Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

The holy Doctor PREFACES in dist. 29, question 1, that fear is twofold. One is grave, which is also called just, and falling upon a constant man; the other light, which is also called falling upon an inconstant man, L. metu, ff. de eo, quod metus causa, cap. consultationi, cap. veniens, 2. de sponsal. cap. Cum dilectus, de his quae vi. Grave fear is fear of some great evil considered absolutely and in itself, which we fear is about to befall us or ours; such is inflicted fear of death, mutilation, atrocious torture, violation, servitude, loss of goods, of status, of honor, of great gain, of infamy, of unjust excommunication, etc. as Sanchez proves lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 5.

Whether indeed these evils threaten us or ours, they instill grave fear. So Menochius tract. 1. lib. 2. de arbitr. centur. 2. casu 136. Azor p. p. lib. 2. cap. 17. dub. 6. Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. disput. 1.

IN SONS, as Leg. Isti quidem, §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa, proves; for children are part of the father, as Aristotle teaches in the Ethics.

IN WIVES, AND HUSBANDS, because they are one. So D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unic. art. 2. ad 3. D. Bonavent. same dist. and others teaches.

IN FATHERS, BROTHERS, AND SISTERS leg. ult. Cod. de impub. et aliis substit. §. hi, qui, Instit. de inut. stipul. and the Doctors commonly; and concerning all connected in the first degree the Praep. teaches cap. cum locum de sponsal. num. 10. Cucus lib. 5. inst. Maior tit. 22. num. 156.

IN OTHER KINDRED, AND AFFINES, because, as is said in cap. non existimemus, 13. quaest. 2., they are one flesh. It is also proved by cap. sciant cuncti de elect. in 6., which text Iason calls notable, leg. de pupillo, §. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de oper. nov. nunciat.

IN FRIENDS JOINED BY THE TIGHTEST BOND IT IS PROVED, because a friend is another self, as the Philosopher says, 6. Eth. cap. 4. and D. Augustine lib. 4. confess. cap. 6. Hence grave fear of an evil, whether ours or our dear ones', is said to be inflicted, and it invalidates the contract, if the evil truly impends.

LIGHT fear is reverential fear, on account of the presence of some grave person; yet this fear, if threats, harsh words, etc. are added, can become grave. Therefore one must note that fear is called grave and light respectively; for what is light fear for someone, say a man, will be grave for a girl, as Sanchez shows, citing some fifty Doctors, and it is proved ex Leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis.

FIVE conditions, however, are required for fear to be grave.

FIRST, that the evil feared be grave leg metum, ff. de eo quod metus causa; there Labeo says fear is to be understood not as any fear whatever, but of a greater evil, that is, a great evil, as the Gloss explains.

SECOND is, that it be feared rationally, not for a light cause: it is clear ex Leg. metum cit. ibi, "fear, however, not of a vain man, but of one who fears deservedly," and Leg. Nec timorem, §. proinde, ff. eodem. Whence Eccl. 19: He who quickly believes is light of heart. So D. Thom. 4. dist. 29. quaest unic. art. 2. D. Bonavent. same dist. quaest. 1. in the body, and others. And indeed true infliction of punishments is not required, but a probable and not vain fear, as S. Bonavent. and others prove, as cited by Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. diss. 1. num. 16.

THIRD condition is, that the one instilling fear be able to carry out his threats. So D. Bonavent. loco cit. It is clear ex Leg. famosi, ff. ad legem Iulia maiest. and Sanchez proves cit. num. 19.

FOURTH is, that the one making threats be accustomed to carry them out; for if he is ready to remit them, the fear is not grave, ex Leg. Unica, Cod. si quis Imperatori, and Leg. famosi cited.

FIFTH is, that the one fearing be unable to avoid the evils threatened. So Sanchez num. 23. and at the same time Fagundez cap. 5.

The Doctors note here also that grave fear can proceed from an extrinsic natural agent and natural cause, as from a storm, disease, etc.; or from an extrinsic living being operating by natural impulse, as from a brute animal, a drunkard, and a madman; or finally from an extrinsic freely acting agent, such as a man or a demon.

THEREFORE, if fear is instilled by an extrinsic natural agent, the contract is not held invalid, even though the consent there is conditional, as if, were no shipwreck threatening from the storm, or death from disease, he would not vow or swear to do this. The reason is that such fear is not injurious, but is often sent by the providence of God to do holy works, or to rouse penance, as the Council of Trent teaches sess. 14. cap. 4. Therefore it adds: For by this fear the Ninevites, usefully shaken, did penance at the preaching of Jonah, full of terrors, and obtained mercy from the Lord.

Then, however, penance, to be right, ought not to have conditional consent. "If ruin did not impend, I would not repent," as I shall say in my Tract. de Poenit. Disput. de contritione.

THIS is the doctrine of D. Thom. prima secundae, q. 6. and D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 34. part. 2. quaest. 1. and 2. Vasquez part. 2. disp. 27. cap. 3. Sanchez in decal. lib. 4. cap. 1. Fagundez cap. 5. num. 17. and it is clear ex cap. de regul. where the vow of a sick man, made from fear of death, is declared valid. The same is said if the inflicted fear is from a brute animal, a drunkard, etc.

BUT if the inflicted fear is from a freely acting agent to extort consent, the most certain resolution of all the Doctors is that the contract is invalid. So D. Bonavent. 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. Sanchez lib. 4. decal. cap. 3. Suarez Tom. 3. de relig. lib. 6. cap. 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 17. dub. 6. Azor part. 1. lib. 1. cap. 10. num. 11. and part. 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. Bonacina de contract. disp. 3. quaest. prima, puncto 2. §. 3. Fagundez lib. 1. de contract. cap. 5. num. 18. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 6. num. 315.

A GRAVE question, however, is: whether such contracts are invalid by natural law, or rather by positive law. The Doctors are divided into two lines.

The FIRST opinion is that they are not invalid by natural law. So Paludanus 4. dist. 15. quaest. 2. art. 5. Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 15. num. 5. et lib. 4. decal. cap. 3. num. 9. Suarez lib. 1. de relig. cap. 7. num. 12. Corbo quaest. 46. Valentia Tom. 4. disp. 10. quaest. 3. puncto 2. Henriquez lib. 11. cap. 9. Pet Ledessm. quaest. 47. art. 3. Tanner. loco cit. Azor. p. p. lib. 11. cap. 15. quaestio 6. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 1. speaking of a vow, and speaking of contracts cap. 17. dub. 6. from num. 36. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 27. cap. 3. Bonacina de contract. disp. 3. quaest. 1. puncto 2. §. 2. Fagundez de contract. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 5. Caspensis Tract. 19. de contract. disp. 1. sect. 4. who takes innumerable authorities for this opinion as listed with Sanchez. Ballixus subscribes, V. Contractus num. 21.

They except, however, contracts of marriage, betrothal, dowry for marriage, and profession in Religion, which nevertheless they maintain can be rescinded by a judge's sentence.

CONCERNING marriage the Doctors commonly teach this, Sanchez, speaking of marriage and betrothal lib 4. de matrim. disp. 12. a num. 18. Azor 3. part. lib. 3. cap. 7. Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 17. dub. 6. n. 37. Henriquez de matrim. lib. 11. cap. 9. num. 6. Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 3. puncto 8. num. 31. where he also proves the same of betrothals from many most weighty Doctors, and it is clear ex cap. veniens 2. et cap. cum locum 1. et cap. consolationi de sponsal.

AND consequentially concerning the promise of a dowry they give the same warning, Azorius, Lessius, Bonacina and Fagundez, cited.

The REASON is, because marriage is perpetual, nor after it has been legitimately contracted is there any longer room for invalidation, as in other contracts; therefore perfect liberty is required to contract.

HENCE consequentially concerning profession in Religion they deduce the same, Sanchez lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. Suarez tract. 3. de Relig. lib. 6. cap. 4. Fagundez num. 5. and it is clear ex cap. de his, quae vi.

OF any simple vow whatsoever, in whatever matter it be made, Suarez asserts it valid de voto lib. 1. cap. 18. a num. 5. and others; but that such simple vows extorted by fear are invalid teach Sanchez Tom. 1. decal. lib. 4. cap. 3. num. 12. Cardin. cap. 2. quaest. 1. casu 4. de his quae vi. Sylvest. verb. metus, q. 8. and verb. votum 2. quaest. 12. Tolet. lib. 4. summae, cap. 17. Nauar. summa Latina, cap. 12. num. 52. et commonit 2. de regular. num. 15. Azor. p. p. lib. 11. cap. 11. quaestio 7. Abbas, Sotus, Aragon, and others cited by Sanchez, and Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 3. puncto 8. a num. 2. to whom Fagundez subscribes num. 6.

OF an oath extorted by grave fear they commonly assert that it is valid by natural law; and the reason is, because an oath is a promise made with God asserted as its witness. Therefore, lest God be a false witness, it will be valid by natural law.

AS TO a testament extorted by grave fear, that it is null by natural law, Sanchez asserts lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 8. num. 6. Molina tom. 1. de Iust. Tract. 2. disp 136. Spino in speculo glosae, Rubr. 2. part. num. 5. Guttier. de quaest. canon. lib. 2. cap. 11. num. 83. Caldas in Leg. si iuratorem, v. contractum, num. 27. which most common opinion Fagundez applauds, number 8.

The REASON is, because a testament is the last will, and therefore it ought to remain free until death, nor is it confirmed except by the death of the testator, as the Apostle says, Heb. cap. 6.; therefore fear cannot give it firmness.

CONCERNING the collation of a benefice extorted by fear, Garcia asserts it valid by natural law de benef. part. 11. cap. 3. §. 2. num. 145. Fagundez num. 9. and they say it is clear from cap. super hoc penult. de renunc. cap. Abbas, cap. ad aures, cap. ad audientiam de his, quae vi, and Rebuffus teaches it in praxi benefic. tit. de resign. metu fact. and tit. de vi, in resign. adhibita, and tit. de causis resignationem irritantibus, Rosinus lib. 19. de benefic. Nauar. in cap. accepta, de restit. spoliat. opposit. 4. 5. and 6. Flaminius de resign. lib. 13. quaest. 1. and 2. Azor 2. part. lib. 7. cap. 26. quaestio 1. Selua de benefic. 3. part. quaest. 32. They prove it by the reasons I shall set out at the end.

WE must also, with another distinction of contracts, set out various opinions.

AND indeed that a lucrative and promissory contract celebrated under just fear is valid by natural law, Sotus teaches in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 3. which he had almost taught lib. 6. de iust. quaest. 1. art. 4. teaching that a donation, or promise, made under just fear is valid by natural law. The same hold Henriquez lib. 11. cap. 9. Carbo de test. cap. 46. quaest. 4. Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 47. art. 3. dub. 1. ad 3. Sanchez de matrim. lib. 4. disp. 8. num. 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 7. dub. 6. num. 37. ex leg. ultima, Cod. de his, quae vi, which opinion Diana judges probable part. 3. tract. 5. resol. 118.

THE OPPOSITE, however, no less probable, others defend, namely that a contract of liberal donation, or promise, celebrated from grave fear, is invalid by natural law. So Medina Cod. de restitut. quaest. 3. causa 2. Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 86. art. 7. Rebellius part. 2. lib. 1. quaest. 5. conclu. 1. Molina, and Azor, whom, as cited, Basilius Pontius follows de matrimonio, lib. 4. cap. 6. numero 4. Diana loco citato.

The SAME concerning onerous contracts Rebell. asserts loco cit. and others with him. Others, however, assert these contracts (excepting marriage) valid — I mean those contracts in which a thing is given for a thing given. So Basilius Pontius cap. 7. citing Soto, Richard, Paludanus, Sylvester, Navarrus, Henriquez, Molina, and Vasquez. Indeed Pontius says cap. 9. that it is valid even by positive law; yet he grants the action, and limits it only in gaming, and the alienation of the goods of the Church, and Diana notes these things resol. 119. to remove scruples. Bassaeus defends almost this opinion V. Contractus, num. 21. excluding some.

TRULY indeed, Molina asserts all contracts extorted by fear to be invalid by natural law Tract. 2. de Iustitia, disput. 267. et 326. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 3. et lib. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. et lib. 8. quaest. 1. art. 7. Salas part. 2. quaest. 6. art. 6. dub. 3. sect. 1. speaking of contracts outside marriage: but speaking of the contract of marriage, where the reason is the same, the same maintain Matienzo lib. 5. recopil. tit. 2. rubr. gloss. 1. num. 189. Barbosa, ff. solut. matrim. rubr. 4. num. 30. Couar. in 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 5. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 2. concl. 8. Bartholom. Ledesma dub. 23. de matrim. concl. 3. Philiar. de offic. sacerd. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 2. cap. 8. and Sanchez says it is most probable lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 14. Fagundez also cites D. Bonavent. 4. dist. 39. quaest. prima, art. 2. concl. 8.

The holy Doctor supports his opinion not there; but dist. 29. quaest. 1. in the body, where indeed he treats of the contract of marriage, but his reason is universal, taken from the consent of the will being necessary; which embraces other contracts also; and indeed, although he does not refuse to call the opposite opinion, weighed from this passage, probable, he concludes that this one is more probable at the end of the body.

I ASSERT first, that the former opinion is not improbable.

It is PROVED first by D. Bonavent. because, where there is consent sufficient for a moral act, there is a valid moral act; but consent from fear is sufficient for a moral act, as I showed prima secunda, Tract. 1. disput. 3. where I showed that grave fear does not simply take away liberty. And if contracts are rescinded by positive law, this is from indulgence, because he is judged not to have consented fully with his whole heart, but to redeem the penalty.

It is PROVED second by the holy Doctor; because he who receives Baptism through fear of death is baptized: Therefore by natural law what is done from fear is valid, at least as to those things that concern God.

It is PROVED third by the holy Doctor: The will cannot be forced to consent, but only freely induced by a creature. Then thus: He is no less induced by troublesome prayers and blandishments than the one who fears; but the latter consents to contracts sufficiently by natural law: Therefore so does the former. The major is held by many Doctors, as Fagundez admits.

INDEED the holy Doctor replies, that blandishments and prayers do not equal fear, unless tacit threats lie beneath, as Sanchez also teaches lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 7. num. 7. Fagundez cap. 5. num. 25. Romanus Leg. interpositas, Cod. de transact. Nauar. summa, cap. 17. num. 16. Mascardus de probat. concl. 193. numero 4. and 8. Ludov. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 96. And Hippolytus and others will the same, singulae. 645. Sigism. inter consilia feudalia, cons. 17. num. 21. Albertus Brunus inter the same counsels, consil. 14. num. 387. Burgo de Paz consil. 25. num. 72. while they say that the blandishments of princes instill fear in a constant man, because, namely, hidden threats are present; for Princes are accustomed to avenge rebuffs.

It is PROVED fourth by the holy Doctor: Where there is consent sufficient for mortal sin, there is consent sufficient for a contract; but in our case such is found: Therefore. The minor is proved by D. Bonavent. for if anyone denies Christ through fear of death, he sins mortally.

Yet the holy Doctor replies, denying the parity, because more things are required to constitute what requires an integral cause; than to do an evil, which is done from any defect whatever; whence it does not follow that, if conditional consent, shaken by fear, suffices for sin, such consent also suffices for a good act: Therefore, if someone under fear of death, or even of hell, elicited a conditional act of attrition for his sins, namely intending that, with the fear of death or hell removed, he would not grieve, it will be an imperfect act, indeed a blameworthy one, preferring himself to God.

NEXT he replies that fear falling upon a constant man is not that which is instilled to contemn the Divine majesty: For a constant man ought to prefer God to all things. Therefore the fear falling upon a constant man is held to be that which is instilled to do or omit something that is not contrary to salvation, which can also rationally be done and omitted. For if anyone wished to undergo death lest he consent to some indifferent thing, he would certainly act not as constant, but as imprudent; say, if death were threatened to someone unless he were willing to go to the square by the other road, equally convenient, and he persisted in going by the road suspected to the other. But contracts are of the kind of things not necessary to salvation.

I ASSERT second, more probable, that contracts extorted by grave fear are invalid by natural law.

It is PROVED by D. Bonavent. first, most validly, by the first foundation, for the laws declare marriage contracted under grave fear invalid from defect of consent, which natural law requires, but they do not invalidate it by positive law; indeed many past marriages they declare to have been invalid by natural law, and to be just as if they had never been made, as is clear ex cap. cum locum, et cap. consolamini, et cap veniens 2. de sponsal. and ex cap. significasti de eo, qui duxit uxorem; Similarly cap. primo, de his, quae vi: profession made under grave fear is not invalidated, but declared invalid, and no text is found in the whole law that invalidates it.

Fagundez REPLIES num. 10. granting that marriage shaken by fear is null by natural law. Similarly, betrothal, and the promise of a dowry, and profession of religion, as above; but he denies the parity concerning other contracts.

AGAINST, because he does not perceive the force of the argument of D. Bonaventure. It stands in this: What is invalid from defect of consent is such by natural law; but every contract shaken by grave fear is null from defect of consent: Therefore. The minor is proved, for the Pontiffs declare marriage null if made under grave fear, and allege a reason taken not from a consent peculiar to the marriage contract, because it is perpetual; but because it is a contract in its genus, which is an indifferent being, not necessary to salvation. Therefore every contract shaken by grave fear is invalid by natural law.

It is PROVED second by the holy Doctor, because every contract by which dominion is transferred to another ought to be free; but where there is fear falling upon a constant man, there is not full liberty: Therefore.

The ADVERSARIES reply that these contracts are simply voluntary, and that such consent suffices for mortal sin. But I met this reason above.

It is PROVED third by D. Bonavent. concerning marriage. Contracts which are made with God, such as profession and a private vow, proceed in the same way as marriage: But those are invalid by natural law if shaken by grave fear: Therefore also marriage. The major is proved, for marriage is the sign of the union of the Church, or of the soul, with God; but the sign measures the signed.

It is PROVED fourth by the holy Doctor, as to marriage, because the contract of marriage is through love, and this conjugal love ought to be perpetual, according to the Apostle's word: Husbands, love your Wives, as Christ the Church; but coerced consent is not with love: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the holy Doctor; because in an onerous contract there ought to be equals, so that the giver render equally: but where there is grave fear, equality is not given: therefore an onerous contract is not valid by natural law, if it is made from grave fear.

It is PROVED sixth validly, by an argument taken from D. Bonavent. 4. dist. 27. art. 2. quaest. 1. argument 4. with the reply added. Natural law dictates that no one take gain from the loss which one, through his deceit, injustice, and malice, gives to another, as all the laws cry, 30. quaest. 1. cap. Dictum, cap. sedes Apostolicae, cap. ex tenore de rescript. cap. ex litteris de dolo, and leg. quoties, §. qui dolo, ff. de probat. But he would take a great deal of gain who would shake consent to a contract from another by grave fear through malice and iniquity, unless the contract were invalid by natural law; for he could keep the thing in conscience, and its fruits meanwhile, until the contract were rescinded by a judge, which is an enormous absurdity; but absurdities are especially to be avoided in law, Leg. Nam quod absurdum, ff. operis lib. cap. dudum de praebend. in 6.

Fagundez REPLIES num. 10. that then he is held in the forum of conscience to restore everything, and this he gravely enjoins on Confessors for their tribunal, which is the tribunal of truth. But he says he is held to this restitution by reason of the loss inflicted; for natural law commands it, not by reason of the contract.

AGAINST, I argue most validly. What inflicts loss against natural law is forbidden by natural law, if from the force of the action the loss follows formally; but through you, from the contract extorted by fear, loss against natural law is produced and inflicted: Therefore such a contract also is forbidden by natural law, and null.

I strengthen this attack validly by Diana's argument. Almost countless Doctors, and some of the adversaries, as Lessius, Sanchez, Navarrus, and Sylvester with Pontius n. 6. assert that he who unjustly extorts something by force and fear from a donor is bound to restitution: Therefore dominion is not transferred, and therefore the contract was not valid by natural law; for if it were valid by natural law, it would not have to be restored before the judge's sentence; for thus dominion would be transferred.

Since, therefore, dominion has not been conveyed to these, and therefore they are under a continuing burden of restitution, as D. Bonaventure teaches in speculo animae, cap. 2. near the end; it follows that it is invalid by natural law. From which Pontius and Rebellus, in Lessius and Sanchez, deduce grave inconsequences.

HERE I note that Fagundez num. 2. in the first argument presses this for us, as if we inferred that, if liberal contracts extorted by fear are invalid, much more onerous ones; but on the contrary, for he who donates from fear receives nothing, and he who contracts, giving a thing for an equal thing, receives also another thing, whence he is less specifically burdened, and therefore is an injustice of nature, inferior in species. Whence it would be freer to argue: if an onerous contract extorted by fear is just by natural law, much more a gratuitous one of donations, promises, etc.

Therefore Caspensis replies to the argument number 38. according to the mind of Vasquez, that onerous ones are valid by the very law of nature, because it is a sufficient title for their value, namely of the thing given and received. But lucrative ones are not valid by natural law, because in these there is no other title for transferring dominion besides the will, which, since it is coerced, is not sufficient for transferring dominion.

BUT I showed both invalid from other chapters, namely, because consent is lacking, whatever Caspensis num. 39. may mutter, who ineptly argues: light fear does not make contracts invalid by natural law, as is clear from leg. Vani timoris, ff. de reg. iuris, and Leg. metum, ff. de eo quod metus causa; and yet light fear inflicts an injury: Therefore neither does grave.

It is replied, however, that the reason is unlike, because grave fear takes away the liberty of consent, not so light fear, as the holy Doctor notes at the end of the body.

But to our argument above, and to the attack, Caspen. num. 40. and 41. replies that such contracts are simply voluntary and free, nor is it enough to make them invalid if he is bound to restitution; for both can be at once, nor does it repugn, that the contract be valid and that there be an obligation to rescind it, if the other wishes.

For it is against, because the argument was taken from the debt of restitution, as is seen above.

From what has been said it is also clear that the second conclusion of Caspensis num. 44. is false: that contracts (excepting very few, that is, marriage, betrothals, religious profession, Witnesses employed in a testament, promises of the goods of the Church, absolution from censures) are not invalid by positive law; but are to be invalidated, which he proves from certain laws, where things done through fear are to be rescinded Leg. ult. Cod. de his, quae vi, and cap. Abbas, de his, quae vi. And Instit. de except. at the beginning.

It is answered indeed, that some laws only say definitively that such contracts are to be declared invalid; for other laws clearly affirm that they are invalid.

A question however can be: whether also from light fear contracts are invalid by law.

The first opinion is that such contracts are invalid in conscience. So Panorm. in cap. ad Audientiam, and other Canonists, whom Molina cites Tract. 2. disput. 326. de Legibus, Battolus, in Leg. metum, and others.

Of the Theologians Sotus lib. 6. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 4. et lib. 8. quaest. 1. art. 7. ad 3. Sà verb. contractus, numero 3. Carbo quaest. 46. de restit. Palat. lib. 4. de contract. cap. 9. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 17. dub. 2. num. 46. Rebellius p. p. lib. 1. quaest. 5. with these injunctions, which he says num. 9. and 26. Sanchez de matrim. lib. 4. disp. 9. num. 4. Tanner. here, disp. 4. quaest. 6. num. 121. who brings forward the reason, because that fear is the cause of the contract which would not have been made, and he reports many texts of both Laws, which only say that fear and violence make contracts invalid; but they understand fear equivalent to violence, namely grave, which is called fear simply.

For when something is said to be such absolutely, it is understood to be such simply, not such in a certain respect. From which you have that Lessius does not infer rightly, that as many as refuse [to admit] that fear falling upon a constant man invalidates a contract by natural law are bound to sustain this opinion. Among these, however, he lists D. Bonavent. 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. Sotus ibi, quaest. unic. Gabr. quaest. 2. art. 2. in supplem. but he excepts marriage, which he teaches is not invalidated by light fear, with others; although others say it is invalidated, among whom he lists D. Bonaventure as to be placed.

The other opinion is that such contracts are valid in conscience. So Medina Cod. de restitut. quaest. 3. causa 9. Basilius Poncius de matrim. lib. 4. cap. 10. num. 5. Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 12. Menochius lib. 2. de arbitr. iudic. 2. casu 136. num. 2. Franciscus Ripa lib. 3. resp. cap. 15. num. 8. Bonacina dispm. 3. quaest. 1. puncto 2. §. 3. and others with these, adding that contracts can be invalidated, provided however the contracts be invalidable; for if they are not invalidable, they teach that by both laws they are valid, as marriage, profession of religion, and sacred orders; so also Fagundez above.

As to D. Bonavent. he judges no such contract to be invalid by natural law, and as to marriage and other perpetual contracts, he says they can by no law be revoked hence. The reason is, which the others employ, because fear here does not shake liberty so that the act is not free. From which the adverse foundation falls.

From these Caspensis deduces num. 47. that things done under light fear are not to be rescinded by any law, because this action is given in law only on account of grave fear; nevertheless in the forum of conscience they can be rescinded, if the sufferer wishes.

He also infers that things done from reverential fear can be rescinded; and that he who takes gain from them is bound to restitution, because, although this fear is not grave, it is nevertheless injurious, and the cause of the act. So Navar. cap. 17. num. 152. Peter Navar. lib. 3. cap. primo, dub. 7. and others. Therefore, the contract being rescinded, he who entered it through fear will be bound to restitution. Thus a son, who, fearing his father's indignation, promised to pay his legacies, or debts, is not bound.

For a crown-piece Molina notes Tom. 2. disp. 82. put. 267. Lessius tract. 2. lib. 2. dub. 6. num. 39. Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 8. num. 7. Fagundez cap. 6. num. 13. that it matters little whether fear is instilled by the contracting party or by another third party; for the same is to be thought of both.