Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

As regards the first condition, deliberation, and its necessity for a vow, the question is: whether every deliberation sufficient to avoid mortal sin suffices, or whether there is required such deliberation as has weighed all the circumstances of the matter.

Some think that the prior deliberation which proceeds from the heat of passion, anger, or love does not suffice, but that a perfect one is required, which can be proved from c. si quis iratus, 2. quaest. 4, and the rule Quidquid calore, 48. ff. de regulis iuris and l. 3. ff. de divortiis: whence is also drawn what kind of pledge ought to be in marriage. So the Gloss on c. dudum, verb. calore, and there Hostiensis on the same word; Antoninus, c. sicut ex litteris de iureiurando, n. 9; Panormitanus on d. c. dudum, num. 8, and c. sicut ex litteris, num. 2, and c. si vero, num. 7 de iureiurando; Romanus, singulari 508; Tiraquellus, de poenis temperandis, causa 1, num. 26; and among the Theologians, Richard in 4, dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 2.

The opposite opinion, however, is that deliberation suffices which suffices even for committing a mortal sin. So Navarrus, summa Latina, cap. 18, num. 7; Molina, T. 1, de iustitia, tract. 2, disp. 267, where they teach this generally in every promise made to a man; but concerning a vow and an oath, John Andreas teaches it, c. dudum, n. 10, de consecr., d. 5, ubi Antoninus n. 25, Cardinalis n. 2, oppositione 5; Ancharanus n. 10; Alexander de Nevo, c. sicut ex litt. de iureiurando, n. 18, where Imola at the end, Faelinus num. 3 and 4.

Among the Theologians: Paludanus in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 1; D. Antoninus, 2nd part, tit. 11, cap. 2; Cajetan, 2. 1. quaest. 88, art. 1, and in the summa, v. votum; Soto, book 7, de iustitia, quaest. 1, art. 2; Viguerius, book Instit. cap. 5, §. 1; Alcoyer, I. de Ludo, cap. 13; Medina, book 1 of the summa, cap. 14, § 6; Palacios, 4, dist. 38, disp. 1; Manuel, 2nd tome of the summa, cap. 92; Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1; Aragon, 2. 2. quaest. 88, art. 1, fol. 995; Angles, floribus 2. p. quaest. 1, de voto, art. cit. diff. 3; Bassaeus, num. 2; Lopez, first part of the Instruct., cap. 45. Sanchez adduces and follows these, book 1, de matrim., disp. 8, num. 5, and in the summa, book 4, cap. 1. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure in the place cited.

I assert, with this opinion, that deliberation which intervenes with mortal sin suffices for a vow: it is proved from D. Bonaventure in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 3, by the arguments in the first place, with the replies added. Such deliberation suffices for handing oneself over to the devil, and to a vow, as is had in c. sunt, qui opes, 17. quaest. 4, and c. veniens de voto: but to hand oneself over to the devil, deliberation arising even from passion suffices, with all the circumstances not considered: Therefore. On this argument Sanchez and the others rely in the places adduced.

Sanchez notes, first, num. 6, that in betrothals a period of seven years is required.

He notes, second, num. 7, that it is so gathered that the deliberation required be sufficient, the one vowing ought thus to premeditate the moving cause and the end, which Cajetan explains, saying that one ought to compare what one deliberates with its opposite; yet he observes that this does not require a delay of time.

But what consideration, and what consent, is required for mortal sin, has been sufficiently elucidated in Tractate 3, which is on Sin, disput. 2, quaest. 11 and 12.

But if a doubt should arise whether there was sufficient deliberation, we may judge that there was not, according to the foundations handed down in Tract. 1, disp. 17, quaest. 22. Tanner, however, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, says the counsel would be to seek a dispensation. On this see Sanchez in the summa, l. 1. cap. 10, from num. 16, where, in doubt whether a vow has been emitted, he judges it not to be believed emitted, because the condition of the possessor is better, and the whole possession stands for the will, not for the vow. Add Soto, l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 2. dub. secundo, Medina, l. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 7. fol. 90, Suarez, de Censuris, disp. 40. sect. 5. n. 15, Sà in summa, v. debitum, Lopez, 1. p. Instruct. consc. 145, Henriquez, l. 8. de Eucharist. cap. 45, Manuel, 2. Tomo summae, cap. 99. num. 5, Graff, p. 1. decis. l. 2. cap. 26. num. 7, Rebellus, de Iust. p. 2. l. 1. quaest. 3. sect. 2, whom Sanchez adduces loc. cit., where he also retracts what he had taught in T. 1. de matrim. l. 2. disp. 41. num. 34, namely that one who is more inclined to affirm that he has vowed is bound to that part of the thing promised which the quantity of the doubt requires. In which case he here judges that one must judge altogether in favor of the one doubting, with Sala, p. 1. quaest. 10. Tract. 4. disp. unica sect. 25. num. 254, with whom Fernandez proceeds in exam. Theol. Moral. p. 1. cap. 6. §. 2, Bonacina, Tract. de legibus, disp. 2. quaest. 4. p. 2. num. 18, Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resol. 9, against Bassaeus. The same Sanchez, l. 4. decal. cap. 1. num. 12, says one must see whence the doubt arises, since this matter is still undecided; because possession does not stand for liberty in whatever doubt there is from a defect of deliberation. For if it arises from perturbation of mind through fear or anger, he says one must then judge for the vow. But if it is doubted, on account of tender age, whether he has completed 7 years, one must judge for liberty; if from the madness of the one vowing, one must see what the law presumes about what was then done. And thus he decides variously.

Truly, however, he does not expound this rightly. For since the doubt stands in this, that it renders the mind equally undecided on both sides, as is taught in l. 2. de matr. disp. 41. num. 1, and liberty stands in the possession of the one doubting, as he himself asserts, LL. CC., and from each of these causes one can be made doubtful, and the possession of liberty can arise from the doubt, as he himself teaches, certainly he will be in possession, from wherever the doubt arises. Moreover, the cases adduced by him do not leave the matter undecided. Wherefore he labors equivocally. On these things see p. 2. T. 1. disp. 17. q. 20.

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

The intention, which is placed in the definition of a vow, I shall set out briefly here.

It must be noted, with D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. in resol., that the same question arises concerning marriage, Oath, and Vow. So Sanchez l. 1. de matrim. disput. 9., and in the place cited in the summa, walking with D. Bonav., resolved the difficulty completely. He first sets out certain cases in which one vowing without intention is not bound, which are easy: for instance, if he believes a vow does not bind, etc., or if he vows without the intention of promising.

Concerning this question, some have held that it is a true vow and binds. So Soto l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 2. versic. 3.; Penna p. p. Instruct. cap. 42. et 43.; Manuel, 2nd Tomo of the summa, cap. 92. num. 4.; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. fol. 969.; Gutierrez l. 1. quaest. Canon. cap. 22. num. 32.

The second opinion is that it is not a vow, nor does it bind the conscience under the aspect of a vow. So D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. and in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1., whom Richard. follows there, art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 2.; D. Anton. 2. p. tit. 11. cap. 2.; Angel. v. pactum, num. 4. and v. votum 1. num. 7.; Sylvester verb. metus, quaest. 8. and verb. pactum, quaest. 4.; Armilla there, num. 2. and verb. Iuramentum, num. 14.; Tabienna verb. pactum, quaest. 1.; Medina C. de restit. quaest. 23.; Nauar. summa, cap. 12. et 13. conf. 4.; Viguer. l. Iustit. cap. 5. §. 5. versic. 14.; Palacios in 4. dist. 29. disp. 1. fol. 665.; whom Tanner disp. 5. quaest. 4. dub. 1. cites and follows, Sanchez loc. cit. and in summa, l. 4. cap. 1. num. 27., where he adds Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 1.; Azor. l. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. and cap. 13. quaestio 9.; I add Faustus Thesaur. lib. 1. quaest. 26.; Less. lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 3. and Bassaeus num. 7.

I assert, with this opinion, that one who vows without intending to be bound is not bound by reason of a vow.

It is proved by Sanchez from the final chapter, where a condition contrary to the substance of marriage annuls it, even though the words and the intention of contracting it were present: therefore, since it belongs to the nature of a promise to have the mind of binding oneself, where that mind is absent the promise will be nothing. The same is held by others with Fagundez in 2. praecepto Decal. d. 2. s. 9.

Yet this reason seems to beg the principle, as S. Bonav. hinted in 4. loc. cit. with the last argument; for this is the very thing in dispute: whether intention is necessary when the will of promising is present, in which, it seems, the vow, or the other promise, consists.

It is proved, then, by D. Bonav., because a vow looks immediately and substantially to God: therefore such a promise will be as is judged in the judgment of God; but there it is judged according to what is internal, as is said in 1 Reg. 16, For man seeth those things that appear; but the Lord beholdeth the heart; and D. Gregory: Words serve the intention, and God judges such words as are brought forth from within.

PROVED secondly by D. Bonau. with the argument which Sanchez took up loc. cit., Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 13. num. 1. for marriage, and the others cited for a vow. Every obligation which is not from law arises from the private will of a man. Thus in l. obligationum, ff. de obligationibus it is said that no one binds himself to another unless willing: but a vow is not from any law: therefore it arises from the free will of man: therefore it rises there from a private law which the promiser imposes upon himself; yet no law binds unless the lawgiver intends to bind.

You object first: Obligation is a natural effect of a promise, just as fire is to heat: therefore, just as fire being applied, heating follows; so a promise being posited, obligation follows.

It is answered from D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.: when the promise is true, it has the effect of obligation; but not when it is fictitious, such as one with the mind not of binding, for then the natural condition of the promise is lacking. And so, just as heat does not follow from painted fire, so here. So Suarez also answers.

From this there also falls that which they object secondly: Whoever wills the antecedent necessarily wills the consequent, l. 1. §. 1. ff. si ususfruct. petat.; but obligation follows a promise: therefore. It is answered that it follows a true promise, not indeed a fictitious one, such as we here suppose.

It also falls, that other objection: He who gives the form gives also the consequences of the form: therefore he who offers a promise offers also the obligation.

It is answered that this is true of one giving a true form, such as one is not who promises fictitiously.

I ASSERT thirdly, that this fictitious promiser, if he fictitiously goes forth with solemn vows, is bound in the sight of the Church to fulfill them.

It is proved by D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. in the body, because the Church judges according to what is external.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonan. there ad ult. and in 3. loc. cit. with the second argument: Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one, as all the Jurists cry out.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonan. loc. cit. with argument 3.: Human society consists in contracts; but if one were to stand on intention, no one would ever be secure: for words are that in which a contract consists.

By THIS distinction the arguments on both sides are resolved.

From these Sanchez deduces (l. 4. Decal. cap. 1. num. 29.) that one who is initiated and consents to the Sacred Orders, to which the vow of chastity is joined, yet does not wish to subject himself to this vow, but only wishes the Sacred Orders, is not bound by force of a vow to preserve chastity, but is bound by force of the Ecclesiastical constitution; and if he were to enter marriage, it would be invalid.

The SAME he holds in lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 27. num. 12., where he brings along with him Paludanus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1. art. 2. num. 14.; Sylv. Gabriel 4. dist. 38. quaest. unica, art. 2. and dist. 37. quaest. unica, art. 2. after the second conclusion; D. Anton. 3. p. tit. 11. cap. 8.; Sylvest. V. Matrim. 8. quaest. 12. dicto 2.; Durandus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1.; Arboteus l. 5. Theosophiae, cap. 7.; Bassolis in 4. dist. 47. quaest. unica, art. 1.; Nicolaus de Nissia super 4. sent. tract. 6. p. 22. de matrim. quaest. 7.; Antonius Cuccus l. 5. Instit. maiorum, tit. 12. num. 220.; Palac. in 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Anglem. fleribus p. 1., where concerning marriage quaest. 11. art. 1. diffic. 4.; so also Henriq. l. 10. cap. 14.; Valent. p. 1.; Azor. p. 1. l. 11. c. 13.; Bassaeus v. Votum, n. 6.

They are OBJECTED by Rich. 4. dist. 37. art. 1. quaest. 1.; Palud. dist. 38. quaest. 2. art. en.; Nauar. sum. cap. 22. n. 52.; Palac. 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Dominicus c. Diaconi, dist. 38.; Tol. l. 1. cap. 8.: namely, because one who approaches sacred order efficaciously wills it; and so he is held to lay down that volition of the vow of chastity. D. Bonau. seems to have thought this in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.

I FOR MY PART do not think Sanchez rightly deduces from the fact that one vowing fictitiously is not bound, that the same must be said of our case; concerning which I thus argue ad hominem.

WHOEVER wills the antecedent wills also that which necessarily follows it, if he will the antecedent efficaciously, according to Sanchez l. 1. de matrimonio, disput. 9. num. 8. (for so he answers the argument above). But one who is initiated into the Sacred Orders is, of himself, supposed to will the Sacred Orders, from which the obligation of the vow of chastity follows conjointly, as is found in l. 7. de matrimonio, num. 11.; therefore one willing the Sacred Orders wills also to vow chastity.

Yet the disparity is great: for there he wills fictitiously, whence the obligation, which is the effect of the promise, does not fall upon the promiser; but here, one who is initiated wills really and efficaciously that from which the burden of the vow of chastity follows, whence he is bound even to that; just as also (S. Bonau. says) one who intends to promise the rule of the monks intends to vow also chastity and obedience, which, I confess, are vows more closely joined to the Monastic profession than the vow of chastity is to the Sacred Order; yet the same reason runs, because on either side the one follows from the other necessarily.

You will still URGENTLY object: If that ordained man is bound, not by reason of a vow, but by reason of the Ecclesiastical constitution; it would follow that two precepts exist in this business, imposing chastity: one Divine from a vow, the other human from the Church: but this is false, against all, and against Sanchez himself l. 7. de matrimonio, disp. 27. num. 11. et 12. Therefore.

HENCE it follows also, that one initiated into the Orders, by fornicating, sins with a twofold sin beyond the ordinary fault of fornication.

Sanchez answers, num. 14., that the precept of the Church is not immediately about continence to be imposed upon priests, but about the vow of chastity being imposed. Therefore this argument does not prevail against Sanchez.

He ADDS in lib. 3. de matrim. disp. 16., with S. Bonau. in the cited places, and with Hostiensis cap. veniens, qui clerici, and Ioan. Andrea there; Anchartan, and as to an oath forced by fear, the same assert Anton. c. si vero, de iure iur. n. 5., and there Abbas num. 10.; Imola fine, Naeuo n. 38.; Sylvest. iuram. 4. quaest. 7. dicto 1. after D. Bonau. in 3. loc. cit.: that one who confesses that he vowed, and says he vowed fictitiously, is not to be believed, and therefore is to be compelled to fulfill the vow; although in the forum of conscience we are bound to believe him, and to declare him immune from the obligation of the vow.

The REASON indeed is that of D. Bonau. ad 2., which is also found in cap. per tuas, de probat. there: Since it is altogether unworthy that what each one has clearly protested with his own voice should be weakened in the same case by his own testimony; and in l. Labeo 7. versiculo, the same Tubero, ff. suppellect. legat. there: I do not think anyone ought to say what he does not feel. This holds, with many citations, in Tiraquel. l. si unquam, verb. liberis, num. 17. C. de revocat. donat.; Menoch. lib. 6. de praesumpt. 35. and l. 1. quaest. 12. and l. 3. praesumpt. 1. num. 57. et 39.

Sanchez ADDS, num. 10., that if from his confession alone it is held that he truly vowed, yet did not wish to bind himself, he is to be believed; because if he wished to deceive, he would keep silence about both, or would deny. From these the question is almost resolved.

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

I SUPPOSE what I wrote in prima secundae, Tract. 1. disput. 3. quaest. 12., on how ignorance causes the involuntary, and in disp. 4. quaest. 1., which circumstances cause the Involuntary.

AND indeed, that ignorance of the substance of a thing, or of those circumstances which notably alter the matter of a vow, makes it involuntary, Sanchez l. 4. Decal. cap. 2. num. 11. teaches, Soto l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 2., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. fol. 966., Lopez p. 1. Instruct. cap. 56., Manuele 2. Tomo summae, cap. 92. Soto brings an example: If someone, deceived about the choice of foods in a certain religion, were to vow it; he would by no means vow it if he knew. Similarly concerning a journey to Jerusalem, if he believed it to be only ten leagues; but not if he erred about some minute accidents: for knowledge of all the accidents of a vow is not necessary for it, as I said in quaestio prima.

The GREATER difficulty is: when the change to be made in the matter of a vow is unknown, or not foreseen, whether, after such a change is made, one is released from the vow.

COMMONLY the adage is circulated: No one is bound by a vow, an oath, or any other promise, to that to which he would not have wished to bind himself, had he adverted to it while he promised. So teach Innocentius c. veniens, in the single number, de iure iurando, there Abbas num. 4., Anton. cap. Quemadmodum, num. 13., of the same title, Hostiens. summa, of the same tit. num. 3., D. Antonin. 2. p. tit. 10. cap. 6. §. 5., Angel. verb. iuramentum, 4., Sylvester v. Votum 2. quaest. 17., and v. Iuram. 3. quaest. 1. part. 9., and verb. Iuramentum 4. quaest. 6., and quaest. 13., Tabiena v. Iurare, quaest. 15. num. 16., Armilla v. Iuramentum, num. 35., Nauar. summa, cap. 18., Hispana num. 5., Latina num. 7., Molina T. 2. de Iust. disp. 272. col. 2.

From this arises another rule: That releases from the obligation of a vow or oath which, if it had happened or been known from the beginning, would have impeded their being made. So D. Thom. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 1. ad 1., Maior there, quaest. 1., Carthus. quaest. 2. §. Quaeritur item., Archidiac. c. Qui bona, quaest. 17. num. 4., Sylvest. verb. Votum, quaest. 1., and verbo Iuramentum 3. quaest. 1., and v. Pactum, quaest. 4., Tabiena quaest. 2. num. 3., Armilla num. 2., Medina C. de Ieiun. quaest. ult. ad 4., Angles flor. 2. p. quaest. unica de voto, art. 2. difficult. 3. concl. 5., Enriquez l. 11. de matrimonio, cap. 14., whom Sanchez refers to, loc. cit. num. 18. and 25.

OTHERS, on the contrary, say a vow is rendered invalid only if the substance of the vow is changed; otherwise we would never have anything stable in contracts; for many things happen which, had they been foreseen, the contract would not have followed. So Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3., Soto l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad tertium, Armilla verb. votum, num. 11., where the same Caietanus from perult., Nauar. summa, cap. 12. num. 39., Lopez p. 1. instruct. cap. 43., Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 4., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 21., Fagundez in 1. praecepto Decal. l. 2. cap. 13. num. 32.

It must be NOTED, with D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 3. in corpore, that changes of things change obligations, even those ratified by oath. For these compel while things remain in the same state, as is found in c. Quemadmodum de iure iurando, and other texts; and D. Bonav., whom Guttier. follows, de iuramento, p. 1. cap. 29. num. 6. and cap. 71. num. 6., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 20. For who does not see that a vow which brings detriment to salvation does not bind for that time, as if someone had vowed not to accept a prelacy, because he was then unfit, that afterward, having been made necessary for aiding Religion or the state, he is no longer bound? Otherwise he would sin by neglecting the public necessity. Therefore this vow, or oath, if made absolutely, would be evil, as D. Bonav. notes in the cited place.

INDEED, however, if you should open a wider entrance for annulling vows and oaths from any change of things whatever, a way would already be opened to six hundred confusions. Therefore only a grave change suffices, and in this the authors of the first opinion judged rightly.

Take NOTE, however, that that difficulty, or supervening change, which I said ought to be grave, ought also to be new, such that the substance of the thing promised did not carry it with it. So Gloss. in c. non est vero authoritate, Hostiens. summa, tit. de iureiur., and Sanchez num. 29.

ANOTHER difficulty is: whether a vow or oath is invalid when there is error concerning the cause of the vow. A similar question is, when the cause was true at the time of the vow, and afterward ceased.

The cause is TWOFOLD: one final, and that is that to which the operation is directed and ordered, without which he would not operate: the other is the moving, or impelling cause, which stirs a mind already resolved to pursue the work more easily, or more willingly.

I ASSERT first, the final cause ceasing, the obligation of the vow ceases. Thus is understood c. Cum cessante causa, de appell., and similar texts, in which it is brought forward: the cause ceasing, the effect ceases. See Sanchez num. 42., Bassaeus num. 12., who excepts solemn vows, because in them one is presumed to will that state, known to all.

I ASSERT secondly, the impelling cause ceasing, dispensation is made easier, although it does not annul the vow. Thus it is gathered ex c. magna de voto, at the end, and the Gloss there, with the word, ut venires teaches it, Anton. num. 15., Abb. num. 14., Tiraquel. Tract. cessante causa, limitatione 1. num. 10.

You OBJECT against the first, from cap. magna: the Bishop of Troyes is dispensed from a vow he had made of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, so that by the aid of a certain Count, whom he had heard was staying there, he might obtain the liberty of his Church. Now indeed the Bishop was admonished that the Count had died, and so he seemed free from the pilgrimage, and yet, consulting the Pontiff, he obtained a commutation of the vow: therefore, the end ceasing, the vow does not cease.

It is ANSWERED by Abb., Tiraquel., Angel., and Sylvest., that this was only an impelling cause, not a final one.

CONTRA, because the Pontiff testifies: To induce us especially to make this indulgence for you, that since you had chiefly issued a vow of pilgrimage for the liberty of the Church of Troyes, to be obtained through the said Count, with him removed from the midst, because the cause ceasing, the effect could also more easily cease. Where it is brought forward that the principal cause of the vow was to visit that Count for the sake of the liberty of the Church. The Gloss there thinks this, Hostiens. num. 21., Anton. num. 15., Anchar. num. 15.

Sanchez ANSWERS, num. 43. loc. cit., that that commutation of the vow was not necessary, but granted out of greater caution, which the Pope signifies, saying: The cause of that vow ceasing, its obligation could also be ended. As if he said: it ceased, if it was a final cause; otherwise if it was impelling.

Nor does it stand in the way that this commutation is called an indulgence, and so ought to accomplish something; yet it would accomplish nothing if the vow had already ceased of itself.

For he answers that privileges are granted for this work, that consciences may be pacified.

Yet FOR ME an easier solution occurs: that that end of going to the Count was not the adequate one, but at the same time a concasue with another end of going to the sacred places; for the Pontiff says the vow was chiefly issued to that end of visiting the Count, where the Pontiff in the particle chiefly includes implicitly another concasue, not indeed dead, for going more willingly, but simply for going. Therefore the commutation was necessary, because the adequate end had not ceased.

NOR does Sanchez speak well in saying it was not necessary; for the Pontiff professes to dispense, and no scruple is found in that Bishop, but only the cessation of the principal end, whereby the effect of the obligation could more easily cease by taking away the remaining obligation, which had resulted from the other end. But this is clearer than light in that privilege, where elsewhere he asserts that he was bound, bringing in Ps. 75. for it: Vow, and pay to the Lord. And the Pontiff also fears scandal from the laity in so easily freeing clerics from obligations. The Pontiff adds that he compassionates his aging age, the necessity of the Church of Troyes, etc., and commutes the expenses of the journey into so many alms for the holy places without diminution. Therefore he was truly still bound, since he also intended a pilgrimage to the holy land of the east, and on that account had taken up the cross, as Pope Alexander III says there. Nor does Sanchez prove well that that commutation was not necessary, because the Pontiff had said it could cease, that is, it had ceased, if it was a final cause; otherwise if impelling; for this does not show that the dispensation was not necessary.

From what has been said, it is asserted thirdly, that error concerning the adequate final cause takes away the vow, not error concerning the merely moving one. It is clear from what has been said: for if the vow ceases with it ceasing, therefore it is not made with it not existing; for as a thing is ordered to being conserved, so also to being; for by the same causes a moral thing is made and conserved.

But when it is doubtful whether it is a final cause, favor must be given to liberty, which is possessed, as I said in quaest. 2., against Bass. n. 12., Azor. l. 11. cap. 15., Vasq. p 2. disp. 70., Sanchez l. 2. de matr. disp. 9., Sylvium quaest. 88. art. 1.

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Whether fear struck renders a Vow invalid.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of losing honor; it is found in leg. 7. tit. 33. part. 7. The Gloss seems to think the same, cap. cum dilectus, v. metum de his, quae vi.

TO this tends the fear of rape, as S. Bonavent. says, at the place cited, and it is found in leg. isti 8. at the end, ff. de eo, quod metus causa, and leg. ff. 15. tit. 2. part. 4., which seem to speak of a virgin; for she, if not corrupted, can suffer rape. The same think D. Thom., 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. ad 2.; D. Bonavent. is cited also, quaest. 1., and others by Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 12., where he understands the same of another honest woman, which I judge the Seraphic Doctor also to have meant; for he does not there define it strictly of rape, and it is gathered from the leg. isti quidem adduced, which includes also men, for whom there is no seal of virginity; and moreover he adds the reason of honesty, that with good men this fear ought to be greater than that of death, which reason also holds in an honest widow.

AS TO grave infamy, although it is in controversy, and S. Bonavent. has expressed nothing about it, yet I judge he included it in the fear of death, to which it is equated, leg. insta, ff de manumiss. vindic.; or he may have included it in the fear of rape, which for the most part carries infamy with it; or S. Bonavent. held that infamy is not among these evils. The same D. Thomas taught, in 4. dist. 23. quaest. unica, art. 2. ad 3.; Durandus quaest. 2. num. 4.; Carthus. there quaest. 2.; Sylvester V. metus, quaest. 4.; and it is gathered from leg. nec timorem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa, there: Nor is infamy contained in this edict, as fear, Pedius said; and the Gloss holds it there, V. infamiae, when it is infamy of fact. Indeed, of infamy of law, the law itself adduced holds it, and Tabiena holds it, V. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. num. 2.

Others ADD the fear of excommunication. Others deny it.

HERE the rule of D. Bonavent. holds, which Sanchez uses, num. 17.; for either the excommunication is just, and then the fear of it does not fall upon a constant man, because it is medicinal and good, nor is it compared as an evil to be avoided or feared; or it is unjust, and this is to be feared, for so it is found, 11. quaest. 3. cap. 1., as Sanchez notes, num. 17., after D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 18. part. 2. dub. 2., and he brings forward infamy.

S. Bonavent. does not enumerate the LOSS of goods among those things that strike grave fear, for so it seems to be excluded by 32. quaest. 7., there: I will not that you bring before me the losses of the household goods, and it is omitted in cap. cum dilectus de his, quae vi. Paludanus thinks the same, 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. concl. 2.

Or perhaps he includes it in the fear of death, to which it is equated, as Tiraquellus teaches, de nobilitate, cap. 31. num. 369.; for goods are in a certain sense the life of man, leg. advocati 14. Cod. de advoc. divers. iudic., there the Gloss, and it is proved by the song of Hesiod:

Money is the soul to wretched mortals —

So the Gloss cap. unic. verb. coactus de his, quae vi in 6., there Ioan. Monach. num. 5.; Alphonsus Brunus inter consilia feudalia, consil. 82. num. 7., and many others as Sanchez reports, num. 22.

Sanchez NOTES further, disp. 6., that merely reverential fear, without threats, does not fall upon a constant man, nor suffice to annul contracts, cap. ex litteris de despons. impuberum, and cap. 2. de pactis, in 6., and in many others.

The QUESTION, then, is: Whether grave fear, struck in order to extort a vow, annuls it, and on what account.

The FIRST opinion is that such a vow is null by no law, but they say it is to be annulled by Ecclesiastical law. So the Cardinal, cap. 2. quaest. 1. casu 4. de his, quae vi.; Sylvester, verb. metus, quaest. 8., and verb. votum, 2. quaest. 12.

The SECOND opinion asserts this of simple vows alone; but that profession so emitted alone is null, because only one law annulling a vow is found, and it is cap. 1. de his, quae vi, which speaks of profession alone; so Penna, as Lopez reports at the place cited, and other learned Recentiores.

The THIRD opinion is that every such vow is null, whether simple or solemn. So very many, who prove it from tradition, though perhaps the written law annulling it has perished elsewhere. So the final Gloss at the end of cap. 2. de his, quae vi.; Abbas there num. 11., and cap. sicut nobis, num. 5. de regular.; Maior in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 4. col. penult. vers. His rationibus; Rosella V. votum, 1. num. 4., and v. metus, num. 3.; there Angelus num. 8.; Tabiena V. votum, 1. quaest. 1.; Fortunius de ultimo fine, illatione 1. num. 4. 18.; Rota in novis. 4. To decis. 20. num. 15.; Sotus lib. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 1. and 2.; Navar. summa, cap. 14. §. 6.; Arag. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. fol. 988.; Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unic. de voto, art. 3. difficult. 18.; Toletus lib. 4. summa, cap. 17.; Sà V. votum, num. 8., and v. metus, num. 2.; Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. q. 6. puncto 4.; Manuel, Tomo 7, cap. 93.; Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 45.; Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 15. quaest. 7.; Philiat. de offic. sacerd. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 18.; Sanchez in summa, lib. 4. cap. 3. num. 13.

Many note that this is true even if the one vowing had the true intention of binding himself; otherwise, without intention, it is beyond doubt null of itself; Tanner subscribes, disp. 5. quaest. 4. dub. 1. num. 8.

From these, some will that it is null by Divine and natural law. So Sotus, lib. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2., and lib. 8. quaest. 1. art. 7. col. 17., and some Recentiores; and in a similar case, namely marriage, D. Bonavent. holds it, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1.; D. Thom. there quaest. unica, art. 3. quaestiuncula 1. supplem.; Gabriel. there quaest. 2. art. 2.; Almain. quaest. 1.; Carthuf. quaest. 2.; Sotus quaest. 1. art. 3.; Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1.; Altisiodor lib. 4. summae, tract. 9. cap. 7. quaest. 5.; Scotus 4. dist. 20. quaest. unica, §. De secundo dico; D. Anton. 3. part. tit. 1. cap. 7.; Veractuz p. p. speculi, art. 8. concl. 1.; Angles flor. 1. part. de matrim. quaest. 3. de consensu coacto, art. 1. diffic. 1. fol. 546.; Ledesma dub. 23. de matrim. concl. 3.; Philiarc. de offic. sacerd. tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 2. cap. 8. and cap. 6.; Molina tom. 2. de Iust. Tract. 2. disp. 226. ad 2. And they bring it forward as probable: Victoria summa, de matrim. num. 268.; Palacios 4. dist. 29. disp. unica; Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrimonio. cap. 40. fol. 1063.

Of the Jurisperiti, Angelus de Uraldis holds it, among the matrimonial consilia of Zileti consil. 46.; Covar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 5.; Cucus, lib. 5. Instit. Maior tit. 12. num 118.; Alexander Caeretius lib. 4. de sponsal. cap. 9.; Matienzo lib. 5. recopilat. tit. 1. rub. glos. 1. num. 189.; Barbosa ff. soluto matrimonio, rub. 4. part. num. 30. Sanchez asserts it as much more probable than the others recited, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 14. num. 1.

Others, however, say they are annulled by Ecclesiastical law alone. So Aragonius 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 2. fol. 989.; Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 15. quaest. 6.; Vega, tomo 2 of the summa, cap. 129. casu 17.; Sanchez in summa, lib. 4. cap. 3. num. 9. Sanchez asserts the same of marriage, lib. 4. disp. 14. num. 2., bringing forward many: these are Durandus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 2.; Paludanus 1. quaest. 1. art. 3. concl. 2. num. 20.; Sotus there, quaest. 1. art. 3.; Arboreus lib. 11. Theosophiae, cap. 15.; Ledesma 2. part. 4. q. 49. art. 3.; Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. tit. de impedimento violentiae, num. 29. And Richardus says it is probable, 4. dist. 2. art. 1. quaest. 1.; D. Antonin. Victoria, Palac. Bartholomeus a Ledesma reported above; and of the Jurisperiti, Sylvester V. matrimonium, 8. quaest. 11.; Armil. V. matrim. num. 41.; Tabiena V. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 2.; Navar. sum. cap. 22. num. 50.; Fagundez lib. 2. in 2. praecept. cap. 13. num. 15.; and Suarez Tom. 2. relig. lib. 2. cap. 10. num. 8. To this Bassaeus inclines, num. 5., provided the fear struck be for the end of extorting the vow: Navar. cites, above; Suarez cap. 7. num. 8.; Sanchez lib. 4. moral. cap. 5.; Valentiam disp. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 4.; Sylvium quaest. 88. art. 1.

The SENTENCE therefore of D. Bonavent., as regards vows, is found in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 2., where he confesses vows null, though not oaths; the reason of the disparity he assigns, because a Vow regards the obligation toward God, who wills that sacrifices be not forced but voluntary; not so an oath, between which S. Bonavent. places three differences, in 3. dist. 38. quaest. 1. ad ult. The first is in the object, because an oath is made to men; a vow to God. The second in the means, because a vow is vowed to God by promise; but an oath is sworn by God. The third in the end, because an oath is for establishing truth; a vow, however, for increasing honesty, and therefore it ought to be more perfectly voluntary.

On which the opposition of Sanchez in his summa, num. 9., falls, where he argues: An oath extorted by such grave fear binds altogether, cap. si vero, de iureiurando; and yet it is involuntary; and it binds, of itself, no less than a vow; therefore there is no other difference than that the Church annuls the Vow, not the Oath.

D. Bonavent. therefore thinks that a vow is null by the Divine law of nature; for he thought the same of marriage at the place cited above.

I ASSERT, that every Vow extorted by grave fear is null by the Divine natural law.

It is PROVED first by D. Bonavent. at the place cited. A Vow is an act of religion, offering something in the service of God; but God does not will a forced sacrifice, as is found in 2. Corint. 9.: Every one, as he purposed in his heart, not from sadness, or of necessity.

Sanchez answers, num. 19., that it is involuntary only in a certain respect, but simply voluntary.

TRUE, this Doctor has not grasped the character of the voluntary required for a vow; for as S. Bonavent. rightly notes, in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. in argumentis, such a voluntary is required as is contained in the word of vowing, which is altogether spontaneous and most free, that character by which through a Vow we offer spontaneously to God the services of our works and give ourselves over to him; such as there is in marriage, in which the body is given over with love to the holy and dear society; which likeness Sanchez also admits on LL. CC.; but marriage is annulled by grave fear, as the Canons declare, can. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. and can. significavit, related to this by D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1., and Sanchez lib. 4. de matrimonio, disp. 21. num. 18.; and such marriage is null in either forum, as S. Bonavent. holds at the place cited, the Canons being adduced, whom the Doctors of both Laws follow, especially all the Doctors of Pontifical Law, cap. 2. de his, quae vi, and cap. cum locum, de sponsal., where, in cap. matrimonium, they teach it to be null absolutely; for even if they expound it also in the forum of conscience, the Theologians adduced by Sanchez at the place cited expound it so. The reason is that of D. Bonavent., on which Sanchez rests, num. 18., because marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as a Vow signifies the union of the soul with Christ; but that is null by the Divine law of nature if it be entered from grave fear: Therefore.

The Minor is indeed PROVED by the most valid argument of S. Bonavent., dist. 29. quaest. 1. Wherever that is lacking which by its nature constitutes a thing in intrinsic being, there that being is not, because a thing cannot be without its essence: but in marriage entered from grave fear, consent is lacking, which by the intrinsic nature of the thing constitutes marriage: Therefore it is null by the nature of the thing. The Minor is proved from cap. cum locum, de sponsal., as D. Bonavent. reports in the arguments and in the body. For when two citizens of Pavia claimed a right over a girl, saying they had contracted marriage with her, the Pontiff commanded the girl to be placed in a safe place, because she feared violence, and the Pontiff gives the reason: because marriage is perfected by consent alone, which is not found where there is fear falling upon a constant man.

Hence Sanchez himself infers, num. 18.; therefore the Pontiff clearly holds that that involuntary consent, which is found where the aforesaid fear is present, is not sufficient for the worth of marriage: namely, because the essential of nature would be lacking. For that mutual consent is of the essence of marriage is of faith by the Council of Florence, in the decree on the sacrament of matrimony, as Sanchez notes, lib. 2. disp. 25. Indeed in disp. 26. he infers that by no power, even that of God, can there be marriage without consent, because it is of its essence.

But CONSENT, of the essence of it, the Pontiff establishes at the place cited to exclude fear falling upon a constant man. To this argument I do not see what the adversaries, especially Sanchez, can worthily reply.

I URGE further, because neither of marriage nor of vows so emitted is any annulment of the Church found; but the bare assertion that they are null. So of marriage it is found in cap. cum locum, cap. consultatione, and cap. veniens el. 2. de sponsal. significavit de eo, qui duxit in matrimonio, which are texts speaking of this matter; they deal with marriages already contracted, and declare that if they were entered through fear they are invalid; and the Church could not annul those marriages then contracted if, before her decree, they were valid: therefore they were null by the very natural law. That which is found only in cap. 1. de his, quae vi, does not annul profession, but brings forward and declares it to be such.

Sanchez answers, lib. 4. de matrimonio, disp. 14. num. 2., that those texts indeed do not have the form of statutes, and thus it is not established where such annulment was decreed by the Church; yet, a tradition of so many Doctors being extant, the Pontiffs in those decrees show that by law and usage it was always held that a marriage extorted by grave fear is null; and perhaps it was once written, though the writing perished; just as, although there is not extant a written declaration of the Church that marriage between a faithful man and an infidel is null, yet that it is so is established from the most ancient tradition of the Church.

He tries to satisfy with the same answer as regards cap. 1. de vi, which concerns vows.

Yet this answer is frivolous; for the Pontiffs in the decrees alleged before show that at all times such vows and marriages were always null, as Sanchez ingenuously confesses: therefore it is a sign that no solid tradition is had that this annulment was decreed by the Church.

I urge further, by the reason adduced above, because the Pontiffs assert that those marriages were always null from defect of consent, which excludes grave fear; which consent they assert is intrinsically necessary for marriage.

To that, indeed, which he adds about the marriage of a faithful man with an infidel, I say it is not null from the determination of the Church alone, as D. Bonavent. asserts, in 4. dist. 39. quaest. 1. in resolutione, but from the nature of the sacrament, which cannot be had without Baptism, which is the door of the sacraments; and by reason of the danger of falling away from Divine worship on account of the unequal worship of the spouse; from which arises the Ecclesiastical determination, which in many Provincial Councils declared such marriage null; and cap. cave, and cap. non oportet forbid such marriage to be contracted; and in c. Quam vero a general annulling decree is found; therefore many say it is null from the nature of the sacrament, among whom is S. Bonavent., who is badly adduced by Sanchez, lib. 7. disp. 71. num. 7., together with those asserting it null by Ecclesiastical law alone.

You will object first with the first opinion. Where there is free consent, other things being in place, there the Vow and the marriage are voluntary: But in our case there is free consent, for fear makes it involuntary only in a certain respect: Therefore.

D. Bonavent. answers, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1., that the voluntary is required in the manner said above, on account of the reasons adduced.

You will object secondly with Sanchez. Standing in the law of nature, that deliberation suffices for a Vow which also suffices for mortal fault, as I said, quaest. 2.: But this is present in a vow entered from fear: Therefore.

It is answered from what has been said, that such deliberation ought to be simply voluntary, of the kind that suffices also for committing mortal fault; but not that which arises from grave fear, as we showed above: for this does not suffice simply, but only as it prefers the lesser evil to the greater.

Other arguments, resting on the same foundation, he says he refers to lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 14. num. 1., and they press as regards marriage; which are destroyed by what has been said, and will be resolved also in the third part, Tractate on marriage, disputation 4. question 2. and 3.

He objects first. If it is null by reason of liberty — against: for often light fear deprives of liberty more; for the avaricious man is deterred from an act more by fear of losing money than a slave is by fear of the whip: but light fear by its nature does not annul: Therefore.

It is answered from S. Bonavent., at the place cited, by denying that light fear deprives of liberty more; for liberty ought to follow the dictate of reason, so as to be rightly measured, and for that reason it ought to be measured in a rational man, not in a lunatic.

You will object secondly: fear struck by a natural cause, say the fear of death, or even by a free cause, as if a captive condemned to death, to escape, should marry a harlot according to the custom of certain peoples — and in similar cases does not annul the contract thereupon following: Therefore the annulment does not come from the force of liberty, but from Ecclesiastical law.

It is answered from D. Bonavent., dist. 29. quaest. 1. and dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 1., that the fear must be one fighting diametrically against liberty, resisting rationally; for only such fear is grave; therefore fear alone struck in order to extort marriage annuls; for the fear of imminent damnation, or of death arising from elsewhere, do not act against this liberty so as to extort consent; therefore they are not grave against consent; therefore they are said not to compel but to induce, as S. Bonavent. says, as also those pressing with prayers, as the holy Doctor says, dist. 29. quaest. 1. ad penultimum; for these can strike only light fear, as the Doctors hold whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. disp. 6. de matrimonio.

You will object thirdly, that Baptism in adults requires consent for its worth, and yet the will suffices even though coerced by grave fear, for the Baptism to be valid, cap. Maiores de Baptismo, and cap. Iudaeis, 45. dist.: Therefore it would suffice also for marriage and Vow, unless the Church annulled.

S. Bonavent. answers, in 4. dist. 29. q. 1. ad 2., that Baptism is the work of God, not of men; but marriage is from the consent of men; for it is a human contract, therefore it requires greater liberty; for it is placed wholly in consent.

Another reason also is assigned common to Vows, because they are self-surrenders of love.

You will object fourthly: also an oath, extorted by grave fear, is valid, cap. verum, and cap. si vero de iureiurando; and yet it requires liberty. If, then, Vow and marriage are annulled for this reason, it is a sign that they are annulled by Ecclesiastical law, not from defect of liberty. This argument was answered above.

You will object fifthly. Nothing is more opposed to consent than fraud and error, leg. si per errorem, ff. de iurisdict. omn. iudic.; and yet here fraud does not annul marriage unless it be error of person and condition; fear, however, annuls: which is different in other contracts; for fraud giving cause to a contract of good faith annuls it, leg. Et eleganter, §. 1. de dolo; but fear does not annul those: Therefore this difference cannot arise from natural law; for otherwise fraud giving cause to marriage, since it is more contrary to consent than fear, would annul it.

It is answered that fear annuls insofar as it directly attacks liberty in the substance of the thing to be chosen; therefore it goes together with error; for it is struck at the substance of the Vow, of marriage, etc.

What is said, that other contracts are not annulled by fear, is false, as S. Bonavent. intimated, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1.; it is proved ex leg. 1. Cod. de rescind. vendit., there it is null, as the Gloss expounds on leg. inbemus 14. §. accep-mus, at the word privetur, Cod. de sacro-sancta Ecclesia, and l. 5. v. si habeas, Cod. de iurisdict. omn. iudic.; and it is the common opinion, as Cremensis testifies, singul. 7.; Iason leg. 2. num. 13. and 15. Cod. de iure emphyteut.; Tiraquel. with many, leg. si unquam, v. revertatur, n. 21. and following, Cod. de revocatione donat.; the same is found in other laws related by Sanchez lib. 3. de matrimonio, disp. 8. num. 2.

It is proved by the reason of D. Bonavent. in the places adduced. Without consent a contract is deprived of its substance, leg. obligationum, ff. de act. et oblig.; but where fear is present, consent is lacking, from what has been said: Therefore; and it is plain from the rule Nihil consensui 117. ff. de regul. iuris, there: Nothing is so contrary to consent as force and fear; and c. cum locum, de sponsal., there: consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes.

But the texts brought forward in opposition by Sanchez only show that such acts ought to be judged null for the sake of preserving peace, because often they could not have the effect of natural annulment through the power of the powerful.

Others, however, will only that the external act, say the entering upon an inheritance, be declared by a magistrate, or recalled to its state, as done without intention of taking possession. Therefore in cap. 2. de his, quae vi, it is found: Things done through fear and force ought by law to be recalled to nullity.

I answer secondly, from what has been said, that greater liberty is required by the nature of the thing for a Dowry and for marriage than for simple human contracts, on account of the reasons adduced above.

Sanchez brings forward, num. 4., the text of leg. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa, where the Praetor says: quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo, where he notes, with Tiraquel and others, that it speaks in the future, that is, of what is to be annulled; and yet D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. argumento 2., in the second place, so puts it in the present: ratum non habeo.

Note that it is the same thing, that what has already been done, ratum non habeo: and that what he has, he will not have; whence Sanchez accomplishes nothing; for the annulment follows the deed, and from the nature of the thing, all the more as regards the declaration of the judge in the external forum. It would perhaps serve, if he had said: What is done through fear, I will not ratify. But not even so: for the sense would be that it is null at all times.

There remains the doubt: Whether a Vow emitted from grave fear justly struck is null.

The first opinion is that it is null. So Lopez, prima parte Instruct. cap. 45. col. 3.; Manuel, tomo 2 of the summa, disp. 93.; Vega, Tomo 2 of the summa, cap. 29. casu 17.; and in the similar case of marriage they assert it, as Sanchez reports, lib. 4. disp. 13. The reason is, because it still takes away liberty.

The second opinion is that it is valid. So Sanchez in the cited lib. on marriage, and lib 4. summae, cap. 3. num. 21., with Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 6. fol. 86. quaest. 1. ad ultimum, and in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he does not admit fear falling upon a constant man when it arises from justice; for then there is no fear that can deter a constant man from what is just and deflect him, and consequently pertain to annulling contracts, as I said above against Sanchez in his notes.

I assert that a Vow emitted in grave fear justly struck is valid.

It is proved by the reason of D. Bonavent. there, because then no fear falling upon a constant man is struck into him by another, but he rather strikes fear into himself, as is found in leg. si mulier 21. at the beginning, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. For he is himself to himself the cause of fearing sin, or the evil of penalty, one of which looms to be chosen. Which reason Sanchez uses, lib. 4. de matrimonio, disp. 13. num. 3.

This doctrine destroys the foundation of the adversaries; for the vow is voluntary, since the fear was struck from within, duly, and is therefore not coercing; for coercion and force are from without.

From these you can gather that Vows extorted by light fear are valid; for liberty is not gravely assailed thereby.

Here Sanchez discourses at greater length on the excommunication of the holy Council of Trent, sess. 25. de regul. cap. 18., which is fulminated first against those compelling women to enter a monastery, or to take on the habit of Religion, or to make profession.

Secondly, against those giving aid or favor to that end.

Thirdly, against those who, knowing that a woman does not enter or take the habit or emit profession spontaneously, interpose in any way whatever power, or consent, or authority to that act.

Fourthly, against those impeding, without just cause, the voluntary act of the woman willing to emit Vows and enter religion. On this Suarez, Tom. 5. in 3. part. disp. 23. sect. 5., where he treats of Censures, which is the place of this disputation, and which will be treated by us in the 3. part. Tom. 2. Tract. de Censuris.

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Thus far I have treated of those things posited in the definition of a Vow that pertain to the free will; now many things must be asked about the matter of a Vow, which is said to be a certain good.

I suppose, however, that things absolutely necessary cannot be vowed, e.g. to die, nor likewise things impossible, such as to count the sand of the Sea.

The question is: whether you can vow those things that are elsewhere commanded, e.g. not to commit fornication.

Commonly the Theologians assert that this is not properly the matter of a Vow. So D. Bonaventure, at the place cited, whom others follow, as related by Azorius book 11. on morals, q. 9. cap. 14. For this is the sense of D. Thomas in 4., at the place cited, and in 2. 2., where he says that such a being, insofar as it is necessary, does not fall under a Vow; D. Antoninus part 2. title 11. cap. 2. Paludanus 4. dist. 38. question 2. article 1. Maior question 1. Durandus there question 1. Richardus question 2. article 5. Cajetan, however, on 2. 2. at the cited passage of D. Thomas, is cited badly by Navarrus in his manual, cap. 12. num. 25. Sotus lib. 7. on Justice, question 1. article 3. Tabiena V. vow 1. §. 2. note well, Lyranus on Deuteronomy 23. Gerson part 2. in the Alphabet, letter 25, letter I. and letter T. Angelus V. vow 1. question 4. Arboreus lib. 19. Theosophia, cap. 6.

On the contrary, others say that the vow is properly about these things. So Sanchez lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 5. num. 6. where he brings forward D. Thomas 2. 2. at the place cited (but badly, as I said) and Cajetan at the place cited, 2. 1. Navarrus, Sotus at the place cited, Castro lib. 1. on penal laws, cap. 10. Aragon. 2. 2. q. 88. art. 2. fol. 77. Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. question 6. point 2. Azorius at the place cited. The same view is held by Diana part 1. Treat. 6. resolution 86. Bassaeus V. Vow 2. num. 11., bringing forward others. So also D. Bonaventure, as I shall say in question 8.

I assert that it is not properly a vow. It is proved first from D. Bonaventure, because a vow establishes a new law binding; but a law is not a law unless it binds anew; but concerning necessary matter it does not bind, since one is already bound: Therefore.

It is proved second from D. Bonaventure, from the Gloss on that Psalm, Vow, and pay unto the Lord, where he says: To vow is of the will; to pay is of necessity. Therefore it is only about those things to which one is not bound from elsewhere.

Sanchez replies that the will is bound in a new way to that thing, which, he says, suffices for the ratio of a vow.

But here St. Bonaventure more properly calls that mode a new complacency in a necessary good, which does not obtain the force of a vow.

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

I assert first that a vow is not concerning an evil thing: this is a certain assertion, as Tanner says, disp. 5. question 4. dub. 1. num. 12.

It is proved from D. Bonaventure, first from D. Isidore, who warns: in evil promises rescind the faith, in a shameful vow change the decree.

It is proved second, because a vow is a promise of a thing which someone pledges for the sake of God, for his own salvation. Thus it is proved also by Sanchez cap. 6.

It is proved third from D. Bonaventure, last foundation. He who fulfills a vow does that to which he is bound: But no one is bound to do evil: Therefore.

I assert second, that neither is a thing simply indifferent the matter of a vow, e.g. to lift up a straw. So the holy Doctors and others as collected by Bassaeus num. 6., provided that by intention, or of itself, it is not ordered to a good.

It is proved from D. Bonaventure, because a vow is an act of Religion concerning those things that serve God; but things merely indifferent do not pertain to the worship of God: Therefore. Thus it is proved by Sanchez cap. 7. after D. Thom. He notes, however, that some indifferent things, adorned by some end, can become the matter of a vow, as D. Bonaventure notes ad 3.: thus to eat is indifferent, likewise not to eat beyond necessity, and yet I can vow abstinence.

Concerning the first assertion there occurs that remarkable case of the Duke Jephthah, who, going to war, vowed that if he returned victorious, he would offer to God the first whatsoever should meet him from his house, Judges 11. Concerning this vow a doubt arises: whether Jephthah vowed to kill his daughter, and killed her, which vow of killing an innocent is surely evil of its object.

The first opinion, confirmed also by the calculations of the holy Fathers, is that Jephthah truly killed his daughter. So D. Bonaventure here ad 4., which he proves from D. Jerome on cap. 7. of Jeremiah and D. Augustine in the questions on the book of Judges, question 49, and lib. 7. of questions on the Old Testament. He supposes the same from other Fathers. Such was the sense of Chrysostom homil. 14. to the people of Antioch, and homily on Jephthah. Origen Tom. 9. on John. Tertullian lib. 3. against Marcion. Justin Martyr question 99. Nazianzen in the oration in praise of the Maccabees, which is oration 22. Isidore in the Allegories on Scripture, and on the life and death of the saints, Ambrose lib. 3. of offices, cap. 12. Bede lib. of questions, on Judges cap. 7. Rupert on the Trinity and his works, in the book of Indic. cap. 12. Tostatus on 11. Indic. question 56. and among the Hebrews Josephus lib. 5. Antiquities, and other ancient Rabbins, to whom add D. Thom. at the place cited ad. 2., whom Azorius reports lib. 11. cap. 14.

The opposite, however, is brought forward by certain more recent Rabbins, and Catholics, whom Lyranus defends, who say that Jephthah by no means immolated his daughter, but devoted her to virginity.

First, therefore, he proves it, because Jephthah was a man placed among the saints by the Apostle: Heb. 11. Then, when he uttered this vow, it is said: The spirit of the Lord came upon him, but the Holy Spirit does not inspire evil.

Moreover, it is not sufficiently gathered from Scripture that Jephthah killed his Daughter; for where it is said in the Vulgate: He vowed a vow, etc. if you deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever first shall come forth from the doors of my house, and shall meet me, returning in peace from the children of Ammon, him I shall offer as a holocaust to the Lord, the Hebrew reading has: And it shall be the Lord's, and I shall make it go up as an ascension, where no mention is made of a holocaust, as many think, whom Azorius follows, but the reading is: I shall make it go up as an ascension to the Lord. And it will be וְהָיָה לַיהוָה וְהַעֲלִיתִיהוּ עֹלָה. But if he had wished to express "into a holocaust", he would rather have said לְעֹלָה.

Wherefore he seems to have vowed only an oblation owed in a fitting manner.

Moreover, the daughter, hearing that she was to be offered to the Lord, asked a respite of two months, that she might mourn her virginity: but if she were to be immolated, she would have mourned her life; it is a sign, therefore, that she was offered that she might live chastely without a husband, which at that time was a thing to be deplored.

It is confirmed: For returning she did as she had vowed, who knew not man, as if to say he vowed her virginity, and consecrated her to the Lord, shutting her up at home from the company of men.

Moreover, a custom is said then to have prevailed, that the daughters of Israel gathered yearly to lament the daughter of Jephthah; but the word lament, in Hebrew is לְתַנּוֹת, "to speak to" the daughter of Jephthah: Therefore she was still living, and they visited her mourning and shut in, that they might console her; but if she had already been immolated, how did they speak with her for four days? — a custom read nowhere?

Notwithstanding these things, the unanimous sense of the holy Fathers, according to the prescriptions of the sacred Council of Trent, is to be preferred by us. Wherefore D. Antoninus part. 2. tit. 11. cap. 1. §. says: but since the Doctors commonly hold that he killed her bodily, and they reprehend him for parricide, we ought not to know more than we ought to know, as the Apostle admonishes, Rom. 12., which happens when someone does not acquiesce in doctrines approved by the Church, and commonly held, finding new ones, which is prohibited, as related in the chapter, dist. 37. Such is St. Antoninus.

It is proved, for in the Vulgate, which is canonical, it is stated that he vowed to offer her in holocaust, which surely required the death and burning of the animal. Therefore St. Bonaventure says, bringing forward D. Jerome, that this Sacrifice did not please God, although the good intention pleased; and with D. Augustine, that Jephthah was both rash in vowing, and impious in paying. Moreover she was given leave for two months, that she might mourn not her consecrated virginity, for she could have mourned that always.

Second, this is not so deplorable, as she rather mourned death in the flower of her age. Therefore also the daughters of Israel mourned her.

MOREOVER it is said that, when the girl returned, he did what he had vowed; but if he had only wished to consecrate her to the Lord, he would have done nothing new.

TOSTATUS ADDS another argument, because of the Blessed Virgin alone it is said that without precedent she pleased the Lord by offering her Virginity: But he does not consider that the daughter of Jephthah is said to have been consecrated in her place;¹ whereas the Blessed Virgin alone of her own spontaneity, without the precedent of an example, vowed her Virginity.

To the arguments on the opposite side it is answered that the "ascension" of the sacrifice alone includes the burning, by which the holocaust was said to evaporate toward the Lord. So also in other places of Scripture, where a holocaust is said to be offered to the Lord, an ascension is read. The very name of holocaust is added for greater clarity.

THAT that word signifies also "to speak to" matters nothing; for it signifies also "to lament."

AS FOR the Apostle, and D. Jerome, St. Bonaventure replies that his faith, and end, and devotion are praised; but that his inhumanity is censured by other Saints, because he vowed inconsiderately, and paid cruelly; nevertheless he is excused by the Fathers, because he judged that sacrifice to be ratified, as was Abraham's, when it was commanded by the Lord to immolate his son.

BUT if someone knowingly vows something that is a natural sin, and vows it, he commits a twofold sin: one by its nature; the other of injury against religion, by vowing something gravely illicit. So Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 6. num. 9.

JUST as evil is taken from the object, or from the end, or from the circumstances, so also the nullity of a vow from an evil thing promised. See Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 6.

YOU OBJECT against the second assertion. Food and drink are indifferent; but concerning these abstinence or temperance can be vowed: Therefore.

D. Bonaventure answers ad 3. that there are some indifferents that are informable by a virtue, and these can be the matter of a vow; but others cannot be informed by a virtue, and concerning these there is no vow, nor does one who vows need dispensation concerning them, since the matter of the vow is lacking, which ought to be something for the service of God, which is also the view of D. Thomas.

A BRIEF answer indeed, but fertile with the best doctrines, which Sanchez pursues at length, lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 7., who at num. 5. requires four conditions for an indifferent thing to become the matter of a vow.

THE FIRST is, that some circumstance of an honest end concur, rendering the very thing the matter of some virtue: Thus to enter some house is indifferent; but if there were there some occasion of sinning, it would be the matter of a vow, by promising on that account not to enter. So Richardus in 4. dist. 38. art. 3. question 1. and others. I give another example of a thing subject to a vow: if there were a sick man there to be visited, and not by precept, one could vow to enter.

THE SECOND condition is, that the thing be apt to serve that good end, or, as St. Bonaventure says, be informable by that good end; for the end in moral matters in a certain way informs the act and makes it intrinsically good or evil, as I said in the first part of the second part, Treat. 1. dispute 4. question 8. For if it contributes nothing to that end, neither will the vow be valid, as if someone were to vow, for the honor of the Blessed Virgin, not to cut his nails on the Sabbath. So many, as collected by Sanchez at the place cited.

THE THIRD is, that the indifferent thing be actually directed to that end, and thus be actually informed by that end; otherwise it will remain still indifferent in the moral order.

THE FOURTH is, that the end honoring the indifferent thing still remain. From these many things are defined by D. Bonaventure.

FOR truly the matter can be an honest bride for the Vow, but the end indifferent.

And indeed if the end is the attaining of temporal things, it will be valid. For thus also in Scripture vows of this kind were made, and judged ratified, as D. Bonaventure notes in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 15.: thus Genes. 28., for his pilgrimage and happy return Jacob vowed his to God. Thus 1. Reg. 1. Anna vowed for obtaining a son. The people of Israel, cap. 21. vowed for obtaining victory. Antiochus, 2. Macab. 9. for obtaining the health of his body, nor is he reprehended. Therefore these vows are received by the common sense of the Church. So Hostiens. c. scripturae on the vow, num. 5. and 6. Ioan. Andreas num. 3. Anchar. num. 3. question 2. Henricus num. 11. Richardus, in 4. dist. 38. art. 1. questions 2. and 3. Maior there question 1. Abulens. cap. 30. of Numbers, question 92. Angelus v. vow 1. num. 4. and 9. Sylvest. v. vow 1. question 4. dictum 2. and question 5. Cajetan on art. 2. at the cited D. Thom. dub. 4. Sotus lib. 7. on Justice, question 1. art. 3. Palac. 4. dist. 38. disp. 1. fol. 814.

HENCE the view that Innocentius c. Scripturae, num. 1. de voto says — that vows made for attaining temporal things are simoniacal and do not oblige — is not received.

NOW indeed this general rule of St. Bonaventure holds: when a vow is offered in some way for the service of God, it is valid from this head of indifferent matter, and thus it befits one who vows to serve God even for attaining temporal goods, or for giving Him thanks devotedly for things received; but the vow will be invalid if a certain act is vowed which is materially of a virtue, and is specified by an end not ordered to any other than a temporal one, as when we vow alms, so that the opinion of avarice spread about us may be washed away, or fasting, so that expenses may be lessened.

HENCE innumerable cases are resolved, which Sanchez reports, lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 7. and others. What sin it is to vow indifferent things, St. Bonaventure at the place cited says only thus: This man lacks judgment; but that it is sin is evident, because he renders the vow profane: therefore it is indeed a sin, but venial, say Aragonius at the cited passage of D. Thomas. Petrus Ledefma, second tome of the summa, tract. 10. cap. 1. dub. 2. Manuel second tome cap. 94. num. 6. Tolet. lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 17. num. 14., whom Sanchez follows, lib. 4. cap. 7. num. 4. who at num. 27. asserts the same concerning a private vow; but concerning solemn vows, because they render those things null that were begun with them, he says it is mortal, as he had said cap. 6. n. 15.

JUST as vowing for an evil end takes its malice from the end; so if the end is mortally evil, to vow it also will be mortal; if the end is venial, it will be venial: But to vow religion solemnly even for a venial end, he says, is venial, because it renders those vows null by a grave injury to God.

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

I WONDERED at first glance that the Seraphic Doctor had indicated with scarcely two articles the things that concern the matter of a vow, a most weighty matter indeed; but I saw clearly that these twin articles are like the Gnomon on a sundial, which indicates all the hours.

IN the second, therefore, of the foundations of the second question, from the definition of a vow he teaches that it must be concerning a better good; for it is some new service rendered to God; hence it renders the one who serves better before God, and in order to his own salvation. From this it follows that it is not always concerning the best good, nor concerning any better good whatsoever, but concerning a better one with respect to the prior state, so that the one vowing vows something better than his state before God. Thus for a celibate person marriage will not be the matter of a vow; yet it will be for an incontinent man. So others, as collected by Bassaeus V. Vow 2. num. 2.

From these foundations, third, answering the argument, he says: A lesser good is taken in two ways. First, compared with what the one vowing has, and thus it cannot be the matter of a vow; for a virgin will not vow a lesser good that is owed, by vowing marriage: in another way a lesser good can be said to be one compared indeed to other greater goods that the one vowing does not have, and thus it can be the matter of a vow. Thus a secular man can vow chastity; because thus it is concerning a better good with respect to the conjugal state to which he can be assigned, although it is a lesser good than the profession of religion, which he lacks.

AGAIN, St. Bonaventure notes that this good is less than many others that the one vowing does not have; yet greater than those that the one vowing has; e.g. celibacy can be vowed in two ways: either simply, as by vowing private chastity; or by excluding in this vow a greater good, e.g. by vowing private chastity, and excluding, by vowing, ever vowing it solemnly in religion, and this is null.

ALTHOUGH you say: That state of private chastity is licit, and holy: Therefore it can be vowed. He answers, although that state is not evil, but good and glorious; nevertheless it is evil to will that state in such a way that it excludes a better one, just as to be praised is not evil, and yet it is evil to wish to be praised in such a way that the praise is in us and does not tend to the greater glory of God; for to exclude a greater good does not tend to the service of God.

YOU WILL SAY: In marriage it is licit to promise oneself to another, although it is a state of imperfection: Therefore it is licit also in a vow.

St. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS by denying the parity; for in marriage you betroth yourself to another person who is content with that state. And so you rightly promise her, along with that state to which you are then also bound, even if you exclude religion implicitly, when you choose the state of matrimony. But if you wish to vow to God in His service, you are bound to will and promise something better, because God always demands that what is better be offered to Him in a vow made in His service. Such is that holy Doctor.

MOREOVER, for deciding this question, one must suppose, from St. Bonaventure in the cited question, that the matter of a vow is simply some good of counsel, even if it can also, to that extent, be concerning a good of precept, insofar as it exhibits a new expression of the will to God, and also on another head an obligation, which if violated infers a new injury also, specifically distinct, and therefore to be expressed in confession, as is evident from cap. impudicas, and cap. sacrilegii, 27. quest. 1. and the Doctors commonly teach, as collected by Sanchez lib. 2. cap. 5. num. 7., against Gerson and Tabiena, who deny that the species is changed.

From this doctrine it follows first that things negatively opposed to the counsels, such as not to be chaste, not to enter religion, and the like, are not the matter of a vow, and that such vows are not valid. So all confess, as Sanchez notes, lib. 4. cap. 8. num. 3. — except Hostiensis, who in his summa, tit. de voto, says that these vows are indeed rash; yet valid.

The COMMON RATIO is deduced from D. Bonaventure above, because a vow ought to offer something for the service of God; but those things have no moral good in themselves. They could, however, have it per accidens, and thus be the matter of a vow; suppose, for instance, that he who vows not to enter religion recognizes that he is unfit, or is rightly and deservedly detained by the piety of his parents lying in necessity; and he who vows not to live chastely recognizes that he is too unstable in carnal matters.

INDEED, from this it seems to be inferred that he who, from the experience of his own incontinence, knows it better to marry than to burn, validly cannot vow religion or chastity; for this is a lesser good, therefore for him the vow of matrimony is valid, because it is a greater good: therefore a contradictory vow, e.g. of religion or chastity, cannot be valid. Thus argues Homobonus, to be cited. Valencia seems to suppose this, 2. 2. disp. 6. question 6. point 2. difficulty 4. col. penult.

THE SAME Peter of Ledesma asserts, 2. Tom. of the summa, tract. 10. cap. 2. dub. 5. He adds, however, that such a one should seek a dispensation.¹ Which surely seems to imply a contradiction; for if the vow is null, it does not need a dispensation. The same judges it probable — Homobonus de Bonis in Consult. moral. col. 1. part. 2. resp. 28. — as Diana reports, 4. p. Tom. 4. resol. 102. Adding: but you consider it, and he adds, that a dispensation should be sought from the Bishop.

FOR HIS PART, Sanchez at num. 10. is indeed frightened by the contrary argument: nevertheless he still asserts that those vows of religion and chastity are valid for the incontinent man. He argues ², because the Church has been accustomed to grant a dispensation to such persons as for a valid vow, only with the most rigid commutation enjoined.

HE ANSWERS, therefore, the argument with Valencia, that such a one, as a singular person, is such that the state of matrimony is better for him: but, as he is a member of the Church, it is better that it be judged ratified and be a vow of continence and religion; otherwise many evils would arise in the Church from this, while, crying out under the pretext of incontinence that the vows of chastity and religion are invalid, they would deliver themselves to pleasures. In this sense what Maiot says is true, in 4. dist. 38. question 1. col. 2.: the matter of a vow need not be better for the one vowing, but it suffices if it is better in itself.

I WOULD answer otherwise, that such a one can rightly vow, and ought not only to trust in his own strength, but to confide, and to acknowledge with Solomon that he cannot be continent unless God gives it to him; and that this grace of avoiding mortal sins is denied to no one, and is necessary for salvation even for the married; for among these some incontinent persons are most lustful, nor are they sated with the pleasures of matrimony, especially if the wife is not at their nod; and yet God does not fail these, if they too do what is in their power. Therefore, just as anyone can validly vow not to sin mortally, as Sanchez probably asserts, cap. 5. num. 16., citing others; much more not to sin in the matter of Temperance, as in chastity, the more so since God would concur with the necessary help, because He does not demand any of those things that He does not grant even to the saints, such as to avoid all venial sins, which surely would not be licit to vow, nor would it be valid, as very many teach with Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 5. num. 10., Bassaeus at the place cited, where he adds that a vow not to sin venially, made after deliberation, is valid.

YET THESE vows of chastity or religion will sometimes be null on account of some impediment, for instance if someone had previously deflowered a Virgin by betrothal of marriage, or had known an honest woman. The reason is, because a vow does not take away a preceding obligation of justice. Yet he, once his wife is dead, is bound to enter religion, or keep chastity, as he vowed. See Sanchez lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 44. and lib. 8. diff. 36. from num. 8. and lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 8. num. 11.

FURTHERMORE it is elicited from the foundations of D. Bonaventure that good works quasi contrary to, opposed to the counsels, are valid, provided they are goods better than the state of the one vowing, as e.g. to serve in a hospital for the whole course of one's life. So all assert, as Sanchez notes, lib. 4. cap. 8. num. 40., Valencia at the place cited, point 2. col. 8., Paludanus 4. dist. 38. question 1. num. 29., D. Anton. 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2., Sylvester V. vow 1. question 4., Tabiena V. vow 1. at the end, who give the reason of D. Bonaventure: because that thing promised is concerning a better good, according to the state of the one vowing: Therefore it is the matter of a vow. So the Doctors, as collected by Bassaeus V. Vow 2.

FOR HIS PART, all cry out with D. Bonaventure that he who by that vow directs himself to a better thing, according to his state, so as to exclude a still better state — for instance, if he were to vow private chastity, so as never to vow it solemnly in religion, or on that account were to vow to serve in a hospital — would vow ineptly. See Sanchez at the place cited, num. 42. The reason of it is, because thus he would fight diametrically against the counsels of Christ, and, a rebel against grace, would shut out his own progress toward the perfection proposed to him by God.

From these it is gathered that even a vow of matrimony is not valid. So the Doctors commonly, whom Sanchez brings forward, lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 4.; for thus one descends from celibacy, which is nobler, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 14. can. 11., and it is the counsel of the Lord.

YET matrimony can be of precept, as if someone deflowered a Virgin by betrothal of marriage, or knew some honest widow; or if matrimony were necessary for the public peace, and then it could fall under a vow in the broad sense. See the Doctors in Malderus cap. 5. disp. 2. and in Bassaeus at the place cited.

MOREOVER such a vow can be more useful and better, because such a one is incontinent, according to 1. Corinth. 7.: it is better to marry than to burn. This the Doctors commonly hold, as collected by Sanchez at the place cited, num. 7., Maldonatus, and Bassaeus above.

IT CAN ALSO be vowed for a pious cause, for instance to take in a girl from danger, or destitute; yet this must be included in the vow, as it were as the matter, as is evident, because otherwise it is invalid. Baldus notes this, leg. illud Cod. de sacro-sancta Ecclesia, Azor lib. 11. cap. 14. num. 9. Sanchez holds the opposite at the place cited.

BUT IF the end is against the Evangelical counsels — for instance, to vow alms in order to obtain matrimony — Sanchez, lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 8. num. 56., says it is valid, with Soto, lib. 7. de iust. question 1. art. 3.

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what sort it is.

It is certain that a vow binds under sin to its fulfillment, as D. Bonaventure notes in Speculum animae, cap. 3, long after the middle, and first from Prov. c. 20, and Deut. 23, and 1 Tim. 5, and Ps. 75: Vow, and render to God, where the Gloss explains it: To vow is of the will; but to render is of necessity, as D. Bonaventure notes there. That it binds under mortal sin, Innocent III defines in cap. Licet, de Voto. So all Catholics hold.

The parents of the heretics of this age, Luther and Calvin, most bitter enemies of religion, are not ashamed to do away with even the most solemn vows.¹

FIRST they teach that Vows for the worship of God cannot be made except about things commanded; hence there is one common vow of the faithful, which we make in Baptism.

SECOND they teach that Vows about things not commanded can be made, if not for the worship of God, at least for carrying on the affairs of this life, or for avoiding sins.

THIRD, that the vows of monks are impious and void: this Luther teaches de votis monasticis, and Calvin lib. 4, Institut. cap. 13. Nor do they teach dissimilarly the Augustan Confession, art. 27, and the Confession of Württemberg, c. de votis monast., whom Bellarmine reports lib. 2, de Monach. cap. 15.

Peter Martyr, in his book on celibacy and monastic vows, says two things contrary to Luther. One is that all vows are to be reckoned among the Jewish ceremonies and are therefore abrogated; the other is that no vow is made in Baptism. As to monastic vows, he censures them with no less insolence.

I ASSERT first, that Vows pertain to the worship of God even about things not commanded.

It is PROVED first from Isaiah 19: In that day the Egyptians shall know the Lord, and shall worship him in victims and gifts: and they shall make vows, and shall perform them.

It is PROVED second, from Bellarmine following D. Bonaventure in 4 Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2: every honorable thing, even of the supererogation of virtue, is of itself acceptable to God: therefore also when offered by vow. The antecedent is proved from D. Bonaventure from Luke 2, where it is said that that Anna dwelt in the temple, serving God night and day; where the Greek has λατρεύουσα, which properly signifies worship, as D. Bonaventure indicates there on that passage, officiously rendering it, she was devoted, and devout toward God. The consequence is proved from D. Thomas, because by a vow one is established in good.

It is PROVED also from the Socratic Doctor in lib. 1, Pharetrae, cap. 38, where, following D. Gregory in Moralia 15, cap. 12, he calls virginity obsequium Deo, "an obsequy to God"; and D. Augustine in lib. de virginitate, cap. 27, where he describes the obsequy of virgins toward God, for they follow the Lamb; and from Cyprian de disciplina et habitu virginum, where he teaches that virgins are far and diametrically alien from the worship of the earth, because they follow Christ. See other things there.

It is PROVED third from the Scriptures, wherein it is found that the saints made vows about things not commanded. So Jacob in Genesis 28, where he first made a vow, promising God tithes of all things, and to raise upon it a stone house of God, if God had granted good fortune to his journey. But if these things had been commanded, Jacob would ill have done them under the condition of a prosperous journey. In 1 Kings 1, Anna vowed in the same spirit her son, if it should be given her by the Lord. So in 1 Paralipomenon 29, David vowed most many treasures together with his subjects for the temple to be built for the Lord, and it is written: The people rejoiced, when they promised their vows willingly: because they offered all with their whole heart to the Lord: and David the king also rejoiced with a great joy. Indeed, not even David himself heaped up so many treasures by command. So in 2 Paralipomenon 31, the children of Israel offered many animals, which they had vowed spontaneously, not by command. In 3 Esdras, Artaxerxes offered what he had vowed spontaneously. In Jonah 1, the men who were in the ship vowed to God, that they might be delivered from shipwreck; Heliodorus, in 2 Machabees 3, vowed many things for his own deliverance. The Blessed Virgin spontaneously offered and vowed virginity, as is said in Luke 1: How shall this be done, because I know not a man? as the holy Fathers testify: Gregory of Nyssa in his oration on the nativity of the Lord; Augustine in lib. de sancta virginitate, cap. 4; Bede on cap. 1 of Luke; Anselm in lib. de excellentia virginis, cap. 4; Rupert in lib. 3 in Cant.; Bernard in sermone 4 super Missus est; D. Bonaventure on Luke 1, and in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 25, where he also enumerates as vows all the things said above.

Calvin most immodestly dares to bark in the Commentary on this passage found in Marloratus, first rebuking the Most Blessed Virgin for infidelity, of whom Elizabeth cried out: Blessed art thou that hast believed, though the holy Fathers, on this passage, cry out with one voice that she never wavered in faith.

Next he rebukes the holy Fathers as absurdly and ridiculously gathering from this the vow of the Blessed Virgin, because (he says) if she had had a vow of virginity, she would have mocked Joseph by taking him as her husband, with great perfidy toward him, and to the mocking of God.

But the wisest Fathers thence solidly deduced the vow; for she alleges her difficulty in conceiving, because she will not know a man. And indeed she could, in harmony with Joseph after the betrothal and before the salutation of the Angel, have vowed virginity — upon which the whole edifice of Calvin collapses.

Yet I will never grant Calvin that the Blessed Virgin at any time had the mind of consummating the marriage; otherwise she would have been a virgin only in body, not in soul, as Bellarmine indicates in lib. 2, de Monachis, cap. 22, after D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 30, dub. 5, litt. et quaest. 2.

Therefore it is answered with D. Bonaventure in the cited question that the Blessed Virgin before the betrothal had vowed virginity absolutely, and in this Scotus follows him in 4 dist. 30, quaest. 2. The same say Albert the Great de laudibus Virginis, and before them the holy Fathers Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine in the places adduced; nevertheless she had received a revelation concerning Saint Joseph, that he would never seek the conjugal debt, and therefore she confidently associated him with herself for most honorable causes, which we shall relate in the Treatise on Matrimony. She therefore entrusted the Most Blessed body to a spouse who could have consummated the marriage; yet she was certain that he would never wish to do so. But she was betrothed while the divine Spirit breathed upon her, which is sufficient for the reason of matrimony, as Bellarmine notes in the cited place, and Sanchez proves lib. 2, de Matrimonio, disp. 28.

Otherwise Calvin objects conjectures from his own inverted fantasy, namely that the Virgin spoke thus out of excess of mind, because she was about to conceive the Son of God, and therefore to exclude the embrace of a man — not that she had a vow of virginity.

But Calvin rashly prefers his conjectures to the assertion of so many Fathers. Nor does he sufficiently gather that it was said out of admiration; for the Angel answers the doubt, saying: The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, etc., as D. Bonaventure notes on that passage, and Bellarmine after him. As if the Angel should say (the Socratic Doctor says): You ask how you shall conceive? To this I answer, that you shall be made fruitful without corruption; you shall conceive without lust; you shall bring forth without pain, not from the seed of man, but by the power of the Holy Spirit.

But what Bellarmine adds, that the Blessed Virgin did not yet think herself to be the mother of God, does not please me; for in the preceding words the Angel had expressed it: This shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, etc.

Peter Martyr objects further that from those words the vow of the Blessed Virgin is not gathered, just as when Moses says in Exodus 6: How shall Pharaoh hear me, seeing I am of uncircumcised lips? and yet we would not gather that Moses vowed the circumcision of his lips. So in John 3 Nicodemus says: How can a man be born, when he is old? and yet from that you would not gather that he vowed old age: therefore neither is it gathered from similar words in the Blessed Virgin. These things, however, are senseless and frivolous: for the proposition of Nicodemus was whether a man could be born corporeally again and renew his life, which is impossible; he himself understood regeneration carnally, as proposed to him by the Lord; therefore he sets up a thing impossible and not depending on free will: How can these things be done? as D. Bonaventure notes on John 3. So Moses sets up an impediment to speaking which is necessary from nature; but the Blessed Virgin sets up an impediment depending on free will, namely to be joined to a man in marriage. But if she objects: How shall this be, because she was prohibited by the law — not indeed by the universal law, as is clear: therefore by the proper law of the Vow.

He objects further that the Virgin answered prudently, even though not bound by a vow — namely, if the birth were to come about in the ordinary way, it stood in the way that she was not yet mingled with a man; but if in a higher manner, she asks to be instructed.

But he explains it foolishly thus; for since the Angel brings in the future conception, what does it matter that she was not yet mingled with a man? It was enough to be mingled afterward; but if it was to be done in a higher manner, to set up the natural mode would have been beside the point.

Now I return to our proposition. The vows narrated in the Scriptures were about things not commanded, and yet the Lord required them as most pleasing to himself, as is written in Deut. 23 and Ps. 75: Vow, and render, as Saint Bonaventure weighs it in Speculo animae, cap. 3.

I assert second, that Vows do not pertain to Jewish ceremonies.

It is PROVED first from the cited place of Isaiah, which the holy Fathers Jerome, Cyril, and others interpret of Christians.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 3, from that verse of the Psalm soon adduced: Vow, and render to the Lord, which Saint Doctor proves to be understood of us from the Gloss, which says: To vow is of the will, but to render is of necessity. The same Saint Augustine has here. Hence the heretic's response collapses, that the speech was to the Jews.

It is PROVED third from D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, dub. 4, litt., from that passage, cap. 5 of the former Epistle to Timothy, where of certain widows he says: When they have been wanton in Christ, they will marry: having damnation, because they have made void their first faith. In which place by first faith all the Greek and Latin interpreters understand the vow of continence. Hence Saint Augustine on the cited place of Psalm 75, Vow, and render, says: Let each one vow what he can, render it, and be not slothful to vow: for you shall not fulfill it by your own strength, and then, expounding the place of the Apostle, says: What is, they have made void their first faith? They vowed, and did not render.

This the Fourth Council of Carthage expounds, which consisted of 214 Bishops, in canon one hundred and four. And the Fourth Council of Toledo, which consisted of seventy Bishops.

The same three most holy supreme Pontiffs expound with this reasoning: Clement in lib. 3, Constit. cap. 1 et 2; Innocent I in epistola secunda, cap. 13; Gelasius I in epistola 1, cap. 23. Likewise Tertullian in lib. de monogamia, not far from the end; Basil in lib. de Virginitate, past the middle; Jerome in lib. 1 in Jovin., and on cap. 44 of Ezech.; Epiphanius in haeresi 48; Augustine in lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 23, and lib. de bono viduitatis, cap. 8 et 9, and the cited place on Ps. 75; Fulgentius in epistola 1. Besides these also all the expositors thus, both the Greeks, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius; and the Latins, as Ambrose, Primasius, Bede, Haymo, Sedulius, Anselm, D. Bonaventure, and others.

Luther de votis monasticis answers that by the first faith is to be understood, not the vow — which nowhere is taken under the name of faith — but the Christian faith; which those widows had lost, who, that they might more easily be permitted to marry, fell away from the Christian faith. Therefore he says they went after Satan, and raged wantonly against Christ.

But this interpretation is audacious; and indeed that the promise is meant by faith, D. Bonaventure shows from D. Gregory to Boniface, which is found in 17 quaest. 1, cap. Viduae a proposito, which he also condemns with Apostolic authority, as is related in the text of dist. 38, cap. 1. The same Saint Bonaventure observes in 3 dist. 23, dub. 2, adducing this passage for the keeping of a promise, where he notes it is also taken for the fidelity of a promise owed: Jerem. 7, Fidelity is perished; and of the saint, as is said of Joseph in Gen. 44: I received him into my fidelity; so in Rom. 3 it is said: Shall their unbelief make the faith of God of none effect?

But what he says, that they fell away from the faith in order to marry, is false; for even Christian widows could marry, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinth. 7. But to go after Satan, and to wanton against Christ, aptly signifies the sacrilege of the sin of lust.

Calvin's instance was also similar to these, who adds another exposition: that these widows promised continence, but could not licitly unless they were sixty years old, at which time they are no longer fit for marriage. Therefore the Apostle says: Let a widow be chosen no less than sixty years of age; this therefore makes nothing toward establishing the vows of religious women, who vow even in the flower of their age.

But why does the Apostle rebuke them, if they made void their vows, or if the vows did not bind? Truly the time of sixty years was not prefixed to the vow when making it, but either to the office of a deaconess, as Tertullian says de velandis virginibus, and lib. 1 ad Uxorem, and others; or to admission into the number of those widows who were to be fed from the alms of the Church, as Chrysostom and Ambrose expound here, and Jerome in his epistle to Salvina.

Calvin's THIRD answer is, that that promise was not a vow made to God, but a pledge to the Church not to marry, that they might more freely discharge the office of deaconesses.

But the Fathers say the opposite: that if the pledge had been made to the Church alone, it could easily have been dispensed.

They INSTANCE: the Apostle there says: I will that the younger marry.

It is ANSWERED that he says this by way of indulgence, not of command, as he himself testifies. But of this below.

Peter Martyr says this passage is ambiguous, because it is expounded in many ways, and therefore is not fit for doctrine; then he says it sounds not of damnation, but of a certain infamy, or accusation, or mark, because they did not persevere; and he draws this from Bucer.

But all the holy Fathers expound a true eternal damnation of those widows who married after the vow; and in this sense the Apostle everywhere takes damnation before God and men, Rom. 3 and 13.

Moreover, John also in cap. 3 uses the same word κρῖμα not once but thrice: The Son of Man came not to judge the world — which signifies not a judgment of discussion, but of damnation, as Saint Bonaventure rightly notes there.

Then he admits it: why were those widows infamous for marrying, if they were hindered by no vow?

I ASSERT lastly, that Baptism is not a vow. So D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, quaest. 2, ad primum, and commonly the Thomists on the same distinction.

It is PROVED from Bellarmine cap. 19, lib. 2, de Monach., with the argument of Saint Bonaventure: Vows must be spontaneous. So Deut. 23: If thou hast made a vow, thou shalt not delay to render it: for the Lord will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be reckoned to thee for sin. If thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin. But the promise made in Baptism is necessary, nor can it be said of it: if thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin; for all are bound by divine law to receive Baptism. It is CONFIRMED: vows made for little ones by their parents are not valid unless they be afterward confirmed by those very ones in whose name they were made, when they come to adult age, as D. Bernard teaches in his epistle to Robert; but the promise made in Baptism binds little ones even if made through others: therefore.

It is CONFIRMED from Bellarmine following D. Bonaventure, because since it is neither necessary nor very useful to vow the commandments, it is not credible that God wished to bind us to these.

You will OBJECT first, against the first assertion: every voluntary worship cannot please God, from Col. 2, where the Greek has voluntary worship for every superstition, and Rom. 14: Whatsoever is not of faith is sin; but of faith we do not have that this worship pleases God: therefore.

It is ANSWERED that the Apostle here rebukes certain worships invented gratuitously, without order to the divine obsequy — such as were the frequent washings of the Jews, and now of the Turks, who ascend to prayer washed many times over; for these worships are rebuked elsewhere by the Apostle, and by Christ in Luke 11, as Saint Bonaventure observes on that passage; but this worship, which the Socratic Doctor in 4 dist. 13, dub. 4 calls standing and long-lasting, he rebukes as an ancient error.

That of Rom. 14 is understood of him who acts not from conscience; for thus faith is taken here, as Saint Bonaventure notes in 3 dist. 23, dub. 2, and elsewhere passim; and this is the common exposition, as Bellarmine notes.

The Pseudo-Martyr OBJECTS second, against the second assertion, because in the new testament the name of vow is not found, nor need it be; for in Baptism we profess the faith of Christ — what need, then, of vows about it? For so evangelical liberty is diminished by vows. Nay, injury is done to God, making necessary what he himself made free.

It is ANSWERED easily, that in the new testament the reality of the vow is found, as we saw above. Rightly indeed are we said to have received all things from God, and to give them to God, as the Council of Orange says in can. 11, because they are delivered over to our power; for God receives these for his own obsequy, as D. Bonaventure says in quaest. 1 et 2. Nor is evangelical liberty violated, which frees not from a law to be observed, but from sin, as the Apostle says Rom. 6. Nor is any injury done to God, for he shows himself delighted by these things.

He OBJECTS third, against the third assertion: Christians sin more gravely by violating the law than do the heathen.

It is ANSWERED that they are punished more gravely on account of the guilt of an ungrateful mind.

They OBJECT fourth, D. Augustine on Ps. 75, where he says, we have vowed the divine law.

D. Bonaventure ANSWERS on cap. 1 of the Rule, that there to vow is taken broadly; and if it be taken strictly, already the heretics hear that they are held by the law of God; for there he speaks thus: Vow, and render to the Lord your God, all of you in common. What ought we to vow? To believe in him, to hope from him for eternal life, to live well according to the common manner. For there is a certain manner common to all: not to steal, not to commit adultery; not to love violence; not to be proud; not to kill a man, not to hate a brother, not to weave mischief against anyone. All these we ought all to vow. Have you heard, sectaries, Augustine? Does he patronize you in this way?

They OBJECT fifth: the Church compels the baptized to keep the law, but not the heathen or the Jews: therefore in Baptism they contracted some special obligation.

It is ANSWERED that he compels them to keep it insofar as they have been made sons and members of the Church; for members are subject to the head, and the son to his parents.

There remains now to see from what virtue this obligation arises.

I ASSERT fourth, that it arises from the virtue of Religion.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, passim, because by a vow something is promised to be done in obsequy of God, which is the formal object of religion.

But it is called an act of Justice IMPROPERLY by D. Thomas 2 p., quaest. 80, art. 1, insofar as religion is a potential part of justice. Nor can anyone, by title of justice, bind himself to God by vowing, because between God and us true justice cannot intercede, as I showed in the first part of the first part, Tract. 1, disp. 17, quaest. 1. So Sanchez lib. 4, cap. 11, num. 8.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio VI: Whether* the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Dubitatio I: Whether* KNOWLEDGE *is a gift of the Holy Ghost