Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Whether there is in the Church the power of dispensing in Vows.

HITHERTO we have treated of the first way in which vows are removed, which is irritatio [annulment]. Now the second must be treated, which is dispensation. And indeed that this power exists in the Church is clear from that saying of Matth. 16, Whatsoever you shall bind, which words are universal, as D. Bonaventure notes in 4. d. 20. quaest. 5, and after him Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 37. num. 3, where he proves the same from Ioan. 22, Feed, etc., where also D. Bonaventure.

IT MUST BE NOTED FIRST, from what was said in the tract. de legibus, d. 5. quaest. 14, with D. Bonaventure in the body, and Sanch. cap. 37, what the difference is between the dispensation of a vow and a declaration; for a declaration takes away no obligation of a vow; it only declares that the vow of itself does not bind in that event; as if someone vowed to fast on such a day, or to perform certain prayers, and the prelate declares that he is not bound because he is infirm; this does not take away the obligation but only explains that it ceases by reason of impotence. But a true dispensation is when, a just cause existing, the prelate takes away an obligation of the vow still existing; as if one should free someone beset by the burning goads of concupiscence from a vow of chastity which still endures: or if one having a law for the public good, having subjects under him for its execution, judges that for the time being it should not be commanded to be carried out.

THE FIRST opinion, which D. Bonaventure reports, is that the Church can properly dispense. This opinion is exceedingly celebrated, and is upheld by D. Thom. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 4. quaestiuncula prima, ibi, Richard. art. 9. quaest. 1, and d. 17. art. 2. quaest. 2. supplem. Gabr. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 1. Hostiensis in summa, tit. de voto, num. 16, and cap. Non est, num. 1, same title, ibi. Abbas num. 5. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Canus relect. de poenit. part. 5. Medina de Poenitentia Tract. de confess. quaestione de dispensatione super confessione revel. ad 2. Sotus lib. 1. de iustitia quaest. 7. art. 3, and lib. 7. quaest. 4. art. 1. Palac. 4. d. 38. d. 3. fol. 884. Suarez Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 9. Toletus lib. 4. summae from cap. 18. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unic. de voto, art. 8. diff. 1. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. Sayrus lib. 6. cap. 11. num. 9. Azorius Tom. 1. lib. 6. cap. 1. quaest. 4, and lib. 11. cap. 18. quaest. 5. Graffis s. p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 18 and 20, and cap. 32. num. 2. Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Lessius lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 40. d. 12. num. 98. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 8. dub. 2. Henriquez lib. 8. de Eucharistia, cap. 13, and lib. 7. de Indulg. cap. 23. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 97. art. 4. d. 178. num. 10. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. Sanch. 2 lib. 4. summae, cap. 37. num. 5. Fagundez in secundum Praeceptum Decal. lib. 2. cap. 40. Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 6. dub. 6, citing many. Bassaeus, V. Votum 7, proclaims this to be of faith.

THE SECOND opinion denies that there is in the Church a power to dispense, but only to declare. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10 in the body. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 102 and 103. Caietanus in summa, verb. votum, cap. de dispens. Armilla verb. votum, num. 13. Gloss. cap. Non est, under the word Authoritate, de voto. Ibi Anton. num. 3. Cardin. cap. cum ad monast. num. unico de statu monach. Covarr. ac pactis 1. quaest. §. 3. num. 3. Ferrar. lib. 3. contra G. cap. 124, and Paludanus 4. d. 38. quaest. 4 art. 4. concl. 1. num. 38 sufficiently indicate it. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. notab. 1. Sylvester verb. votum 4. quaest. 3. d. 3.

AS TO D. Bonaventure, he is adduced for this opinion loc. cit., but one must explain in what sense he upholds it: he himself, after stating the opposing opinion, puts forward this one, which he calls more reasonable and more secure, and because by it the conscience is more fully satisfied. And it is such that it is not a mere interpretation of the law, such as any learned man can make, but is a declaration of law. For since a vow is a good directed to the glory of God and the salvation of the one vowing, and looks to the good of the whole Church, therefore the Pontiff, who is the supreme judge, has the power of choosing from those goods the one which he has known to be better and more expedient for the Divine glory and the good of the Church; and consequently, even if the obligation, for example, of continence in a King, be in force; if the Pontiff judges it to be for the utility of the public Church that he marry and endeavor to obtain children for the preservation of peace, and this good be more certain than the evil that presses, namely that the King lack a successor, he can dispense; which in rigor is not to relax the law, but to declare, the true obligation remaining: But if the good arising from the dispensation is uncertain, he ought not take away a certain obligation, as S. Bonaventure notes. ad 2. Thus, then, the law, which is ordered to the greater good of the Church, is not relaxed, and this is also the opinion of D. Thomas, as I shall show.

This is the genuine opinion of S. Bonaventure, who defines it better than all others and avoids the difficulties, as we shall see.

I ASSERT with this opinion, first, that vows cannot be dispensed in the Church by relaxing the law.

THE FOUNDATION of D. Bonaventure is: Those things which are of natural Divine law cannot be dispensed by man: But a vow is of this kind: Therefore. The major is the axiom of all Theologians and Canonists, as Azorius notes, lib. 6. quaestio cited above, and Sanchez confesses it, num. 4. The minor is proved by S. Bonaventure, foundation first, from Psal. 75, Vow, and pay to the Lord your God. And since this law has always existed, as all confess, it follows that it is a natural law, not a positive one, as is gathered in the second foundation.

IT was led by this reasoning that S. Bonaventure, devoutly devoted to the authority of the Church, adapted his opinion. By this argument the adversaries are badly twisted about, and they sweat marvelously in rendering an account of this power.

RICHARDUS answers, 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1. Graffius p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 8. and others cited with D. Bonaventure; whenever someone binds himself by vow or oath, he does so not absolutely, but saving what must be saved; and because the Pope is the supreme Pastor, upon whom rests the salvation of all the faithful, this condition is always understood in the one vowing: if the Pontiff wish it ratified.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., and Sanchez, num. 7, because on this account the Pope could dissolve a vow and an oath without cause by a mere nod, which cannot be said, since a cause adequate to this is required. In this attack Azorius and Sanchez fall into the opinion of D. Bonaventure, while they confess that dispensation is not a proper relaxation of law, since a just cause is required, which is the end of every law, and while it remains, in a dispensation the law is not relaxed.

IT is indeed attacked by D. Bonaventure because this condition, thought up gratuitously, finds a foundation nowhere; for vows, which are offered, are offered most freely, as all proclaim, and one can offer what pleases God more. And this being the absolute counsel of the Lord,, some condition is added to its execution without foundation, as Bassaeus also warns, verb. Votum 5. num. 2.

THE SECOND response is that of Conar. cap. 2. in fine de testam. Graff. eodem num. 18. — a vow indeed as to its genus asserts an obligation of natural Divine law; yet the peculiar obligation of the vow is not of so strict a law, just as to obey human laws is of natural Divine law, yet no particular law binds by that law.

Against this Sanchez argues, first, because if the singular obligation were of human law, it could not be established by any private man, who has not the power of enacting a law. Indeed not even if he were a prince, who cannot bind himself by coercive force.

SECOND, because if the obligation were only human, a dispensation without cause would be valid. This is according to the mind of D. Bonaventure.

THE THIRD response is, that Divine law is not dispensed, because it does not happen that, the obligation toward God remaining, it is not observed; rather the obligation resulting from human will is taken away, which is a kind of human law; Just as when a superior dispenses in his own laws, he is not considered to dispense in the Divine law, which dictates that the laws of superiors be obeyed, so long as they retain their force, but by the dispensation he takes away from that law its binding force, which being removed, the Divine law is taken away indirectly by a certain consequence, and therefore he truly dispenses in the human law alone. So D. Thom. answers, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. ad 1, and quaest. 89. art. 9. ad 1. Caietanus, same quaest. 88. art. 12. Abul., quaest. 102. in 30. Numer. Victoria, de potestate Papae, et Concilii, proposit. 1. ad 3. D. Anton., 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Sotus, lib. 10. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 1. ad 2. Arag., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. in fine. Valentia, puncto 2. d. 7. quaest. 4. p. 6, and l. 1. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Sayrus, lib. 6. cap. 11. Henriquez, lib. 7. de indulg. cap. 23. num. 5.

YET this response is refuted by Sanchez, num. 17, and Azorius, loc. cit., because the law of the vow is not human but Divine, as I showed above; otherwise it could be dispensed from by the one vowing, and a dispensation without cause would be valid, as in the example given of the Prelate dispensing in his own law.

BUT the adversaries are mistaken, because they consider the obligation of the vow as merely resulting from the act of vowing, as if the bond came from nowhere else; yet the bond comes from the natural precept of fidelity, and from the Divine, inasmuch as God is owed, by the natural and Divine precept, the rendering of what has been promised to him. Therefore it is only the application of the bond, which remains in its natural law, just as in ancient times the law of circumcision bound to the whole Judaic law, as the Apostle says, yet it did not bind any Gentile absolutely. And if he had freely accepted it, he was not for that reason bound to the Mosaic law merely by human law, because he had bound himself to it by human will, but he was bound by Divine law. So it is in the matter at hand.

IT IS CONFIRMED, because the obligation of a vow arises principally and completely from the acceptance of God, who has testified that he wills whatever we duly vow.

THE FOURTH response is that of Vasquez, num. 13, Lessius, num. 99, Suarez, num. 15, in the places cited — that in a vow the relaxation takes place through the remission of the promise, made by the Prelate in the name of God, by the faculty of remitting received from God himself; and therefore the Prelate, in the name of God, cedes the Divine right acquired by God through the vow. For the natural Divine law exacts the promise, so long as God himself does not cede his right by himself or through his Vicar; but here he cedes it, and therefore the Pope does not dispense in the natural Divine law, because God has already ceded to him his right in that matter: Just as if Peter were to cede a field promised to him by oath by Titius, he would not relax the natural Divine law prescribing that an oath be kept.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., for whence is it established from Divine authority that this was granted to the Pontiff?

THEY ARE REFUTED by Sanchez, because this mode of dispensing by taking away the obligation, namely by ceding his own right, is not to dispense but to forgive or to cede the promise: Just as one who absolves from sins and remits them is not said to dispense in the debts owed to God, but to remit them.

SANCHEZ himself answers, num. 14, that natural Divine right is twofold: one arising from human will, as a vow: the other absolute: And indeed the Pontiff can dispense not only in the former, and thus in a vow, oath, etc., but even in some things of absolute natural Divine law, truly taking away the obligation by a true dispensation, as in Communion under both species in the most remote regions, where there is no wine, and in other cases which he pursues at length, lib. 8. de matrim. disp. 6. The same is answered by Cano, relec. 5. de Poenitentia p. 5. Medina, loc. cit. ad 2. Azorius, lib. 6. cited above. Petrus Ledesma, loc. cit. and others.

AGAINST this mode Suarez rises up, cap. 9. num. 9, from D. Bonavent. foundation 4. What is intrinsically evil is indispensable by God; but what is against a vow is intrinsically evil: Therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved, because what is against natural law is intrinsically evil, and therefore indispensable, as to lie.

SANCHEZ answers that not all things which are against the law of nature are intrinsically evil to such a degree that they are never lawful, as to steal and to detain what belongs to another, which are lawful in necessity.

BUT in those cases the circumstances required for natural law to bind do not concur; yet when a dispensation is granted in a vow, those do concur — otherwise they would not have bound before the dispensation, and thus there would be no relaxation of law. But it is certain that all of them intervene there, namely the obligation of truth to be exhibited to God: And therefore, as it is intrinsically evil to lie, so it is intrinsically evil not to keep a promise made to God; for it is to lie to God, as S. Bonaventure rightly argues, loc. citato.

SANCHEZ answers that it is not as with lying, and in this his comparison stands, that just as to steal is not intrinsically so evil that it may never be lawful, so also not to observe a vow when some just cause intervenes; which, he says, although it does not suffice of itself to take away the obligation, yet suffices, he says, for Prelates to dispense by authority received from God.

BUT again he begs the question; for he is bound also to assign the parity in this, that as it is sometimes lawful to steal by reason of circumstances, so also by a just cause it should be lawful not to keep vows made to God, and thus the malice would cease on both sides; for if this is taken away by dispensation, it follows that it is still of itself evil against nature, and the burden of proof falls on him; by which reasoning, those things which are still intrinsically evil could be dispensed — and whence this power would be had, as Azorius argued.

THEREFORE S. Bonaventure explains it thus most excellently: all laws look to the common good, and particular laws to a particular good; and consequently, and often even directly and primarily, to the public good, over whose judgment the Pontiff presides, as Pastor of the whole Church, whose good it falls to him, by Divine power, to labor for; and therefore it belongs to him to judge what is more expedient for it. Therefore, when he wishes to dispense, there must be present such a cause as renders the dispensation just, as even the adversaries confess — which is a sign that what is just belongs intrinsically to the dispensation, and consequently enters into making what is dispensed validly done on this account, namely because provision must always be made for the greater good of the Church. And so when a dispensation is granted, the law of the vow is not relaxed, which must always look to the good of both the one vowing and the Church. But if for the one vowing, or for the Church, it were better in the Lord not to carry out the vow, for a grave cause bringing greater spiritual utility; then the law will not be relaxed, but it will be judged for the time being, according to the mind of God, that God does not will it to be done, or at least does not compel it. Which definition is not a simple declaration, such as a learned man would make, as Sanchez thinks, num. 5, but a judgment and definition, not of the measure of knowledge and prudence, but of jurisdiction, which is not granted to any learned man whatever. But even if we were to concede that it is an act of prudence, as Sanchez says we assert, still it would be ampler than the declaration of a learned man; for this looks to the providence of the Church, and consequently, while it is being made, indicates the power of jurisdiction for execution; for this belongs to God authoritatively, that he may render wholly secure the one with whom he dispenses.

SANCHEZ INSISTS, lib. 18. de matrimonio d. 6. num. 5. Thus to interpret laws belongs to the Legislator alone, or to his Superior, cap. inter de sent. excom. cap. ideo, 25. quaest. 1. cap. sicut enim 11. quaest. 3. leg. fin. ff. de legibus.

IT IS ANSWERED that this belongs to the Pontiff by Divine commission; for God entrusted to the Pontiff, in Peter, the sheep to be fed, Ioan. 22. Feed my sheep, etc.

BUT he himself argues against this, that even the power of dispensing belongs by Divine commission, since God does not fail the Church in necessary things; just as to Bishops, in a case of necessity, it has been given to dispense in Pontifical laws in some case of necessity, e. g. when the Pontiff cannot conveniently be approached; and just as the dispensation of inferiors in the law of a superior does not derogate from the authority of the superior, because it is done by his tacit commission; so this Pontifical dispensation does not derogate from the authority of God, since it is done not by the proper authority of the Pontiff, but by the tacit and most lawful, presumed commission of God.

IT IS CONFIRMED THUS: if the Pontiff, declaring that it is lawful in extreme necessity to steal or to kill an aggressor, were to use the word "I dispense," he would speak ineptly; so therefore in our case.

FOR INDEED Sanchez is bound to show where this faculty of relaxing a vow was given, nor is it sufficiently presumed, as Azorius well notes. For why do you presume that what was promised to God is not to be rendered to God? Nor is it similar with human laws, which do not bind with so much rigor as natural or Divine ones, as Sanchez himself often urges. Nor is the necessity the same, since provision is sufficiently made by that authoritative judgment by which it is decreed that it is thus fitting at that time not to fulfill so particular a law, by another will of God, which is not presumed but declared often and again, that the perfection of individuals may be intended and the progress of the Church. And as to the dispensations of Bishops, it is not ineptly held valid, because the mind of the Church and of the Pontiff is sufficiently expounded in their laws, lest it be wanting in necessities. Therefore in the article of death anyone can absolve from all reserved cases, which would be lawful even if it were not explicit in the laws or censures; but in our case this is not necessary; for that authoritative judgment suffices, from a cause which even the adversaries do not deny to be necessary for the dispensation to be valid. And so what Sanchez last says, that it is inept, is denied; for it is not a mere declaration, as in the case of theft or of blameless self-defense, but a juridical judgment.

THE SAME with D. Bonaventure D. Thomas thinks, and defines in the same way. Nor does Azorius himself rightly insist that by this means the vow is taken away, not by the benefit of Pontifical indulgence, but by the very interpretation of the law.

FOR IT IS ANSWERED that the obligation is not sufficiently taken away by a mere declaration, but by the authoritative providence of the Church, which resides in the Pontiff, as I said.

BUT STILL Sanchez objects, loc. cit. summa, num. 5, from cap. 4. de iureiurando: But it is chapter 18, where it is said: On which point a diligent inquirer could easily have seen that not so much the absolution of the oath was necessary as an interpretation to be required. Sanchez leans deeply on this text, because the Pontiff openly distinguishes that both could be granted, and says that absolution was ineptly sought, since in that case the oath did not bind; and therefore there was no need of absolution, but of a declaration.

YET this text profits the adversaries nothing; for there the Pontiff Innocent III had been asked by the King of the Aragonese to be absolved from the oath he had made to keep the coin that fell short of its due weight; for on that account the people had risen in revolt.

He replied: If you had been diligently investigated, you would indeed have seen that you ought rather to have inquired: whether it was valid, namely because, when you swore, you either knew or did not know the coin to be false; if you knew, the oath was illegitimate and invalid, because an oath is not a bond of iniquity. But if you believed it legitimate, the oath is to be kept, and that it be observed, you shall reduce the coin to its lawful weight. Nevertheless, if in making the oath you believed it diminished from the lawful weight, and your conscience pricks you, humbly confess your sin.

The Pontiff does not will that the definitive judicial declaration, according to the mind of D. Bonaventure, be distinct from absolution, but from that interpretation which was a mere declaration of whether it was valid or not, which depended on a multiple knowledge of circumstances, namely in what way, with what knowledge, with what mind the oath was made, which he had carried, wrapped up without due exposition, to the Pope. He therefore wishes to say: You ought to have proposed the fact, clothed with its circumstances, so that you might first know what kind this oath of yours was: whether it was valid or not; whether you were bound to confess it and be sacramentally absolved from it; for you swore wickedly and sinned, if you swore knowingly. But after you had learned that it was valid, you could have asked to be absolved, which I would have done — not indeed by merely interpreting whether the oath was valid or not; for that would be presupposed; but by exempting you from the authoritative judgment, if I had seen that it so suited the Church.

Therefore Sanchez confuses, first, the interpretation of fact with the interpretation of law. Then he infers that we confuse the interpretation which is a mere declaration of whether the oath is valid or not with absolution; and moreover he also says badly that the Pontiff answered absolutely that absolution was not necessary, for he always speaks conditionally, as is clear to the reader. And so I concede that the interpretation, insofar as it is a decision of fact — whether it is a sin, or whether the oath is valid — differs from absolution or dispensation; yet that is not a dispensation as understood in the sense of the Seraphic Doctor; for that is rather a theological definition of fact: but the declaration in the opinion of S. Bonaventure is a definition of law, by which, the oath having been recognized as valid by the supreme Provider and Pastor, his observance having been compared with the evils arising from it and the scandals that had already arisen among the people, he determined by supreme authority that it pleases God more that the now-binding right, from Divine and natural law, no longer require observance, but that, according to the mind of God, it can be dispensed.

From this doctrine the remaining little arguments of Sanchez collapse, as is clear to the reader. For all of them suppose that dispensation in our opinion is a mere doctrinal interpretation, which is false; for S. Bonaventure, with loosened sinews, as they say, confesses that this power inheres in the dignity of the Lord Pope, and consequently is one of jurisdiction, which Sanchez, Tract. de voto, lib. VI. cap. 10, asserts to be of faith.

Still Sanchez objects: All Doctors deny the Church the power of dispensing in natural law which does not emanate from human will, while they nevertheless concede it concerning natural law that takes its origin from human will, as concerning a vow and an oath, and this is of faith; but this distinction would be made in vain if dispensation were a mere declaration.

It is answered, from D. Bonaventure, that this happens because those things which are natural in that way are goods so necessary that they do not admit the exchange of an equal good, nor would it ever be more useful for the Church not to carry them out. They are only declared in themselves, as they lie of their own nature; but vows and oaths, since they have something that is not a necessary good but freely exhibited, which since it depends on our will, can be compensated by another greater or equivalent good; therefore, besides exposition, they have it that they can be taken away by the authority of the Church; but this is not a simple declaration, as the argument supposes, but a potestative definition.

From these things it is gathered that this jurisdiction belongs first to the Pope universally for the whole Church, as S. Bonaventure notes. And so he can dispense in all simple vows. But of solemn vows I shall treat in the following Disputation, although as to the vow of Chastity S. Bonaventure speaks timidly, in corpore, and says he does not know whether it is better to say that one can dispense in the vows of Religion, and especially of chastity, even a private person. But the holy Doctor speaks according to his own phrase of dispensation, which others call relaxation, while he himself calls it a juridical declaration, or Epikeia; of which I treated at length, quaest. I; and as I shall treat of the vows of Religion, diff. II. quaest. IV.

Hence you have that only those can dispense who have Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, such as Legates in their province, whose power is ordinary, as annexed to the office, not to the person.

So also Bishops in their Diocese; and the See being vacant, the Chapter obtains this power. Similarly Abbots and other Prelates having quasi-episcopal power. See Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 38. Suarez, cap. 10. As to Archdeacons, S. Bonav. seems to think that some have this power, as also that of excommunicating, because they have jurisdiction. So in IV. dist. 18. parte II. quaest. III. See also Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 38. num. 20. To some Archdeacons only, not to all, he denies it, with many Doctors whom he cites. Of this I shall treat more fully in the Tract. de matrim. d. VIII. quaest. VI.

It follows also that this dispensation, since it is of jurisdiction, extends to subjects alone. See Sanchez. And indeed that Prelates of religious, not only Generals, but Provincial and local ones, can dispense in the vows of their subjects, the Doctors commonly teach, as cited with Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 39. Indeed even with Novices. Similarly, in the vows of religious, that even the Pope can; it is clearly evident; add the Apostolic Legate, or Nuncio a Latere. So Henriquez, lib. VI. de Sacramento Poenitentiae, cap. 16. num. 8. Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 25.

Observe, however, that certain vows are reserved to the Pope; and they are five: of Religion, of Chastity, of Pilgrimage to Rome to the thresholds of the Apostles, to Jerusalem for the aid of that place, and the Compostellan to St. James. Thus it is gathered from the extravag. §. Si Dominici, tit. I. de poenit. et remiss. where those who commute these five vows without the license of the Pope are excommunicated.

Note, however, that this excommunication is thundered against those who dispense by privileges granted by Sixtus IV himself, who issued that extravage. Therefore one who dispensed by privileges received from elsewhere would not incur it. See Suarez, Tom. V. in III. part. disp. 22 sect. V. num. 28. Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 40. num. 23.

Yet those vows are supposed by that Bull to be reserved, as Sanchez notes, numero 6, who says they are not reserved by law, even common law, but by custom only. But these five are so reserved to the Pope that not even a Legate a Latere can dispense in them. Others add other vows, but truly only these are reserved to the Pope, as Sanchez teaches, loc. citato.

¶ INDEED Bishops, the reservation set aside, could dispense in those vows, since in relaxing they succeed the Pope; because as the Pope in the whole world is the Prince of the Church, so the Bishop in his diocese — excepting those things which touch the universal government of the Church, as to define matters of faith, etc. And so he can do in his diocese everything that the Pope can in the city, unless it is specially reserved to him. For he is ordinary in his diocese, as the Pope in the world, as D. Bonaventure notes, in 4. dist. 20. part. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore.

You will say: the Parish Priest also is ordinary in his parish: Therefore he can dispense in vows, and whatever the Pope can in the world.

D. Bonaventure answers that the reason is different; for the full power over the Church was granted by Christ in a certain spiritual marriage, through consecration; now the bridegroom ought to have the power of begetting sons imperfect and perfect — such are Bishops, who can both regenerate neophytes by Baptism, and not only make the imperfect perfect by penance, but recreate sons perfect by Orders, etc., and strengthen them by Confirmation — not so Parish Priests. Therefore the Bishop in consecration receives the ring, as a bridegroom. On this reason the Doctors commonly rely, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 61, and disp. 9 of the eighth book, and lib. 4. summae, chapter 40.

From these things very many Corollaries follow. For since dispensations of chastity and religion are reserved to the Pope only absolutely, and that law is odious to Bishops, it follows that it must be restricted.

¶ FIRST, therefore, it follows that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity made for a time. So D. Thom., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. ad 2, and it is gathered from D. Bonavent., loc. cit., whom others follow, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 8. disp. 9. num. 6.

SECOND it follows that he can dispense in the conjugal vow of chastity, since it falls short of absolute chastity, and likewise from the vow of not entering marriage; for the vow of chastity is greater, obliging to more. So the Doctors commonly, as related by Sanchez, num. 11.

THIRD it follows that he can dispense in the vow of taking sacred orders, for it is not simply of chastity, but of the thing to which the vow of chastity is annexed. So very many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, numero 13, and Bassaeus, numero 14.

FOURTH it follows that he can dispense in a disjunctive vow, which promises the alternative of a thing reserved or not reserved, as of religion or of sacred orders, since in alternatives the choice belongs to the one bound, and it suffices that one be fulfilled: Rule on alternatives, de regul. iuris, in 6. So Azorius, Tom. 1, lib. 11. cap. 19. quaestio 10. Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 14.

¶ FIFTH it is inferred that he can dispense with a religious in a vow concerning a stricter religion, since he does not vow the substance of religion but an excess; or if a secular vows a stricter religion, he will be able to enter a looser one. So many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, num. 17.

SIXTH, that one who has a vow of entering religion can be dispensed from perseverance in it, if the entrance, for just causes, leads to not persevering. So Sanchez, num. 18.

SEVENTH, he will be able to dispense in deferring the execution of his entrance into religion. So Sanchez, num. 19.

EIGHTH, he will be able to dispense in the matter into which a reserved vow, for instance of religion, has been changed by the Pope. So many, with Sanchez, num. 20. And this separately, even if one has vowed in simple vows the individual parts of chastity, e. g. by one to abstain from fornication, by another not to enter marriage, which comprise the whole matter of chastity.

NINTH, in all those in which only a part of the matter of chastity is vowed, as in the vow of a spouse.

They ASSERT besides that Bishops can, in a case of necessity — for instance the gravest danger of incontinence, and difficult access to the Pope — dispense in a vow of integral chastity. So Sanchez, lib. 2. matrim. disp. 40, and lib. 8. dub. 6, relating very many. The reason is, because the Pontiff is not to be presumed to will to reserve these cases to himself, casting nooses around himself. The same concerning other Pontifical laws very many teach, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 2. cited above. Indeed even to absolve from a case reserved to the Pope, besides the article of death, when access to the Pontiff is an impediment. The common reason is, because Pontifical laws proceed for the good of the Christian commonwealth, for the salvation of souls, according to the rules of charity; but it would be against charity so to bind the impotent. But the Church uses censures for salvation, not for destruction. So also S. Bonaventure runs, in 4. dist. 17. part. 1. quaest. 1. Say the same of the other reserved vows, if it be necessary. See Bassaeus, num. 15.

By the same reason very many say that even the Parish Priest can dispense in vows, when access to the Bishop is not easy. These are related by Sanchez, num. 27. They rely on this, that dispensation in a vow is like dispensation in a law, as D. Thom. teaches, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10, and D. Bonavent., in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3, argument 4, first place, and argument 2, sed contra: where he mixes and compares the obligation of the natural law of lying, and of the species to be kept, with the vow. But all follow them, as Sanchez notes, num. 27 of the disputation cited. Now indeed, since the matter stands thus, and the Parish Priest can dispense in the law of fasting when access to his Bishop is not easy, as very many teach, cited there, indeed with no necessity pressing, as many there affirm; it follows that he can also in the other things said above.

Indeed Manuel goes further, Tomo 2, quaestionum regularium, quaest. 46. art. 9. — that the Parish Priest can dispense even in vows which belong to the Bishop; not by ordinary law, but by the sole presumed will of the supreme Pontiff, of which above, when access to the Bishop is not easy. He proves it by the reason given above, because the Parish Priest, although by the law of parishes he has not the power of dispensing in the law of fasting, yet dispenses by custom, even if the Bishop could be approached, and this by custom, because custom gives jurisdiction, cap. cum contingat, de foro competenti, with many texts which the Gloss heaps up there; this is not to be denied of the vow, which is put on a level with law. Some say that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity emitted from perturbation, when the one vowing is young or suspect; they rely on cap. veniens, qui cleric. vel vovent: but the dispenser there is the Pontiff himself, not a simple Bishop, as is clear in the title, Idem, namely Alexander III, as above.

SOME ADD that a Bishop can dispense for asking the debt in a vow of chastity, marriage having been entered before. And Sanchez adds, lib. 4. summae, cap. 40. num. 63, that custom is equivalent to law.]

¶ There is a certain difficulty: whether he can dispense concerning penitential vows. Now a vow is penitential: I vow to undergo such a punishment, as fasting, if I game; I promise religion, if I have been drunk.

MANY say he cannot, when the will falls even upon a reserved thing, e. g. religion.

OTHERS bring forward, because odious things are to be restricted: but this vow is only conditional: Therefore it is not reserved to the Pope, because only absolute vows are reserved. So Sanchez, lib. 8. de matrimonio, disput. 10. num. 8, and lib. 4. summae, cap. 40. num. 91. Suarez, Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 13 — who nevertheless adds that it cannot be done when the punishment is imposed as medicinal, but only when it is imposed as vindicative. Similarly if a punishment is imposed in thanksgiving for a future benefit: as, I vow religion, if I shall have been preserved from such a sin; but this Sanchez does not admit, with very many cited by him. But of this below.

Hence you have what must be said of a conditional vow concerning the future (for if the condition be of the past, it is not valid). Suarez says it cannot be done after the condition is fulfilled, loc. cit. cap. 12; the reason is, because the condition fulfilled, the obligation arises as of an absolute vow, leg. Potior 11. in fine principii, ff. qui in pignore potiores habentur, and it is confirmed from other contracts also.

But many others assert that one can dispense even after the condition is fulfilled. So Sanchez, lib. 8. de matrim. disp. 10. num. 15, citing Toletus, lib. 4. summae, cap. 18. num. 11. Gomez, in Bulla Cruc. clausa 10. num. 99. Ledesma, 2. part. summae, tract. 10. cap. 8. and others. Add also those whom I shall cite below with Diana and Bassaeus.

It is proved, because such a vow is at root imperfect, and conditional, not absolute. It is confirmed. For if in penitential vows it holds even after the condition is fulfilled, as Suarez confesses: Therefore also in these. For just as in penitential vows this is conceded because the will toward that object is imperfect, nor does it proceed first from affection for the thing, toward which it stimulates itself through fear of punishment; so in the conditional, the will is imperfect, nor does it go forth from love of the thing promised, but of the condition: thus that man vows religion, if he wins the lawsuit; or if his brother has had a male son.

Hence the principal argument of Suarez is solved, for it tends also against the conditional penitential vow, that it be absolute. It is answered, therefore, that the obligation indeed becomes absolute, the condition being fulfilled; yet there still remains an imperfect obligation.

From these things you have that in the same vows even regular Prelates can dispense with their religious, in which also Bishops with theirs (let this be said, however, without prejudice to the vow of religion). And so they can dispense in the vow of passing over to a stricter religion, although they cannot annul it: the reason of the disparity is, that as to this vow, it is not subjected to the dominative power of Prelates, and therefore they cannot annul it. For by a coercing power they retain him from that passing over: but dispensation is by their consent. So very many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 4. summae, cap. 42.

Therefore that they can dispense in all the vows in which even Bishops can dispense is clear from the privilege of Martin V, which is found in the Compend. Privil. societatis Iesu, verbo Dispensatio, §. 10 — which is understood of those reserved vows which fall short by reason of some condition; not of those which are perfect, but which are dispensed by reason of necessity. So Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 43. Suarez, loc. cit. cap. 26. num. 17, 18, and 19. Yet Bassaeus doubts this in vain, V. Votum 7. num. 10. Whether it was granted by the Bull.

Likewise the Confessors of Mendicants can dispense in all the cases in which even Bishops. This Iulius II granted to the Congregations of St. Benedict and of St. Bernard; and Eugenius IV to Monks, as is seen with the Confess. fol. 31. Bordon., resol. 15; and it is an absolute concession. Whatever limits C Caesarub and Lezana impose, Bassaeus refutes them, num. 10.

By the concession of Julius II it is possible to dispense by the confessors of mendicants with the incestuous for asking the debt, as Rodriguez relates, Bulla 23, and Sorb. V. Dispensatio — provided they be specially deputed to him by the superior; and this he has in the Sacrament of Penance, and in the houses of Regulars, not outside. See Bassaeus, V. Incestus, in fine. These faculties are universal.

But that Provincial Prelates can do with their subjects what Bishops do with theirs is clear and consonant to reason; otherwise Regulars could not be rightly governed, since they do not have recourse to Bishops.

Other Privileges of Innocent VIII and Pius V exist concerning these things by the oracle of the living voice; but they have already been abrogated by Urban VIII, who abrogated all oracles of the living voice in the Bull Alias feliciss. 20. Decembr. 1631.

The same Confessors can dispense with those who have entered marriage with a vow of chastity, for asking the debt, as Bassaeus notes, V. Privil. num. 8, and Bonagratia, V. Dispensatio, num. 148, and V. Privilegium.

The delegated power for dispensing in vows must be specified, and to a fit person. See Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 12. Filliucius, tract. 26. cap. 9. Bassaeus, verb. Votum 7. num. 9.

But you can draw many corollaries from this.

First, that regular Prelates with their subjects, and the Confessors of Mendicants with their penitents, can dispense in all true vows, except those reserved to the Pope related above; but some things must be noted about these.

Concerning the vow of perpetual and integral Chastity, which excludes every act, even an internal licit one, of the flesh — with the danger of scandal, incontinence, or harm to a third person pressing, the Bishop can in some way dispense, or suspend, as Suarez teaches, lib. 6. cap. 26, and Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 40. So also to the confessors above, as Crouf. notes, ad cap. 7. Reg. lib. 29; and it was tolerated in the year 1629 in the S. Congregation, and it is established by the Bull of Clement VIII, given 13 Jul. 1604, as found with Rodriguez and Bassaeus; and just as the Bishop can dispense with one who contracted marriage with a vow of chastity, even if he has not consummated it, that he ask the debt to avoid incontinence; and just as he can, on account of the same danger, dispense with both spouses concerning the vow of concordant continence. And so the custom and practice of Bishops from time immemorial has carried this; although some add that this is true if recourse to the Pope is difficult to be had, as you see in Diana, part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 125. So also the Confessors of Mendicants; and just as the Bishop can dispense in a vow of integral chastity entered from a fear that is not grave, as found with Diana, part. 5. tract. 12. resol. 61. He can also dispense in it if it is elicited less principally together with another vow; as if one should vow not to play under the penalty of keeping chastity; so also the confessors related above. Similar is the case of one vowing sacred orders, to which chastity is tied.

Concerning all these reserved vows say: Just as the Bishop is able to dispense in a conditional vow, even though reserved absolutely; as if you vowed chastity if you escaped this danger, provided the condition be not yet fulfilled — indeed, probably, even with the condition fulfilled, with such great danger, as Diana relates, part. 3. tract. 5. resol. 25, and part. 6. tract. 8. resol. 16 — because such a vow is imperfect, arising more from affection for one's own utility. So also the Confessors can dispense in a similar case, above.

Similarly, as in alternative vows, as if one of them is reserved, the other not; and the one vowing determines himself to the one not reserved, the Bishop can dispense. So also the confessors. And as it is more probable, in a reserved penitential vow, that the Bishop can dispense even with the condition fulfilled, since such a vow is not made directly for the worship of God, but from detestation of the crime; as if you vowed Religion, or the reserved pilgrimages, if you had committed fornication. So also the Confessors related above. Yet it is probable that such a vow arising from a medicinal condition is reserved. See Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 15, and Bassaeus, num. 22. Say the same, therefore, of both.

Just as the most urgent cause is left to the Bishop, that he dispense in a vow made for the utility of a third person, after he has accepted the promise: so, etc. See Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 41. num. 16, Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 15, and Bassaeus, num. 275.

Note from the same author that it suffices that it be a matter of opinion whether it is reserved, for the Bishop and Confessors to be able to dispense. See V. Votum 7. num. 13.

What I said of chastity — namely that it must be integral to be reserved — say the same of the Vows of Religion, of pilgrimages not impeded, etc.

Wherefore if anyone has vowed poverty, or part of the journey to Jerusalem, or a military Religion (except the Maltese), since it is disputed whether those are true Religions, dispensation could be given.

Finally, Regular Novices are to be dispensed by the regular Prelates; for although they are not subjected to their power of economic dominion, yet they are subjected to the power of jurisdiction, or spiritual polity. See Bassaeus, num. 25.

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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