Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused
Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal
Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven
Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others
Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy
Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution
Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned
Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered
Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge
Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself
Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when
Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES
Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness
Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial
Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses
Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses
Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate
Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office
Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate
Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault
Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing
Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity
Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts
Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion
Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion
Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely
Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises
Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies
Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction
Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin
Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it
Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly
Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal
Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused
Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments
Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself
Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing
Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering
Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery
Quaestio III: On Cursings
Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general
Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required
Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract
Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract
Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts
Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract
Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot
Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting
Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired
Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made
By what right the first division of things, and subjection, was made.
IN this most weighty question we must first see in what way the most precious liberty of men, which is not well sold for all gold, has been bound.
THE holy Doctor supposes that even in the state of integral nature there would have been pre-eminence and prelation; as also among the Angels, not only while on the way, but now also in the homeland: for this is most suitable to the hierarchy, which is called the directing power, that the wiser direct the less wise. Thus 1 Corinth. 11 it is said: the man is the head of the woman.
ANOTHER is legal pre-existence and prelation, by which a Prince governs his subjects and coerces them civilly.
THE third is the subjection of servitude, by which one man is despotically in the power of another; and this mode of servitude is misery, of which Aristotle, first Polit. cap. 3. and 4.
THE holy Doctor shows that these two servitudes did not exist in the state of integral nature. Therefore he says, God did not say to men: rule over one another; but only: rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the whole earth, as D. Thomas also observes, 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 1.
THEREFORE the holy Doctor proves that servitude arose from sin: not only is it asserted as imposed after sin; thus Gen. 9. Noe says to Chanaan: A servant of servants shalt thou be to thy brethren. And Exod. 21. If thou buy a Hebrew, six years shall he serve thee: in the seventh however he shall go out free. Levit. 25. The bondmen and handmaids who are round about you (that is, from the Gentiles) these you shall have as servants: and you shall transmit them by hereditary right to posterity, and possess them for ever.
IN PARTICULAR also the Apostle expresses the servitude of Christians, 1. Corinth. 7: Let every man abide in the same calling in which he was called; art thou called a servant? care not for it; but, if thou canst be made free, use it rather. And first Timot. 6: Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honour, lest the name of the Lord, and his doctrine, be blasphemed.
BY this servitude the pious Emperors often condemned those taken in war, whom they could have killed, adjudging that servitude, a misery almost to be equated with death; who for that reason were called servi, because they were preserved; and mancipia, as if taken by hand. So Molina tract. 1. de Iust. disp. 32. Fagund. lib. 2. de contractibus, cap. 1.
THEREFORE the cited Scriptures show that servitude was introduced as a punishment, and hence that servitude is not against corrupt nature, as taught by D. Bonau. and also D. Thom. loc. cit. and in 4. dist. 36. Navar. in C. Ita quorundam de Iudaeis, notab. 11. Gloss. penult. num. 1. Couar. in regula peccatum, 2. p. §. 11. it is evident from C. Ius naturale, dist. 1. and from Roderico Cunha on the same C. in p. 1. decret. and Fagundez l. 2. de contract. cap. 1. num. 6.
NEXT it is proved by D. Bonau. from D. August. l. 19. de civit. cap. 15. where he also proves it, because God willed that rational man, made to the image of God, dominate only over the irrational. The same he proves from D. Gregory.
IT IS PROVED thirdly by D. Bonavent. by the argument of D. August. which the other cited authors use. Liberty is in man from nature, as created to the image of God. But liberty is the natural power by which it is licit for a man to do what he wills. Therefore servitude is against nature; but man, free by nature, ought not to be deprived of his liberty on any other ground than fault: Therefore.
ALTHOUGH dominion is of dignity; yet to be a slave is said to be an indignity, and hence those do not judge well who say that dominion over slaves ought to have existed even in the state of integral nature, as the holy Doctor says ad 3. Hence it arose from sin, and also on the occasion of the drunkenness of Noe it was proclaimed, and this D. Ambrosius wills, l. de Elia, et ieiunio, cap. 5. saying: Servitude was introduced through the sin of drunkenness, as D. Bonau. reports ad 4.
MOREOVER the holy Doctor shows most excellently, ad ultimum, that servitude is most justly to be posited in the state of sin, namely to remove oppressions, and to ward off crimes. For if all were free without subjection, they would already be carried by unbridled cupidity into every crime; and one would try to oppress another.
BUT by four titles men already fall, from sin, into servitude.
THE FIRST is by the right of just war, by which the captured are made the captors' own; thus Leg. Hostes, ff. de captivis. it is introduced by the law of nations, as cap. cum Redemptor, 12. quaest. 1. proves, where D. Gregory, the author of that canon, says, as D. Bonau. also reports, quaest. 2. fund. 1. Men, whom nature at first brought forth free, the law of nations subjected to the yoke of servitude.
THE holy Doctor proves the same, quaest. 2. argum. 4. with the response, from the Instit. of Justinian: Wars arose, and captivities followed, and servitude.
FOR since by the right of war it is licit to kill enemies, C. ab illo, 14. quaest. 4. C. quid culpatur, 23. quaest. 1. nothing could be judged more equitable for tempering the raging of war than that life be granted in mercy to those who could be slain, according to c. noli 23. quaest. 1. at the end. Whence, as I already said, they are called servi, because they are kept alive, and mancipia, because they are taken by hand, when they could have been killed, Leg. Libertas, ff. de stat. homin.
YET Christian CHARITY works further, so that Christians taken in war are not reduced to servitude, which has been preserved by perpetual custom, as Bartol. admonishes on Leg. Hostes, ff. de capt.
THE SECOND title of servitude is birth, on which D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 3. For he who is born of a bondwoman is a slave, of whatever condition the father may be, whether he be born of lawful marriage or not, because the offspring follows the womb, ex Leg. partum, Cod. de rei vindicatione, Instit. de iure personarum, §. penult. Instit. de ingenuis, §. 2. cap. unic. de natis ex libero ventre, as the holy Doctor proves in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 2. and 3. where he shows this not only by imperial and canon law, but also from the divine law, Exod. 21. where it is said: If the Lord shall have given to him (the Servant) a wife, and she have borne sons and daughters: the woman, and her children, shall be her master's, but he himself shall go out. Fagundez proves almost the same by these.
YET the holy Doctor admonishes that he who is born of a bondwoman does not become a slave, if the mother was free, either when she conceived, or at least in birth, or at any intermediate time, ex Leg. et servorum, ff. de stat. homin. Instit. de ingen. §. 2. and cap. unic. de natis ex libero ventre, cited above.
A REASON also is brought by the holy Doctor, because the mother is the more substantial principle of the offspring, as the father is the more honourable; therefore in honours the offspring follows the father, and in all things which he has, since those are acquired by paternal solicitude; but in that which he is, he follows the mother; and because servitude is according to that which one is, not according to that which one has, therefore in it he follows the mother.
YET the holy Doctor observes in the body that some provinces, which do not obey the imperial laws, dispose otherwise by their own laws, so that the offspring either follows the worse parent, or follows the condition of the father, or contracts no servitude unless both parents are slaves; and this is to be observed there, as appears ex cap. licet de coniug. servorum, and Panormitanus affirms there. But where the Roman laws did not prevail, nor any other peculiar law, or custom; it could be judged that the mother is a bondwoman at the time of birth, as Fagundez also says, lib. 2. cap. 1. num. 5.
THE holy Doctor ADDS also that in certain places of France there is a custom, that if one of the spouses is a slave, the children are slaves; and if the mother is a bondwoman under a different master, the children are divided among the masters. Yet he says it is more fitting that the offspring follow the mother, just as also in animals, the foal engendered follows the mother, not the father, and the fruit of the seed is the lord of the land's, not the sower's; and in artificial things, if one builds on another's land, the building goes to the Soil, but not the Soil to the building. So Lex Patet. The reason is, that although the formative power is from the Father, nevertheless it draws more substance from the mother.
THE THIRD title of reducing to servitude is some most grave crime, on account of which one is condemned by the Prince. That this punishment can be imposed the Doctors teach commonly: Scotus in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 15. Navar. in cap. ita quorumdam, de Iudaeis notab. 11. gloss. penult. Sylvester V. servitus, Angelus there, Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 3. dub. 4. num. 4. Cunha dist. 32. in cap. eos qui, Salon de dominio, quaest. 3. art. 1. poss. 4. concl. Fagundez lib. 2. cap. eos qui 32. dist. It is conceded to secular Princes the power of reducing to servitude women who knowingly contracted marriage with those in sacred orders; and cap. cum multae 15. quaest. 4. it is established that the sons conceived of such a union become slaves of that Church to which the father belonged, cap. de raptoribus, 36. quaest. 1. ravishers are condemned to the punishment of servitude, which laws the holy Doctor indicates in 4. dist. 37. and in confess. cap. 3. particula 54.
THE FOURTH title of reducing to servitude, or of possessing one as a slave, is sale, as D. Bonavent. teaches in 4. dist. 36. dubio 2. litt.
AND first indeed a free man can sell himself into slavery, as the holy Doctor observes, dub. 3. dist. cit. which the holy Doctor proves elsewhere by the example of D. Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, who had sold himself to redeem the son of a poor widow. Thus also Deut. 15. has the rule for sanctioning this; yet it must be done according to that rule; thus Levit. 25. poverty is assigned as a sufficient cause of sale.
YET the law of the Caesars Leg. liberis, §. si quis sciens, ff. de liberali causa, prohibits anyone from knowingly buying a free man, even one willing, and grants to one so bought a proclamation in liberty.
YET OBSERVE that that law of the Caesars was enacted in favour of the liberty of the subjects of the Romans. This I prove, for Leg. Non ideo, Cod. de liberali causa, there belongs to parents the power of selling their free children in grave necessity, which also is of the law of nature, as is gathered from Exod. 21. But this necessity is restricted by the law of the Caesars to the case of extreme poverty, leg. 2. Cod. de partibus, qui filios suos distraxerunt.
FOR indeed although there only the cause of destitution is expressed, yet if another similar necessity arrives, the law is extended, as Pinellus observes, ad Rubr. Cod. de bonis matern. part. 2. num. 27. who also observes from the common sense of the Jurists that the sale of offspring is granted to the father alone, not to the mother, on account of the lack of counsel, and the weakness of mind, which is found in women; by the law of nature, however, the aforesaid power belongs also to the mother, as the Doctors unanimously hold in Pinellus number 28. on the law 2. Cod. de Patribus, qui filios distraxerunt. All of which the holy Doctor saw dist. allegata, dubiis litterae.
YET that Roman law grants to the son that he can recover his liberty, the price being returned to the buyer.
YET this law, and others like it, are no longer in use among Christians. See also Fagundez lib. 2. de contract. through many chapters, in which he discourses eruditely on the purchases of slaves of infidels from the lands beyond the seas, especially in the Indies.
THERE REMAINS now to be seen the other part of the question, on the division of other things, made by the law of nations; and first I shall treat of the Fact: then of the Right.
IT IS CERTAIN, however, that in the state of innocence no division of things was made, as the holy Doctor observes hic, quaest. 2. ad 4. nor was there to be in it any dominion of property, but only of jurisdiction, as Tanner says, to be cited num. 69. but immediately after sin it was fitting that the things to be possessed be divided; thus Abel, and Cain are said, Genes. 4. to have offered of their goods; the one sheep; the other the fruits of the earth he immolated to God; then indeed Noe divided the world among his sons, Genes. 10. and 11. Afterwards indeed smaller divisions were made by fields, and acres, and thus the division is believed to have been made by Adam, or Noe, whether through a Prince chosen from the people as arbiter, as Tanner says, disp. 4. quaest. 1. num. 70.
AS TO what is of right, I ASSERT that the division was made by the best right. So D. Bonavent. hic ad 4. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 2. Sotus lib. 4. de iustitia, quaest. 3. quaest. 3. art. 1. Ioan. Medina Cod. de rebus restitut. quaest. 1. Conradus de contract. lib. I. quaest. 8. and 9. Molina tomo I. de iust. tract. II. disp. 20. Brito de locato, et conducto, I. part. rubrica, fol. 4. col. 4. and the Doctors commonly in Fagundez lib. II. de contract. cap. 7.
IT IS PROVED first by D. Bonavent. in the cited place, because the law of nature dictates that peace, and justice be preserved in the society of men; but if all things were possessed in common, innumerable disputes, dissensions, and quarrels would arise; for the stronger would seize, and would leave nothing to the weaker, and often many would rush together to take the same thing, as necessary to them.
HOW EASILY, however, these quarrels arise in the state of corrupt nature, is clearly evident from the societies of travellers, and merchants. Thus Genes. 13. quarrels arose between the shepherds of Abraham, and of his nephew; which inconvenience Abraham avoided by dividing the land with Lot.
ARISTOTLE also proves this in the cited place of the Polit. against Plato, and Socrates, who, to preserve peace, willed all things to be common, even wives, so that all things might be more one.
FURTHERMORE, Deuter. 32. it is said: When the Most High divided the nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he appointed the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the sons of Israel. Therefore God proclaims himself the author of this division.
FURTHERMORE in the Council of Constance, among the dogmas of John Hus, that was condemned which held that it was not licit for Clerics to possess anything of their own, which was also the heresy of the Manichaeans, as S. Bonavent. reports in quarto cap. regulae Minorum. For it is certain that from the time at least of D. Sylvestri, Clerics, and Prelates have had possessions, and these most justly, the Church acclaiming; otherwise all the holy Clerics, Prelates, and Laics who had anything of their own would have been condemned, as the holy Doctor argues there; indeed from the time of the Apostles, and before, many saints were rich, and yet just, which he alleges as a noted point, in decretis, 12. quaest. 1.
YOU OBJECT first. The division of things is against the law of nature: Therefore it is unjust. The antecedent is proved, because by the law of nature all things are common, as in cap. ius naturale, dist. 1. and in cap. dilectissimis, 12. quaest. 1. where Clement, the author of that canon, says thus: The common use of all things that are in this world ought to have been for all men, but through iniquity one said this was his, another that, and thus among mortals division was made.
Scotus answers in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 2. from D. Bonavent. dist. 44. art. 2. quaest. 2. ad 4. that the law of nature, which before sin required all things common, after sin, with the state changed, required that things be proper; and this Scotus meant to say when he said the law of nature was changed after sin. Wherefore Fagundez, num. 11. says Scotus spoke imprudently, although he tries to draw him to the mind of D. Bonavent.
TO the text of Clement Pope 12. quaest. 1. the holy Doctor already answers above ad 4. cap. regulae, namely that according to those canons the Church had proper goods from the beginning, granted the occasion of the state of corruption.
YOU OBJECT secondly, many Fathers teaching that all things are common. Thus Chrystost. in cap. 6. Lucae, Ambrosius, reported in cap. sicut hi, 47. dist. and others. See D. Chrysost. oratione de sancto Philogonio.
THE holy Doctor answers most fully, ad cap. 4. regulae, and in the Apologies of poverty, and of the poor, that the Fathers meant only this: that riches are not to be so adhered to that for their sake one omits serving God, and that one remember that in necessity all things are common as to use; and therefore alms are to be given, and the counsel of leaving all things is best, because that Mine, and Thine, is tenacious, and viscous. Moreover he shows most luminously that riches are licit, and that innumerable saints were and are rich, and glorious. That the Church indeed even of old was most wealthy, and that the Levites were opulent, he proves from the Law of God in Apolog. pauperum, responsionis tertiae cap. 2.
THESE same things the holy Doctor sets forth at length ad 14. Lucae in these words: Who does not renounce all things that he possesses cannot be my disciple, saying: to renounce all things in affection is of necessity; but to dismiss all things is of supererogation, and counsel. Therefore it is concluded: some inconveniences indeed arise from the property of things, but there would have been more, if all things in this state were common.
IT IS indeed fitting with friends that all things be common, as Pythagoras said, not in property, but in use, as Aristotle said, 2. Polit. cap. 3. et 4.
YOU OBJECT thirdly. That is better which is of counsel, and falls under a vow; but expropriation is of counsel, Matth. 19. If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all, and give to the poor, and it is the matter of a vow even solemn: Therefore.
Fagundez answers, num. 14. from Molina Tom. I. tract. II. disp. 20. §. tertia conclusio, that it is indeed fitting that there be some congregations in which all things are held in common, and nothing proper, so that, more intent on the cult of God, segregated from every concretion of worldly things, they may lead a heavenly life. The holy Doctor pursues these things most fully in the cited places, who also shows that for those wishing to serve God most highly, most high poverty is an option, which admits nothing even in common; yet in the world, where estates, business, and contracts are necessary for civil life, and for political fellowship; it is indeed fitting that certain things be determinately proper; both that contentions, and disputes be removed; and that each diligently apply himself to his own affairs. For one's own good is amiable to each one, as Aristotle says; on the contrary, where the business is common:
More sluggishly do many dispatch the affairs committed to them,
And as in the Law, Cod. quando, et quibus quarta pars debeatur, leg. 10. it is a natural defect, that what is possessed in common is neglected.
FOR that proverb is common among many: He who benefits the community benefits no one.
THERE RESTS now to be seen by what right the division of things was introduced.
ALREADY in the Tract. de Legibus, disp. 4. quaest. 2. I solved this doubt together with the others pertaining to servitude.
BUT I said that by the dictate of the natural law indeed the division of things in this state is sanctioned, yet this was made by the law of nations, as D. Bonavent. teaches here quaest. 2. D. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 66. art. 2. ad 1. where Caietanus, and other Thomists, Medina Cod. de restitut. quaest. 1. concl. 5. Salon 2. 2. quaest. 4. art. 1. et 2. Ledesma 2. 4. quaest. 18. art. 1. dub. 6. Molina Tom. I. de iust. tract. II. quaest. 20. concl. 1. Fagundez lib. II. de contract. num. 16. and it appears from Leg. ex hoc iure, ff. de iustitia, et iure, where Bartol. num. 5. Iason num. 43.
OBSERVE that D. Augustin is cited in cap. Quo iure, dist. 8. where he says: Each one possesses what he possesses — is it not by human right? Take away the Laws of the Emperors; who dares to say: this villa is mine?
BUT S. Augustine speaks of particular divisions, of divisions; fixed by the law of the Caesars, as Fagundez notes, num. 17.
NEXT observe that D. Augustin reduces all laws to Divine law, and Human; and indeed he reduces the law of nations to human law; and human law to the law of the Caesars; just as he recalls the Natural to the Divine, as Cunha teaches, 1. part. decreti, cap. quo in-re, dist. 7. But the properties of things are more broadly called servitudes, whether mixed, or real, affirmative, or negative. See Layman lib. 3. Filliucium tract. 31. Lessium lib. 2. Bassaeum V. Servitus.