Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused
Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal
Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven
Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others
Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy
Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution
Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned
Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered
Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge
Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself
Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when
Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES
Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness
Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial
Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses
Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses
Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate
Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office
Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate
Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault
Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing
Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity
Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts
Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion
Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion
Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely
Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises
Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies
Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction
Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin
Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it
Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly
Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal
Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused
Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments
Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself
Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing
Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering
Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery
Quaestio III: On Cursings
Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general
Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required
Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract
Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract
Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts
Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract
Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot
Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting
Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired
Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made
Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians
Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures
Disputatio III: On Promise
Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION
Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice
Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds
Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted
Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause
Disputatio IV: ON DONATION
Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what
Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations
Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling
Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are
Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell
Quaestio III: Which things can be sold
Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things
Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum
Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down
Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful
Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing
Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer
Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.
Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful
Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury
Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin
Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price
Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice
Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money
Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer
Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)
Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold
Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law
Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS
Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES
Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law
Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something
Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself
Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss
Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful
Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just
Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful
Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud
Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is
Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is
Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio XI: On Testaments
Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open
Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs
Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato
Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable
Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake
Disputatio XII: On Legacies
Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how
Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed
Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is
Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them
Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general
Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is
Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue
Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue
Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend
Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary
Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one
Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION
Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio III: ON PRAYER
Quaestio I: What Prayer is
Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER
Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary
Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer
Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded
Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray
Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to
Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray
Quaestio X: How one ought to pray
Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours
On that manner of praying, the Canonical Hours.
Most abundantly does Fr. Zacharias Boverius write on the public praises sung in the Choir of singers, Tom. 1 of the Annals.
There were some heretics even truly most ancient who censured the Canonical Hours, and the Sacred Hymnody, by which the Church consoles herself in this exile, as the most saintly Urban VIII says at the beginning of the renewed Breviary, and attacked them with sarcasms. Among these was Vigilantius, of whom St. Jerome speaks in the epistle to Riparius the Bishop. And other heretics are found in Isidore book 1 on the office of clerics, chapter 22.
But the usage of the Canonical Hours was altogether condemned by the Waldensian heretics, as Aeneas Sylvius testifies, in the book on the origin of the Bohemians, chapter 35, and Wycliffe, as in Thomas Waldensis, tome 3, chapter 21, the Hussites, and finally Luther, in the book on the form of celebrating Mass, where imprudently he dares to say, the reading of the Hours is a feigned worship of God. The herds of the Sectaries follow this arch-heretic.
This most holy manner of praying is therefore proved from the Holy Doctor, who for that reason observes it as prescribed to us by St. Francis the Father, in the rule, chapter 3, by the custom of the universal Church, which it is the most insolent madness to condemn, as D. August. cries, epistle 118. This, says the Holy Doctor, the Holy Spirit intended in composing the Psalms; therefore Psalm 45: The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me. And D. Gregory, in Ezech., homily 1: The voice of Psalmody, when it is carried out with intention of heart, by it a way to the heart is prepared for omnipotent God, that there may be poured into the devout mind either the mystery of prophecy, or the grace of compunction. He pursues this at length, Holy Doctor, in the opuscule on the Progress of the Religious, book 2, chapter 72.
The Holy Doctor proves this on Psalm 50 from the most ancient custom of David himself, who said, Psalm 118: Seven times a day I said praise to thee, and at midnight I rose to confess to thee, where the Canonical Hours are enumerated.
Therefore, on that Psalm, chapter 11, verse 4, he observes that in the seven canonical hours here enumerated is expressed the perfect servitude and worship owed to God, whence, cleansed from the seven vices, adorned with the seven virtues, confirmed with the corresponding gifts and charisms, we shall fly to immortality, which closes the septenary of times. Hence we too are warned: if he sin against thee seven times in a day; if seven times in a day he be converted to thee, etc., Luke 17.
And chapter 4, verse 14, on those words: At midnight I rose to confess to thee, he observes that this time was reserved for the divine praises. Therefore Act. 16: At midnight, Paul and Silas, praying, praised the Lord.
For the divine praises the choir of singers was therefore instituted and deputed, with Asaph, 1 Paral. 16, and at the dedication of the temple they sang the Psalms which David had made: Praise the Lord, for he is good, etc. And Psal. 121: The tribes of the Lord went up to confess the name of the Lord. He pursues all this as a figure of the sacred canticles of the Church. So Daniel prayed three times a day, as D. Bonav. notes, in the Bibliotheca pauperum, chapter 21.
This rite, moreover, as I said, the Holy Doctor proves from the most ancient usage of the Church. It is attested in Acts 3, when Peter and John went up into the temple at the hour of prayer, the ninth, which St. Basil explains at length in his rules, to interrog. 37, and Ephes. 5: Be filled with the spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms, and hymns, and spiritual canticles, singing and psalming in your hearts to the Lord, giving thanks always in all things, etc. Where Haymo admirably understands the Hymns in use in the Church, which Ambrose, Gregory, Hilary, and other Fathers composed. But Bede reports that this usage took root in the Church of Jerusalem, book 2 on Luke.
This rite is described by St. Clement Pope, disciple of St. Peter, book 8 of the Apostolic constitutions, chapter 34; Tertullian, in the Apology, chapter 2; St. Cyprian, in the exposition of the Lord's prayer. Likewise St. Ambrose composed certain hymns, as D. August. reports, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 21. The Canonical Hours are mentioned by St. Jerome, epistle 22 to Eustoch. on the custody of Virgins, chapter 16, and epistle 27 in the epitaph of Paula, chapter 10. St. August., in rule 3 (taken from epistle 109), chapters 7 and 8, and sermon 201 de tempore, and book 22 de civit., chapter 8. D. Isidore, in the book on the Ecclesiastical office. Bede, on chapter 18 of Luke.
Finally, nothing is contained in these but the divine praises, graces, etc., which are paid to God justly and piously. Nor am I moved by the fact that certain hymns were composed by men in the Church; they are not on that account to be despised. For hence the Fourth Council of Toledo, canon 12, casts the penalty of excommunication upon those who reject the ecclesiastical hymns because they were composed by human industry.
But priests are held to recite the Divine Office, C. Presbyter de celebr. missarum; deacons and subdeacons, C. Dolentes, under the same title, and C. Finali, distinction 32; but not those initiated in minor orders, as the Doctors commonly hold on the said chapter Presbyteri. Those also are held who hold some ecclesiastical benefice or prebend under a clerical title, as the Doctors expound those words cap. finali, and all who are deputed to a church, namely prebendaries, are held to the divine office, as was declared by Pius V.
All Religious deputed to the Choir are also held, even if not initiated in sacred orders, not by the common law, but by their own particular law or custom. So the Friars Minor, chapter 3 of the Rule, have a precept on this, as all expound with D. Bonavent. there, where prayers are imposed also upon the Laity. Novices, however, are not held, as Valencia and others note.
Moreover, the Breviary, already established by the most holy Pontiff Pius V, and now at last reformed by the most holy Pope Urban VIII, is to be observed.
But whether it be lawful to say another office in place of the current one, without mortal sin: Cajetan asserts it, in summa on the word Horae canonicae, Sylvester, on the word hora, numbers 2 and 15, Valencia, dispute 6, question 2, point 10, § Quid recitandum, nor does Sotus dare to cry out against it, book 10 on justice, question 5, article 4. But Tannerus, dispute 5, question 1, dub. 5, says that to do so without cause is at least venial. Of this, doubt 2, there has been treatment. Azor brings forward Sylvester, Cajetan, and Sotus above, chapter 10, question 2, and Lessius, chapter 37, number 77. But he says others assert it to be mortal, as Toledo, book 2, chapter 13, and says that Valencia also inclines to that view.
But the Clergy are commanded, in cap. Dolentes, Divine office, to celebrate it diligently as well as devoutly, as far as God shall grant. Therefore by force of this precept there is imposed a manner of reciting with distinct voice, as D. Thom. teaches, here, article 12, and D. Bonaventure. There is, moreover, a threefold attention, as the Holy Doctor often teaches in the places cited, questions 5 and 10: either to the words, or to the thing signified, or to the end, God. See the Holy Doctor, book 2 on the progress of religious, at the place cited.
As to the time for reciting the office, it is from first Vespers until midnight of the following day inclusive, provided, however, that at first Vespers no other hours be said than Vespers and Compline, and afterward Matins. But Prime, Terce, and the following Hours ought to be recited on the following day.
Concerning these many questions are disputed, especially by Diana, pt. 2, Tract. 2, of which I shall touch upon some.
Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept
Whether Attention is necessary for reciting the office under precept.
The FIRST opinion is affirmative. Thus almost all the more recent authors: Fernandez in Exam. Theol. part 3, chapter 15, § 6; Villalob. Tom. 1, tract. 24, dub. 15; Sotus book 10, question 5, article 5, conclusion 7; Caietan. 2. 2, question 83, article 13; Navar. on prayer, chapter 13, number 18; Vasquez prima secundae, Tom. 2, dispute 160, number 30; Medina in summa, book 1, chapter 4, § 11; Nattat. on restitution, book 2, chapter 2, number 140; Lopez Instruct. Tom. 2, chapter 103, § on the words Horae canonicae, number 19; Pesantius number 2, q. 62, art. 1, disp. 3; Zerola in the practice of bishops, part 1, on the words Horae canonicae, § Beia in resp. part 2, case 33; Comitol. in resol. moral. book 1, question 6; Malderus 2. 2, tract. 10, chapter 2, dispute 2; Moneta de distrib. part 2, question 2; Carolus Macigni de Hor. can. chapter 86, number 16; Molfesius in summa, tom. 1, tract. 4, chapter 2, number 8; Sylvius 2. 2, question 83, article 13, conclusion 4; Homobon de exam. Ecclesiae, part 1, tract 4, chapter 5, question 40; Viguer. Instit. Theol. chapter 5, § 5; Gavantus com. on the rubric of the missal, Tract. 3, sect. 1, chapter 6, title 4; Bellot in praxis on reserved cases, part 2, question 15; Contadus in resp. of cases of conscience, part 7, question 144; Rodriquez tract. 1, chapter 143; Vega in summa Tom. 2, chapter 128, case 20; Valentia Tom. 3, dispute 6, question 2, point 10; Azor part 1, book 10, chapter 16, question 6; Ledisma in summa, tom. 2, tract. 9, chapter 4; Squillante de oblig. cleric. part 1, dub. 20; Suarez de Relig. tract. 2, book 4, chapter 26, and on censures, dispute 4, sect. 2; Aragon 2. 2, question 83, article 13; Sayrus on censures, book 3, chapter 4; Salas on laws, dispute 9, sect. 9; Lorca in prima secundae, Tom. 1, on the Laws, dispute 16, member 2; Raphael de la torre, part 2, on the Canonical Hours, commonit. 9; Antonius Caramuel, on the Rule of St. Ben. 1575 and seq.; Lugo de Euch. dispute 22, sect. 2; Tambur. Tom. 2, dispute 10, question 2; Antonius Ragaucius on the canonical office in choir, question 19, and others with those cited, whom Diana adduces, pt. 2 on the Hours, and part 7, tom. 11, 30. This seems to be the opinion of D. Bonavent., part 2 of the Mirror for Novices, chapter 1, and in the opuscule on the six wings of the Seraph, chapter 8. Tanner. subscribes, 2. 2, dispute 5, question 1, number 154, with others there.
MANY, however, not undistinguished Theologians, teach that satisfaction is made without attention, provided meanwhile they do not do anything incompatible with the office. So Durandus, in 4, dist. 15, question 12; Sylvester, on the words Horae Can.; Medina, in the Codex on prayer, question 14; Angel., on the word Horae; D. Antonin., 3rd part, title 13, chapter 4, § 8; Rosella, on the word Horae; Palud., 4, dist. 25, question 5, article 2; Coninch., on the sacraments, in 3rd part, question 83, article 6, number 291; Ioan. Valderus, in the differences of both forums, on the words Horae can., difference 1. And Diana affirms it as probable, with Lessius, book 2, chapter 37, dub. 2; Henriquez, book 9, chapter 25, in the Gloss, letter P; Victorello, in summa, following Toledo book 2, chapter 13; Layman, book 4, tract. 1, chapter 5; Fulientis, book 4 de Inst., chapter 2, who says it is the view of many grave and pious men; Bassaeus, V. Horae, citing others.
I ASSERT the former opinion, which is that of D. Bonavent., in the places adduced, and on the perfection of life to the sisters, chapter 5, as Bonacina reports, on the Hours, dispute 1, question 3, point 2.
I proved this at length, in the Treatise on the Laws, dispute 5, question 3, where I adduced many authorities and arguments.
It is proved from cap. Dolentes, where it is prescribed. See what I said there.
It is proved from Suarez, book 3 on vocal prayer, chapter 4, by the argument of D. Bonaventure, whom he cites in the book cited: Where one thing is uttered by the mouth and another is meditated by the heart, there is no true prayer; but while one does not attend to what is uttered by the mouth, one meditates another thing in the heart, as is evident; therefore. He adds that such prayer is never heard by God, on account of the Gloss saying on Psalm 118: A divided heart obtains not what it asks; but he divides his heart who has one half in heaven and one half on earth.
Next, prayer is a kind of adoration; but this ought to be made in spirit and truth; but things said with the attention distracted elsewhere do not cohere with truth; whence there follows irreverence, substantially opposed to the end and effect of prayer, at least when it becomes known to him to whom the prayer is made; but God is the searcher of hearts, nor can he be ignorant of the undue manner in which, without attention, bare words are directed to him.
Finally, where the definition of prayer is not preserved, prayer without doubt cannot subsist there substantially; but while attention is absent, the definition of prayer does not stand, which is the ascent of the mind to God; but for the mind to ascend to God, the mere outward utterance of words cannot suffice. It is confirmed by a likeness: he who merely bends his knees, in no way attending to inward adoration, is not said to adore; therefore. The consequence is evident, because as vocal prayer is made to testify to the inward devotion of the mind, so genuflection is made to manifest the inward submission of the mind in acknowledging the Divine majesty. So Suarez, at the place cited, number 5.
From these things it follows that a beneficed cleric reciting the divine office distractedly does not make satisfaction and is bound to restitution. So Valencia, Aragon, Tannerus and others.
Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it
Whether one who recites another Office in place of the current one makes satisfaction.
Two opinions are found on this matter. The negative is followed by Vasquez, opuscul. on benefices, chapter 4, § 1, dub. 2, number 60; Reginaldus, Tom. 2, book 18, chapter 16, number 172; Suarez, de Relig. Tom. 2, book 4, question 23, number 12; Fernandez in exam. Theol. part 3, chapter 13, § 3; Fabius, on the sacrament of order, dist. 24, question 1, dispute 1, n. 146; Homobon., de exam. Ecclesiae, part 1, tract 4, chapter 5, question 41; Gavantus, Tract. 2, on the rubric, sect. 1, chapter 5, title 2; Onuphr., opuscul. on the change of office; Navar., on prayer, chapter 10, number 211; Graff., decis. part 1, book 2, chapter 51; Philiarc., tract. 1, part 1, book 1, conclusion 6; Rodriquez, Tom. 1, question 42, article 6; Bellarm., Tom. 3, book 1, controversy 9, chapter 18; Tolet., book 2, chapter 23; Ledesma, part 2, tract 9, chapter 4, conclusion 12; Ragavuius, on the canonical office in choir, question 13; Squillante, on the obligation of clerics, part 1, dub. 26; Tabiena, on the word hora, question 10; Molphesius, Tom. 1, tract 5, chapter 2, number 50; Naldus, on the word Divinum officium; Bonac., question 3, point 1; Filliucius, Tom. 2, tract 23, chapter 8, number 186; summa Corona, 1, chapter 1, number 10. On whether it is mortal, Tannerus wavers, dispute 5, question 1, number 150, with Sylvester, on the word hora, question 12. Cajetan, there, chapter 2, says it is at least venial. Bassaeus judges it probable, V. Hora, number 4.
Reginaldus, Suarez, and others limit that opinion: when the change of office would not be made out of contempt, and would be equivalent in quantity, or nearly so; and it would not be done with the intention of doing so often. But they will that some compensation be required, if a lengthy office, e.g. that of Sunday, is exchanged for the office of some Saint, according to the doctrine of Raphael della Torre, 1. 2, tract. 1, on the Canonical Hours, controversy 9, number 6.
Diana, however, rejects these limitations, pt. 2, tract. 12, resol. 3, with Vega, pt. 2, chapter 128, case 17, because he is bound to say such an office each day under such a form: therefore it profits little if it be violated but once, and only equality in quantity be observed.
The SECOND opinion, therefore, teaches that a change of office, even deliberate, is not deadly, as if in place of the office of a Feria the office of some Saint were said. Cajetan, V. Hora, chapter 2; Layman, book 4, tract. 1, chapter 5; Zetola in Praxis of Bishops, part 1, v. Hora can.; Lessius, on justice, chapter 37, dub. 12, number 77; Valencia, Tom. 3, dispute 6, question 3, point 10; Vega, in sum., at the place cited; Binsfeld., in the Enchiridion of Theology, part 4, chapter 9, conclusion 7; Sylvester, at the place cited; Sotus, book 10, question 5; Medina, book 1, chapter 14, § 11; Medina, on prayer, question 10, difficulty 10; Armilla, V. Horae Can.; Azor, part 1, book 10, c. 10, question 2; Rodriquez, summa Tom. 1, chapter 195; Diana, at the place cited. And Filliucius, Tom. 2, tract 29, chapter 7, number 227, and Bassaeus, at the place cited, judge it probable.
The REASON is, because the substance of the precept is to recite the Divine office, so that the seven Canonical hours be paid.
Yet the FIRST opinion rests on the precept of Pius V, who prescribes such a form of reciting the Office, of which more was said at large, tom. 4, dispute 17, question 10, according to the Decree of Alex. VII.
Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour
Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour is gravely mortal.
No one blames disjoining the Lauds from Matins, even for a light cause, since they can be said in the manner of two hours; nor is it culpable to separate one nocturn from another with a moderate interruption, since the sense can be completed and concluded in each nocturn. But the question concerns the interruption of the psalms, chapters, and lessons of the same hour, in which there may intervene either the exercise of another action incompatible with the office, or conversation with someone; but whichever occurs, if the interruption is moral and notable, it is guilty of mortal sin, according to the thirteen Doctors whom Diana cites, part one, tract. 12, resol. 4.
The REASON is, because the unity of each office belongs to the solemn rite of the office instituted by the Church; but this is often destroyed by such a notable interruption: and in consequence the precept is not satisfied; and while for the physical destruction of unity a grave interpolation of time is required, from which the unity of the action is mostly derived, nevertheless sin is not thereby committed unless such interpolation be moral and free.
Suarez, however, remits the measure for discerning a notable interruption to the judgment of a prudent man; who ought to weigh the quantity of each hour, which, the smaller it is, the more is it violated by the lesser delay of time also; wherefore that time which is judged slight in Matins will not be judged so slight in a briefer hour; nor ought the same delay of time be reckoned for the recitation of one psalm as of two.
In another way the office is interrupted, when, having begun, it is lightly set aside, with the intention of resuming it again; which Suarez condemns as culpable, since such a one behaves irreverently toward God; yet he does not sin mortally, provided he completes the interrupted office again.
Suarez adds further: if the office be interrupted even gravely, to do or say something that serves the office itself; for instance, consulting a companion about the manner in which such an office, in which some new difficulty occurs, should be said, or removing some cause of distraction; then there will be no sin: it would nevertheless be more prudent, if the hour be short, to repeat it from the beginning, at least if it were interrupted in the middle of a Psalm. But indecorous words, or even indecent actions, in the Divine office are gravely prohibited, Caput nullus, de consecr. dist. 5, and cap. Dolentes, de celebr. miss.
Twelve Doctors sustain the opinion contrary to the former, in Diana, at the place cited. So that they condemn a notable interruption of the office as venial only; to whom I add Tannerus, dispute 5, question 1, dub. 4, number 156, Peltanus, book 3 on good works, with whom Diana himself subscribes, with Bassaeus, V. hora, number 16.
Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins
Whether one who omits all the hours of one Day commits several sins.
By several sins we here understand those that are consummated by external omission; for if the will, merely internally, have determined itself concerning each individual hour to omit them, no one doubts that there are as many sins as there are repeated acts of will; since even thus one could sin several times about the same hour numerically, intending by a moral interruption to omit it altogether.
Some think and maintain that there are as many sins as there are hours omitted, in the same way as if you omitted some hour for ten consecutive days, or neglected the fast for one entire week of Lent; thus Lessius, book 2, chapter 37, dub. 9; Tabiena, v. hora, question 18; Frascus, on Justice, book 1, chapter 20, number 19; and it seems the view of Toledo, book 2, chapter 12.
They maintain this on a single argument which they suppose: because there are as many precepts of praying as hours omitted; and sins are multiplied by the multiplication of the precept.
Nevertheless fifteen Doctors maintain the opposite, in Diana, resol. 5, to whom add Tannerus, dispute 2, question 1, number 145; and Suarez confesses this to be the more common and sounder opinion, book 4 on the canonical hours, chapter 25, number 18.
There is one argument for all: because they are all parts of one office, and there is a single precept to recite them all as one total office; but the opposite argument is solved by this one, because the diverse parts of the same office, in relation to diverse days, cannot make one thing; a sign of which is that an hour habitually said today cannot, absolutely, be said tomorrow while preserving the precept; and yet each hour of the same day can be said validly and licitly at any time of that day.
Yet in relation to God it is just the same as if there were one sin or seven, since the malice is as great in seven as in one alone, they being equivalent; nevertheless Suarez urges that in confession the number of omitted hours be disclosed on account of the very aggravating circumstances.
There are, however, some, whom Suarez does not approve, who admit indeed that to omit several hours is one sin if it is done by a continuous, not a discrete, action, so that after Prime he omits Terce, and after this, the next following one; but that it is otherwise if after Prime he says Terce, and after this omits None, etc., in nearly the same way as it is one sin to maim a man now, and then, after some time, another sin to kill him.
But this reasoning, with respect to the office, is defective, since there is but one omission, even if in discrete parts; because an office is not said to be altogether omitted until the time prescribed for it has wholly passed; wherefore he who would determine in the morning hours not to say Prime, and afterward would say it, even after the other hours, up to the last point of the prescribed time, would not be said to omit Prime, although intending it he would have sinned, because no hour is omitted so precisely that it is not said in its time; since the inversion of hours can be done without sin, but because the will, in the very instant when the necessary time for saying them pressed upon him, persisted in the resolve to omit them.
Hence you have that it is one thing to omit certain hours in effect, another to omit them in fact; and this, I think, is to be noted on account of the censures impending over those who do not recite the hours; for he who would resolve in his heart to pass over some part of the office, as to the sin, which I call the effect of omission, has already omitted it, yet he would not undergo the censures until the last instant of time had passed, because up to that point he could have recalled the intended omission, and so avoided the censures.
Hence also you have that one censure would punish him who omitted all those hours in one day, because it is one sin; but otherwise if it should happen on diverse days.
Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies
Whether one reciting the Divine Office in Choir in a very low voice, so that he is not heard, satisfies.
S. BONAVENTURA, part 2 of the Speculum disciplinae ad Novitios, cap. 1, seems altogether to require that those who sing in Choir be heard. That he does not satisfy is taught by Beia resp. part 1. cap. 55; Sotus de Iustitia, lib. 10, quaest. 5, art. 4; Navar. de oratione c. p. 13. num. 17; Graff. lib. 2. decis. cap. 51. num. 12, and cap. 52. num. 22, and cap. 53. num. 45; Convar. resol. lib. 2. cap. 13; Columna de redditibus Ecclesiae, part. 3. cap. 34; Pinell. in lib. 1. Cod. de bon. mater. part. 3. num. 16; Rodriquez sum. Tom. 1. cap. 43; Zech. summa part. 2. cap. 83; Summa Coronae part. 1. cap. 2; and others cited by Moneta de distrib. quot. part 2. quaest. 2. num. 31, and by Garzia Tract. de benefic. Tom. 1. part. 3. cap. 2. n. 513. And lest this opinion be harsh, Comitolus lib. 1. quaest. 62 holds it, supposing that the most eminent Sacred Congregation of Cardinals so declared.
IT IS PROVED also from the Councils of Basel sess. 21. §. 3, and of Aachen cap. 131, where it is said: The Canons shall stand in Choir most religiously when the psalm is sung.
FINALLY the Council of Trent sess. 24. cap. 12 says: All are compelled to perform the Divine offices in person, and not through substitutes, and, assembled in Choir for the singing of psalms, to praise the name of God reverently, distinctly, and devoutly with hymns and songs.
NOTWITHSTANDING these, very many say they do satisfy. So Lessius lib. 2. cap. 34. dub. 31. num. 185; Raphael de la Torre 2. 2. tract. 1. quaest. 83. de Horis Can. controv. 10. disp. 7; Petrus Navar. lib. 2. restit. cap. 2. num. 217; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 83. art. 12. dub. ult.; Garzia de benef. Tom. 1. part. 3. cap. 7. num. 517; Cenedo quaest. 2; Rivius tom. 2. resp. 362; Ioan de Cruz in direct. praecepto 3. art. 3. dub. 7; Petrus Ledesma tom. 2. tract. 9. cap. 3. concl. 31. See also Gavantus in coment. ad reg. missalis, tom. 2. tract. 1. cap. 5. tit. 5; Diana resol. 6; Tannet. disp. 5. quaest. 1. num. 159, citing Valentia and Aragonius. So also Bassaeus, but he adds that such men do not satisfy the Choir.
TO the authority of the Cardinals it is answered that it is not certain it exists. So Comitol.
TO the Councils of Basel and Aachen, Cenedo num. 16 and Diana say that it is not a precept but a counsel. For the Fathers use the word debent [must], which seems to mark a counsel; and if it is a precept, they say it has already been abrogated by custom.
TO the Council of Trent they answer that Praelates are indeed commanded to induce the Canons to sing in Choir, but not the Canons to sing. So Lessius num. 186.
THESE things, however, are slight, for the decree of the Sacred Congregation is reported by Comitolus himself. And those two first Councils use the word debent, and I would like to know in what Dictionary that word signifies counsel and not debt [duty]. As to custom, none is found.
AGAINST Lessius's answer I argue: Whenever an ecumenical Council commands that Superiors compel others to the observance of something, it is rightly a sign that the matter is of precept; otherwise why is it commanded that they compel to the execution of that work? But the Council of Trent commands that the Canons be compelled to sing aloud in Choir: Therefore. It is confirmed; for the end of the law is the soul of the law; but the end of the institution of the Choir and of chant is that it be sung aloud, and on that account the fruits are given: Therefore. Diana saw this argument. Therefore he answers that this precept has been abrogated by custom while it endured.
But against this: the custom was before the Council, as he himself declares in his decrees [i.e. the Council derogated from it], and so it is not a prescriptive custom but mere non-observance.
Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions
Whether Canons confabulating in Choir are capable of distributions.
Many deny it, as reported by Diana resol. 7.
Others, however, concede that they can receive distributions.
To me the former opinion is proved, for by cap. Dolentes they are most gravely condemned: Therefore they do not satisfy.
Moreover it is certain that those absent from Choir cannot receive distributions, and if they received them, they would be bound to restitution; but it is all the same, as regards the end of the precept, which must be looked at above all, whether the Canons are absent, or present while confabulating; nay, at times they would profit the Choir more by wholly abstaining from it than by mumbling and whispering and diverting the pious application of others: These things, however, are to be limited according to what we said above dubit. 3., considering whether that confabulation is slight or great; holy or profane, etc. For these conditions, inasmuch as they validate or invalidate the recitation of the office, also make the Canon capable or incapable of distributions.
There are, however, some Canons who are bound only to assist in Choir, without any burden of reciting; and these Bassaeus excepts num. 24., if they confabulate so modestly and humbly that they are not a scandal to others; which happens when they converse with one another somewhat farther off and apart from the rest. Of these I have given some indication tom. 4. tract. 1. de actibus humanis, disp. 17. quaest. 10., according to the tenor of proposition 19 condemned by Alexander VII.
Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself
Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself.
One recites the office privately who says it outside the Choir and outside chant, whether alone or with another; if he recites it with a companion, no one doubts that he must pronounce with such clarity of voice that he can be heard by him: But if he is alone, Reginaldus asserts in praxi tom. 1. lib. 8. cap. 12. disp. 5. quaest. 174., and Suarez de Religione, tract. 2. lib. 4. cap. 7., that he is bound to pronounce in such a way that he is heard by himself.
Suarez proves this by reason, because this prayer is vocal; therefore it ought to be audible, at least by the one praying: the consequence is proved; because, setting aside impediments, which are accidental, there is no voice so faint that it does not sound in the ears of the speaker; otherwise the voice is not to be considered a voice.
He says this is evident from the Council of Basel sess. 21., which says that the voice ought to be formed in such a way that the words are not formed in the throat or between the teeth; and between that pronunciation which is made between the teeth and that which is audible, a middle cannot morally be given.
Further, the Canonical office must be performed in such a way that each one is morally certain that he has satisfied his debt; but how will he be certain that he has prayed vocally who has heard himself in no other way than mentally? For unless the mind attended to such pronunciation, it is established that a man knows he has spoken just as if he had not spoken.
For the opposite opinion stands Azorius parte 1. lib. 10. cap. 11. quaesito 4. His reason is that that pronunciation of the office satisfies the precept of the Church which is contradistinguished from mental pronunciation; and such is that which is made with the lips alone moved, even if it is heard by no one; because, as Navar. says de orat. cap. 20. num. 14., it suffices that the cleric so utter the words that he perceives that he has uttered them.
Yet this reason is not proved valid to me, because he perceives mentally only that he has uttered the words, either mentally or vocally; if the first, it is just as if he had said them mentally; if the second, therefore he heard his voice; and so we are back with the first opinion.
In the other way also the reason of this second opinion can be attacked; because such is not the tenor of the Ecclesiastical precept, that we pray not only mentally and in heart, but that some other contradistinguished mode should suffice; as is clear from the Council of Basel cited above; otherwise it would suffice to mumble between the teeth or in the throat, which is there reproved.
Be that as it may, Filliucius admits this opinion only for the Scrupulous tom. 2. tract. 23. cap. 3. num. 117., and Diana resolut. 11. But Bassaeus num. 15., Caramuel in Reg. S. Bened. l. 380., Tamburin. tom. 2. disp. 10. quaest. 9. absolutely will that the second opinion stand, saying that the precept is given of saying the office, not of hearing it.
Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies
Whether one who says the office with notable cutting off, or truncation, of syllables satisfies.
Clerics are gravely reproved in clement. 1. de celebr. Missarum, because by running through and syncopating they finished the Canonical Hours; So Innocent III also took notice of them in the Lateran Council cap. Dolentes; as Azorius has it, ubi supra, cap. 7. num. 1., citing the manner which the Council of Basel, cited above, prescribes to those reciting the office outside the Choir in these words: This Holy Synod admonishes all Beneficiaries elsewhere also, or those constituted in sacred orders, since they are bound to the Canonical Hours, that if they wish their prayers to be acceptable to God, they perform the Divine and nocturnal office reverently with distinct words, whether alone or joined with others — not in the throat or between the teeth, or by swallowing, or by syncopating syllables or words.
¶ WHEREFORE the Holy Doctor gravely upbraids this manner of reciting the office, in the places alleged, dubit. 1. et 4.; yet Filliucius tom. 2. tract. 23. cap. 7. num. 242., Azor. cit., Villalobos summa tom. 1. tract. 14. diff. 10. num. 7., Diana resol. 31. hold that the precept is nevertheless satisfied, provided the whole office is not so cut through with syncopations that its substance seems to perish.
Azorius proves this by a similar case; for the obligation to pronounce the form of baptism distinctly and integrally is greater than that for the Canonical Hours; yet if one so syncopated that form, he would neither sin gravely nor be bound to rebaptize; as is clear ex cap. retulerunt, de consecr. dist. 4., where the Pontiff answers that a man thus baptizing, from a slip of the tongue or ignorance of the Latin language, acted validly; moreover in leg. debet, ff. de manumiss. it is said that he who by testament gave liberty to his slave, naming him Crarinus who was however called Crastistus, validly made his testament, though he did so with syllables cut off.
For my part, however, I would rather bring forward arguments of this kind for Nuns, or for those ignorant of the Latin tongue; and if truly the parity stands, it is supposed for them, as is clear from the alleged examples, where that ignorance intervened; wherefore, since very many clerics bound to the divine services and offices are held to learn the Latin tongue as far as is fitting, I would not say that they are immune from fault, or from the obligation of repeating the hours, unless the smallness of the matter, or a natural stammering of the tongue, or a precipitous stuttering, presented them as excused. So Sylvius thinks quaestio 83. num. 13., Caramuel 1583, Bassaeus num. 7.
Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies
Whether one who says a great part of the office with the intention of not satisfying satisfies.
¶ COMMONLY Doctors assert that one who thus performs the office with the intention of not satisfying, whether in part or in whole, satisfies the precept, and is bound to nothing further; So many, as reported by Diana resolut. 37.
The REASON is, because the law obliges only to execution, not to intention; and he who thus recites the office fulfills all that is commanded. It is confirmed by Suarez cap. 16. num. 8.; for he who from devotion completes the hourly task, intending to say it again in order to satisfy the Church, is no longer pressed by such a precept, which only enjoins on him to recite the hours once in the day; but this he has already done: Therefore. Say the same of Hearing Mass, or the execution of another human precept: I say human, because if it is a natural or divine precept, whose imposition depends on your will, as in a vow, it must be said otherwise, as I shall note below. This is clear from the example cited in Suarez; for he who in good faith on the Vigil of the holy Virgin, when he was bound by precept to fast, wished rather to fast from devotion, intending to satisfy the precept on the next following day — who would say he was bound that day to the precept, which was extinguished with its own day? Moreover, he who with whatever intention would say the office, or a notable part of it, the intention of satisfying being excluded, would incur no excommunication or censure; therefore it is a sign that the precept has been satisfied.
I SAY the same of other crimes on account of which censures are incurred; for he who would so wound a man that, all hope being removed, he would be dying, if nevertheless he were saved by a miracle, would contract no censure.
On account of these reasons there adhere to this opinion Portell. addit ad dub. regul. verbo hora can.; Lessius lib. 2. cap. 47. dub. 10. num. 59.; Sanchez in summa tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 43. num. 16.; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 83. art. 3.; Henriquez lib. 9. cap. 15.; Garzias de beneficiis, tract. 1. part. 3. cap. 1. num. 198.; Squillante de oblig. clericor. part. 1. diff. 22.; Valentia tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 2. puncto 10.; Vasquez opusculo de beneficiis, cap. 4. §. 1. disput. 7. num. 114.; Mollesius tomo 1. tract. 5. cap. 1. num. 40.; Neldus V. officium; Filliucius tom. 1. tract. 23. cap. 8. quaest. 1. num. 251.; to whom Bassaeus subscribes num. 18. Many, however, hold the opposite opinion, as reported by Suarez cap. 16. num. 7.
FIRST they support it, because the action which is in the precept ought to be elicited in a human manner; but this happens with intention.
SECOND, because he who owed a hundred gold pieces to someone, and gave them to him, saying he did not will by that payment to satisfy his debt, would always be bound to pay as much again from justice; so he who received a stipend in order to celebrate Masses, and said them from devotion, would be bound still to satisfy the prior debt.
THESE reasons, though specious enough, yet seem to me to yield to the former ones; first indeed, because the human manner in which the will obeys the precept is well and sufficiently preserved, while he acts freely and effects by his liberty the substance of the action; nor is it necessary that he affect the manner, since the manner does not fall under the precept, at least when the manner is not the principal object of the precept: as happens in the second reason alleged, where he who owes 100 gold pieces is bound not only to give them, but to pay them from justice; wherefore if he gave them under another title, he would still be a debtor; because it lay with him to give or not to give. So he who would vow to recite the office of the Blessed Virgin on a fixed day, and would not will to say it from the vow but from his own devotion, resolving that he would satisfy the vow on another day, would be bound still, and would not satisfy by the first recitation; because, since the natural or divine precept of the vow arose from him immediately, it will be in his own power to retain it as long as he wills; it is otherwise in precepts which are imposed upon us but not by us; for if we have once satisfied a thing commanded by the Church, with the intention of executing the formal part of the precept at another time, or even of not executing it, it is no longer in our power to retain that precept, but in the thing once done the precept has simultaneously been accomplished and extinguished.
Suarez, however, above strives to make BOTH opinions agree in such a way that a twofold precept occurs: one natural, which obliges us to obey whatever precepts with affection; and this he says is transgressed if the office is said with altogether no intention of satisfying: because by natural law we are taught that, a precept being posited, we execute it without reluctance of will. The other is a human precept, which is satisfied by performing externally the action enjoined, cut off from all internal intention; provided it be done voluntarily, both objectively and effectively.
Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour
What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour.
Diana reports many opinions resol. 41. Navarrus cap. 10. de oratione, numero 44., with Squillante de oblig. cleric. part. 1. disp. 33. num. 99., say that a notable part of one Hour, namely the whole beginning with a psalm, is grave matter.
D. Antoninus, cited by Azor. part. 1. lib. 10. cap. 7. quaest. 3., Macrignus de Horis can. cap. 16. num. 20., Malderus 2. 2. tract. 10. cap. 2. disp. 3., and others say that a third part of Prime, Terce, Sext, None, and Compline is a grave part.
Diana refutes this opinion with Angelus, verb. Horae, num. 18., and Lessius lib. 2. cap. 37. dub. 9. numero 32.: If a third part of an Hour is grave matter: therefore also a third part of a Psalm. But this reason is frivolous; for if I admit that a third part is grave matter, it is because compared to the whole it is still a grave part; not so a third part of a Psalm.
Diana answers with Fernandez part. 3. cap. 13. §. 7., Belloch. in Praxi de casibus refer. part. 2. quaest. 15. num. 49., Vega tom. 1. cap. 128. casu 15., Pet. Ledisma tom. 2. tract. 9. cap. 10. conclusione 14., Reginaldo Tom. 2. lib. 18. cap. 12. num. 143., that in the brief Hours, the half is a grave part. He also refers to Lorca Tom. 2. disp. 16. memb. 2. de legibus.
As to the other greater Hours, Sanchez Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 18. num. 8. says that to omit nine lessons is grave matter in Matins.
Gavantus ad rubr. missalis, tom. 2. sect. 1. cap. 5. tit. 1. num. 4. and Suarez de Relig. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 15. num. 16. say it is necessary that no part of any hour be omitted which is equivalent to one small hour; but if they do not reach this, it is not mortal.
Antonius Ragucius tract. de officio Canonicorum in Choro, quaest. 13. num. 4. says that in the greater Hours, namely Matins, Lauds, and Vespers, a notable part is a fourth.
The reason, however, why a greater part is required in a greater Hour is, because it ought to be a part compared to a whole still greater and grave: Tannerus disp. 5. quaest. 1. num. 145., with Sà verb. Horae, says a notable part is one Hour of the seven, or the half of each Hour, even the least; and he says this is the common opinion.
You will ask: whether one is bound to recite the Litanies on the days of Rogations outside the Choir, and the public supplications. Tannerus asserts so 2. 2. disp. 5. quaest. 1. dub. 5. num. 148., with Gavant. in comment. ad Rubr. missalis, Tom. 2. sect. 6. cap. 16., Suarez de Relig. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 15., Bonacina de Horis, can. disput. 1. quaest. 3. part. 1.
Macign. denies it de Horis, can. cap. 29., with Vazquez opusc. de benefic. cap. 4. §. 1. art. 2. disp. 1., Molfesius Tom. 1. tract. 5. cap. 1. num. 56., Diana resol. 42.
The Holy Doctor notes also, on Psalm 94, that the Invitatory Psalm is omitted at the beginning of the office of Epiphany, because that office concerns the calling of the nations, while the Jews remain in their obstinacy. But at length in the sixth place it is sung, because in the sixth age even they lick the traces of Christ.
The Holy Doctor notes, on Psalm. 23. et 118., in those words: See my humility, that in holy week, in the three days of darkness, the beginning of the office is omitted: O God, come to my assistance, and also the end of the prayers, because then Christ was taken away, who is Alpha and Omega; that is, the beginning and the end.
Moreover, the Holy Doctor examines the effect of prayer in its figures in Dieta, tit. 2. cap. 5.
He compares it to incense Psalm. 104. suaveolenti. Second, to a shield; sap. 18. it is said of Aaron proferens scutum orationis, restitit irae [bringing forth the shield of prayer, he withstood the wrath]. Third, he compares it to tribute, which we are bound to pay to the Divine majesty.
The praying man is compared to a man carrying an encomium [gift] to the Prince. So the Angel says, cap. 12. Tobiae, de orationibus eius.
Therefore he exhorts us to cry out to the Lord like little ones who want the breasts, like a whelp when it feels blows, and like a people seeing dangers.
Likewise we ought (he says) to open the mouth like one afflicted with rheum, or like a little chick hastening to its mother coming; and like a tiny infant to its nurse.
Let us rise then vigorously to the divine praises in the manner of the cock at song, nor be driven by sleep; for thus, not repeating the office which you sang while sleeping, you are guilty of a lethal fault, as Bassaeus warns num. 23., with Marchino de sacr. Ordinis, tract. 2. part. 6. diff. 2. cap. 12. Though I would grant gratis — which I deny to Rodericus sum. part. 1. cap. 140. — that the Choir is satisfied if one strives to shake off sleep. Nor, I constantly assert, is the Choir satisfied while it is sung with musical chant, if you are willingly distracted, against Zach. Pasqualigo decis. 408., if you are bound to recite that part.