Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Name: Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Author: Gaudenzio da Brescia

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

By what power and of what kind is the power of annulling VOTES.

Having treated of the obligation of votes, we must now treat of their dissolution.

IN THREE ways votes are dissolved extrinsically: by Irritation, Dispensation, and Commutation; for when the obligation ceases from a change of the matter, or from the cessation of the cause, or of the condition, it of itself fails and perishes, as can sufficiently be gathered from what has been said.

They DIFFER, however, because by dispensation and by irritation the obligation of a vote is extinguished; but by commutation it is not extinguished, but transferred to another matter substituted in place of the former, which, if it be an alms, is called the redemption of the vote, which they enumerate as an essential species of commutation.

IRRITATION, moreover, is twofold: one, direct and proper, by which a vote is extinguished outright; the other improper, which is called the suspension of a vote by the prohibition of the matter, the bond of the vote remaining unimpaired.

This IRRITATION differs from the other, in that proper irritation belongs to dominative power alone, such as the Priors of Religious orders have over their religious; a father over his sons; a husband over his wife; a master over his slaves, as D. Bonav. teaches in corpore, and after him commonly, as Sanchez has it l. 4. cap. 24. But the improper and indirect belongs by reason of any subjection whatever, whether temporal or spiritual, as Suarez has it Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1. num. 6.

The QUESTION, however, is: whether this power is so absolute as to require no cause for annulling.

The FIRST opinion is, that no cause is required. So the twenty-seven Doctors in Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 24. Tannetus subscribes, disp. 5. quaest. 4. 20. et 21.

The SECOND opinion is, that a cause is required when they have the power of annulling ordered to the good of the one vowing, which the Priors of religious orders possess; but not when it is granted for the good of the one annulling alone. So Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1.

The THIRD opinion is, that to annul without cause is always a venial sin. So Sanchez l. 4. cap. 24. num. 15. adducing nine Doctors of the same sense.

There are Soto lib. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Medina l. 1. summa, cap. 14. §. 7. Aragonii 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. Sayri lib. 6. cap. 10. Leonard. l. 1. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 70. Mantelis on the Bull of the Crusade, §. 9. num. 104. Conrad. in resp. p. 1. quaest. 298. Valentiz 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 6. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 43. Sanchez loco citato.

I ASSERT with this opinion that votes are not annulled without cause without venial sin.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonav. dist. 19. dub. 6. in 4. as regards dispensations, as I said in prima secunda Tract. 4. who is on the Laws disp. 5. quaest. 14. — because to remove anyone from the worship of God without cause is insolent, and an abuse of power. Sanchez uses this reason num. 15. who says it is a venial sin, which very many think even of the one requesting an annulment without cause. See Sanchez num. 4. But if leave to vow was previously given, and the vote is annulled without cause, Suarez l. 6. de voto, cap. 4. near the end says it is rarely mortal, unless contempt or scandal intervene: Soto approves, l. 7. quaest. 3. art. 1. Rosella verbo votum, num. 2. Yet Sanchez l. 4. cap. 32. says it is mortal, of which at quaest. 13.

The PRINCIPAL question, however, is: whether it ought to be dominative; and whether spiritual Jurisdiction suffices for directly annulling votes; for if this sufficed, the Pope could then annul everywhere the votes of all.

I SUPPOSE, moreover, from what was said in prima secunda, Tract. 4. which is on the laws disp. 6. quaest. 1. that the Pope has no civil dominative power over all Christians.

SOME assert that the Pope can annul the votes of all absolutely, because they say all votes contain impliedly this condition: if it please the Pope, who is the supreme Pastor, to whom our spiritual governance belongs, under which votes are included. The same concerning Bishops in their Diocese is gathered ex cap. quemadmodum, v. Conditio de iureiurando. Moreover, he to whom the greater is licit is licit also for the lesser, Regula, cui licet 53. de regulis iuris, in 6. — and the Pope can dispense, which is greater than to annul, since that is of spiritual power, which excels dominative power: Therefore. This Medina maintains, de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 5. cap. 44. Lilius methodo curationis, 3. part. cap. 44. §. 51. and Lessius grants some probability to this opinion lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 86. S. Bonavent. reports it, in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3.

The OPPOSITE opinion, however, is common after D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. and of nineteen other Doctors whom Sanchez reports and follows, lib. 4. cap. 24. num. 18. And from these many bring the same argument concerning the votes of secular clerics, which do not pertain to Ecclesiastical matters. Add Bassaeus 5. To this the Sainted Doctor seems to incline art. 1. quaest. 3.

I ASSERT that the Pope cannot annul the votes of all the faithful.

It is PROVED by D. Bonavent. art. 1. quaest. 3. For this there is necessary a dominative power, such as that of a master over slaves, of a spouse over a spouse, of a father over sons, of a prior of religious over subjects, which the Pope has not with respect to all, as the Sainted Doctor there supposes; therefore he omitted it.

This is the common reason which Sanchez uses, num. 18. That civil dominative power is not universal I showed in the Tract. de legibus.

From this reason many infer that the Pope can annul the votes of religious, because he has dominative power over them. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 186. art. 5. ad 2. — which is truer of the Order of Friars Minor, because St. Francis cap. 1. Regulae promises filial obedience in a special manner with his sons to the Apostolic See, as D. Bonavent. notes in expositione illius capituli. See the Doctors in Sanchez num. 20. Suarez lib. 6. cap. 2. Bassaeo V. Votum 5. num. 2.

To the opposite D. Bonavent. answers that the things which are for the service of God are not so bound to the will of the Pontiff that they cannot be rendered without him.

To the other it is answered that it is understood of oaths, not of votes; because the reason is not the same, since for these dominative power is required; hence he can dispense, not annul, nor does that proposition, He who can do the greater, etc., hold in things of different kinds, as D. Bonavent. says, whose sign is this (he says) that man can generate man, not an ass.

There is, however, a controversy: Whether this dominative power, insofar as it is extended to the annulling of votes, is of natural law, or of human law.

The FIRST opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law. So Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 74. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 165. cap. 4. num. 29.

The SECOND SECOND opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law together with natural law. So Sanchez in the place cited, num 32.

The THIRD opinion is that it is of natural law. It seems to be that of D. Bonau. art. 1. quaest. 3. cited in 4. dist. 38. There follow Sotus l. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Aragon. 2. 1. quaest. 88. art. 8. Ouandus 4. dist. 38. disp. unica, prop. 22. Sayrus in Claui regia, l. 6. cap. 10. Azor. T. 1. l. 11. cap. 17. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 7. dub. 2. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de voto, l. 6. cap. 6. speaking of those under age, and of religious l. 6. cap. 7. The same Salas holds p. 2. quaest. 21. tract. 8. disp. unica, sect. 25. num. 262. speaking of parental power.

Thus, speaking of the Priors of religious orders, they bring forward Vega 2. Tomo summae, cap. 120. casu 88. Conradus in suis resp. 1. p. quaest. 297. Manuel 2. Tomo summae, cap. 89 et 99. regul. tom. 1. quaest. 25. art. 5. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. dub. 5. — yet Suarez and Ledesma confess that human law also concurs, prescribing a time for boys.

I ASSERT with this opinion that the dominative power of annulling votes is of natural law.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau., first foundation, as regards the wife from cap. 30. Numer. where it is said that the votes of a wife depend on the will of the husband; but this is not merely positive: Therefore. The minor is proved first, because it would have ceased with the other merely positive precepts of the Mosaic law: therefore it is an explication of the natural law. And so all the Fathers gather from that passage this subjection of the woman toward the husband with respect to votes. The same S. August. l. 4. in qq. Numer. quaest. 59. gathers; by which he proved his own opinion, S. Bonav. dist. 32. dubio 3. littera.

It is PROVED secondly by a most valid argument of S. Bonau. loc. cit. in corpore, which the others use. That which compels when every positive law is set aside is from natural Divine law: But the dominative power of annulling the votes of a wife compels when any human positive law whatsoever is set aside: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the wife subjects herself by natural law, and is subjected, that she may be governed by her very husband. For she has not power of her own body, as the Apostle says, first Corinthians 7. and Genesis 2.

HENCE falls the refuge of Sanchez, that this subjection induces only the improper irritation, insofar as it impedes: For marriage is a perpetual bond.

It is PROVED thirdly as regards those under age by D. Bonau., foundation 1. and in corpore, from the nature of a child, who on account of the weakness of his judgment is under the power of parents and under tutors, as a part of them, indeed even as nothing different from a slave, as we have in Galatians 4. and this nature itself teaches.

Sanchez answers, num 31. that this subjection does not impede other promises, graver and irrevocable, unless injury is proved; since yet in votes there is present the remedy of dispensation; but promises made by those under age cannot be annulled by parents, as is clear of betrothals. Secondly, a minor contracting with a man is bound, which obligation cannot be annulled by the father, and a son of a family of age is bound to a man naturally and civilly independently of the father. All which things are done by reason of the disposition of the civil law, so statuting.

MOREOVER because natural subjection grants only the improper irritation of suspension, and this when the execution of the votes impedes that subjection, as num. 28. has it.

FINALLY, whenever human law determines an indefinite obligation of natural law, it is said to bind absolutely by human law, as is clear in the precept of annual confession, and of keeping someone's feast; for that determination is like a form specifying that precept.

But these things are frivolous: And first indeed betrothals are permitted in such a way that they do not pass to the effect of matrimony except after puberty. And then indeed there is a mature judgment for this, nor in these things is he subject to parents, for it is said in Genesis 2. Therefore shall a man leave father, etc. — but subjection impedes in those things which are repugnant to that subjection, or to a part of it, as D. Bonan. and others note.

To that about the minor and the orphan it is answered that the assumption is false, otherwise the laws would be inequitable which protect the orphan, lest he pay that debt.

Sanchez answers, lib. 6. de matrimonio, disp. 38. num. 36. that the laws are not inequitable, but that that law protects him so that it may be lawful for him to elude that natural debt, using against it the privilege of restitution.

BUT I do not see by what reasoning, wrapped in these words, he dissolves the argument; for it is an inequitable privilege that exempts from a restitution naturally owed.

But as to what he adds, that natural subjection grants only the improper irritation, not the proper one: I answer, already at num. 4. I asserted that dominative power is the foundation of the power of annulling votes; but this power in the father is natural toward the son.

But as to what he adds about indeterminate precepts, it is false; and, that we may use the example of confession, if it were determined essentially to human law, we would no longer be bound to confess sins merely internal: therefore when something essential is determined, for instance the matter, or the form, then it is drawn to human being, not when it is determined as to things entirely extrinsic, for instance time, etc. Thus therefore, although liberty is by natural law the natural foundation of such dependence on the father; yet the time is determined by human law, not indeed that some time naturally subjected be eluded, but that it be declared at what time the son is apt of himself to vow naturally. And so the law only declares the natural law, which, since it varies with the stage of a man's age, has much of doubt in it, as Sanchez num. 29. Suarez, and Ledefma well note, cited above. Nor was this to be left to manifest arbitrariness.

It is PROVED fourthly by D. Bonau. loc. cit. and the last foundation, as regards slaves, because that which arises from natural dominion is natural; but this power arises from a dominion which is natural over a slave, as Sanchez himself concedes: Therefore. I know that the law of nations intervened in captivity; but servitude in this state is natural, as I said in Tract. 3. de Legibus, Disput. de Iure gentium, prima secunda.

Sanchez answers before num. 32. that by that subjection only the improper power of irritation in Dominion is induced, for suspending votes, insofar as they do harm. The same he says of wives, and of sons.

BUT concerning wives the answer is surely absurd, because since the bond is perpetual, nothing other than proper irritation is required. It is similar concerning sons; but slaves, as long as they are slaves, have the same perpetual obligation as regards the things of their servitude. For we do not wish that by servitude all spiritual goods are impeded, as S. Bonau. notes loc. cit. but those things which clash with the state of servitude, and are not indispensable to salvation.

AS REGARDS Religious it is proved by D. Bonau., foundation 3. in corpore. By the voluntary promise of obedience they are so subjected to the prior that with respect to the disposition of their own will they are as minors under a tutor. Therefore c. si religiosus, de electione in 6. religious are said not to have a WILL of their own or a NILL, and thus the custom of all religious orders has interpreted this subordination of the religious to the prior.

Sanchez answers that that solemn obligation of one's own will is of Ecclesiastical law, and by that law alone does he render such obedience invalid, which is done; and this appears in simple votes, which by Ecclesiastical determination obtain the power of annulling, as in the Society of Jesus. He urges: because that subjection argues only the power of an imperfect irritation. He adds that religious do not subject their will in all things.

But even grant that the solemnity of the vote, that it may constitute religion as such, requires Ecclesiastical law; yet the obligation of the will, made in the service of God to that man, by natural Divine law binds as regards the promises, except in those things which are repugnant to that subjection; but the promise is in all things which are within religion, as D. Bonavent. notes in corpore, nor therefore does he wish the power of annulling to be extended beyond the dominative power, which is in the prior for governing all things; though it is not to be commanded, ex Sanchez. See the end of quaest. 19. And the valid promise of a religious from the nature of the thing binds naturally by the force of fidelity; otherwise the votes would revive, which Sanchez lib. 4. sap. 26. num. 4. does not concede, and it is against the practice of the whole Church, and cap. 29. num. 29. from the nature of dominion he gathers the power of annulling directly in the rule given cap. 26. num. 4.

↑ Top of work

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio VI: Whether* the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Dubitatio I: Whether* KNOWLEDGE *is a gift of the Holy Ghost