: Therefore in the simple vow there is a handing-over, and it does not differ in this from the solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that there is some handing-over in the vow of chastity, but not an adequate one, as I shall say below; nor of the whole of life, whence it is not to the point; nor should religion be understood as endowed with a single vow, since three are necessary for it. Moreover let there be a handing-over under some man, in the name of God; yet the obligation is still of Divine law; for that man is not the Lord of this vower by human law. By this the way is open to the rest.

NAY, I argue from the ninth argument of Sanchez, where he proves the assertion from this, that Gregory XIII defines that the simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus constitute a true religious. If those vows are newly decreed by the very ecclesiastical law, as the Pope admits, saying: We ordain that the three vows of this kind, although simple, by the institution of this See, and by our declaration and confirmation also, are truly substantial vows of religion, and in the said society, as in a religion approved by the same See, have been admitted and are, and are admitted by us; it follows therefore from ecclesiastical law that there is no difference, and that all are solemn; for the simple vows of the Society of Jesus have the same effect: therefore the difference must be found elsewhere.

He proves 10. A handing-over and a promise are contraries; but a solemn vow is a promise made to God; therefore it is not a handing-over.

This argument is frivolous; for it is called a promise with respect to the whole future life, to be led to that service; it is called a handing-over with respect to the present donation, which therefore has a promise joined to it, because the handing-over could be for the present.

PROVED eleventh, because the handing-over has the character of genus in the solemn vow; but the circumstances imposed by the Church the character of difference; but a thing has its being not from the genus, but from the difference: Therefore the solemn vow has its being from the ecclesiastical circumstances.

SURELY a FUTILE argument, begging the question; for this is the very thing to be proved, since the adversaries say that the ecclesiastical solemnities have only the character of an accident.

LASTLY he proves. A solemn oath differs from a simple one only because it has a certain formula prescribed by law: Therefore also the vow.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying the parity; indeed, in this way he would prove that a public and a private vow are the same thing; but the solemn one exhibits more, and more perfectly, than the private one.

I ASSERT second, that the former opinion is not to be disapproved.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure loc. cit.: Whatever things are of ecclesiastical law can be changed and dispensed by the Church; but in the solemn vow the Church cannot probably dispense for marriage, as Sanchez admits lib. 8. de matrimonio, d. 8. num. 5. Therefore the major is evident, and granted by all.

The minor is proved from cap. cum ad Monasterium toward the end of de statu Monachorum, where it is had: The keeping of chastity is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it.

Innocent answers there num. 31., the Cardinal num. ultimo., Durandus in 4. d. 28. quaest. 2., Pelagius de planctu Ecclesiae, lib. 1. art. 46., that the text says advisedly that the Pope cannot give a dispensation, and does not speak of dispensation, as if it said that he cannot at will and without just cause.

CONTRA, because, as the Abbot notes there, "licentia" comes from licet, which implies a just cause and a consistent reason, as with Bartolo leg. aliam, num. 8. ff. de alim. et cibar. and as others hand down, Menochius de arbitr. lib. 1. quaest. 8. num. 45., Naevo cap. 1. num. 110. de constit.

The Abbot answers there that the Pontiff cannot dispense easily with a cause; or cannot dispense, by changing into another good more acceptable to God.

But this answer does not please Sanchez himself. The reason may be, because the text is absolute.

Bartholomaeus Socinus consil. 91. num. 1. vol. 1., Richardus in 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1., Durandus loc. cit., Paludanus quaest. 4. art. 4. concl. 11., Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. and in opuscul. tom. 1. tit. 27. quaest. unica., Palud. dist. 3. quadrupl., Azorius lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 7. quaest. 1., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 7., Sanchez lib. 8. de matrim. d. 8. num. 12. ANSWER that the Pope cannot dispense a Monk in chastity in the composite sense, so that he takes a wife, remaining in the Monastic state, because it is against the essence of the Monastic state.

Sanchez ADDS another answer, that the Pope speaks in a kind of hyperbole; for since the Abbot wished it to be entirely within his power to dispense a Monk in retaining property, the Pope argues from the lesser to the greater; as if saying: Scarcely is there in me the power of dispensing, and it is greatly disputed; by what reasoning, then, do you usurp it to yourself?

TRUE, as the Gloss notes there, the Pope defines his opinion not hyperbolically; but seriously, and concluding adequately: Nor let the Abbot judge that he can dispense with any Monk in holding property, because the abdication of property, just like the keeping of chastity, is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it. But the reason of the Gloss is that which D. Bonaventure gives in 4. d. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore, because nothing worthy exists into which the state of solemn chastity could be changed, to which there is an allusion Ecclesiast. 26: All weight is not worthy of the soul of the continent, not because he could not be religious, for it is not at all established whether entire chastity is necessary for the religious state, as Sanchez admits cap. 1. num. 17.

NOR is that case relevant, that the Abbot presumed to grant the Monks property; nor does the Pontiff rebuke him, but he hands down many things necessary for observance, as is clear to the reader of his works. These things I have said probably. Therefore probable is the opinion which S. Bonaventure does not dare to reprove, namely that the solemn vow, which indeed is not such insofar as it is public, as some would have it, unless perhaps Hugo lib. 1. and others employ the word "public" for "solemn" — certainly he knew solemn vows, as is clear to the reader of his works. The vow, I say, is solemn differing by its nature from the simple one; that it is solemn is a translation of the dominion of the vower into the hands of the one accepting in the name of God, who accepts it, so that from this he is rendered incapable of transferring the same dominion to another by revoking it from the first legitimate possessor through marriage: but in the simple vow dominion is not transferred perfectly to God, but only as regards the non-use of venereal acts, therefore it can be validly transferred through marriage.

SIMILARLY in the solemn vow man is bound to man and to God at the same time, just as also in marriage; therefore there is an equal obligation on both sides, and an equal obligation does not dissolve the bond of the obligation of peace; therefore the obligation of the solemn vow cannot be broken by the supervening bond of marriage, but not so the simple one, which promises to God alone.

HENCE I seem to elicit some reason why Caelestinus III, cap. Rursus, qui clerici, vel voventes, defining that he who, after a simple vow of chastity, had sworn marriage to a girl is not bound to keep that oath, although it seemed a promise was made to God and to man, brings forward as the reason that a simple vow obliges before God no less than a solemn one; as if he said: The solemn vow is a promise made not only to God, but to men; therefore in this respect I compare the obligation of these vows only before God, for in the other respect the solemn vow excels; but the promise of the oath, made to that woman, is posterior, and inferior, to the promise made to God; nor could that other legitimate promise be made to God on any other foundation through that oath; he adds, nay rather it is an injury; therefore it does not stand, nor subsist.

I gather THE SAME difference of vows from cap. meminimus, same title, where the Pontiff defines: If anyone who has devoted himself to religion, and has made profession with the habit received, afterwards joins himself to some woman, he is compelled to withdraw from her, and to pass to the Church to which he applied himself without contradiction. But if he has received neither the habit, nor made the profession, but has only made a vow, and promised that he would pass to religion: Although he afterwards contracted marriage, he is not compelled to pass to religion and to rescind the marriage vow.

HERE the Pontiff clearly gives the reason of S. Bonaventure why the solemn vow, but not the simple vow, annuls marriage, namely because the solemn vow is by its nature the greater bond, namely a handing-over of the man made to God, but the simple vow is a promise to God alone. The same is intimated in cap. insinuante, same title.

NOW indeed the best reason is had for the first opinion, which D. Bonaventure seems to embrace. However much two things are equal: one does not act upon the other, as is had in sound Philosophy, but action must be upon an unequal inferior: but the bond of marriage and of religion are equal, for each hands itself over to God and to man; but the vow of chastity is an unequal inferior, because it is a handing-over to God alone: Therefore marriage cannot act to dissolve the bond of the solemn vow of religion, and it can act upon the simple vow. These things I would say, because the adversaries say that no reason is found for this opinion; but only that doctrine concerning the handing-over.

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

RELIGION is commonly defined as The state of men tending toward perfection, through chastity, poverty, and obedience. It is gathered from D. Thomas 2. 2. last question, and D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta, tit. 4. cap. 1. and in the exposition of the rule of the Minors. And it is reported by Bellarmine Tom. 2. lib. 2. de Monachis, cap. 1.

IT IS SUPPOSED, however, rather than what I would wish to prove from D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta loc. cit., that for religion three vows are necessary, Chastity, by which the goods of the body are consecrated to God: Poverty, by which external goods; and obedience, by which the most precious good of the soul, namely the will, is consecrated to God. So it is had in cap. cum ad Monasterium related above. So D. Thomas 2. 2. last question, art. 3. 4. and 5. Bellarmine Tomo 2. lib. 2. cap. 9. and from cap. 20. as I shall show in quaest. 4.

The REASON of D. Bonaventure loc. cit. of the Diaeta, and of the rule, is, because the state of religion is a way to perfection; and therefore those things must be removed which impede it most, namely dietetic pleasures, as the Apostle has, first Timot. 6. The root of all evils is covetousness. Chastity takes away venereal things, which tickle most with the itches of pleasure, and plunge into filth, and add the care of a household and of children: and obedience takes away one's own will, without which there would be no hell, as D. Bernard says serm. 3. de resurrect. Domini before the middle. These things D. Bonaventure, whom Sanchez imitates lib. 5. cap. 1. num. 16.

NOTE, as regards poverty, that it is enough if goods are so retained that they may not use them without the license of a superior. So Gregory XIII. Extrau. Ascendente de Biennalibus Religiosis Societatis Iesu.

THESE, however, must be confirmed in some way, as D. Bonaventure teaches loc. cit. from D. Thomas 2. 2. last question, art. 6. The reason is, because the state demands immobility.

MOREOVER it is required that the vows be emitted in a Religion approved by the holy Roman Apostolic See. This S. Doctor indicates at the beginning of the exposition of the Rule, and the Gloss in Clem. cum ex eo, V. tertio, de sentent. excom. Abbas Rubr. de regul. num. 1. and others.

FINALLY it is required that the one vowing be constituted under the power of someone, which arises either from Ecclesiastical institution, or from the nature of the thing according to what was said in quaest. 1.

WHAT is to be inquired here is, whether solemn vows are of the essence of Religion.

IT WAS the opinion of those saying that solemn vows are of the essence of Religion. So D. Thomas seemed to think 2. 2. last question, art. 2. ad 1. The Gloss cap. 1. verb. dedicanda de relig. domib. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 3. Sylvest. votum 4. quaest. 5. and verb. religio beginning and 3. Angelus verb. religiosus, Armilla religio. and there. Tabiena, Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 188. art. 1. ad 4. Sotus lib. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 5. art. 1. concl. 8. Nauarr. cap. non dicam 12. quaest. 1. num. 25.

BUT IN TRUTH already in our age the most holy Pope Gregory XIII. of his own motion declared, that the Biennials of the Society of Jesus, by mere simple vows, are religious, no less than the professed of any religion whatsoever: So all the Jesuit Fathers, and so it must be held.

NEVERTHELESS, because so many holy and eminent Theologians must not be condemned, among whom is also D. Bonaventure in 4. d. 38. art. 2. quaest. 1. who acknowledge only the solemn vow of religion, and assert it to be distinct from the simple vow,

IT MUST be noted with Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7. col. 2. that the state of Religion can be constituted by the Church in a simple vow, which however will not be from the nature of the thing, but from a privilege against the common law, as the most learned Sylvester shows V. Privilegium at the beginning. This I prove thus, point by point, against Sanchez.

Those things which by the ancient law were not such, and became such only after Ecclesiastical law, are not such by their nature, from Sanchez disput. 25. of the seventh book de matrimonio, num. 2. and proportionally they are not simply from Ecclesiastical law, if before, by Ecclesiastical law they were not such: but simple vows before the decree of Gregory XIII. did not constitute Religious, nor did they dissolve marriage, which was granted to the solemn vow alone cap. unico de voto in 6. Therefore they are not such from the nature of the thing, or simply from Ecclesiastical law, but from a new privilege.

Sanchez RESPONDS, that no law provided that no one should be a Religious without solemn vows, though those alone invalidate marriage. But this is disproved by cap. minimus ubi qui Clerici, vel vou. where the one vowing solemnly is compelled to the Monastery; but the one vowing with a simple vow is not compelled to pass over, as is certain, which is because he is not a Religious.

I prove the SAME by cap. ex parte tua, de conuer. coniugat. where it is had, that a certain woman, who was withdrawing from a ratified marriage, is compelled either to consummate the marriage, or to vow religion; nor is a private vow of chastity judged sufficient for this: Therefore a private vow does not make a Religious by the ancient law.

THEREFORE since this privilege was given whole centuries after D. Bonaventure, for it was given in the year 1572, it is a sign that this is not to be said simply the common Ecclesiastical law, which before, with the contrary practice, persevered down to these times.

WHENCE I do not see by what right Sanchez strikes terror lib. 5. of the summa, cap. 1. num. 26. lest anyone assert that simple vows constitute the state of Religion by a privilege alone, since never before the times of Gregory XIII. did it do so.

Sanchez PRESSES, that Gregory defines these to be religious, no less than the others. Let them enjoy my good will: he does not say, by the same law; but, no less, which indicates a likeness. It is confirmed from Valentia 4. part d. 10. quaest. 5. puncto 3. where he says, that the Biennials in the Society of Jesus are indeed truly religious, yet not in that perfect degree of the religious state, as the solemnly professed. Henriquez thinks the same lib. 12. de matrim. cap. 5. num. 3. with the commentary joined, litt. N, and num. 6.

Sanchez PRESSES num. 16. That by those simple vows a perfect donation is made.

IT IS ANSWERED, that these are raised to that which before they did not effect. Moreover, they fall short of perpetuity by the nature of the thing, because they can be expelled, whence the donation is not accepted with that perfection with which the solemn donation. Add, that they retain the ownership of goods, which the solemnly professed do not retain.

IT IS CONFIRMED, for the Cardinals of the Congregation of the holy Inquisition, gathered together with Sixtus V. decreed, that the substance of religion consists regularly in solemn vows: but that the Supreme Pontiff can indulge, know, and determine otherwise, as Rebadeneira reports de suo Instituto, cap. 17. ad 3. Therefore those emitting those vows by a privilege alone are true religious, even in the opinion of those saying that the solemnity of vows is of Ecclesiastical law. If you wish to say, that solemn vows constitute a religious from the nature of the thing, but this from Ecclesiastical faculty, still the privilege must be judged. On this account Sixtus V. decrees with the Cardinals, that the Church can indulge, or determine otherwise, that is, grant a privilege, and determine, which is not a simple decree, according to the common law, as Sanchez believes num. 26. at the end, saying, that to indulge signifies to determine; for it was something superfluous to premise indulge, and afterward determine. Therefore these two words are rightly joined, by the one of which the Privilege of the indulgence granted to the religion would be expressed; by the other, however, the firm decree, or law, by which all were so held.

Therefore let these Reverend Biennials be CONTENT to be numbered as truly religious with the rest; but without prejudice to the solemnly professed, who, as clearer than light shines forth, are in a more perfect state; and without distinction of the Holy Doctors, who did not venerate the state of religion in simple vows, because it had not yet been granted by the Church.

WHETHER, however, by those vows after the biennium a ratified marriage is invalidated, the more probable part is the negative, which is upheld by Vasquez d. illa 165. cap. 10. Rebad. cap. 19. Instituti Societatis, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrimonio, cap. 8. Sanchez lib. 2. de matrimonio, d. 18. for the laws speak of solemn vows alone cap. desponsatam, and cap. decreta Regalia 27. quaest. 2. Extrav. Ioan. XXII. Antiqua de voto, cap. Ex publico, and cap. ex parte de conver. coniug. and the Council of Trent sess. 24. de matrim. can. 6. Nay, neither is this granted to a solemn vow of fact of Order, as is decided in that Extravag. Antiqua. Yet I do not think it improbable, that the Church, by whose law the solemnity of vows is required, could have defined those private vows to be enough of law, as many teach.

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

THIS status, so illustrious, this member so vivid and laborious of the mystic body of the Church, has been hated by heretics from ancient times; and therefore they tried to torment and tear apart Monks with the sword, with flames, and with every force of tortures. But the unhappy Sectaries of this age pursue the religious life with such hatred that their Books and sermons are filled with gibes and most grievous insults, to stir up the hatreds of all men against them; hardly anything else do they more sharply reprehend. I lament, for from their very ranks very many, having shaken off the holy yoke of Religion, have rushed into the abyss of all crimes, and, with most shameful nuptial chambers, have even defiled the sacred Sacrament of matrimony with Nuns taken from Monasteries; but they did not touch the Sacrament of matrimony. They were rather most filthy concubinages, which they adorned with most foul epithalamiums. Thee I adjure from the abyss, most wretched Heresiarch, thee most unhappy apostate from Religion, from faith, thee most filthy suitor of a holy woman, strangled by a demon in her lap that night, I summon, most lost Luther. Come forth to confess thy filthiness. This indeed I should promise myself, that no other arguments would be needed than to learn the confession of this reprobate from the place of torment.

PLURIMA he wrote in his most filthy Epithalamium, which he weaves onto chapter 7. of the former epistle to the Corinthians, with brazen face and impious hand. He has much in his other works deserving to be burned, On Monastic Vows, and the rest.

PLURIMA that unspeakable Calvin too, marked with the coal of burned Pentapolis, perverter of nature and of the foul, exhaled in those pestilential corrupting Institutions of his, especially book 4. chapter 13.

PLURIMA also the bitter Melancthon, and others of this same sort, not men but Wolves, vomited forth. See them in Bellarmine Tom. I. lib. 2. de Monachis. and Bouerio exam. 2. Cens. 18. errore 3.

These men, therefore, cry out that the Monastic life is a new invention of superstition, a cult of the devil, a plague of the Church, a monster, brought forth with no hand of Divine authority acting as midwife from the deep abyss of Tartarus into the light, in order to overthrow true religion.

But we, on the contrary, will show that it is a most ancient exquisite mode of Divine worship, a holy buttress of the Church, proceeding from the bosom of God, and a hammer of heretics. Since indeed I find very many things recorded in monuments of letters, I will expose them according to custom in the Arena, which my Seraphic Saint Bonaventure wrote.

FIRST indeed, these religious men, whom I have undertaken to defend, are called by the Greeks by five names, men destined, namely, for Divine worship; for this the Latins hold as the chief name. Thus D. Dionys. cap. 6. Ecclesiasticae Hierarchiae, where he says that Monks were called by the Apostles. Therapeutae, because they worshipped God purely, beyond the others. Philo uses the same name at the beginning of the book de contemplativa vita, and D. Basil everywhere, who also calls his discourses on Monastic matters Ascetical.

These are they whom the most ancient Fathers call Monks, and the champions of the Church, because their life is to be exercised unceasingly in the arena of the virtues.

A MONK however is said from Monos, which in Greek means singular, as D. Bonav. teaches, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 32. from D. Isidore in ethymol. lib. 7. cap. 13. He concludes indeed: Therefore if the word of a Monk is interpreted as solitary, or singular, what does he do in the crowd, who ought to be alone.

IN ALMOST THE SAME way speaks D. Hieronym. epist. ad Heliodorum. Wherefore Bellarmine does not rightly infer from this cap. 1. that the name of Monk, adduced by D. Jerome, suits most properly Hermits; for he elicits only from the etymology that a Monk ought to be separated from the world, saying: Interpret the word of a Monk, that is, one; what do you do in the crowd, who art solus (alone)? It is confirmed, for D. Jerome himself in the epistle to Eustochium says the name of Monk also belonged to the Cenobite, which all the ancients assert, from the time of D. Dionysius, who flourished CCC. or so years before the first Hermit, who was Paul.

That this is the genuine sense of D. Jerome S. Bonavent. proves, libro primo Pharetrae, cap. 31. from the same S. Doctor epist. 13. after the middle: Avoid the company of seculars: what need have you to see those things more often, in whose contempt you began to be a Monk, and before he exhorted them to imitate the holy sons of the Prophets, who dwelt in fields and solitudes, who dwelt together widely at the same time. Of these he says were the sons of Rechab, Hierem. 35. who indeed dwelt together.

D. AUGUSTINE on Psal. 132. Behold how good, etc. for brethren to dwell in one, places in holy unity concordant the name and the manner of the Monastic life.

The truest explanation of this name is in Cassian coll. 18. and Dionysius loc. cit. that Monks are so called, because, having left things divisible, they strive to please Monadio, that is, the divinity alone.

AND THEREFORE the primitive Monasteries (as S. Bonavent. says, contra Guilielmum, near the end) were instituted and built, that living together they might live in a solitary manner, and that each might have care of himself, and dwell with himself; and therefore they were called Monks, not because they were Hermits, but because their end was to be occupied solely with Divine contemplation, as the same S. Bonavent. has, citing for this the testimony of D. Jerome to Rusticus; otherwise, if they had been dwellers in hermits' cells, they would not have dwelt together in Monasteries, but alone in heremuses, after the example of Paul. And so from then on the name of Monk was left to those alone who devote themselves solely to contemplation: these are the Cassinenses, Cistercians, Carthusians, Camaldolese, and others of that kind. Which S. Bonaventure, S. Thomas, and other Doctors understanding, do not call later Dominicans, Franciscans, and others, who do not sweat solely in contemplation but also in action, aiding Bishops and Clerics in sermons, confessions, and administrations of the Sacraments, Monks, but call them regulars, or friars, as Bellarmine notes loc. cit. and it is gathered from D. Bonavent. loc. cit. and in the exposition of the rule, and lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 27. and 28. Although he sometimes ascribes to them also the name of Monks, as is plain loc. cit. contra Guilel. and in 4. d. 19. art. 2. quaest. 2. fin. where he reports the decree of Leo, forbidding Monks: Let no one dare to preach, unless he be a Priest, and it is held 16. quaest. 1. cap. 19. I add that also, as D. Bonav. notes.

ONLY two kinds of Religious, who are so called, namely as wholly given to the cult of God, did antiquity recognize. One of Hermits; the other of Cenobites. Thus teach D. Hieronymus epist. ad Eustochium, de Virginitate. D. Augustinus lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 31. Cassianus collat. 18. cap. 4. and D. Bonav. loc. cit. from D. Benedicto in regula, reporting two other kinds of corrupt Monks, who were called Sarabaitae, intent on the flesh: and Gyrovagi, wandering, whom D. Augustinus sharply reprehends de opere Monachorum, as related by D. Bonavent. there, and D. Hieronymus ad Rusticum, and other holy Fathers, whom S. Bonavent. reports, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 28. et cap. 32.

S. HIERONYMUS adds a third kind, as S. Bonavent. reports in Diaeta tit. 4. cap. 1. near the end, whom he calls Remobot, who dwelt two and three together, as is read epistola 22. ad Eustoch. after the middle; these however he reproves: he praises indeed the Cenobites, who in the Egyptian tongue are called Sauses, that is, living in common; and the Anchorets, who dwelt alone in the deserts, and are named from that, that they withdrew far from men: as Hermits are so called because they inhabit desert places, whom D. Isidorus distinguishes among themselves, lib. 2. de Divinis off. cap. 15. who, I think, lived apart not under obedience to Prelates; and therefore he rightly distinguishes them from Monks, that is, Cenobites, who dwelt in Cenobia, and from Anchorets, who dwelt scattered in solitude, but under obedience to some Prelate. Wherefore it does not seem sufficiently reasonable that Bellarmine reprehend S. Isidore cap. 3. because he distinguishes three kinds of Monks.

We, with D. Bonavent. in the aforesaid book contra Guilielmum, with D. Thom. and other scholastics, can better distinguish the friars and the orders of religions from their various ends, because some undertake the contemplative life, others the active, others the mixed. All however are called Religiosi by antonomasia, because they exercise the acts of religion in a singular and excellent manner; or, as S. Bonav. says, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 27. from D. Isidoro ethymol. lib. 10. because the Religiosus (says Cicero) is named from relego, because he re-examines, and as it were re-elects, those things which pertain to Divine worship.

NEXT, those who follow the contemplative life are various: some Cassinenses, some Cistercians, some Camaldolese: similarly among those who follow the active life, some are the Knights of Jerusalem, some of S. John, some intent on curing the sick, some on burying the dead: of those who profess the mixed life, some fight under D. Augustine, some under D. Francis, some under Saint Dominic.

But that these orders, instituted now many ages ago, were not the first, nor that Monasticism began only after the third century, and that the first authors were Anthony, Macarius, and the like, as the Magdeburgers bark centur. 4. cap. 6. col. 464. Nor that Monasticism began from error, or by chance, as they themselves say, col. 470. (Monasticism began, they say, partly from the observation of the doctrine of justification and the true worships of God, partly from a wicked emulation of the Essenoi,) I show more evidently.

PROVED from D. Bonav. loc. cit. The sayings from the Scriptures and the Fathers, on which Bellarmine relies cap. 5.

FIRST indeed Samuel gathered together the company of the Prophets, as is had 1. Reg. 10. for they met together for the cult of God, and professed justice and holiness. Wherefore, seeing Saul mingled with them, although he was then so good that none was better, as is said cap. 9. they marveled, saying: Is Saul too among the Prophets, psalming, and sounding forth the praises of God, and prophesying? From this the master of histories asserts the beginning of religious men. See S. Doctorem parte prima Eccl. Hier.

AGAIN Elias had disciples gathered, of whom the chief was Eliseus, as is had 4. Reg. 2. who were very anxious about the rapture of Elias. Similarly cap. 4. Eliseus, having gathered disciples, kept them in spiritual exercises, and they wanted neither wives nor riches. Of these D. Hieronymus to Rusticus, epistola 4: In order the sons of the Prophets (he says) whom we read of as Monks in the old testament, built themselves little huts near the streams of the Jordan; and, having left the crowds of the cities, they lived on polenta and wild herbs. And epist. 13. to Paulinus, adduced by D. Bonavent., speaking of Monks, says: Our prince Elias, and our Eliseus, the leaders of the Prophets, who dwelt in fields and solitudes, and made themselves tabernacles near the streams of the Jordan. He adds the Nazaraei, consecrated by vows, instituted by God Amos 2. whom, as S. Doctor argues, parte prima Eccl. Hier.

MOREOVER S. Bonau. proclaims John the Baptist the Prince of Monks and Hermits, with almost all the holy Fathers: Nazianzeno in the oration on Basil; Chrysostomo in the first homily on Mark, where he said loftily: As the Princes of Priests are the Apostles; so the Prince of Monks is John the Baptist. Hieronymo to Eustachium, epistola 2. The author of this life Paul, its illuminator Anthony, and, that I may ascend to higher things, its Prince John the Baptist. (S. Bonavent. uses these words.) The same Cass. collar. 18. cap. 6. teaches; Sozomenus lib. 1. hist. cap. 12. Isid. lib. 2. de off. cap. 15. Bernard. serm. de excell. Ioan. Baptistae.

We have also, Hier. 35. the nephews of Rechab, who, leading an austere life, shadowed forth above all the obedience of Religions, as D. Hieron. teaches, epist. ad Paulinum.

LET US GO FORWARD to the new testament, and we will show that there were Monks before the years CCC.

ACTORUM cap. 5. where the Apostles instituted the life in which all things were common. There it is proved that the obligation of that life was not of all Christians, from the reprehension made by Peter to Ananias: While it remained, did it not remain to thee, and being sold, was it not in thy power? That the Apostles bound themselves by vow to that perfection, D. August. asserts, lib. 17. de Civitate Dei, cap. 4. saying: The mightiest vowed this vow.

THAT Religions took their beginning from the example of the Apostles, Eusebius testifies, lib. 2. hist. cap. 16. Hieronymus de viris illustribus on Philo. Augustinus serm. 2. de vita communi Clericorum. Possidonius in the life of Augustini. Isidorus lib. 2. de offic. cap. 15. Cassianus, collat. 18. cap. 5. Therefore (he says) the discipline of the Cenobites took its beginning from the time of the Apostolic preaching.

But that which the Magdeburgenses say, Centur. 12., that then there was no vestige of Monks, and they adduce S. Ioan. Chrysostomum homil. 25. on the epistle to the Hebrews, is frivolous; for there the Saint speaks of the Church of Corinth alone; for he expounds those words: If any brother be named among you, and says that by the name of brother are understood not Monks but any faithful whatsoever, because then there was not even a vestige of a Monk at Corinth. But that they then were in Palaestina and in AEgypto, the same Saint asserts, lib. 4. contra vituperatores vitae Monasticae, not far from the end, and homil. 11. in Acta, where he says, that Monks live thus, as once at the beginning of the Church all the faithful lived in Hierusalem. And homil. 17. to the people he says: So great is the Philosophy introduced by Christ.

But that which D. Bonavent. would assert, that Anthony was the illuminator, not the Prince, of the Monastic life: it is proved from Athanasio in the life of D. Antonii, where he asserts that before Anthony there were Monks, who constituted their Monasteries in fields near the cities, and that Anthony went to a certain old man among them, that from his earliest age he might learn the Monastic discipline: from which it follows that Monks were far before B. Antonius. But B. Antonius was before the years CCC; for in the three hundredth year he was forty years old, as is gathered from the Chronicle of D. Hieronymi.

S. DAMASUS in the life of Dionysii Papae writes that he was taken up from being a Monk to the Pontificate. But it is established from the Chronicle of Eusebii that Dionysius sat at Rome in the year 266.

MOREOVER Tertullianus wrote a Book on the veiling of sacred virgins, and Beatus Cyprianus writes on the same argument. These were indeed older than Dionysius Papa.

MOREOVER D. Dionysius Areopagita writes to Demophilum the Monk. And lib. de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 6. he expounds at length the form of the Monastic profession. But in vain do the Centuriators, Erasmus, Valla, Lutherus, and Calvinus deny that Book to be Dionysii's, the disciple of the Apostle Paul; for three ancient Pontiffs allege those works as Dionysii Areopagitae: Martinus I. in C. Romano. Agatho in the epist. to Constantinum IV. Imperatorem. And Nicolaus Papa I., ad Michaelem Imperatorem, cites this epistle to Demophilum. Likewise two General Councils, the fourth, sixth, and seventh, can. 2. Moreover S. Maximus, who wrote annotations on Dionysium; Sophronius Patriarcha Hierosol. in the oration which is had at act. 11. of the sixth Synod; Damascenus lib. 1. de fide, cap. 12. Euthymius in the Panoplia, part. 1. titulo 2. Anastasius Bibliot. epist. ad Carolum Calvum. Hildoin. ep. ad Ludov. Pium, and all other later men. Therefore let Erasmus, Valla, etc. avail nothing.

SPLENDIDLY the Apostle testifies this of the vow also of chastity, in what is added, prima Tim. 5. Avoid younger widows. For when they have grown wanton in Christ, they will wish to marry: having damnation, because they have broken their first faith.

THAT they broke the faith given by vow, the Councils declare: Conc. Carth. IV. can. 104. which was of 214. Episcoporum. Tol. IV. cap. 55. where there were 70. Episcopi, and so also three Pontifices. Clem. lib. 3. const. cap. 1. Innocent. I. epist. 2. cap. 13. Gelas. I. epist. 1. cap. 23. Add Tertull. de Monog. Basil. lib. de virg. Hieron. lib. 1. in Iovin. cap. 44. Etc. Epiphan. haeres. 48. August. lib. de sancta virg. cap. 23. and lib. de bono vid. cap. 8. and 9. and in Psal. 75. Fulgent. epist. 1. and all the expositors of this place, both the Greeks, Chrysost. Theodoret. Theophylac. Oecum. And the Latins, Ambrof. Primas. Beda, Haymo, Sedul. and Anselm. apud Bellarm. cap. 24.

But the Apostle inflicts damnation on these, to which the Council of Chalced. subscribed, can. 16. Concilium Turon. II. cap. 16. Gelas. Pap. epist. 1. cap. 21.

FURTHERMORE Philo Iudaeus, older than Dionysius, in lib. de vita contemplativa supplicum, describes at very great length the life and manners of the Monks and of the consecrated Virgins, whom S. Marcus Evangelista instituted in AEgypto, where he plainly sets down the profession of poverty, continence, fastings, psalmody, etc.

THAT HE spoke of Christians, not of the Essenoi, as the Centuriators feign, is proved: for Eusebius lib. 2. hist. cap. 17. and Epiphanius haeresi 29. assert it. The same D. Hieronymus touches on, de viris illustribus on Philone, where he concludes: From which it appears that the first Church of those believing in Christ was of such a kind as the Monks now strive and desire to be. Moreover Cassianus, lib. 2. cap. 5. de Institutis Coenobiorum, asserts that the Egyptian Monks received from S. Marco the first norm of living, which Cassianus could not have learned except from this book of Philonis. The same assert deserte Beda in the prolog. on Marcum, Sozomenus lib. 2. cap. 12. Nicephor. lib. 2. cap. 15.

I ASSERT first that some of the Evangelical counsels are holy, against the heretics, as related by Bellarmino lib. 1. cap. 8. First the counsel of Castity is proved.

THE FIRST place of Scripture is adduced by D. Bonavent. in Diaeta salutis, titulo 6. cap. 2. Matth. 19. There are Eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take it, let him take it. That these are they who vow continence in religion, S. Epiphanius asserts, haeresi 58. S. Hieronymus on this place; S. Augustinus, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 30. S. Fulgentius, lib. de fide ad Petrum, cap. 3. That here indeed it is not commanded is plain, because above he said, praising matrimony: What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder, and it is confirmed by what follows: He that can take it, let him take it, as D. Bonavent. notes, serm. 6. de tempore.

Pseudomartir, de caelibatu, and others answer, that that is signified significatively "for the kingdom of heaven," on account of preaching the Gospel more expeditiously.

But against them are all the holy Fathers, expounding with us: Cyprianus, de habitu Virginum. Hilarius on this place. Chrysostomus here. Hieronymus lib. I. in Iovinianum. Augustinus de sancta Virginitate, cap. 24. The same hold Beda, and Anselmus, here.

Here he alludes to that of Isaïae cap. 56. Let not the Eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree. For thus saith the Lord to the Eunuchs: They that shall keep my sabbaths, and choose the things that please me, and hold fast my covenant: I will give them in my house, and within my walls, a place, and a name better than sons and daughters: I will give them an everlasting name, that shall never perish.

THAT what is here treated of is those continent of their own will, of whom Matth. 19. speaks, not of the maimed, or so born, who are continent of necessity, the Saints teach: Hieronymus, and Cyrillus on this place; Augustinus in the Book de sancta Virginitate, cap. 24. Basil. lib. de vera virginitate. Ambrosius in the exhortation to the Virgins; and Gregorius, 3. part. Pastoralis, cap. 29. And it is plain from the reward, that there is promised to them a greater glory than that of the sons and daughters of God.

S. Augustinus adds subtly: If anyone contend that Isaias speaks of true Eunuchs, still our cause is helped; for if to Eunuchs, who are continent of necessity, there is promised a greater glory than to the just who are married; certainly a greater will be given to those continent of their own will.

THAT here continence is not commanded but urged, the aforesaid Fathers teach; S. Hieronymus proves it from those words: They that shall choose the things that I will. That the vow of continence is holy is proved, because eternal glory is promised to it. D. Augustinus praises this vow excellently, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 25. as is related at the end from D. Bonaventura.

IT IS PROVED secondly by D. Bonavent. on 3. sapientiae: Blessed is the barren and unspotted, who hath not known a sinful bed: she shall have fruit in the visitation of holy souls. And the eunuch, who hath not wrought iniquity with his hands, nor thought wicked things against God: for a special gift of faith shall be given him, and a portion in the temple of God. For the fruit of good labours is glorious, and the root of wisdom that never faileth. That this place is like the former, D. Hieronymus teaches, loco citato.

IT IS PROVED thirdly by D. Bonavent. in 4. d. 38. art. 2. quaest. 1. in corpore; for the Lord compares the Church to the good earth, of which one part rendered fruit a hundredfold, another sixtyfold, another thirtyfold; which place, expounding, Cyprianus, de habitu Virginum; Hieronymus, lib. I. in Iovinianum; Augustinus, de sancta Virginitate, cap. 44. et 45. teach that by that parable is distinguished the merit of chaste marriage, widowhood, and virginity. From which it is plain that Virginity is a greater good and more meritorious than conjugal chastity, and so is a counsel of God.

IT IS PROVED fourthly by D. Bonavent. in the exposition of the Missa, at the fraction of the most holy Hostia, and in the serm. de Virginibus, from prima Corinth. 7. where the counsel of continence is proposed in many ways: It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Likewise: It is good for a man so to be. Likewise: Art thou loosed from a wife? Seek not a wife. Similarly: But I say to the unmarried and to the widows: it is good for them if they so continue, as I also. Likewise: I would that you all were, as I myself am. Likewise: Concerning Virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel, as having obtained mercy of the Lord, to be faithful. Where note that Paul presents himself as a faithful minister of God in giving this counsel. Likewise: He that joineth his Virgin in marriage doth well: and he that joineth her not doth better. The unmarried and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy in body and in spirit. Finally of the widow: She shall be married to whom she will: only in the Lord. But she will be more blessed if she so continue, according to my counsel: and I think that I also have the Spirit of God. Where thou seest that this counsel is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Lutherus answers in the epithalamio, that the Apostle indeed indicates that he inclines to continence, but that at last he dissuades from it: But because of fornication, let every man have his own wife; and let every woman have her own husband.

Calvinus answers nearly the same in his commentary on this place, namely that he wishes to say: I would urge continence, but because it is impossible, let every man have a wife; just as if anyone should say: It would be good neither to eat nor to drink; but because without these you cannot live, eat ye and drink.

BUT on the contrary, for the Apostle says: I would: I give counsel; but I would not command: And this is the unanimous commentary of the holy Fathers. See Chrysostomum, and others on this place, Ambrosium lib. de viduis, near the end. Hieronymum lib. I. in Iovinianum. Augustinum lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 13. who, as if he had foreseen the empty invention of his apostate, namely that the Apostle would deter from continence, himself wrote the contrary in cap. 16.

In this manner he exhorts to virginity and perpetual continence, that he might also somewhat deter from nuptials.

MOREOVER, if continence is impossible, why does Paul labor so much in giving this counsel? And the absurdity will be plain if the sayings of the Apostle are applied after the example of Calvinus. It would surely be ridiculous for the Apostle to say: It is good not to eat. Likewise: Be without food, seek not food. Likewise: Concerning not eating I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel: that no one should eat. Likewise: he that eateth doth well, and he that eateth not doth better. Likewise: he doth not sin who eateth, but he will be more blessed, if he so continue according to my counsel. From the ridiculous doctrine of Calvinus these absurdities would follow.

NOR does he wish all to have necessity of marrying, as Lutherus himself confesses, who excepts those who have the gift of continence, but warns those who are unwilling to be contained to marry, lest they fornicate: He that containeth not, let him marry.

Petrus Martyr answers on this place that the sense is: Let them be continent who have the gift of continence. It is good for a man not to touch a woman, that is, not to have a wife; but because almost no one can promise himself that he has this gift, let him accept the commandment, or counsel, of God, Genes. 2. It is not good for man to be alone.

BUT the answer is empty, for God said this to Adam, who in the state of innocence was adorned with the gift of continence, and he said it for the species to be preserved and for a temporal good; but the Apostle speaks universally on account of the spiritual good of the individual. Wherefore as virginity is a gift of God, so also conjugal continence: Every one hath his proper gift from God: one indeed after this manner, another after that. Therefore, as he who marries has need of this gift, and is not on that account removed from marriage, because he can obtain it from God; so also here.

They answer thirdly that Paul praises continence only as useful, either for driving away the molestations of marriage (Lutherus says, in the epithalamio) or for serving God more easily (Melancthon, and P. Martyr say).

But the Apostle asserts that it avails also for pleasing God, as D. Bonavent. notes, loco cit.: The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, how she may please God, that she may be holy in body and in spirit.

It is proved fifthly from that of Lucae primo: How shall this be done, because I know not man? and from prima Timot. 6. For when they have grown wanton in Christ, they will wish to marry: having damnation, because they have made void their first faith. I have sufficiently expounded these places in the preceding disputation, quaest. 10. where I showed that vows are pleasing to God.

It is proved also from the sacred Councils: Ancyrano can. 18. Chalced. generali can. 16. Carthag. tertio cap. 33. and Carthag. quarto cap. ultimo; Toletano quarto cap. 55. Turon. 2. cap. 16. Maguntiensi cap. ultimo, where it brings in the Elibettinum decree 13. and the sixth of Colonia. Romano sub Sylvestro can. 10. and Fotouilicense, where the solemn vow of virginity is enjoined to be most gravely observed.

The same the SS. Pontifices impose: Clemens lib. 3. Constit. Apostolicarum, cap. 1. Cyricius epist. prima, cap. 6. Innocentius I. epist. 2. cap. 12. Leo I. epist. ad Rusticum Episcopum Narbonensem, which is 90. cap. 13. Gelasius epist. 33.

In the same way Constantinus Magnus Imperator abrogated that law of the Romans, by which the childless, or those bereft of children, were deprived of hereditary succession. The cause of the abrogation Eusebius writes, lib. 4., to have been on account of those who vowed celibacy out of piety, lest the political Law seem to punish piety.

Thus also Iovinianus Imperator made a Law, that no one should dare to seek a sacred Virgin in marriage, nor look upon her immodestly, as had been done in the time of Julian the Apostate, and he imposed the punishment of death. Lutherus was guilty of this punishment. Sozomenus writes this law, lib. 6. cap. 3. and it still exists in C. lege si quis, de Episcopis, et Clericis.

It is proved also by D. Bonavent. both in Pharetra lib. 1. cap. 38. and in 4. sent. d. 38. quaest. 9. from the Fathers, who commend the vow of chastity wonderfully, as most pleasing to God and profitable to salvation.

S. Gregorius lib. 15. moral. cap. 12.: The virginity of the flesh was by no means commanded, but only praised. For if it were commanded, surely marriage would now be turned into a fault.

S. Augustinus lib. de virginitate sancta, cap. 12. Tom. 6.: Assuredly the Virgins will have something great beyond the others in that common immortality of the saints, because they have something already not of the flesh in the flesh. And below, cap. 27.: The Virgins are they, and they follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth. Whither do we think this Lamb goeth? Certainly whither no one either dareth or is able to follow him, unless you? Where I believe the joys are great, perchance distinguished from all the other joys in that kingdom. The joys of the Virgins are Christ's: of Christ, in Christ, with Christ, after Christ, through Christ, for the sake of Christ. And cap. 5.: That birth of one holy Virgin is the glory of all holy Virgins. And those Virgins themselves, with the Virgin Mary, are the Mothers of Christ, because they do the will of his Father.

S. Cyprianus de habitu, et disciplina Virginum, cap. 3. Tom. 2.: If continence followeth Christ, virginity is destined for the kingdom of God.

D. Ambrosius lib. 3. de virginitate, Tom. 4.: They who do not marry, and do not take wives, are as Angels on earth, that they may not feel the tribulation of the flesh, may know not servitude, and that, as it were stripped of the infirmity of the body, they may think not the things of man, but the things of God.

I ASSERT secondly that the vow of poverty is a holy Counsel of God. Thou hast very many arguments and authorities in D. Bonavent. in Apologia Pauperum, of the third responsio, chapter one.

It is proved by D. Bonavent. in the first place cited, and in Diaeta salutis, tit. 4. cap. 1. near the end, and tit. 6. cap. 2. from that of Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect: Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven. D. Aug. epist. 89. quaest. 4. and in Psal. 103. concion. 3. refers this whole place excellently to the Monastic profession.

Calvinus answers lib. 4. Instit. cap. 13. § 13. that that young man lied, when he said: All these things I have kept (that is, the commandments) from my youth, and therefore Christ, mocking him, said to him: Go, sell, etc. That he had not fulfilled the commandments he proves, because the great commandment is to love God above all things, and yet he did not love God with his whole heart, because, having heard: Go, sell all things for love of me, he went away sad.

But Calvinus strikes his foot with the hoe; for if Christ imposed that commandment on that young man, impossible no less than to number the stars of heaven (as he himself says), by what argument is he convicted of sin, because he went away grieving?

The same Petrus Martyr answers nearly with Calvinus; therefore both, now reprobate, lie.

I press the point, for in 10. Marci it is said: Christ loved him. By what argument then do they either convict him of lying, or ironically lead him on to things simply impossible?

Pseudomartyr insists that this is a commandment: If thou wilt be perfect, for in Matth. 5. we are commanded: Be ye perfect, as also your Father is perfect.

It is answered that that perfection, like that of the eternal Father, is simply impossible, unless one be some god; therefore only imitation is urged in charity, not is every work commanded.

Martyr answers that this commandment was given to this young man alone.

But this is false: for many Saints acknowledged that it was said to them also. Thus D. Antonius, as S. Athanasius testifies in his life, and S. P. Franciscus, as S. Bonaventura notes in his life, where S. Doctor advertises that this counsel was given under this condition: If thou wilt be perfect, as if he said: This is the way, and the ladder, to perfection, to which whosoever wills to ascend must leave all things.

From these the exposition of Osiander falls also, apud Alphonsum Viviesium Phil. 20.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonavent. in Diaeta, tit. 4. cap. 1. from 4. Actorum: And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of the things which he possessed was his own, but all things were common unto them. That they agreed thus by vow, D. Augustinus asserts, in the first sermon de communi vita clericorum.

It is confirmed, for Ananias, and Saphira, were therefore punished with death because they retained something of their own; otherwise they would not have deserved so great a punishment.

That they had already vowed it is proved; for it is said: He defrauded of the price of the field; but it would not be fraud unless the thing had already been promised; and therefore the Apostle says: While it remained, did it not remain to thee, and being sold, was it not in thy power? That that violation was sacrilegious the Apostle testifies: Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, to lie to the Holy Ghost? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God.

IT IS CONFIRMED from the holy Fathers, who acknowledge this breaking of a vow. Thus Chrysostomus homil. 12. in Acta. Hieronymus epistola 8. which is ad Demetriadem. Augustinus serm. 27. de verbis Apostoli, and sermone 10. de diversis. Fulgentius epistola de debito coniugali, cap. 8. Gregorius lib. 1. epist. 33. Arator lib. 1. in Acta Apostolorum. Oecumenius, on this place. Beda on this place.

IT IS PROVED then by D. Bonavent. in his works on Poverty, from the Fathers, especially in the Apologia, loco citato, where he reports very many; lib. indeed 1. Pharetrae, cap. 41. he brings among others D. Bernardum epistola 103. and in the first sermon of all the saints, expounding that of Matth. 5.: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Thus also the saints expound: Ambrosius in 6. Lucae, Nyssenus, Hieronymus, Beda on 5. Matth. Leo in the sermon on this Gospel, Chrysostomus, and Anselmus on that place; Basil. quaest. 105. Abulensis, Lyra, Caictanus, Iansenius, who expound of actual voluntary poverty: for the Greek word πτωχὸς also sounds of a beggar. It is confirmed, for in Lucae 6. the Poor, who are said to be blessed, are opposed not to the proud but to the rich; for he soon adds: Woe to you, rich, as Bellarminus notes, ad eum locum, where he confirms that the name of poor agrees here with that: Who when he was rich became needy. 2. Corinth. 8. whence S. Bonavent. deduces that it speaks of actual voluntary poverty: and below he observes that the woe against the rich is opposed to the Beatitude of the poor.

HENCE therefore S. Bonavent. argues that it is best to vow poverty, loco citato in Lucam.

From this the exposition of Calvinus falls, who by "the poor" expounds "the afflicted."

AGAINST it, indeed, because, as Bellarminus notes, after D. Bonavent. ad 6. Lucae, he distinguishes the poor from those who mourn.

But S. Bonavent. disputes it deliberately, opuscul. de paupertate Christi, contra Guillelmum.

FIRST he shows it from that Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect: go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor; and follow me.

SECONDLY from that of Peter, who, the promises having been made to the poor, animated, said: Behold we have left all things, and have followed thee: what therefore shall we have? and Christ promises them: Amen I say to you: that you, who have followed me, shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israël; and every one that hath left house, or brethren, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting.

But S. Bonavent. OBSERVES, with the Glossa, that not a part of the goods, but all, were to be renounced.

THIRDLY he proves it from that Marci 12. where Christ praised the widow, who sent those two mites, necessary to herself, into the Gazophylacium. But this, of her want, sent all that she had, her whole livelihood.

FOURTHLY he proves it from that Lucae 12. where, that rich man having been blamed, greedy of gathering, he exhorts to renouncing all things, and to living after the manner of the birds, especially the crows, which, possessing nothing, are fed by the providence of God: Consider the ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap; they have neither storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them, after that Psalm. 146.: Who giveth to their beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. But S. Bonavent. advertises, ad eum locum Lucae, that the crows are put among the other birds, partly because they are of the greatest gluttony, as is intimated Genes. 8. of that raven, which went forth and did not return back; because it had settled on carcasses. Then because the young of crows are abandoned by their parents, and, naked and unfit to seek food, are fed by God, as is had Iob 38.: Who will prepare food for the raven, when her young ones cry unto God? Whence by the crows he understands also the other birds, as is said Matth. 6.: Behold the birds of the air.

HENCE Christ elicits the inference: How much more are you better than they: For indeed, because someone could argue that it is more fitting for us to be solicitous, because we have need of more things, Christ rebukes: And which of you, by thinking, can add to his stature one cubit. Thus therefore he argues: He who gives you the growth of the body even to the last hair, will give also the necessaries to the body; therefore he concludes: If then ye be not able to do even the least thing, why are you solicitous for the rest?

HE ADDS also: Consider the lilies, how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin, etc. From this indeed Christ advances step by step to urging the selling of all things: Sell what ye possess, and give alms, where he answers that counsel, Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect, etc. as D. Bonavent. notes, loco cit. in Lucam, where he also refers the Fathers to this.

FIFTHLY from that Lucae 14.: Every one of you that renounceth not all that he possesseth cannot be my disciple, where he observes from the Gloss that the disciples of Christ, who profess the chief religion, ought to renounce also in effect. Which the same S. Bonavent. observes, ad 14. Lucae, from the same Gloss, where he also notes, from D. Bernardo, loco supra citato declamat that this is laid as the foundation of edification, as he had said, Lucae 12.: For which of you having a mind to build a tower, doth not first sit down and think whether he have means to finish it? and therefore the first beatitude is placed at the beginning for the poor: Blessed are the poor in spirit, etc.

But S. Bonavent. CONFIRMS it in the opusculo cited; whom Bellarminus follows, loco addicto: that Christ urged poverty in affection, because he himself was most poor, as is said Matth. 8.: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head, as the Gloss notes. Whence D. Chrysostomus, homil. 28. in Matth.: Why wouldst thou gather money, following me? Seest thou not that I have not so much as a lodging, not so much as the birds have?

NEXT Matth. 17. Christ had not a stater to pay the tribute. Whence he says to Peter: Go thou to the sea, etc. so the Gloss observes.

IOANNIS C. 14.: The prince of this world cometh, and in me he hath not any thing, as the Gloss notes, and secunda Corinth. 8.: For your sakes he became needy, when he was rich; in this I give counsel. Where D. Bonavent. adds Augustinian words in the original: He became so needy as not to have what the foxes have; and in this I give counsel, he subjoins under a breath, that ye imitate his poverty. Thus it is expounded also by D. Hieronymo in the Gloss, and Lyrano, and other expositors.

NOW indeed D. Bonavent. argues thus most strongly against Guillelmum: Christ made his works holy, most worthy of imitation, especially in suffering nakedness, poverty, etc. as is said prima Petri 2.: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that ye should follow his steps: Therefore to vow poverty is holy.

HENCE D. Hieronymus ad Hedibiam, epist. 150.: Wilt thou be perfect, and stand in the first pinnacle of dignity? Do what the Apostles did: Sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow the Saviour. The same he has in epistola 1. ad Heliodorum, and Matth. 6. on those words: Behold the birds of the air, etc.

He confirms it with the testimonies of other holy Fathers. These are Ambrosius in Lucam lib. 6. cap. 9. Tom. 3. and lib. 2. de offic. Tom. 4. Augustinus lib. de bono coniug. cap. 8. at the end, Tom. 6. de eccl. dogm. cap. 71. Gregorius homil. 20. in Ezech. Bernardus epist. 42. Prosper de vita contemplativa, lib. 2. cap. 9. and it is had in 12. quaest. 1.

HE PROVES it then by reasons. The first is: The more one withdraws from the occasion of cupidity, the more one ascends toward the city of God: but by poverty we are wholly separated from the occasion of cupidity: Therefore. The minor is evident. The major is proved, because the more one withdraws from one opposite, the more one approaches the other opposite: but the city of God and the city of the Devil are opposites, because the former has for its foundation the love of eternal things; and the city of the devil, cupidity: Therefore. See the other reasons in D. Bonaventura.

But the principal one for proving the sanctity of poverty, even that excluding the common, is: As simple is related to simple, so more to more; but poverty simply is laudable: Therefore greater poverty is more laudable. Such is this: Therefore.

I ASSERT thirdly. The vow also of obedience is a holy counsel of the Lord.

IT IS PROVED by D. Bonavent. loco cit. Diaetae, titulo 6. cap. 2. from Matth. 16.: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me, on which almost alone Bellarminus solidly relies, lib. 2. cap. 21.

IT IS PROVED secondly by D. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 43. from the holy Fathers, whom Bellarminus also reports.

FIRST D. Augustinus, de operibus monachorum, cap. 17. Tom. 3.: The prayer of one obedient man is heard sooner than ten thousand of the scornful.

D. HIERONYMUS, epistola 4. ad Rufinum monachum, after the middle, Tom. 1.: Serve the brethren, wash the feet of guests, having suffered injuries keep silence, fear the Superior of the monastery as the Lord, love him as a father, believe that whatsoever he shall command is salutary for thee, and judge not the judgment of the greater, whose office it is to obey and to fulfill the things commanded.

D. BERNARDUS de praecepto, et dispensacione, before the middle: Whatsoever man commandeth in the place of God, which nevertheless is not certain to displease God, must be received altogether no otherwise than if God commanded it.

THE SAME, epistola 7. ad Adam monachum: This is to be noted, that some things are pure goods; some pure evils, and in these no obedience is owed by men: because neither are those to be let go, even when they are prohibited; nor these to be committed, when they are commanded. Moreover, between these there are certain middling things, which according to the manner, place, time, or person, can be both evil and good: and in these the law of obedience is laid, as it were in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was in the midst of paradise. In these assuredly it is not lawful to prefer our own sense to the judgment of the masters: in these altogether neither the command nor the prohibition of the prelates is to be despised. O Monk most obedient, who from whatsoever words of the elders lettest not slip one iota, attendest not what sort of thing is commanded, content because it is commanded. And this is obedience without delay. D. Gregorius Magnus, who was a Monk, has like things, lib. 35. moral. cap. 10.

THE SAME D. Bernardus, in the Declamation upon the Gospel: Behold we have left all things; Go then, go to work, thou who disposest to leave all things; remember to count thyself also first among the things to be left; nay, indeed, above all and principally deny thyself, if thou deliberatest to follow him, who emptied himself for thee.

THE SAME, serm. 3. in Adventu Domini: Render reverence, and obedience, to the prelate, of which the one is of the heart, the other of the body. S. Bonavent. reports many other things, lib. 1. cap. 11. S. Bonavent. reports many other things, lib. 1. cap. 11.

MANY things I have adduced from D. Bernardo, whom Calvinus confesses to be a pious writer.

S. BENEDICTUS, in Regula, cap. 5.: Obedience then will be acceptable to God, and sweet to men, if what is commanded be done not lukewarmly, nor tardily, nor with murmuring, nor with the answer of one unwilling; because obedience, which is rendered to superiors, is exhibited to God; and cap. 7.: Obedience, a good, is to be exhibited not only to the Abbot by all, but the brethren also should obey one another, knowing that by this way of obedience they are to go to God.

S. Bonavent. reports also other testimonies of these Fathers, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 11. and the twelfth. Finally S. Doctor shows the whole state of Religion to be holy, cap. 3. Resp. primae.

THAT is a holy state which leads swiftly to Charity: Such is the state of Religion: Therefore. The major is plain, because Charity is the end of perfection, 1. Timot. 1. and from D. Augustino lib. 1. retr. cap. 6. The minor is proved; for Christ praised this perfection above ordinary and necessary observance, Matth. 19. et 16. Hence D. Chrysostomus, homil. 17. ad populum, calls it the Philosophy of Christ. It is confirmed by S. Doctore; for he enjoins works of supererogation, as we saw above, which the SS. adduce as such: Cyprianus lib. de habitu Virg. Hieron. lib. 1. in Iovin. Ambrosius lib. de vid. Gregor. lib. 15. moral. cap. 9. Chrysostomus homil. 8. de Poenit. Basil. lib. de Virg. Nazianzenus orat. 2. in Iul.

WHATEVER Calvinus sees, lib. 4. cap. 13. sect. 12. denying works of supererogation, but saying all are commandments: Why then does he cry out that none is necessary to salvation?

IT IS PROVED still further by S. Doctore above: That state is holy which removes all incentives to evil: Such is Religion: Therefore. The minor is proved; for: Whatsoever fault there is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life, from D. Ioan. The first, as to occasions, is removed by the vow of Chastity. The second, of Poverty. The third, by the vow of Obedience. In this Evangelical declining consists perfection, as the scriptures, Councils, and Fathers teach, as S. Doctor says there.

The holy Church indeed has attested this in the Councils: Chalc. act. 15. cap. 6. Gangr. cap. 9. Ancyr. c. 18. Carth. I. cap. 3. Carth. 4. cap. 11. Tol. 4. et 10. Eliber. cap. 13. Tur. 2. cap. 21. Constan. sess. 8. Trid. sess. 25. The acts that are not of Religion are the acts of Religious, as S. Doctor says most beautifully, and with him Valentia.

THOU OBJECHEST first: Works spontaneous are dearer to God than compelled: But works from vows are necessary: Therefore. The major stands from the scriptures, Psalm. 5. prima Corinth. 7. where he protests that he wills not to compel them to the vow, but that they be free: Not that I cast a snare upon you; secunda Corinth. 3.: Not of sadness, or of necessity: The same he has ad Philem.

IT IS ANSWERED from D. Bonau. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 2. especially in the first argument, second place: that he who vows spontaneously presents himself to the work not owed, and voluntarily submits himself to the obligation and necessity of rendering; which necessity is voluntary, and does not diminish but increases alacrity, because it proceeds from love. Nor does it oppose cheerfulness in rendering, which stands in the proposal of the heart and the serenity of countenance, as D. Bonau. teaches, in Diaeta, tit. 2. cap. 7. at the end.

BUT THAT of prima Corinth. 7. where Pseudomartyr cries out that the Apostle exhorts to continence, but does not will that they ensnare themselves by vow: S. Bonau. answers that the Apostle wills to say that he does not compel to vowing virginity, as if he reproved marriage; but that he exhorts to vowing it, as more honorable than marriage.

He wills also to indicate that a vow can be a snare holding by force unto ruin, if anyone vow rashly, or compelled; just as also marriages are snares to those marrying unwillingly. Bellarminus brings it in, cap. 29., that Prov. 20.: It is a ruin to man to devote holy things, and after vows to retract, where in Hebrew for the word ruina there is מוקש, which properly indicates a snare.

Thou objectest secondly against the first assertion, that the Apostle, prima Corinth. 7., exhorts to matrimony: Because of fornication, let every man have his own wife; and let every woman have her own husband; and prima Timot. 5.: I will the younger to marry, and to bear children.

S. Bonaventure answers, in 4. dist. 31. q. 1., that men are called to matrimony not on account of temptations alone, but on account of fornication, because otherwise the incontinent live. Therefore the Apostle first said: If they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn, that is, than not to be continent; and therefore he also says: It is good for a man not to touch a woman: but because of fornication let every man have his own wife, and he subjoins: But return again to the same, that Satan tempt you not for your incontinency. Thus S. Bonavent. answers, ad 2., from D. Hieronymo, and after him Bellarminus; they expound that to Timothy in the same way, because certain young women cast themselves after Satan, as the Apostle himself testifies there.

Thus indeed S. Hieronymus says, in the Apologia pro libris, contra Iovinianum: But if they cannot contain themselves, and wish to quench the ardor of lust not so much by continence as by fornication, it is better to marry than to burn, that is, it is better to take a husband than to fornicate. The SS. expound in the same manner: Clemens Alexand. lib. 4. stromatum, at the beginning, where he reprehends the exposition of the Basilidian heretics, namely that it is better to marry than to burn, that is, to be tormented with temptations; even if we do not assent to what is the example of Luther in the Epithalamio, of Calvin, and of Peter Martyr, on this place. For the innovators have overturned all errors, that they might dig a sewer fouler than the rest.

But our exposition is also that of the author on the epistles of D. Paul, who is judged to be Ambrosius; of D. Augustini, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 34. and de bono coniugali, cap. 10.; of Theodoreti, nay even of Chrysostomi, if it be read attentively, as Bellarminus notes.

But grant that: If they do not contain themselves, let them marry. It is better to marry than to burn, be understood as being struck by the keener stings of the flesh; still they gain nothing; for matrimony is not commanded, as Calvinus wills, lib. 4. Instit. cap. 13. §. 17., but permitted, which the words of the Apostle plainly show; for as, to remove the burning, he says, let them marry; so in a more efficacious manner, namely in the imperative mode of words, he says to the married, if at any time they be continent: Again: return to the same, that Satan tempt you not, and he subjoins: But this I say according to indulgence, not according to commandment. Which expressed that matrimony was by him merely permitted, not commanded, as Bellarminus notes, cap. 30., after D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 31. art. 2. quaest. 2. in the second argument.

Thus also that is understood: I will the younger to marry, for in prima Corinth. 7. he says: I would that all were as I myself am. So Chrysostomus, Ambrosius here, Hieronymus epist. 11. Augustinus lib. de bono viduit. cap. 8.

Finally these things were said to those not having the vow, but to the free, as the SS. note: Ambrosius ad virg. lapsam, c. 5. Hieronymus lib. 1. in Iouin. Augustinus lib. 1. de adulter. coniug. cap. 15. Gregorius in Pastorali, part. 3. admonitione 28. Chrysostomus lib. de virginitate, cap. 39. Theodoretius, Theophylactus, Oecumenius, and others on that place.

Thou objectest thirdly against the first assertion. It is mad to vow what is not in our power: but continence is such, because it is a gift of God, as is had Sap. 8.: No man can be continent, except God give it. Matth. 19.: He that can take it, let him take it, and prima Corinth. 7.: But every one hath his proper gift from God; Therefore, etc. Bellarminus says this argument, cap. 31., is most difficult.

D. Bonaventure answers, in 2. dist. 28. art. 2. in corpore, that the gift of continence is indeed from God, in such a way that no one is continent by his own proper powers; nevertheless the help of God is always present, and to us willing it remains entire, with that help, to be continent, so that we can even vow continence. But this is the argument of Pelagius, whom the sectaries imitate, namely that what we cannot attain by the powers of free will alone is not in our power; which is most false, because the assisting grace of God is never wanting; for this is not of those gifts which communicate non-necessary actions, as prophecy; but that celibacy is in our power is certain, by the grace of God at least assisting, which is ready to each one willing.

It is proved first by D. Bonavent. in stimulo diuini amoris, part. 3. cap. 9. from the same, where he says: I would that you all were as I myself am: but every one hath his proper gift from God, one indeed after this manner; another after that.

It is proved secondly from the Fathers. Tertullianus, lib. de Monogamia, near the end, says: Choose what is good; if thou canst not, it is because thou wilt not. Origenes on that place: Whoever wills to take the word laid down about chastity, let him ask, and he shall receive. Hieronymus on the same place: To these it is given, who have asked, who have willed. Nazianzenus oratione 31. on this Gospel: When thou hearest, to whom it is given; add, that it is given to those who will, and consent. Ambrosius lib. 3. de Virginibus, and lib. de viduis, where he has: This is not commanded to all; but it is sought from all. The same has Chrysostomus on the same place: To these it is given, who choose it of their own accord; which he said in order to show that we have need of the higher help, which indeed is prepared for all, if we will to come out superior in this struggle. Augustinus, in Psal. 137.: He who exhorts thee to vow, himself helps thee to render, and lib. 6. confess. cap. 11.: Assuredly thou wouldst give continence, if with an internal groan I knocked at thy ears. S. Augustinus shows the same ex professo, lib. de adulterinis coniugiis, cap. 10. 13. et 20. and D. Basilius lib. de Virginitate, beyond the middle.

But that place of sapientiae 8. about continence must be taken in a general sense. For Salomon, who there speaks, was not a virgin or a widower, but a husband, and therefore he asked marital continence, as Bellarminus notes, after D. Bonavent. loco cit. and in the commentary on sapientiae.

But as to that Matth. 19. All men take not this, etc.: it is Answered from D. Bonavent. in Diaeta, tit. 6. cap. 2. at the end, that this is a counsel which is free in our will, and so not all men take it, that is, will to take it. For it is usually said: This good man does not take the counsel, although he be capable, that is, he could take it; whence he subjoins: For there are Eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, that is, many have received this counsel. Wherefore it does not denote that some are incapable, as the adversaries pretend. But what is said: it is said: He that can take it, let him take it, sounds: He who is not thus blinded by the passion of concupiscence, and is illuminated by God, and can perceive how great is the dignity of chastity, let him understand. For it sounds the same as he that readeth, let him understand. For it stands in us, with Divine help, to will to attend; as is said in Isaia cap. 6.; and on the contrary: They could not understand, namely because they would not, being indeed blinded by their passions.

But the third place, prima Corinth. 7., indicates the gift of virginal and marital continence, which are in our power.

THOU OBJECHEST fourthly against the first assertion: The inconveniences which follow from celibacy. The first is, because the world would be ended if all were celibates. The second, that diseases arise from celibacy.

Bellarminus ANSWERS, cap. 32., after D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3. ad 2., from D. Hieronymo lib. in Iovin., that there is no danger that all die, or that all vow; nor are the diseases such that they cannot be cured otherwise. As we saw with Medina, lib. 4. de continentia, cap. 11. And if there were a certain holiness from a lethal disease, still continence must be prized more, which is the hundredth fruit, as I said above.

OTHER things the heretics object, namely that by the vow of chastity the generation of men is impeded; the forces of the Republic are diminished for expelling the barbarians; the inclination to begetting, which is a good, is impeded; finally that the tree is better which renders fruits than if flowers only, etc.

IT IS ANSWERED that these men have spoken petulantly and carnally; but truly if thou read through those who savor of heavenly and true goods, thou wilt understand that things are otherwise. To all these S. Bonavent. answers, in Diaeta, Tit. 4. cap. 4., where he has a panegyric of chastity; that this vow is preeminent above the others springing from marriage, and therefore in the parable to bear the fruits of the earth a hundredfold; but marriage thirtyfold. See S. Bonaventuram. Therefore D. Augustinus, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 8.: Therefore (he says) no fecundity of the flesh can be compared to the holy virginity of the flesh. D. Hieronymus shows the same at length, ad Demetriadem, et epist. 22. ad Eustochium, and the same D. Augustinum loco cit. capite 10., where he refutes that which Erasmus says, in the dialogue of the Suitor and the Maiden, namely that Virgins are born from the conjugal act. But he answers that virgins are born from the conjugal act, not as is honorable, who are born even from adultery. So let it be that a virgin be born even of a rape: but a virgin once made is not born even from marriage.

THOU OBJECHEST fifthly, the Councils: Ancyr. can. 19. where he puts the violators of the solemn vow of chastity among bigamists: but bigamy is not a sin: Therefore.

IT IS ANSWERED that in this they are likened to bigamists, in that they are irregular and unfit for the priesthood.

Other Councils also they bring, which bring only this, that marriages are not to be blamed.

THOU OBJECHEST sixthly the Fathers: first because from D. Ambrosio, all the Apostles, except Paul, and John, had wives.

IT IS ANSWERED that the Apostles were continent after their vocation. Therefore Matth. 19.: Behold we have left all things, and Christ answers: Every one that hath left wife, etc.

SECONDLY they bring Tertullianum, lib. de monogamia, where treating of that prima Tim. 6. I will the younger to marry, where he seems to exhort to marriage those who had broken the first faith of the vow, as I said in the assertion.

IT IS ANSWERED that Tertullianus speaks of widows who had not yet vowed; for he says: On account of which he wills them to marry, that they afterward rescind not the first faith of widowhood; for if he spoke of those already fallen from the vow, how could he warn that they rescind not the first faith, when it had already been rescinded? More cautious therefore, having been made cautious by the fall of others, he wills others to marry, who are not willing to contain themselves.

THIRDLY they oppose D. Cyprianum, lib. 1. epist. 11., where he writes of certain virgins who, after they had dedicated themselves to God, were found to lie with men: But if from faith they have publicly dedicated themselves to Christ; and chastely, without any fable, let them persevere thus strong and stable, and await the reward of virginity; but if they are unwilling, or unable, to persevere, it is better that they marry than fall into the fire with their delights. Petrus Martyr, Calvinus, Brentius, and others press this place.

Bellarminus answers that in that epistle he presses that those who had fallen should be separated from their suitors, otherwise he threatens excommunication; therefore he exhorts to marry those who had not yet vowed, lest they fall as the former.

I indeed exhibit an easier answer, that S. Cyprianus does not speak of those who had vowed to Christ, etc. For he seems to speak of the same who had dedicated themselves, and who could marry. Therefore he exhorts them, with the Apostle, to rendering the vow; but if they are unwilling, or unable, that is, judge that they cannot, let them marry. For it is a manner of speaking: whether thou wouldst not, or couldst not, contain.

Martyr PRESSES Hilarium in cap. 19. Matth. where he says: Christ, about the Eunuchs, admonishes, if we are able, where he objects that he did not say: if we would.

IT IS ANSWERED that Hilarius adds nothing to the Gospel, but admonishes that we consider the powers of our will, whether with Divine help it can take this counsel.

They object also many others, who either praise marriages only, as Ignatius ad Philadelphios, Nazianzenus, Chrysostomus, etc.

Or they exaggerate against those who have the vow and keep it not, and cry out not indeed that it is better, but that it would have been future, that they should be married, as Basilius lib. de Virginitate, Epiphanius haeresi 61.

Or that continence profits outside the Church, as Hilarius in Psalm. 64.

But the REMAINING Papists they cry out are weak, mad, and deceived.

Petrus Martyr INSISTS, because D. Augustinus, although deceived, asserts that those marrying sin after the vow; nevertheless validly to marry.

IT IS ANSWERED, with D. Bonavent., that D. Augustinus spoke of the simple vow, not of the solemn, which by Divine natural law makes marriage invalid.

HE OBJECTS against the second assertion, because Monks are made by absorbing alms, which is against the Apostle, Ephes. 4. prima Thessal. 4. et secunda Thessal. 3. and D. Augustinum lib. de opere Monach. cap. 17.

Bellarminus answers, cap. 42., from D. Bonavent. in the questions on the rule of S. Francisci, q. 11. and in the Apologetic book against a certain unnamed man, near the end, and de paupertate Christi, contra Guilelmum, art. 2. ad 9. and in the Apologia Pauperum, and D. Thom. opus. 19. et 22. quaest. 187. art. 3. ad, that Religious are not bound to seek their food by the labor of their hands, as is said Actorum 6.: It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables. But the Apostle writes to certain idle seculars, as is plain to the reader. He exhorts (grant it) even Religious, as S. Franciscus exhorts his own, to do some work for avoiding idleness, yet so that he weaken not the spirit of prayer and devotion. Say the same as to D. Augustino, who obliges only those who, before they became Religious, lived by the labor of their hands, and who now can do the same without impediment to a greater good, and yet will not, out of idleness and sloth. For in cap. 21. he excepts the Religious who exercise Ecclesiastical ministries, such as all mendicants are at this time. For thus he says: If they are Evangelists, if ministers of the Altar, if dispensers of the Sacraments, they do not arrogate well to themselves, but plainly claim the power, namely of living from the means of the people. So S. Bonavent., who adds also D. Hieronymum, in the prologue on Iob.

Brentius objects secondly, in the confess. Vuirtemberg.: Either he vowing poverty is poor, and then he has nothing that he might leave; or rich, and then either he puts all things in common, and provides more surely for himself; or he gives to the poor, and so renders himself troublesome to his neighbor by his begging, and so against Charity.

Bellarminus answers, cap. 20.: Even the poor man to leave what he may acquire, from D. Augustino epistola 89. quaest. 4. But if a rich man, by putting into common he leaves the dominion, after the example of the Apostles, Actorum 4. Nor is it against Charity, because they give the rich an occasion of buying heaven; otherwise Christ would praise a thing against Charity. So also D. Bonav. in the places adduced.

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion.

I assert first that these are required for the state of religion.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure in the Apology for the Poor, chapter 3 of the first response, because for perfection it is required that man be withdrawn from those things that gravely impede Charity and draw him toward harmful things: but these three are the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, which most of all draw one away from God toward harmful things; and these are cut away by the vows: the first indeed by the vow of Chastity, the second by that of Poverty, the third by that of Obedience: Therefore. See this argument in the preceding question.

It is confirmed, for by these vows all our goods are offered to God, which are the exterior goods of the body and of the soul, as Aristotle teaches 1 Ethics, chapter 8, and book 17, chapter 13. Hence D. Gregory, homily 20 on Ezechiel, calls this a holocaust.

That these ought to be confirmed by vows is proved, for immobility is required for the state, and that one not easily look back, as is said Luke 9; but this is confirmed by vows: Therefore. So also D. Thomas here, and Valencia disputation 10, question 4, part 2. See also Alphonsus Rodriguez On Vows.

I assert second: among these, the vow of obedience is the chief.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure in the place cited, and in chapter 1 of the Rule, and D. Thomas article 8, because we offer to God the more excellent good, namely the will, which precedes the goods of the body and of fortune.

The Angelic Doctor observes moreover that clerics also promise obedience to the Bishop, as is said 11 question 1, chapter Non dicatis; nevertheless the obedience of Monks is more sublime, as is said Extra, de officio ordinarii, chapter 5. The reason is, because clerics promise to obey, the stability of their place remaining intact, and not in all things, but in certain spiritual matters. But Religious expose themselves to obedience, so that the prelate may send them wherever he wishes, and they are subject in all things that pertain to the rule.

I assert third, that these three vows suffice for constituting one in the state of religion.

The reasoning of D. Bonaventure is, because by these we are sufficiently dedicated to God immovably.

Note however that the emission of simple vows in the Society of Jesus, after the Novitiate, makes them religious. So declare Paul III, Julius III, Gregory XIII, who decreed penalties of excommunication with incurred sentence, and of incapacity for all offices and benefices, to be incurred by that very fact without declaration, against those contradicting. See Valencia. This privilege was confirmed to them by the holy Council of Trent session 26, chapter 16, on reform.

I assert fourth, that the vow of religious poverty ordinarily imposes two things: one, not to have anything proper; the other, not to have superfluities.

The former part all teach with D. Thomas article 3, and it is clear from the chapter Cum ad monasterium, on the state of monks. The latter part is clear from Clementine 1, on the state of monks, and it is handed down by Navarro in the chapter Non dicatis, number 27; Sylvester under the word Religio, question 6, question 7; Lessius book 2, chapter 41, dubitation 9; Valencia disputation 10, question 4, part 3; Tanner disputation 6, question 3, doubt 4; and others.

It must be noted, however, that these suffice for those who vow only particular Poverty, yet have goods in common, such as are all religious, except the Capuchins and those of the Observance, as the Council of Trent declares session 25, chapter 3.

Some objections are raised that carry no weight.

Since all orders agree in essence, grounded on the vows, it follows that they are not distinguished essentially; but only with respect to the ends of each, as I said in question 2, and as D. Bonaventure teaches in the place cited, D. Thomas questions 188, 189, Sylvester there, Lessius book 2, chapter 41, doubt 2, Laymann book 4, treatise 5, chapter 3, Faustus in skef. book 5, question 17, Bassaeus V. Religio 1, number 10.

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Whether the Pontiff may dispense in Solemn Vows.

Once the things I defined in disputation 1, question 28 are supposed, this question is easily solved, by admitting a juridical declaration.

The chief controversy is concerning the solemn vow of chastity.

The first, and celebrated, opinion is that the Pontiff can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and they assert the same concerning the other solemn vows. So a hundred and ten Doctors, related by Sanchez book 8, On Marriage, disputation 8. Only one of these, whom I have seen, Navar. commentary 2, on regulars, number 17, excepts the vow of poverty. Others are also related by Tanner disputation 5, question 4, number 122; Platus On the Good of the Religious State, book 2, chapters 16 and 27; Vasquez prima secundae, disputation 165. Add Bassaeus V. Votum 7, number 28, who says this is common among the Canonists and almost all the Theologians.

The second opinion denies that the Pontiff can dispense in solemn vows. So D. Thomas 2. 2. question 88, article 11, with twenty-two others, whom Sanchez relates in the place cited, number 5, where in support of this he brings forward D. Bonaventure, who, as we said in the first question, does not dare to condemn this opinion: yet he does not presume to prefer it to the opposing one, but says he does not know which is the better.

I ASSERT first that this second opinion is probable. So Sanchez confesses, having cited almost innumerable Doctors for the opposite opinion.

IT IS PROVED first from the chapter Cum ad monasterium, where it is said: The custody of chastity is so annexed to the monastic rule that against it not even the supreme Pontiff can grant a license.

SEE the responses related in the first question. This decree, moreover, is that of Innocent III. The Thomists press this text gravely, and especially Peter Labata Tom. 7, treatise 3, disputation 6, doubt 8.

Mastrius answers on behalf of all, in 4 dist. 7, number 512, that the sense is that the Pontiff cannot dispense in the composite sense, so that one exempted from the vows remains a Religious still; for the vows are of the essence of Religion. So also answer the twin most excellent writers on the sacrament of matrimony, Sanchez and Pontius.

Labata INSTANCES further, for there the Pontiff infers that an Abbot cannot dispense his subjects in the vow of chastity, because not even the supreme Pontiff himself has that power: but if, according to the aforesaid response, the supreme Pontiff could dispense by withdrawing a monk from the Religious state, he would not satisfy the question.

Mastrius answers that this author infers without any foundation that, if the Pontiff could call a Monk away from the Religious state, anyone could deduce that an Abbot also has the same power.

Yet Mastrius does not seem to have parried him correctly; for this is not the point on which Labata presses, nor does he pretend to infer that, but he argues thus: God forbid that an Abbot should think he can dispense with his Religious in solemn vows, because the vows are so intrinsic to Religion that against them not even the supreme Pontiff can grant a license. Now truly, to answer that the Pontiff can dispense by calling one away from Religion seems a mockery, because the Pontiff supposes the contrary in his reasoning; namely, that one cannot be dispensed in the vows of Religion, because they are intrinsic to it irrevocably; or because one cannot go back on promises made in Religion and on Religion itself, and the vows are intrinsic to Religion. Therefore I marvel that this response has been embraced by so many men: Socinus, Richard, Durandus, Paludanus, Cajetan, Palacio, Azorius, and Valencia, as in Sanchez book 8, disputation 8, numbers 7 and 12.

I STILL PRESS the point on behalf of Labata; for the reasoning of the Pontiff seems to suppose that Divine saying there, Luke 9: No one who puts his hand to the plough and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God, as S. P. Francis indicates chapter 2 of the Rule, and there D. Bonaventure, and likewise Leviticus, last chapter: The animal that has been vowed to God shall be holy, and cannot be changed. And upon this supposed foundation to infer: Since one legitimately professed is irrevocable from the Religious state, and Religion essentially includes these vows, it follows not only that one can be dispensed by an Abbot, but that it is absurd to say so; since not even the Pope can do this.

IT SEEMS TO ME that the sense is rather that of one reproaching an Abbot who thinks that it is within his right to grant a license, or a lawful concession, for retaining something proper, since very many deny it as probable even concerning the Pontiff himself; and that although for a most grave cause it has at some time been granted, the Pontiff ought to have exercised that supreme authority and fullness of power which he exercises in the whole world for a change of state on account of the universal good, a power and superintendence which an Abbot does not enjoy. So, then, divine law permitted in those cases. That the case has often happened, Cajetan relates treatise 1, work, title 27, and others, as in Sanchez. So Alexander III dispensed with Nicholas Justinian, a Monk, at the instance of the Most Serene Doge, lest the most illustrious offspring of the Justiniani perish: he took Anna to wife, by whom, having had six sons and three daughters, both entered religion and became famous for miracles. So it is related by Surius in the life of B. Laurence Justinian, and in Azor book 11, Institutions, chapter 7.

RAMIRUS, King of the Aragonese, having become a Monk, when his Father died without offspring, was dispensed by the Pontiff; and he married, and begot a daughter.

CASIMIR, the first of that name, King of Poland and a Monk, was dispensed and begot sons. Constance, daughter of Roger, dispensed from monastic profession, married Henry VI. They relate others also.

Azorius observes, moreover, that these had been professed. Which he rightly shows from the histories, and thereby refutes the responses of Soto and Sylvester.

Yet it is impious to condemn this practice, as Peter a S. Joseph Fuliensis warns book 4, On Religion, chapter 4.

IT IS PROVED second by D. Bonaventure, because for a dispensation to be valid a preponderant cause is necessary; but no such cause can exist for dispensing in the vow of chastity, because No weighing is worthy of the soul that is continent, as is said Ecclesiasticus 26. Therefore.

Sanchez answers number 7, and almost all the others: that a good can be given that preponderates, for instance the peace of a whole kingdom, the life of a King, which may be most necessary for preserving the kingdom, and other things of this weight, which, when weighed against the spiritual good of one monk, plainly preponderate. This response is taken from D. Bonaventure in the place cited, who nevertheless warns that they not be deceived by positing such causes unless they are morally certain to achieve the effect; then truly the Angelic Doctor gives way.

Sanchez ADDS that that argument of the incomparable goodness of continence can also be adapted to the simple vow, and yet it is certain that in this the Pontiff can dispense.

BUT D. Bonaventure with others cite that passage for the solemn vow, because it hands over the soul perfectly, together with the body, as a pledge to God, and on that account, I judge, the Holy Spirit said: there is no weighing of the soul that is continent, in the place cited above.

HENCE another argument is taken from D. Bonaventure. What is given over entirely to God cannot be taken from Him by any inferior: But by solemn vows there is made a total giving-over of man to God, and thus by divine law he remains wholly devoted to God, as I showed in question 1. Therefore.

Sanchez answers number 120, from D. Bonaventure in the place cited, that for the sake of the common good something given over to God can be taken away, because God, since He always wills what is better, judges Himself sufficiently compensated. On this question 1, disputation 1.

IT IS PROVED fourth by D. Bonaventure cited distinction 14, article 2, question 1. What is of divine natural law is dispensable by no one, the Church included: But the solemn vow of chastity is of divine natural law, in this way, that it voids marriage: Therefore. The major is an axiom of all, as I said in question 1. The minor was proved there with respect to the former part. That it voids marriage by divine natural law is proved from Pope Syricius epistle 1, chapter 6, and it is related in the chapter Si quis sacro, § Si quis sacra, § Velata, 27 question 1, where he says: Those who contract after a solemn vow are to be separated by the word of the Lord and by canonical authority. Therefore that marriage is void not by ecclesiastical law alone, but also by divine law.

It is CONFIRMED by D. Bonaventure question 3: A thing given over to one is invalidly given over to another, by the law of nature.

For no one can transfer to another what he does not have, by the rule of the chapter Quod autem, on the law of patronage. But by the solemn vow of Religion the dominion of the person is transferred to God, so that he no longer has the use of his body for the acts of marriage: Therefore. It is confirmed, for on this account a spouse cannot marry another; and although the Church, as accepting the consent, assists, yet it is not by ecclesiastical law alone that a spouse is bound to one spouse, not to marry another, but by the law of nature.

Sanchez answers in the place cited, from what was said in disputation 6, number 2, that dispensation is possible over divine natural law which acknowledges its origin from human will, such as vows and oaths are, although not always in absolute divine natural law; although some, among whom is D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, article 2, question 3, deny that any relaxation is made, but only a declaration in that prior law, in the mode explained in disputation 1, question 1.

These things, therefore, are not so firm that they do not lie overthrown by the preceding disputation, question 1, and here question 1: for if dispensation is possible in every law dependent on our will, it will also be lawful to dispense in polygamy; for the obligation of spouses is of such a kind.

Finally it is proved, because, as Abdias relates, S. Matthew was unwilling to dispense so that Iphigenia, professed in monastic life, should marry the King, who was offering himself and his whole kingdom to be consecrated in Baptism.

Sanchez answers, from Cajetan, that this was done because it did not befit the beginning of the nascent Church for religion to be propagated with those things relaxed that pertain most strongly to it, and with so apparent a defect of religion.

But (with deference to them) who does not know that at the beginning some things were tolerated, lest a scandal be set against the increase of religion? So also D. Gregory the Pope wrote to S. Augustine in England. So the Ecclesiastical Annals testify that many things were tolerated at that time, which were afterward restricted when the forces of the Church had been strengthened.

I assert second: It is also probable that it is within the Pontiff's right to dispense in solemn vows, supposing what is proved in Treatise on Marriage, disputation 7, question 6, that the solemnity of vows is from Ecclesiastical Law.

It is proved first by D. Bonaventure. Nothing is to be denied to Pontifical authority that befits the governance of the Church, unless some implication or inconvenience follows: but dispensation in solemn vows is profitable to the Church, as would befit it if for the peace of some kingdom, or the salvation of a King profitable to the Church; nor does any implication follow: Therefore.

The last part of the Minor is proved. Either it is repugnant because it is of divine law; and this is not so, because beyond all doubt dispensation is granted in the simple vow, which is of divine law. Or it is repugnant on account of the matter of continence, to which no good can be equal; and neither is this so, as we have seen, because the good of a whole kingdom preponderates: Or it is repugnant on account of solemnity; and neither is this so, for in solemnity the reason of the vow is not placed. Or lastly it is repugnant on the part of the giving-over; and neither is this so, because for the public good what has been given over can justly be recalled.

Yet this argument can be weakened from what has been said, by denying the Minor on account of the arguments brought in question 1, and in the preceding disputation, question 1, with D. Bonaventure. Yet very many acclaim it, as in Mastrius number 510.

It is proved second by the argument brought by D. Bonaventure at the beginning of the body. The will of man, inasmuch as he is political and ordered toward the common good of the Republic, is subordinated to the head in those things that pertain to the political common good: Therefore in the will of a religious, bound by the tie of a vow binding him, there is included the condition, unless the Head of the community, that is, the Pontiff, relax these ties for the sake of the common good. And it is confirmed, for if for the sake of the household it is granted to a Father to void the vows of his sons, and to a husband those of his wife, why should it be denied to the supreme Parent and Prince of all, for the public utility of the whole Church?

Yet this argument, which Sanchez trumpets as the principal one, is not very Seraphic in its proof, because since these vows are most pleasing to God, and are His counsels, it does not seem probable that they should be made under a condition, while it does not remain altogether proved that some good preponderates.

The last argument of D. Bonaventure, which is found in the cited distinction, article 2, question 1, which he greatly values, and on which Sanchez relies, is this. In doubt, the deeds of the Pontiff are to be presumed good, since he is directed by the Holy Spirit in a special manner in the governance of the Church; but it is established from the histories related by Cajetan Tom. 1, opusc. title 17, on the dispensation of marriage, in the western Church a single question, and by others. This argument indeed prevails over the others, and by it the Seraphic Doctor was deterred from the opposing opinion. Add that Sanchez testifies that Pontiffs have very often dispensed; but the unworthy response of Sylvester V. Votum is exploded by Peter Mastrius, and justly.

Hence it follows that the same must be said also concerning the other vows: for the reason is the same, as Sanchez indicates book 5, Decalogue, chapter 2, number 9, the more so because a married man cannot keep religious poverty. So Rebadene in the Institute of the Society of Jesus, chapter 18; Azor book 12, Moral Institutions, chapter 7, question 2; Vasquez prima secundae, disputation 165, chapter 9, number 104.

The same argument is pressed also concerning the vow of obedience, for a married man ought to be the governing head.

Hence it follows much more that the Pope can dispense in the vow annexed to sacred orders; for it is not so solemn, nor per se, but annexed to sacred orders, and thus there is the least controversy about this, since it is annexed by ecclesiastical law.

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

I suppose that the individual Orders each have some particular statutes on this state. Since, however, there are four principal Rules, namely those of Basil, Augustine, Benedict, and Francis, yet the individual Orders also differ in their statutes, and much more those alien to them, such as the Carthusians and the Jesuits.

But in this matter I shall treat of those things that are almost common, and met with in every Order.

First, Bishops, bound by oath to the most holy Pope, cannot be received without his license. So D. Thomas question 189, article 7, from the chapter Nisi cum pridem, on renunciation.

Second, nor can spouses whose marriage has been consummated, as in the chapter Quidam, and the chapter Placet, on the conversion of the married. They can, however, by mutual consent, as in the chapter Cum sis, the chapter Uxoratus, the chapter Ad Apostolicam, on the conversion of the married; but the woman, if she is young, or of such a condition that her incontinence might be feared if she remained in the world, is bound to enter a monastery, her husband entering. Otherwise it is enough if she vow continence into the hands of the Bishop.

But judgment is to be made from the state of the person, health, and previous life, as Pontius says On Marriage, book 9, chapter 12. But whether there is danger, the Bishop will judge, in the chapter Si vir et uxor, 27 question 2, the chapter Quia Agatho, the chapter Scripsit nobis, 27 question 2, as S. Bonaventure observes on chapter 2 of the Rule, where S. Father Francis provided for this.

But S. Doctor notes that the age owed for this, so that the wife may remain in the world without suspicion, her husband entering Religion, is to be measured rather by the stability of virtue than by the lapse of years; for it is said Wisdom 4: Gray hairs are the wisdom of man, and the age of old life a life unspotted. Pontius agrees in the place cited, Bassaeus V. Religio 2, number 2. Therefore he does not determine that she be fifty years old, as Sanchez On Marriage, book 7, disputation 32, number 15 would have it, Gutierrez On Marriage, chapter 95, Bonacina question 3, part 3, number 12, Filliucius treatise 10, part 2, number 133; nor does he determine that she be sixty, with Faustus in thes. relig. book 5, question 55, Azor treatise 1, book 12, chapter 1, question 6.

Yet in a ratified marriage, one may enter religion against the spouse's will, in the chapter Verum, the chapter Ex publico, on the conversion of the married; or if within two months the man has consummated by violence, Diana On the Sacraments, resolution 242, part 3; or if one commits adultery, in the chapter Agathosa, 27 question 2, the chapter Porro, on divorce, yet not if he has pardoned it; or if the spouse fall into heresy, distinction 32, question 1, chapter 1.

THIRD, because he deflowered a virgin under promise of marriage. See Diana part 3, On the Sacraments, resolution 203.

FOURTH, a servant against his master's will, in the chapter Si quis, 17 question 2.

FIFTH, one who is a debtor; so D. Thomas 2. 2. last question, article 6: a debtor, I say, by contract or by wrong, as I said on Pess. Yet the profession will be valid, though illicit, according to Clement VIII In suprema, where he moderates the Bull of Sixtus V.

SIXTH, those obliged to render accounts, by Sixtus V, Cum de omnibus.

SEVENTH, sons whose parents lie in grave poverty: or conversely.

EIGHTH, those under age without the license of parents or guardians, D. Thomas 1. 2. question 88, article 9, and question 101, article 4, and the last question, article 5.

NINTH, one illegitimate, whose surviving father has professed in that religion. But by their own statutes some orders exclude homicides, the infamous, and those born of Jews, Saracens, or heretics.

ELEVENTH, those blemished in body; for such are kept from the altar, in the chapter De corpore vitiato, and chapter 2, de clerico aegrotante.

TWELFTH, the infamous. Add, by the Constitution of Sixtus V, criminals. These are those who have perpetrated shameful deeds, and these are notorious. Likewise exclude those gravely suspected.

TWELFTH again, Bigami cannot be Clerics.

But the Prelate is bound to be informed; and if through his fault a criminal is received, or one obliged to render accounts, etc., he incurs the penalties of privation of voice, of incapacity for all offices and honors, etc. See Tamburinus treatise 3, On Abbatial Law, disputation 6, question 4; Portel. doubts on the Rule, under Novitii informatio; Rodriguez treatise 3, questions on the Rule, question 10; Miranda treatise 1, questions 17, 18, 19; Peyrin treatise 2, On Prelates, question 3, chapter 1, § 1; Vecch. in praxi, disputation 6, doubt 7; Bassaeus V. Religio 2, who warns that one is bound, when being received, to disclose his own grave impediment.

Those, therefore, are to be received who are fit to serve Religion. Whence those are justly condemned with mortal fault who receive worthless or unfit persons.

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

On NOVICES.

The SPECULUM adds a verse of D. Bonaventure, in which Novices suit their conduct to it exactly, and the Fathers, destined to admit candidates to profession, anatomically examine the life of the novices. A truly heavenly little work.

He adds ANOTHER similar work. On the Institution of Novices; a truly golden work. But he gathers all things more fully discussed in the Rule of Novices.

Again, he adds another little work for nuns on the perfection of life.

The holy Council of Trent DECREES, session 25, chapter 15, that profession is not valid if the novice has not completed 16 years and has not completed a full year of probation; and S. Bonaventure observes this in our Rule ad cap. 2.

The YEAR must be completed after the civil manner, so that if it be a leap year, two days count as one.

If a novice about to die is admitted to profession by privilege, the parents succeed ab intestato, whatever Diana may say with others, part. 3. de dub. reg. resol. 17. and part. 5. tract. 5. resol. 139. The reason is, because it is granted only for spiritual consolation, and therefore it cannot in the external forum prejudice the legitimate heirs, nor devolve the inheritance upon the monastery, where there is no right; and no obligation either.

The year OUGHT to be whole and continuous, not interrupted; Rodriquez tome 2. cap. 8. and tome 3. qq. quaest. 15. art. 8. Sa V. Relig. num. 9. Azor tract. 1. lib. 12. cap. 2. quaestio 8. Bonacina de claus. quaest. 2. puncto 10. diff. 2. Nauar. de reg. consil. 32. et 33. Henriquez lib. 13. de excomm. cap. 40. Sylvester V. religio 5. q. 4. D. Anton. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 3. §. 2. Faust. in thes. lib. 5. quaest. 163. et 164. Sanchez lib. 5. cap. 4. Bassaeus V. Religio 3. num. 5.

If a novice runs away for two hours in the habit and returns, the year is interrupted, according to the decision of the Cardinals in Barthosa de im. can. lib. 1. c. 42. n. 139. Vecch. disp. 11. dub. 3. num. 6. et 15.

The year OUGHT to be completed in the habit of the Religion, as Sylvester V. Religio 5. quaest. 5. Angel. V. novitius, Vecchius disp. 11. dub. 7. and others in Bassaeus num. 7. teach.

IF the novitiate was null, it must be repeated, because there is no cause, nor is potency directed to the past: So Nauar. and Rodriquez in Bassaeus num. 9.

Those receiving to profession among the Mendicants, before the year is completed, are excommunicated and suspended ipso facto from the faculty of admitting to profession, cap. Non solum de reg. in 6.; the same censure binds those who during that whole year hinder the novice from freely passing to another order, unless he has made profession when older than 16 years. In other Orders, however, they sin gravely against the precept of the Council of Trent, session 25. de regul. cap. 15.

Superiors CAN, for a cause, prolong profession, by the old law, from which the Tridentine Synod does not derogate in this matter. It is indeed conceded by Pius V. in Rodriquez loco citato, and Bassaeus num. 10. provided that within six months he may be hoped to become fit.

NOVICES are not bound by the statutes of the Religion, since they are not yet members. See Bassaeum n. 11. et 13.

They enjoy the privilege of the Canon, and of the Forum, Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 39. num. 17. et lib. 6. cap. 10. Layman lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 4. Diana de dub. regular. Resol. 73.

One RETURNING to the world does not fall back into the censures or irregularities from which he was absolved in the Religion by force of the privileges, which Vecch. disp. 9. dub. 25. adduces. See Suarez tract. 5. in 3. part. disp. 7. sect. 5. num. 35. Dianam cit. resol. 44. Bonacina de leg. dist. 4. quaest. 2. puncto 7. §. 4. num. 28. Bassaeus num. 16. says this is the more probable opinion.

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

What is required for profession in a Religious Order.

THIS PROFESSION is of one kind express, of another tacit. Express profession is made in express words, in writing, or by signs: Tacit profession, however, is presumed to have been made, first, if after completing the year of probation one wears the habit of the professed, distinct indeed from the habit of novices, for three days. cap. ad Nostram de regul. Secondly, in assuming such a habit one does something proper to the professed even before the three days, for instance casting a vote in the chapters or elections. Thirdly, if for a whole year one wears the habit of the professed, when the year has passed one is presumed to have made profession. Clement. eos, de Regul. See Manuel tract. 1. sum. cap. 8. num. 13. Azor. lib. 12. ap. 4. quaestio 2. Sanchez lib. 5. cap. 3. Mirandam tract. 1. quaest. 14. art. 1. Layman lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 5. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 41. num. 57. Vecch. disp. 13. dub. 8. Bassaeum V. Religio 4. num. 1. Thus by one of these modes one will be professed tacitly.

The Council of Trent notes, in truth, that it did not change or take away these modes, but only added that the year of probation be completed, and that the age of sixteen years be fully completed to the point. The reception also of Sacred Orders induces profession of this kind, as the Sacred Congregation declared in 1619, according to Tamburin. de iure, Abb. dist. 6. quaest. 13. num. 12.

NOTE also that by constitut. cap. fin. quaest. 1. profession is to be set down in writing by the one making it, if he knows how to write, and signed.

¶ BESIDES the conditions related from the Council of Trent as necessary, where the Council is received, others are required.

THE FIRST, that it be made in a monastery of one's own sex. Thus a hermaphrodite, being equally of both sexes, professes nowhere. Portel. V. Professio, who says that a professed woman, if she should break out into a male, is bound to pass over to a men's religion. But this does not please me; for her profession is precisely that of the Nuns. See Dianam part. 5. tract. 14. Resol. 49.

THE SECOND condition is, that one be received by one having the power. These are the General, the Provincial, and the immediate local Prelate with his community; for without the consent of the greater part of the community the Prelates cannot admit anyone, nor can the community act against the Prelate's refusal; Rodriquez tract. 5. qq. 17. art. 7. Vecch. disp. 12. dub. 1. et Sanchez lib. 5. 14. a num. 62. cum Bassaeo num. 3. The reception, however, belongs to the Prelates, as is commended to the more prudent, and the consent of prudent brothers is added to the reception, as the holy Doctor says ad cap. 2. Regulae Minorum. Wherefore the General or Provincial can command the superior of the Novitiate not to admit anyone without his license, under declaration of nullity, Nauar. lib. 2. cons. reg. 61. Rodriquez tract. 3. qq. quaest. 57. art. 7. for his power is eminent in the major Prelate.

ALL are bound, indeed, not to exclude a suitable candidate, Suarez tract. 3. de relig. lib. 4. cap. 3. num. 7. Vecch. disp. 11. dub. 1. Portel. V. Novitius, num. 55. et in addit. num. 17. Mirand tract. 1. quaest. 25. art. 1. et 2. Diana part. 7. tract. 11. resol. 26. Bassaeus V. Religio, 4. num. 3. And the holy Doctor indicates this ad cap. 2. Reg. minorum.

The REASON is, because a great evil is inflicted on that one, while he is deprived of so great a good; just as a grave evil is inflicted on the Religion, whether suitable men are driven out, or guilty and unfit ones are admitted. For this reason it is entrusted to them, endowed with the fisher's art, to cast the good into vessels, the bad and unfit being cast outside, as the holy Doctor discusses.

BUT if, even after vows are given, the Fathers of the convent find or uncover some grave defect in the novice, they can still expel him: for the year is given for approval, cap. ad Apostolicam. And as it is permitted rarely in marriage, so in spiritual marriage cap. Inter corporalia, de transl. Episcop. So Bassaeus num. 3. Vecch. disp. 12. dub. 7. who in disp. 5. says that private individuals by voice cannot give a vote.

THIRDLY, there is required a mind of the one professing free from violence, grave fear, or importunate entreaties, and from the displeasure of parents, etc. cap. Perlatum de his, quae vi. Sanchez de matrim. lib. 4. disp. 6. num. 18. et disp. 7. num. 7. Coninch. disp. 28. dub. 2. num. 35. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 17. num. 35. Vecch. disp. 13. dub. 12. Bassaeus num. 5. In doubt, however, whether the fear was grave, judgment must be given in favor of the profession itself which holds possession, thus Sanchez lib. 4. moral. cap. 3. Bonacina de leg. disp. 4. quaest. 2. puncto. 3. §. 1. num. 11.

A profession that is null can be ratified, unless it was made in a non-approved Religion. See Bassaeum.

The Council of Trent sess. 25. de reg. cap. 19. grants that one who presumes he has professed invalidly may object only within five years, unless within that time he was prevented. He must bring forward the causes for objecting before his own superior.

NOTE truly, that if the profession was null, it is not ratified by the lapse of five years, for what does not subsist by right from the beginning is not confirmed by the passage of time; thus Diana part. 6. tract. 7. Resol. 56.

The causes for objecting see with the rest in Bonacina de claus. quaest. 2. puncto 10. Sanchez de matrim. lib. 7. disp. 37. Suarez de relig. tract. 3. lib. 7. cap. 3.

I shall recount the EFFECTS of the obligation when I treat of the individual vows.

BUT it brings many goods. The first good which it carries about is the Restoration of Baptismal innocence: So D. Thom. q. 189. art. 5. Navar. tract. 2. de reg. num. 60. Peyrin. tract. 2. de prael. quaest. 3. cap. 1. num. 154. Sà V. religio, num. 17. Layman lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 10. Villalobos tom. 2. tract. 35. diff. 26.

SOME add that one who in profession has placed an impediment, if he repents, receives back innocence; But I do not see whence they prove this ex opere operato, where this promise is found, as Cajetan notes ad locum citatum D. Thom. art. 3. ad 3. Azor tract. 1. lib. 12. cap. 5. quaestio 11. Navar. de indulg. not. 20. num. 17.

THEN profession removes the irregularity which arises from defect of birth for orders and simple benefices cap. 1. de filiis Presbyt.

It removes STAINS with respect to temporal acts ex Amb. de monach. collat. 1.

Moreover, one is freed from paternal power with respect to burdens. See Sanchez numero 29. Finally, profession made before the death of a parent blots out the mark of ingratitude, on account of which one could be disinherited. See Layman lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 10.

The holy Doctor recounts many reasons, quaest. 10. in Reg. why not all are to be received into Religion.

He heaps up many motives, on account of which suitable persons are to be received into religion quaest. 15. in Regulam. Those reasons, however, as well as these motives, since they are evident of themselves from common practice, I pass over here.

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

That religious are bound to perfection — not indeed to be possessed in act, but to be pursued — the Doctors commonly grant, as D. Bonaventure, book 1, On the Progress of the Religious, cap. 1, and in the Questions on the Rule, question 16, and p. p. On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, cap. 2, 3, and 4, and part 4, cap. 4, LI. 1 D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 184 a. 5 ad 2, and q. 186 a. 2 and 9, and there Cajetan, Abul. q. 144 on cap. 9 of Matthew: Astensis, part 2, tit. 47, art. 1, q. 3; Carthusian, On the Reform of Cloisters, book 1, art. 1; D. Antoninus, part 3, tit. 16, cap. 1, §. 1; Angelus, verb. Religiosus, num. 27; Sylvester, there, 1, q. 3; Armilla, n. 3; Tabiena, q. 4; Navarrus, com. 1 de Regularibus, num. 10, dist. 10; Corduba, on the Rule of St. Francis, cap. 1, q. 3, dict. 2; Viguerius, book, Institutiones, cap. 7, §. 1; Azor, book 11, tract. 1, Institutiones, last cap., question 11; Valentia, disp. 10, q. 4, point 4; Bannes, Prima Secundae, q. 53, art. 3, dub. 3; Manuel, qq. regul., tract. 3, q. 48, art. 1; Beltramus, tract. On the Vow of Poverty, cap. 3; Sanchez, On the Decalogue, vol. 2, book 6, cap. 5. The reason of D. Bonaventure is, because this is the School of virtues. Hence Christ says, Matthew 19: If you will, etc. This opinion is terrible to many Religious, as Bassaeus says, V. obed. num. 17, with Navarrus, com. 1 de Reg. num. 10.

Yet all are not bound to pursue every perfection, but according to the condition of their rule. So D. Bonaventure in the letter to the Provincials and Custodes, and in the places cited, and D. Thomas q. 186 a. 2, and the rest with the holy Doctors.

The reason of D. Bonaventure in the places adduced is, because religious orders are instituted by the mind of their Founder and by the confirmation of the Apostolic See, like ranks drawn up in battle array to attain some end by the use of certain appointed means: therefore only these must be insisted upon; otherwise there will never be any firm exercise of the virtues in any religious.

There is, however, a difficulty: whether this be enjoined upon us by a particular precept.

I assert that it is not a particular precept. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure, in the places cited, who everywhere enjoins and declares perfection through the observance of the rule. Hence also Cajetan, q. 186 a. 6, and Corduba, cap. 1 of the Rule, q. 3, dict. 3, who seem to assert that it is a particular precept, conclude that contempt of the rule and of this obligation of tending to perfection are inseparable.

It is proved first by D. Bonaventure, On the Progress of the Religious, cap. 1, for in Apocalypse 2 Christ, rebuking that Prelate who had already grown tepid, says: I have against you a few things: because you have left your first charity: wherefore do penance, and do the first works.

There nothing else is enjoined than that he take up again the first works of the virtues, especially charity, and tread back the interrupted way through the bypaths: therefore it suffices that works of charity be done toward the end. For so it is said also in Ecclesiastes 9: Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly; and this is said even to seculars, to whom nevertheless no one will say that perfection is enjoined by a distinct precept: otherwise all mortal sins would have to be doubled, which no one, not even the most fearful, will say. So likewise a religious, as often as he violates his vows or precepts, would commit a double mortal sin, which is unheard of, nor are sins to be multiplied so without cause, as Sanchez, num. 5, warns.

The question, however, is: when is one said to sin against this obligation?

D. Thomas, q. 186 a. 2 and 9, and Cajetan on the same art. 2 and 9, D. Antoninus, Angelus, Armilla, Valentia, cited at num. 1, say that it is contravened when there is contempt of the counsels by which perfection is reached, and Valentia, disp. 10, q. 4, point 5, col. penult., with Cajetan, explain this contempt to be, when a Religious transgresses the rules for this reason, that he is unwilling to subject himself to them. Cajetan, moreover, speaks of religious and seculars, as Azor notes, tract. 1, book 11, last cap., question 11.

But Sylvester, verb. Religio, 1, q. 3; Tabiena, q. 4; Corduba, On the Rule, cap. 1, q. 3, dict. 3, say that to contemn is not to esteem; and so he contemns religious perfection who has no intention of tending to it; although such a one does not sin out of contempt, but out of negligence or cupidity. In the same way speak D. Antoninus, Angelus, and Sylvester, n. 1, as cited, with D. Thomas, q. 184 a. 5 ad 2, that religious are liars as often as they withdraw their mind from the perfection which they profess. Where Cajetan at the end, and Navarrus, Commentary 1 de Regularibus, num. 10, judge that D. Thomas in this place means that this is a mortal sin; otherwise there would be no distinction between religious and seculars: for these too sin mortally in contemning the counsels, and thus the question concerning the obligation of the Religious by reason of his state, which is the school of perfection, would be vain.

D. Bonaventure, in the Compendium of Theological Truth, book 5, cap. 6, says that a Religious is bound to perfection, because all things are renounced; but seculars to the precepts, without which Charity is not had. Nearly the same he has in the Apology of Poverty, cap. 3, first reply, where he says that the perfection of the religious consists in the observance of the counsels of the Gospel. This he explains thus: as the perfection necessary for all is the observance of the commandments, so the Evangelical perfection of the religious is to avoid even those things which are occasions of sins, which are enumerated by D. John, 1 epist. cap. 2: All that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. The incentives of the concupiscence of the flesh are avoided by the Vow of chastity, Matthew 19: There are eunuchs, etc. The incentives of the concupiscence of the eyes, by the counsel of Christ, Matthew 19: If you will be perfect, etc. The vex of pride, by the counsel of the same Christ, Matthew 16: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, etc. By the Vow of obedience, which is not extended to all the objects of the will, as I showed at length with D. Bonaventure, Tract. On the Vow, disp. 1, sect. 2, q. 2; and in this threefold turning away from evil and its origin, the first part of Evangelical perfection consists, as both Sacred Scripture insinuates and the holy Fathers, the Institutes of Religions, affirm.

Therefore in these turnings away from evil and its occasions he places the first part of Evangelical perfection.

The second, indeed, stands in the pursuit of supererogatory good through the active and contemplative life toward God, through vehement charity toward the neighbor, through great beneficence toward enemies, of which Matthew 5: Do good to them that hate you. Be you perfect, etc.

THIRD, in the supererogatory endurance of adversities, by bearing them with a joyful spirit, as is said James 1: Count it all joy, when you shall fall into various temptations.

He says that the first three indeed fall under vow. Hence St. Francis hands down the rule: The rule of the Friars Minor is this: to observe the holy Gospel of our Lord, living in obedience, without property, and in chastity.

The OTHER three he sets down as desirable in the manner of admonitions, commending them: Let the brothers attend that above all they ought to desire to have the spirit of the Lord and his holy operation, to pray always to God with a pure heart, and to have humility and patience in infirmity and tribulation, and to love those who persecute us.

He SUBINFERS, moreover, that religious are bound to perfection by vow, and some by reason of state, that is, Bishops, who are bound to the acts of perfection.

THIS perfection, moreover, he places in the observance of the vows and precepts of the rule, and concludes: From all these it openly shines forth that the vow of religion places one in the state of perfection.

From these I deduce those two assertions which follow.

FIRST I assert that the perfection sufficient for Christians is to keep the Precepts.

It is proved by the holy Doctor, 1. from Matthew 19: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. This, the holy Doctor says, is the ladder, ad the Gradual of the Mass.

NEXT he proves the same in the place cited from D. Prosper, On the Contemplative Life, book 1, cap. 15: They are perfect who, willing what God wills, acquiesce in no sins by which God is offended.

He brings the same testimony from the Seven Journeys, journey 4, dist. 4, art. 3.

He ADDS that of Deuteronomy 18: You shall be perfect and without spot before the Lord your God, where the Gloss: without criminal spot.

IF, however, someone should propose, they assert that not to pursue the counsels is only venial, as Sanchez, book 6, cap. 5, num. 8, with Cajetan, q. 186 a. 2; Corduba, On the Rule, cap. 1, q. 3, last disp.; Valentia, disp. 10, q. 4, point 4; Azor, book 11, Institutiones, last cap., question 11.

As to Religious.

I SUPPOSE, from D. Bonaventure, book 5, Compendium of Theological Truth, cap. 69 and 70, that this perfection adds the observance of the counsels, which differ from the precepts by their nature, because a counsel is a persuasion to a better supererogatory good.

The holy Doctor finds TWELVE counsels in the Gospel.

The FIRST is that of poverty, Matthew 19: If you will be perfect, etc.; Luke 14: Who does not renounce all, etc.

The SECOND of obedience, Matthew 23: Upon the chair of Moses, etc. All things whatsoever they shall say, etc.

The THIRD of chastity, Matthew 19: There are eunuchs who have castrated themselves, etc.

The FOURTH, beneficence toward enemies beyond necessity, Matthew 5: Do good, etc.

The FIFTH, of meekness, Matthew 5: If anyone strike you on one cheek, offer him the other also: and he who will contend with you in judgment, and take away your coat, do not forbid him.

The SIXTH is that of supererogatory mercy, Luke 6: Give to everyone who asks you.

The SEVENTH, simplicity of words, Matthew 5: Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no.

The EIGHTH, avoiding the remote occasions of sin, Matthew 5 and 18: If your eye, etc.

The NINTH, perfect intention of the end, Matthew 5: Let your light shine, etc.

The TENTH, perfect conformity to doctrine, Matthew 23: For they bind heavy burdens.

The ELEVENTH, avoiding solicitude, 1 Cor. 7, Romans 12, Luke 10.

The TWELFTH, reproving even venial faults, for with regard to mortal faults correction is a precept, and its order. Of these counsels some are promised under vows; others are urged by admonitions.

I ASSERT, therefore, that the perfection necessary for the Religious is that which consists in the vows and precepts of the rule and in the Constitutions of superiors: but that a Religious who wishes to omit the remaining counsels and admonitions does not forthwith sin mortally, as they say; so also Bassaeus, V. obed. 17, Sanchez, book 6, cap. 5, and Azor, tract. 1, book 1, cap. 11, question 11.

It is proved by a reason drawn from D. Bonaventure in the places cited. In the state of perfection that perfection is necessary which is expressed as necessary in the rule; but the others, since they are simple admonitions, do not induce mortal sin: For I knew not sin, but by the law. Therefore it will be mortal only from grave contempt, as Cajetan collects, on art. 2, q. 186, from D. Thomas. And the same judge Azor, vol. 1, book 11, last cap., question 11, and Sanchez, book 6, cap. 5, num. 9. Therefore, if the contempt be light, the fault will be only venial.

I ADD, however, with Sanchez, book 6, cap. 4, num. 18, and cap. 5, num. 9, from D. Bonaventure in a letter to a certain Provincial, and in another to the Ministers and Custodes, that that proposal would be deadly, on account of the danger of transgressing even the precepts and vows, and on account of the scandals which it will bring — molestations and disquietudes which it will stir up, for example, if he should be unwilling to keep the prayers, silence, and solitude, and the other holy admonitions of the rule. Bassaeus subscribes, as cited.

Sanchez ADDS, num. 10, that a religious sins lethally against this precept if, while keeping the rule and the vows, he intends not to attain the perfection of the religious life, nor the end intended through it.

It is proved, because he has in mind the contrary intention of attaining the end promised; and this the holy Doctor willed, saying that for the perfection of supererogation it is necessary at least to have the desire, namely, that there be not at least a contrary intention. The same Corduba judges, on cap. 1 of the Rule, q. 3.

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be judged.

FROM the commonly received doctrine of D. Dionysius cap. 7 of the Divine Names, which D. Thomas, Paludanus, book 4, dist. 38, q. 3, art. 1, reports and follows; D. Antoninus, part 3, tit. 16, cap. 4, §. 4, with very many others cited; Manuel, qq. regul., vol. 3, q. 48, art. 1; Tanner, disp. 6, q. 3, dub. 2, num. 34; Valentia, disp. 16, q. 6, point 2 — who accordingly teach that the greater excellence of Religion compared with others is that which pursues either a better end, or more of the better means; which is praised not on account of austerities or the quantity of works, but on account of the proportion of the means to the end.

I SUPPOSE first, with D. Bonaventure, in the Apology, cap. 3, first reply, and q. 18 on the Rule of St. Francis, that religions agree in many things. For first they agree in the end of Charity, which they set before themselves not only by keeping the precepts, by which sins against Charity are removed, but also by warding off the occasions of evil and the impediments to good. Such are the vows; for by the observance of the law is warded off all that is in the world, whether the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life, which are the three chief heads of sins, from which the others are derived. By the vows, moreover, they are separated even from those things which give occasion to sins. Thus by the vow of Chastity is removed whatever fosters the concupiscence of the flesh: by the vow of poverty, whatever fosters the concupiscence of the eyes: and by the vow of obedience, that which fosters the pride of life.

NEXT they agree, because all Religions constitute for themselves some peculiar work of Charity, or even some things as their immediate end, through which they may at length come to the end of Charity, and they add besides peculiar exercises and observances, that they may the more easily keep the vows and attain the immediate and ultimate end: such are vigils, penances, etc.

ALL must also be approved by the Apostolic See. This Valentia also has, point 1, and others.

The holy Doctor OBSERVES further, serm. 22 of the Hexaemeron, and in the places adduced, that the variety of religions serves for the ornament of the Church, with which the Church being clothed shines forth, in a garment of gold, encompassed with variety. Psalm 44. For some devote themselves to contemplation alone, whom the holy Doctor compares to Thrones. He says these are the Monks. Others apply themselves to contemplation and also to instructing the common people, teaching them by sermons and leading peoples to salvation; and he says these are the Preachers, whom he compares to Cherubim. Others especially insist on Divine love by an uttermost separation from worldly things, sequestered from the world, with most perfect poverty excluding even common possession, and rejecting other comforts: with most perfect chastity guarding even against companionships and other things that foster love. By the most lofty obedience, obeying in all things where there is no offense of God; and he says this is the Seraphic religion, which corresponds to the Seraphim; while it is destined also for the purifying, illuminating, and perfecting of others, as he pursues at length also in p. p. the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.

THEREFORE, taking my stand on what has been assumed, I say that that religion is the better which more fully attains the end, and those the better means which are more ordered in a straight line; for the nobility and pre-eminence of religions is to be judged with respect to the end of Charity, and of austerities insofar as they are ordained to a greater separation from the world and approach to God; for the further one withdraws from one extreme, the nearer one approaches the opposite.

IN this, however, some of the Recentiores take up a falsehood, saying that no greater perfection of a religion is to be judged from the frequentation of the choir, because it may be that it does not conduce to the end intended, namely Charity, and indeed impedes greater goods, namely the exercises of teaching and preaching; and if at any time in an order of this kind the Choir is burdened, it is destined for those only who are unfit for the spiritual exercises of the salvation of souls. Hence they conclude that there can be most perfect religions not using the Choir at all, the more so because they hold that those unfit for their institute of preaching and teaching must be excluded.

TRULY, however, the Choir is acclaimed by the holy Fathers as most useful toward the end of elevation in God and of the contemplative life, which prevails over the active. Nor indeed does anyone rightly pursue the active life alone, but he ought with Christ to ascend from the crowds to the mountain of contemplation, and thus they will undertake the most perfect mixed life. On the most holy institution of the Choir see our Boverius, Volume One of the Annals.

The holy Doctor, q. 18, on the Rule of St. Francis, hands down MANY signs from which the greater perfection of a religion is gathered.

The FIRST is a more fervent study of the virtues, especially of separation from worldly things and of union with God through Charity.

The SECOND is, if they strive to extirpate all vices and sow virtues, to cut off occasions of evils, and to be zealous for greater purity.

The THIRD, if they love the just, hate the wicked, that only the upright be assumed to the rule of souls, and by these both order be governed and even small corruptions be eliminated: For he who despises small things shall fall by little and little, Ecclesiasticus 19.

The FOURTH, if they withdraw themselves from the frequenting of seculars, flee honors, do not covet riches, and are ashamed to be conformed to this world.

The FIFTH, if they willingly endure injuries and persecutions: For patience has a perfect work, as he pursues at length also in the Apology in the place cited.

From what has been said the holy Doctor collects, q. 12, on the Rule of St. Francis, that from any religion a transition may be made to the Religion of the Minors, as to the more perfect, unless on account of scandals to be avoided and disturbances it has been otherwise disposed by the holy See.

The REASON of D. Bonaventure is, because in that religion the regular vows are more eminent, as I showed above, even though some religions are more eminent in abstinence from flesh, in silence, and in the ecclesiastical office: for these are compensated by the spiritual observance of the perfection of the vows, in which the essence of religion is placed, just as a great weight of silver by a little gold.

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

On the transition to another Religion.

A TRANSITION of this kind must not be made without weighty cause, but one must stand by the Apostle's Counsel, 1 Corinthians 7: Let every man abide in the vocation in which he was called.

FOUR conditions are required for this transition: First, that it not be forbidden to them. Second, that it not be made rashly, etc., but solely from zeal for a better life. Third, that the transition be made to a better religion. Fourth, that the faculty be sought from the Prelate, even if it is not obtained. This is found in cap. statuimus, and cap. mandamus, 19. q. 3. cap. non est, cap. sane, cap. significatum, especially cap. licet, de regular. Nor is this derogated from by the motion of Pius V in the year 1569, beginning Quaecunque sacrarum; for there he only abrogates certain particular faculties concerning this transition, it being licit by Divine natural law that vows and life be changed for the better. So Cajetan q. 88. art. 12. Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 9.

That this is licit to all religious is found in 20. q. 4. cap. 1. and cap. unic. at the beginning, verb. perpetua, de statu regular. in 6., and there the Canonists, and Sanchez num. 6., where he shows it has not been revoked for nuns. They concur: Faust. lib. 5. q. 127. Rodriguez tract. 3. gg. q. 52. art. 6.

As to intention, that it not be made rashly or from levity, but from zeal for perfection; moreover, that it not be made with... Therefore if grave harm would come to the abandoned religion, it could reclaim him, as the Canonists note on cap. licet, provided the perverse morals of that religion were not the cause, for then he must ascribe the evil to himself. So Sanchez from num. 11.

But there is a question about the third condition: whether the transition ought to be made to the more perfect, or rather to the more austere.

The first opinion holds that the transition is granted by reason of greater perfection. So D. Thomas q. 189. art. 8. Paludanus 4. dist. 38. q. 2, and q. 3. art. 1. Turrecremata cap. 1. num. 1. verse 1. Quidem 19. q. 3. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 4. Rosella verb. religio, 4. Sylvester 4. q. 1. Tabiena 3. q. 23. Navar. com. 4. de regular. num. 2. and 3. Cucus tract. 3. Instit. moral. tit. 1. num. 136, and Sanchez says it is probable, lib. 6. cap. 7. num. 20.

The second opinion is that consideration is given to whether it is stricter. So Ioan. Andreas cap. sane, num. 8. de regular., and there Antoninus, Anchar. Abbas, Cardinalis, Henricus, Rosella, verb. religio, 4. Angel. verb. Religiosus, num. 34. Passarellus in privil. minim. cap. 39. Lessius de Iustitia, lib. 2. cap. 41. dub. 13. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 13. cap. 14. question 2. Manuel qq. regul. tract. 3. q. 52. art. 4., and the royal law embraces this opinion, 9. and 10. tit. 7. part. 1, there: A otra orden mas aspera, and ibidem, mas estrecha vida, as Gregorius Lopez notes on that law 9, and Bassaeus V. Religio 5.

The opinion of D. Bonavent. q. 12. on the rule is that this perfection to be followed is taken from the fact that the religion is higher and stricter, and this is literally what the text has, cap. licet, where we read: He can freely fulfill the purpose of a holier life, and at the end it concludes: which is judged better, saying, that you might lead a stricter life among them. Therefore this greater perfection is measured from a stricter manner of living, from which surely a greater perfection in religion is gathered, if it occurs in the observance of vows.

Here each will try to defend his own religion at all costs; thus Paludanus in 4. dist. 38. q. 3. art. 1. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 4. §. Sylvester verb. religio 4. q. 6. assert that no transition is granted from the Religion of the Friars Preachers; yet from all others to it, gladly.

Passarellus in Privil. minim. asserts the same of his religion, because it is the strictest on account of the perpetual Lenten fast, as Julius II says.

D. Bonaventura q. 12. and 13. on the Rule, Corduba cap. 2. q. 17. on the rule assert the same of our religion of the Minors; yet the Seraphic Doctor adds, unless it be specially forbidden, and he observes this prohibition in order to avoid seditions, tumults, etc. Thus in the Extravagant Viam de regular. it is expressly forbidden under pain of excommunication latae sententiae, reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, which both those receiving and those received incur, that a transition not be made from any mendicant religion to any other whatsoever, except to the Carthusians, from which one can pass to the mendicants, where the rule is observed, as Sylvester verb. religio, 4. q. 6. Navar. tit. de regular. consil. 88. Tannerus disp. 6. q. 3. num. 164. teach.

And indeed as to those receiving, the penalty is restricted to certain Orders numbered there, as Suarez Tom. 5. in 3. part. disp. 22. sect. 5. num. 7. notes. But as to the Society, it extends to all Religions.

From what has been said you have that Sanchez n. 29. did not rightly ascribe to the Seraphic Doctor the saying, made absolutely, that one can pass from any religion to ours, as if no prohibition existed: the holy Doctor speaks from the nature of perfection, but adds that certain prohibitions exist, and he understands the same in q. 13., when he says one cannot pass from the religion of St. Francis to others by the force of the perfection of the essential vows, which are higher among us.

As to the fourth condition, license must be sought, and if it is unjustly denied by the Prelate, the Religious may pass, provided the other two conditions hold: that the religion be stricter and that the religious pass only out of zeal for greater perfection. See Sanchez from num. 32.

Yet one may not pass at once once license has been sought, but he must wait a time according to the rule, cap. cum in veteri toward the end, de elect.

They must not, however, be dismissed without the dismissory letters of the Prelate of the religion, cap. statuimus 19. q. 3.

The immediate Prelate indeed can grant license, those four conditions being in place, as Sanchez num. 59. Azor lib. 12. cap. 14. question 7. notes, and others cited by Sanchez.

And although the common law, cap. licet, de regul., grants the transition when license is denied; nevertheless by the decree of the S. Congregation by order of Urban VIII, 1624, on the 21st of September, one must wait until the superior has been made certain that that religion is prepared to receive him; and this holds especially of nuns, who must both present a dowry and pass with honorable matrons accompanying them, and not lodge just anywhere, unless for the sake of hospitality, and with respectable persons, and they must make their way by a direct route to the monastery without hope of returning to the first. But license must be sought from the superior who can incorporate one into the religion itself. Here, among the Minors, it is the Provincial or General; but in religions in which even local superiors are able to receive, the giving of license belongs to those same superiors, Vecch. disp. 15. dub. 2. Mirandus tract. 19. 31. art. 5. Bassaeus V. Relig. 5. n. 2.

Regulars may pass to a laxer religion for a cause, license nevertheless having been obtained. Indeed, when some relaxation of the vows occurs, a cause is necessary even for the Pope dispensing. This faculty the Bishop can grant in monasteries subject to him; but in exempt ones the Prelate having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over his own, with the consent nevertheless of the Chapter, because this is one of the greater affairs in which, that proceedings follow the Canons, it is required, Navar. conf. 56. de regular. Azor tract. 1. lib. 12. cap. 15. question 1. Mirand. tract. 1. q. 31. art. 6. Sylvester V. or 4. q. 2. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 41. dub. 15. num. 103. Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 7. num. 70. Diana part. 3. de dub. reg. Resol. 43. Vecch. disp. 15. dub. 5. Faust. q. 345. Bassaeus V. Relig. 5. num. 3. The holy Doctor, at cap. 2. of the Rule, censures this transition as made without the gravest cause.

Mendicants by common law cannot pass to non-mendicants, except to the Carthusians, without the license of the Pope, from the Extrav. In viam ambitiosae, de regular.; by privilege, however, some Generals can grant it.

Religious Jesuits cannot pass even to the Carthusians without the license of their General, Bonacina de claus. q. 2. p. 9. §. 5. diff. 2., for the Society enjoys by the indult of Pius V the privileges of the Carmelites; but these were granted by Paul V on the 3rd of April 1610, that they may not pass to the Carthusians under a penalty of excommunication to be incurred ipso facto. The same was granted by Urban VIII to the Capuchins on the 9th of August 1628, where he forbids that anyone of our order pass to a laxer one without the license of the Apostolic See; but to the Carthusians, or to any other order, unless it is said of him of the General's minister: Qui potest capere capiat, means: Let him who is not so blinded by the passion of concupiscence, and is enlightened by God, and can perceive how great is the dignity of chastity, understand. For it means the same as, he who reads, let him understand. For it stands within our power, with Divine aid, to will to attend; as is said in Isaiah cap. 6.; on the contrary: They could not understand, namely because they were unwilling, being blinded by their passions.

But the third passage, 1 Corinthians 7, indicates the gift of virginal and marital continence, which are in our power.

You will object, fourthly, against the first assertion, the inconveniences that follow from celibacy. The first is, that the world would come to an end if all were celibate. Second, that diseases arise from celibacy.

Bellarmin answers, cap. 31., after D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. q. 3. ad 2., from D. Hieronymo lib. in Iovin., that there is no danger of all dying or of all vowing, nor are there diseases that cannot otherwise be cured. As we saw with Medina lib. 4. de continentia, cap. 11. But if sanctity were certain against a lethal disease, continence must be valued all the more, which is the hundredfold fruit, as I said above.

Other things the heretics object, namely that the vow of chastity impedes the generation of men; that the strength of the Republic is diminished for expelling the barbarians; that the inclination to beget, which is good, is impeded; finally, that the better tree is the one that yields fruit rather than flowers only, etc.

It is answered, that they have spoken petulantly and carnally; but if you read through those who savor heavenly and true goods, you will understand that things stand otherwise. To all these St. Bonavent. answers in Diaeta, Tit. 4. cap. 4., where he has a panegyric of chastity; that this vow is illustrious above the others, flowing from marriage, and therefore in the parable it bears a hundredfold the fruits of the earth, while marriage bears thirty. See St. Bonaventure. Therefore D. Augustine, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 8: Therefore (he says) the fruitfulness of the flesh can in no way be compared to the holy virginity even of the flesh. The same D. Jerome shows at length, ad Demetriadem, and epist. 22. ad Eustochium, and the same D. Augustine, in the cited place, chapter 10, where he refutes what Erasmus says in the dialogue Proci et Puellae, namely that virgins are born from concubinage. He answers, however, that virgins are born from concubinage, not as is honorable, for they are born even from adultery. So be it, that a virgin is born even from a rape; but the sacred virgin is not born even from marriage.

You will object, fifthly, the Councils, Ancyr. can. 19., where he places violators of the vow of solemn chastity among bigamists: but bigamy is not a sin: Therefore.

It is answered, that in this they are likened to bigamists, in that they are irregular and unfit for the priesthood.

Other Councils are also adduced, which merely assert that marriages are not to be disparaged.

You will object, sixthly, the PP. first because from D. Ambrose, all the Apostles, except Paul and John, had wives.

It is answered, that the Apostles after their calling were continent. Therefore Matt. 19: Behold, we have left all things, and Christ answers: Every one who has left wife, etc.

Secondly they cite Tertullian, lib. de monogamia, where, treating that passage of 1 Tim. 6, I will that the younger marry, he seems to exhort those to marriage who had broken the first faith of the vow, as I said in the assertion.

It is answered, that Tertullian is speaking of widows who have not yet vowed; for he says: On account of which he wills them to marry, lest they afterward rescind the first faith of widowhood; for if he were speaking of those already fallen from the vow, how could he take care that they not rescind the first faith, when it has already been rescinded? Therefore, made more cautious by the fall of others, he wills others to marry, who are not willing to contain themselves.

Thirdly they oppose D. Cyprian, lib. 1. epist. 11., where he writes of certain virgins who, after they had dedicated themselves to God, were found to lie with men: But if from faith they have dedicated themselves to Christ publicly, and chastely, without any scandal, let them persevere thus strong and steadfast, and await the reward of virginity; but if they are unwilling, or unable, to persevere, it is better that they marry, than that they fall into the fire by their delights. This passage Petrus Martyr, Calvinus, Brentius, and others press.

Bellarmin answers, that in that letter he urges that those who had fallen be separated from their suitors, otherwise he threatens excommunication; therefore he exhorts to marriage those who have not yet vowed, lest they fall as the former did.

For my part, indeed, I offer an easier answer, that St. Cyprian is not speaking of those who vowed themselves to Christ, etc. For he seems to speak of the same who dedicated themselves, and who can marry. Therefore he exhorts them, with the Apostle, to fulfill the vow; and if they are unwilling, or unable, that is, judge that they cannot, let them marry. For it is a manner of speaking: whether you will not, or cannot, contain.

Martyr presses Hilary, on cap. 19. Matth., where he says: Christ admonishes concerning Eunuchs, if we are able, where he objects that he did not say: if we will.

It is answered, that Hilary adds nothing to the Gospel, but admonishes us to consider the powers of our will, whether with Divine aid it can take this counsel.

Others, moreover, many more, object, who either merely praise marriage, as Ignatius ad Philadelphios, Nazianzenus, Chrysostomus, etc.

Or they exaggerate against those who have a vow and do not keep it, crying out not indeed that it is better, but that it would have been better, that they had married, as Basilius lib. de Virginitate, Epiphanius haeresi 61.

Or that continence, or that it profits outside the Church, as Hilarius in Psalm. 64.

But the rest of the Papists they proclaim flaccid, insane, and deceived.

Petrus Martyr insists, because D. Augustine, although deceived, asserts that those who marry after a vow sin, yet marry validly.

It is answered, with D. Bonavent., that D. Augustine spoke of a simple vow, not of a solemn one, which invalidates marriage by Divine natural law.

He objects against the second assertion, because monks are made by absorbing alms, which is against the Apostle, Ephes. 4. 1 Thessal. 4. and 2 Thessal. 3., and D. Augustine, lib. de opere Monach. cap. 17.

Bellarmin answers, cap. 42., from D. Bonavent. in the questions on the Rule of St. Francis, q. 11., and in the Apologetic lib. against a certain unnamed author, near the end and on the poverty of Christ, against Guillelmum, art. 2. ad 9., and in Apologia Pauperum, and D. Thom. opus. 19. and 22. q. 187. art. 3., that religious are not bound to seek their food by the labor of their hands, as is said Actorum 6: It is not good for us to leave the word and serve tables. But the Apostle writes of certain idle seculars, as is clear to the reader. He exhorts (be it so) even religious, as St. Francis exhorts his own, to do some work to avoid idleness, yet so that it does not break the spirit of prayer and devotion. Say the same of D. Augustine, who binds only those who before becoming religious lived by the labor of their hands, and now can do the same without impediment to a greater good, and yet out of idleness and sloth are unwilling. For in cap. 21. he excepts religious who exercise ecclesiastical ministries, such as all mendicants are at this time. For thus he says: If they are Evangelists, if ministers of the Altar, if dispensers of the Sacraments, they do not arrogate, but plainly claim for themselves that power of living, namely, from the means of the people. So St. Bonavent., who adds also D. Hieronymus prologo in Iob.

Brentius objects, secondly, in the confess. Vvitemberg.: Either he who vows poverty is poor, and then he has nothing to leave; or he is rich, and then either he places all things in common, and provides more securely for himself; or he gives to the poor, and so makes himself a burden on his neighbor by his begging, and thus against Charity.

Bellarmin answers, cap. 20. That even the poor man leaves, what he can acquire, from D. Augustine, epistola 89. q. 4. But if he is rich, by placing in common he leaves the dominion, after the example of the Apostles, Actorum 4. Nor is it against Charity, because they give the rich occasion to buy heaven; otherwise Christ would praise a thing against Charity. So also D. Bonav. in the places cited.

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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