Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

TWO Sisters, harlots, and daughters of one Mother, are Detraction and Contumely: the one Oolla the greater, fervent and wanton; the other Ooliba the lesser, of whom Ezech. 23. Both alike in face, alike also in guilt, they run mad with the lust of calumniating, uncover the disgraces of their neighbors, and pour out upon them their malices. But detraction rages the more against the neighbor's fame, the more it lurks in secret under the lesser species of defaming, lest it betray itself by its own vice. Concerning this virulent sin, we must inquire what it is, and how manifold it is.

What Detraction is, and how manifold.

Detraction is the unjust injury and darkening of another's good fame by occult words. So D. Thomas here, where the Thomists, and D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1. toward the middle, and p. 1. Centil. sect. 13. at the end, and the little work Declaratio terminorum Theologiae.

I note, however, that occult utterance is not intrinsic to detraction, but pertains to the manner in which it is for the most part done; for if anyone imputes a secret, or false, crime to another in the presence of others, this man certainly sins also by detraction, and not by contumely alone. But it pertains to the manner of detraction that it be about an absent person, according to that, Ecclesiasticus 10: The serpent bites in silence; but he is nothing less than he that detracteth secretly, as Valencia notes, question 17. p. 1. after D. Bonaventure, cited in the first place, and this S. Thomas indicates in his reply ad 1.

The differences, or divisions, of Detractions are taken from the various ways in which one can voluntarily darken someone's fame, as is seen in D. Bonaventure in the places alleged, Adrian quodl. 11. D. Thomas here ad 3. Alensis 2. p. question 146. member 1. Sotus l. 5. on Justice, question 10. article 1. Navarrus Manual. chapter 18. number 21. Valencia in the place cited.

Detraction is divided, on the part of the will, into direct and indirect.

It is direct when one detracts in order to darken fame; indirect, when one speaks imprudently, or ignorantly, something that harms fame. So D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Mirror: the direct is called formal Detraction; the indirect, material.

Secondly it can be divided into Direct and Indirect on the part of the external act, or of the manner in which one defames another. And on this part detraction is direct, according to D. Thomas here ad 3. and D. Bonaventure in the places adduced, Centil. and of the Mirror, when one defames another by attributing to him something evil; which happens in four ways, namely, either by falsely imputing a crime to another, or by augmenting it in words; or by revealing a hidden crime, even if true; or by saying that it was done by him with an evil intention — and if this is said lightly, without proofs, it is also rash judgment, as all say with D. Bonaventure, chapter one of the Mirror of the Soul, toward the middle.

But indirect detraction, from the same chapter, is when one defames another by conducting himself in a manner undue toward the other's fame; and this in three ways, either by denying that person's good, or by maliciously keeping silence when it ought to be said, or also by diminishing it. The Gloss on Daniel 7. adds also indicating by nods, and feigning that one says it out of charity and piety — which modes are the worst; and the Gloss says these ten modes are those ten horns of the great Beast.

Whether detraction is a mortal sin.

It is most certain that direct detraction, with the intention of blackening reputation, is a mortal sin. So D. Bonaventure in the places cited, question 11; D. Thomas here, and the others commonly, as at Valencia question 17, p. 2; Fagundez book 8, chapter 1, number 8.

The Holy Doctor shows this with many testimonies of Scripture in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 71, where he shows it to be the wickedness of the impious and of the worst of men, and he gathers the gravity of this crime from the punishments inflicted by God.

Thus Numbers 14: the children of Israel detracted to their own harm from those who had brought back word of Josue and Caleb from the land of promise, proclaiming them liars and deceivers together with Moses. Numbers 16: Core, Dathan, and Abiron were swallowed alive into hell, and others were consumed by living fire.

Those who detract from Saul, 1 Kings, are called children of Belial. Absalom, 2 Kings 15, detracted from his father's government, and he was hung by God on an oak and damned.

Christ, Matthew 9, Luke 5 and 19, gravely reproached the Pharisees as they murmured, as being lost men.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, and from Luke 19, out of Wisdom 1: Keep yourselves from murmuring, which profiteth nothing, and from detraction refrain your tongue.

Then he recounts the murmurings of the people in the desert and their damnation, and adduces this from 1 Corinthians 10: Neither murmur ye, as some of them murmured, and perished by the destroyer.

The Holy Doctor proves the same in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, from that passage of Romans 1: Detractors are hateful to God, worthy of death; and not only they who do such things, but they also who consent to them.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, book 3, chapter 3, from D. Isidore, in the Synonyms, chapter 10: Detraction is a grave crime; detraction is a grave damnation.

D. Bernard, sermon 24 on the Canticle: There is one detractor who speaks, and utters but one word; yet that one word, in one moment, infects the ears of a multitude of hearers and kills their souls. And book 2 of the Considerations: To detract, or to hear a detractor — which of these is the more damnable, I should scarcely venture to say.

D. Anselm, On Similitudes, chapter 147: There are three kinds of homicide which are punished with equal penalty: the killing of men, the detraction of neighbors, and fraternal hatred. And chapter 149: It is detraction whenever anyone says anything of another with the intention that he may be the less loved or esteemed.

The reasoning of D. Bonaventure, which all follow, is in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1: to steal another's goods is a grave sin in its genus, against the seventh precept, as if you stole a neighbor's ox or money; but reputation is a more precious thing than outward riches, as is said in Proverbs 23. Therefore it is worse to detract from reputation than to steal money; whence the Holy Doctor further deduces that such a one is more bound to restitution than a thief, because he took away a greater good against justice.

Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one or two prudent men who will keep it secret.

The FIRST opinion is assertive. So Salonius, and Bannes 2. 2. question 73, article 2 — the former in controversy, the latter indeed in doubt 1 — and others, as at Sayrus book 11, chapter 6, number 12; Bonacina On Controversies, disputation 4, question 4, part 3; Malderus 2. 2, tract 7, chapter 1, doubt 4; Vega, Summa, vol. 2, chapter 8, case 12; Azorius vol. 3, book 5, chapter 9, question 2. D. Bonaventure seems so, loc. cit., in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1. So Valentia on question 73, p. 2, doubt 1; Suarez, Tomus 4, disputation 34, section 1; Filliucius, Tomus 2, tract 10, chapter 3, number 90; Molina, Tomus 2, disputation 29; Fagundez book 8, chapter 2, number 24; Sayrus book 11, chapter 6, number 11; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio, 1. number 11, who says this is the common opinion.

The OPPOSITE opinion seemed probable to Diana, p. 1, tract 17, resolution 22, citing Lessius book 2, chapter 11, number 7; Cajetan 2. 2. question 73, article 2, dist. 1; Pererius, Nauarre, book 2, chapter 4, number 335. To these Reginaldus may be added, Tomus 2, book 2, chapter 4, number 75, and others, from whom Diana deduces, resolution 24, that the hearer is not bound to correct that detractor; and Corduba also may be added, question 2, conclusion 2.

I ASSERT with the former opinion, which holds that it is a mortal sin to lay open a hidden crime even to one or another prudent man.

It is PROVED by S. Bonaventure, because the order of fraternal correction is commanded; and it commands that you do not bring before two, even prudent, superiors for amendment before secret correction. That this order is commanded I have shown in the Treatise on Charity, Disputation on fraternal correction.

It is PROVED secondly, for rash judgment about anyone is mortal, even if one single person lose his good opinion of him; and that there is parity is proved from James 4: He that detracteth from his brother, or judgeth his brother, detracteth from the law, and judgeth the law.

Bonacina ANSWERS, denying the parity, because the judge ascribes a perhaps false sin, and so infers a grave injury.

AGAINST: then to reveal a true crime is not mortal in its genus, if done indiscreetly? At last, because, as our Father Marinus used to say, greater loss is inflicted when it is told to a few prudent men than to many others who are not reckoned prudent; and Fagundez teaches so, number 24; Sayrus loc. cit. This also ceases in the disputation on Restitution.

Whether material detraction, which arises from talkativeness, is deadly.

The FIRST opinion is that material detraction, which bursts forth from lightness in speaking, or from indiscreet zeal, is not mortal. So D. Bonaventure reports it, nor did he wholly reject it, saying that it would be a rash judgment to pronounce this mortal. So in the Book of the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, about the middle: but I shall explain it below.

The SECOND opinion is that, if the loss is grave and foreseen, or inflicted through grave blameable ignorance, it is mortal. So D. Bonaventure there, who says it is common to most; D. Thomas, question 73, article 2; Salonius; Cajetan; Aragon there; Soto book 5 on Justice, question 10, article 2; Valentia disputation 5, question 17, point 2; Nauarre in the Manual, chapter 18, number 23, and on the decretal Inter verba, 11. question 3, coml. 6. coroll. 33. number 119; Sayrus in the Clavis Regia, book 12, chapter 6, number 9; Toletus book 5 of the Summa, chapter 63; Sylvester, s.v. detractio; Lessius book 2, chapter 11, on detraction, doubt 3, number 11; Fagundez book 8, chapter 2, number three; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio, 1. number 4; Diana p. 5, tract 5, resolution 69; Sylvius 2. 2. question 63, article 2.

But it WILL be venial, if he speaks from venial lightness in speaking, without advertence, or from a good and reasonable end of correcting his morals. This the second teaches, as Valentia, Salon. loc. cit., Nauarre number 30, and S. Antoninus p. 2, title 8, chapter 4; Astian. in 4. on fraternal correction; Sayrus number 9, even if something of zeal exceeds bounds.

I ASSERT first, that material detraction is venial, if it lightly blackens reputation. It is plain, because light loss is against Justice.

I ASSERT secondly, that it is mortal, if grave loss is inflicted.

It is PROVED first by D. Bonaventure, from the precept of the order of fraternal correction.

It is PROVED secondly, because if grave ignorance also follows, since you are bound not to inflict grave loss, by no means do you remove the voluntary act, whence sin results. Yet if there be some venial lightness as the cause in speaking, the effect also will already be light.

It is EXPLAINED further: for it can arise from some impulse or inadvertence, and so be venial.

Whether to keep silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal.

MARK with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., that indirect detraction can be material and formal. It will be formal, if one keeps silent, e.g. with the end of blackening reputation. It will be material, if one keeps silent from mere omission once recognized.

Yet if one keeps silent from shame or fear, the Holy Doctor does not dare define it to be mortal, unless it is a person whose office it is to correct. For such a one is bound to restitution of the good whose loss he was bound to prevent.

He PROVES therefore there that to omit, or keep silent about a good, when it ought to be said, is mortal; for as we are bound to come to the aid of the poor in grave need with sustenance, so also are we bound in goods of reputation and honor.

The Doctors dispute much here on these words, about the causes excusing from not standing against murmuration; see Molina, Tomus 5, tract 4, disputation 34; Azorius p. 3, book 13, chapter 7; Aragon. 2. 2. question 63, article 4; Sayrus book 11, chapter 9, number 37; Lessius book 2, chapter 11, doubt 4, number 21; Reginaldus, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, question 8, number 65; Peter Nauarre on restitution, book 2, chapter 4, number 337; Valentia disputation 5, question 17, p. 4; Salon. 2. 2. question 73, article 4; Soto book 5, question 10, article 4; Rebell. on the obligation of justice, p. 1, book 4, question 6; Malderus 2. 2, tract 7, chapter 1, doubt 15; Bonacina on contracts, disputation 2, question 4, p. 11, number 8; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio.

Now they warn first, with those whom Diana follows, p. 1, tract 17, resolution 24, that in doubt whether that be detraction, we are not bound to oppose it, because it can be that he justly says it, and he is in possession of a good reputation, to which you do injury by treating him as a detractor.

By this doctrine confessors drive away many scruples from fearful men; hence Diana, part 2, tract 5, resolution 35, concludes absolutely that he who hears a detractor does not sin mortally. So too Crux in the Directorium, precept 8, question 2, article 2, doubt 5, who with one voice with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., say: Whoever does not resist detraction out of fear, shame, negligence, or levity of mind, sins venially. Tanner subscribes, 2. 2. disputation 4, question 8, doubt 7, number 151, who with almost the same words of the Seraphic Doctor so resolved, with Bassaeus.

It is a sin against justice, if anyone directly approves even unjust detraction, or, worse, leads into it. Or it will be against charity, if anyone holds himself merely negatively, not impeding, unless he is bound by office either to correct the detractor or to defend another's reputation, namely because he is the superior of this or that one.

Commonly, however, not to repel detraction out of negligence, fear, or shame is held venial, unless the hearer is a superior, or perceives that grave loss will follow from the detraction, or the fear is so perverse that on its account one does not care to sin mortally. This alone seems contrary to the Seraphic Doctor, because knowingly and unwillingly, by saying that which justifies, he indirectly takes away its justification, against justice, and so is made subject to restitution together with detractors, as I said: although in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, § the second branch of envy he seems to rank this sin with that of not coming to the aid of a neighbor in grave necessity, which seems against charity, though he says nothing of it here; indeed, as I said in the disputation on almsgiving, it seems to belong to justice.

Reginaldus follows the same opinion of Diana, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, number 95, and Faber on restitution in 4, disputation 53, chapter 5, number 127.

The first is, if one tells a close friend of an injury secretly inflicted upon him by someone, in order to lessen the pain; for it is too hard, and contrary to human custom, that anyone should bear injuries alone and not be able to share them with a friend; this is lawful, not with the intention of detracting, but so that he may bear it more lightly. So Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 15. Bassaeus verb. Detractio 12. Less. lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 12. num. 72. Navar. lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 345. Molina tract. 4. disp. 29. num. 5. Layman lib. 3. sec. 3. tract. 4. parte 2. cap. 3. Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 145. and other Doctors in common, with whom Diana subscribes Tom. 3. tract. 15. resol. 32. But Ioan. de Cruz adds more in his directory, p. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3. concl. 1.

Saying: If a person gravely injured in secret, unable to restrain himself from grief, bursts forth into public complaints, he is not for that reason condemned to mortal sin, if the injurer is defamed; for it seems hard to restrain an afflicted mind so that it does not burst into complaints, since this is most natural, so says the same author, also citing Ludovicus Lopez. This is the opinion of D. Bonav. in speculo animae, cap. 1. circa medium, where he says: Yet it matters greatly whether it proceeds from envy; for sometimes it happens that the evil deeds of others are recounted, or even exaggerated, against someone out of a certain indignation, or levity of speech, without the intention of defaming him, which would be a hard judgment to call mortal.

The second case is, when someone narrates the sins of another which he has heard, and expressly asserts that he knows nothing for certain, but is only reporting what was related.

That this person sins mortally is taught by Sotus de Iust. lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 4. and in 4. disp. 15. quaest. 4. Navar. cap. 18. num. 50. Villalob. sum. tom. 2. tract. 11. dub. 36. num. 6. Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 139. Malder. tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 17. Sylvius quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 16. concl. 3. Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 10. num. 8. and others, with whom Diana subscribes Tom. 3. Tract. 5. resol. 28. The reason is, because he defames; Sylv. subscribes quaest. 4. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 4. in corpore. Caiet. there, Less. lib. 2. cap. 9. de iniuriis in corpore, dub. 16. num. 113.

Many Recent authors say this is true in the case, if the one reporting is a man of authority, so that he is believed, or because of the levity of the hearers. So Azor. p. 4. l. 13. cap. 16. Sotus loco citato Less. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 5. Salon. apud Tannetum, Layman. l. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. p. 2. cap. 3. num. 7. Ioan. de la Cruz in direct. art. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3. concl. 4. They say, however, Less. loc. cit. Nauar. Man. cap. 17. num. 71, that it is not against justice, but against charity, which Bassaeus n. 13 judges more probable with Fagundez num. 19, because here he does not defame directly, but per accidens.

Yet there are not lacking those who deny that he sins mortally, and thus hold at least the opposite opinion as probable: Tannerus loc. cit. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 33. art. 2. disp. 2. Sotus in 4. disp. 15. quaest. 4. art. 1. Sylvest. v. detractio, quaest. 4. except. 5. Armilla v. restitutio, num. 4. except. 7. Sà verbo informare, after Gabriel, Adrian, and others. And thus Faber teaches this opinion in 4. de restit. disp. 53. num. 29, and Diana judges it probable.

Tannerus adds num. 140. with Lessio dub. 5: if anyone reports in such a way that he probably thinks no one will believe it, it is not mortal; but if he thinks some will believe it out of mere idle levity, it is not against Justice, but against charity.

The Seraphic Doctor, who in speculo animae, cap. 1. et 2. relates all the modes of excusing in Confession, also appends this one. Therefore I judge that he stands for the first opinion, because, as the holy Doctor himself argues, when reputation is gravely damaged, it is enough that there be no cause; yet if these things are reported out of mere talkativeness, the holy Doctor judges it probably not mortal. But if the detraction is from malice, it will be mortal against Justice; indeed this kind of detraction is pestilential, and more colored toward defaming. So Sotus especially.

The third case, which the holy Doctor notes in speculo animae, cap. 1. §. secundus ramus invidiae, etc., is levity of matter. So Lessius l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 3. num. 11, adding that the same must be said of one revealing natural defects, such as that someone is ignorant, of weak judgment, etc.; and Petrus Nauar. l. 2. cap. 4. num. 307. with others judges the same must be said of natural defects; as if you say that someone is the son of a cleric, born of adultery, and the like; provided, however, the person is not so distinguished that to speak even lightly of him would be grave, as to be a liar. Diana subscribes p. 1. tract. 5 resol. 69. Lessius num. 14. Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 6. art. 3. dub. 3. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 2. before the fourth number. Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 156. To this he also reduces levity of mind, or talkativeness, with D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 3, understanding it by reason of indeliberateness, with Valentia quaest. 17. puncto secundo. Bassaeo, v. Detractio 1. from num. 6.

The general rule of S. Bonav. in speculo, cap. 1. et 2. attests: whenever from detraction a grave loss of reputation of itself follows, it is mortal. So Fagundez n. 4. Less. num. 15. Petrus Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 347. Filliuc. tract. 32. de restit. cap. 9. num. 230. Nauar. Summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 22. 23. 25.

THEREFORE OFTEN to speak venial things will be mortal: and conversely, to speak mortal things will not be mortal with respect to certain persons; as if you say of some young man that he has dishonorable loves; of a soldier, that he has killed, or fought a duel, or seduced a girl, or keeps a concubine. So Sotus l. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3. §. sequetur in medio. et l. 5. quaest. 10. art. 2. concl. 4. Less. l. 2. cap. 11. de detract. dub. 3. num. 17. Lopez p. 1. Instruct. cap. 285. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 66. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 73. Filliuc. tomo 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 231. Corduba de detract. quaest. 1. Fagundez l. 8. cap. 2. num. 51.

Say the SAME, if you detract by general terms, it will be only venial; as if you say someone is proud, avaricious, irascible. So Less. l. 2. cap. 11. de detract. dub. 3. num. 18. Sylvester v. detractio. Filliuc. t. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 232. D. Antonin. 2. p. tit. 8. cap. 4 Nauar. Summa, cap. 18. num. 24. Fagundez num. 6.

The reason is, because these are mostly received as defects, not defamatory, or are taken for a natural inclination. Yet it can happen that they gravely wound. Therefore prudence must be used, to discern whether they gravely defame, considering the persons, both those defamed and the hearers; and therefore confessors must employ great prudence in these matters. So Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 64. Nauar. num. 25. Less. cited above, Caiet. loc. cit. Fagundez num. 7.

MOREOVER, if one idly relates the sins of others to those whom he knows will not believe them, he will not sin, whatever those sins may be: Less. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 5. num. 24. Sotus l. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3. Nauar. cap. 18. num. 49. The reason is, because no damage follows from it. D. Bonau. senses the same above; yet if the crime were atrocious, such as Sodomy, heresy, treason, and although they would not believe it, they would nevertheless entertain some suspicion, it will be lethal, if the person is honorable. The reason is, because since he is in peaceable possession of the best reputation, it is reduced to doubt and to the grave peril of losing it. So D. Bonau. loc. cit. D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 2. in corpore, Caictanus there, Sotus l. 5. quaest. 10. art. 1. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 63. Sylvest. v. detractio, num. 2. Lessius cited above, and Fagundez num. 17.

It is STILL ASKED concerning those who write Annals, and in them recount the hidden crimes of others.

HE ANSWERS Fagundez n. 25. that they do not sin mortally, provided they do not write out of envy or hatred. This is also the mind of D. Bonau. in the place often adduced above, in speculo, cap. 1. Yet let them beware lest they brand any family, and the living, with some stain that grows squalid among posterity. So note Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 10. art. 2. Malder. tract. 7. cap. 1. Molina above. Arrian. quodl. 11. quaest. 1. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 143. Valentia quaest. 17. p. 2. for these things are not lawful.

FINALLY there are certain Astrologers who impose falsehoods upon some, and these gravely sin, as Fagundez notes num. 26.; for foolishly they assert, defaming men, things from the motion of the stars. Whence it happens that if an Astrologer, when questioned, names some thief, he is punished by municipal laws; yet one cannot bring an action of injury against him, as Leg. Item apud Labeonem, §. si quis Astrologus teaches. Therefore also by Leg. Nemo Cod. de maleficis it is provided that no one consult an Aruspex or a Mathematician, because they are impostors, and therefore to be cast out to the farthest lands, as Sotus teaches l. 5. de virtute quaest. 10. artic. 2., who nevertheless speaks of the Judiciarii, condemned by the Pontiffs, Sixtus V. and others.

The Sacred Canons condemn these detractions, extra de sortilegiis from the Penitential of Theodotus, and Alexander III. Granden. the Patriarch, apud D. Bonaventuram in Confessionali, cap. 3. periculis 37. et 38.

NOW the various modes divided in quaest. 1. must be examined.

It is MOST CERTAIN that it is never lawful to impose a false crime upon anyone; for this is most mortal in its kind. So D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1. 2. et 4. et p. 1. Centilog. sectione 13. et in 3. dist. 28. quaest. 3. et sequenti, et ad cap. 10. Eccles., where he urges that testimony of Scripture: If a serpent bite in silence, he is no better that detracteth his neighbour in secret, Eccles. 10. Do not curse the deaf, according to the exposition of D. Gregory 2. p. Pastoralis, cap. 1. admonit. 36. For to curse the deaf is to defame one who is absent and not hearing. The reason, as rehearsed by the holy Doctor, is because he unjustly takes away a good better than riches, according to Prouerb. 22: A good name is better than great riches. By which reason they commonly argue. This is the worst detraction, as the Doctors cry out in common with D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 2., whom Sayrus reports l. 11. cap. 3. num. 7. et Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 3. Therefore not even to avoid tortures, or to avert any grave evil whatsoever, is it lawful, as all Theologians teach with D. Bonau. and D. Thom., and the Canonists ad C. super eo, de usuris, et C. mihi, 22. quaest. 11. See Fagundez l. 8. cap. 5.

But it is ASKED: Whether it is ever lawful to uncover a true crime of someone.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS in speculo animae, cap. 1. §. secundus ramus invidiae; that it is possible, when an unworthy man is praised beyond his merits, and from this some deception can arise, then it does not have the nature of sin. Therefore, if we hear some secretly depraved and pernicious man, who could deceive to the ruin, whether of faith or of life; such as an Apothecary or Physician; or of conscience, such as a Confessor; or of causes, such as an Advocate, being commended, then it is lawful to uncover his depravities; but not, if someone is a hypocrite and evil only toward himself, as if someone outwardly feigns piety and inwardly is full of private sins. The Doctors consent in common: Filliuc. tomo 2. tract. 40. in octavum praeceptum, cap. 4. num. 107. Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 10. art. 2. Less. t. 1. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 10. num. 64. Petrus Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 341. Corduba quaest. 2. de detract. concl. 4. ad 2. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 65. Fagundez lib. 8. cap. 3. num. 3. Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 17. punct. 2. dub. 3. Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 2. Sayrus l. 11. cap. 6. num. 18. et the rest apud Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 144., the same author adding that when due information is inquired by reason of office, marriage, etc., provided the damage be not so enormous that the other consideration ought rather to prevail. Bassaeus subscribes, v. Detract. from num. 10.

From this it ALSO happens that one inquiring into the defects of another, in order to avoid deceptions, does not sin, for instance for marriage, for a Chair, etc. So Fagundez warns loco citato.

You will ASK secondly: Whether uncovering the sins of someone who is already defamed in some crime is a sin.

It is ANSWERED, that uncovering other sins bearing a different infamy is mortal; as, if someone is publicly a drunkard, and you report that he is a thief. So Adrian. quodl. 11. art. 1. Nauarr. Summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 42. and others apud Fagundez num. 9. and Tannetum num. 141., who add that this is true even if the crime disclosed is lesser, as if you wished to defame a homicide by theft. Yet this example indicates something greater as to belief. So also Bassaeus num. 9.

You will ASK thirdly: Whether detracting from the dead is a mortal sin.

It is ANSWERED, that it is an atrocious sin. So in common Petr. Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. a n. 351. Angelus in 4. quaest. de restit. honoris. Malderus de Iustitia t. 7. cap. 1. dub. 8. Molina disp. 28. Fagundez num. 11.

You will ASK fourthly: Whether detracting from the Religious Orders is a special fault.

It is ANSWERED first, that in these times it is dangerous to the faith, because of the heretics eager to carp at the Religious Orders, especially in chastity, which they proclaim as contested among us, judging, or impiously proclaiming, the conjugal life to be better, indeed necessary; otherwise concubinage would be had with others, whence that foul saying of the most filthy Luther l. de vita coniugali: si non vult uxor, veniat ancilla. Yet both Christ and the Apostle proclaim the celibate and virginal life servable by the help of God. And in Apoc. 14. John beheld virgins of this kind innumerable, as Fagundez disserits cap. 3. num. 13. after D. Bonav. in Diaeta salutis, tit. 10. ad finem: See Bassaeus 7.

Against these our Seraphic Doctor, the most valiant Achilles of the Church, often fought, as is seen in Libris Apologeticis contra magistrum Gulielmum, contra Magistrum innominatum in Apologia pauperum, and in other places.

These enemies and detractors of the Religious Orders, utterly hostile to the Gospel (since Christ issued the Evangelical Counsels of Chastity, Obedience, and Poverty, but these men revile them), the holy Doctor proclaims Adversaries of the Church. For the Church approved and venerates the Religious Orders; but these men reprove and spurn them.

He shows them guilty of death with a weighty testimony Deuter. 17.; for there it is prescribed: If you perceive that among you there are hard and doubtful judgments in cause of blood, etc. Thou shalt go to the priests of the Levitical race, and shalt follow their sentence, and shalt not decline to the right hand or to the left. But he that will refuse to obey the commandment of the priest who ministereth at that time to the Lord thy God, by the decree of the judge, that man shall die. Whence the holy Doctor argues: If to resist gravely, or to cry out against a shadowy Pontiff defining or decreeing, the penalty of death was deservedly imposed, how much more worthily will it be imposed upon the most unworthy, who detract from the Sacred and Apostolic sanctions of the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of God on earth? The holy Doctor proclaims such detractors of the Religious Orders, which the holy Mother Church erected, confirmed, and made firm, to be rebels and subverters of the Church. For with what face do these enemies of God proclaim as impostors those poor in spirit by voluntary choice, whom Christ Matth. 5. acclaims as blessed? Do they bark that those who for the straight road to the kingdom of heaven cut themselves off spiritually, and live most continent, and abstain from all things, that they may win the unfading crown, have wandered from the way of salvation? Lovers of Virginity do not revile marriages (says S. Bonan.) but prefer virginity with the Apostle prima Corinth. See the holy Doctor treating this matter at length.

Therefore MERITEDLY anathema was imposed upon these rotten members, detractors especially of the Orders of Sisters, of S. Dominic, and D. Francis, as Bartholomeo Medina witnesses cap. 14. fol. 184. Which excommunication is reserved to the Pope. But Petrus Nauar. notes l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 354. Sylvest. v. Excommunicatio, 7. excom. 48. Sayrus l. 4. cap. 4. num. 10. Graff. l. 2. decisionum, cap. 137. Nauar. cap. 27. num. 109. Fagundez l. 8. cap. 3. num. 14. that the excommunication does not strike those detracting privately from these Religious Orders, but those publishing libellos famosos, songs, and rhymes to the infamy of these Orders. And the same holds for all the other mendicant Orders by extension of the same privilege, as is clear from a certain privilege of Alexander IV. which begins Ex alto; and from another, which begins Non sine multa. Those, however, are bound to sing a palinode in writing.

Those, moreover, who COMPOSE famosos libellos against other persons, first sin mortally, because they gravely offend reputation, and the more gravely as the libelli remain long.

FURTHERMORE, excommunication ferendae sententiae is inflicted upon them by C. quidam malign. et C. si qui inuenti, quaest. 1. if the libelli are against Ecclesiastics; for if against laymen, by canon law they are only to be beaten with rods, C. qui in alterius, 5. quaest. 1. which penalties Pius V. renewed in Bull 147. and Gregory XIII. in Bull 7.

THEREFORE Salonius errs 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 2. controv. 2. in saying they are excommunicated ipso facto. For they are only to be excommunicated, as Sayrus notes l. 4. cap. 4. num. 10. Nauar. cap. 18. num. 35. Sylvester, verbo libellus, num. 5. Filliuc. tract. 40. n. 81. Fagundez cap. 2. num. 17.

Those, however, who find such defamatory libelli are bound to tear them up; otherwise, if they hand them to others, they fall into the same penalties, with the consenting parties.

Yet it will NOT be said that one who reads through a libellus to only one person manifests it. So Burlatus consil. 99. l. 1. num. 17. Cephal. consil. 341. l. 3. num. 28., because that is called manifest which becomes known to many, according to Bartol. in Leg. haered. palam 21. ff. de testamentis, num. 2.

Whether it is lawful to relate a crime, notorious in one place, in another place where it is not known.

We must suppose some cases, in which the difficulty about this matter is not so grave.

I SUPPOSE first, that manifesting the crime of anyone, even one already defamed, with the evil intention of gravely harming him, is mortal against charity. Thus the Doctors commonly, at Fagundez on the eighth precept of the Decalogue, cap. 4. n. 3., with St. Bonaventure, cap. 1. and 4. of the Speculum animae, where he often insists that the malice consists in the intention of harming.

I SAY second. If someone formerly defamed has now recovered his reputation, it will be mortal to defame him again by renewing the memory of the crime. Thus the Doctors commonly, at Fagundez num. 4.; Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 143., although Lessius, l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 13., says it is only against charity.

I SAY third. If someone is defamed in one place and has not repaired his reputation, it is not mortal to relate his crime in another place, where his reputation must soon be carried. Thus Tanner, disput. 4. quaestione 8. num. 142.; Fagundez, numer. 9., citing Malderus, de Iustitia tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 6.; Toledo, l. 5. cap. 63; Peter de Navarra, lib. II. cap. IV. num. 295; Lessius, lib. II. cap. XI. de tract. dub. 18. num. 78; Aragon, Bauny, Valencia; and others, to be cited below, who hold that it is not mortal to relate it even in an alien place, where the reputation was not to be carried. The same say Tannerus, and many at his place: if anyone publishes the sentence of a Judge in even the most remote place, it is not a sin. But about this there is a great question.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is a mortal sin, at least against CHARITY, to relate some crime in a place where reputation would never arrive. In this sentiment are the Doctors commonly, at Diana, part. III. tract. V. resol. 17.; Lessius, lib. II. cap. XI. dub. 13. num. 28.; Sayrus, lib. V. quaest. X. art. II.; Villalobos, tom 1. tract. XI. diffic. 6. num. 13.; Faber, in IV. disp. 53. n. 130.; Salon, 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. II. controv. 18.; Navarrus, lib. II. cap. IV num. 288.; Sayrus, lib. XI. cap. IX. n. 25.; Malderus, 2. 2. tract. VII. cap. I. dub 6.; Adrian, quodl. XI., and very many others at the places cited, with Toledo, lib. V. c. 65.; Tanner, disp. IV. quaest. VIII num. 142.; Bassaeus, V. Detractio, 1. num. 10.

The SECOND opinion denies that it is mortal. Thus Fagundez, on the eighth precept of the decalogue, lib. VIII. cap. IV. from num. 11. (a passage Diana cites wrongly.) The same think Cajetan, tom. II. opusc. 31. respons. 9.; Navarrus, summa, cap. XVIII. num. 26.; Maior, in IV. dist. XXI. quaest. II.; Azor, part. III. lib. XIII. dub. 8.; Filliucius, tom. II. tract. 32. cap. IX. num. 255.; Diana, loc. cit.; and Nangus, 3. part. tract. I. quaest 80. art. VI. diffic. 3., judges it probable.

The REASON is, because when crimes are notorious, the authors of them have lost their right to reputation; and if they have lost it by the sentence of a judge, it is a punishment, as is supposed, just, inflicted by judges, who intend that it be known by all.

For truly, if a crime has been committed in some house, it will not be lawful to sound the trumpet through the streets and squares, and that will be mortal against justice. Soto, lib. V. de Iustitia quaest. X. art. II.; Malderus, de iustitia tract. VII. cap. I.; Fagundez, num. 10.

The REASON is, because he is not deprived of right by law, even if some rumor had broken out; and indeed a broad way would be opened to detractions.

I SUPPOSE, that what is revealed in confession can never be told, even with death otherwise imminent. But SECRET crimes revealed to me in secret outside confession for the public harm, I can tell to the Judge, without danger even of irregularity, on account of a death about to follow someone, provided I protest that I denounce them to guard against evils without shedding of blood. Thus many Doctors at Fagundez lib. VIII. cap. V. num. 5.

But in the question proposed, they commonly affirm that a crime known in secret outside confession can be revealed, if grave loss impends over an innocent neighbor, provided a fraternal correction has gone before, if that is hoped to be of profit. Thus St. Thomas 2. 2. q. 70. art. I. ad 2., and many others at Fagundez cap. VI. num. 7.; Bassaeus, V. Reus, num. 8.

Then they say that it is lawful, in order to avoid tortures and other grave evils, to tell an occult sin that has been heard, even if the death of the perpetrator follows. Thus Lessius lib. II. cap. XI. de detract. dub. 8. from num. 54.; Fagundez num. 9.; and Tanner indicates it, num. 149., with others.

But he WARNS first, that care must be taken not to include the secrets of Princes, whose revelation brings grave evils: Thus he admonishes with many others.

He ADDS second, that otherwise a private secret is not to be revealed, if it has been received by force and fraud. The same teach Sotus lib. V. quaest. X. art. II.; Sayrus lib. XI. c. 3.; Navarrus summa cap. 28. num. 54. Moreover, that to reveal a secret without cause is mortal, St. Thomas the Doctor teaches in the Speculum animae, cap. primo, §. Machinatio, at the end.

They DISPUTE here about the opening of letters. They ANSWER that to open letters without grave cause — for instance, a probable opinion that snares are being laid for oneself in them — is mortal, if you recognize with probability that they contain a grave matter; but not if you open ordinary letters out of levity. See Fagundez cap. IX. at the end.

I indeed judge the opening of letters to be a most grave matter, since the confidence of human intercourse between the absent is destroyed, the peace of the Republic is disturbed, enmities are aroused. And since it must always be presumed that letters are sent for weightier causes, they are not to be opened except rashly.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is deadly to defame oneself without cause. Thus Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. II., and in the summa, v. Detractio. St. Antoninus, 3. part. tit. 8. cap. IV. §. 1.; Angelus, V. detractio, §. ult.; Sylvester, num. 4., who excuse two cases, when it is done out of fear of death; but Valencia, diff. cit. quaest. 17. puncto 2., says it is against CHARITY, which Malderus too thinks probable, tract. VII. cap. I. dub. 10.; but Turrianus, 2. 2. Tom. II. disput. 54. num. 11., says it is mortal against magnanimity. Tannerus also, disp. IV. quaest. VIII. num. 148., and others at his place.

The SECOND opinion is, that to defame precisely oneself is not mortal. Thus St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 57. art. IV., and quaest. 58. art. II.; Couar. lib. I. var. cap. II.; Toletan. lib II. de restit. cap. IV. part. 2. lib. I. num. 123., and part. 3. disp. I. num. 366.; Molina tract. IV. disp. 37.; Lessius lib. II. cap. XI. disp. 6.; Maldet. tract. VII. cap. I. disp. 10.; Sayrus lib. XI. cap. III. num. 33.; Filliucius tom. II. tract. 40. cap. IV. n. 123.; Tolet. lib. V. cap. 66.; Sotus lib. V. quaest. X. art. II.; Navar. sum. cap. XVIII.; Adrian. in IV. de restit. famae, q. 35.; Fagundez in VIII. praeceptum, lib. VIII. cap. VIII.

The SERAPHIC Doctor seems to me constant for the first opinion, lib. IV Pharetrae, cap. 47., where he shows the necessity of good fame from the Fathers.

St. GREGORY in the Register, lib. VII. Ind. II. cap. II., says: Whatever can weigh down either your opinion or your soul, refuse it altogether, and consent to commit yourself to it by no one's persuasion. The same, lib. XXVI. moral. cap. 23.: He tortures the just when his [honor] is wounded, exalts the wicked: but while he tortures the just, he purifies them.

St. AUGUSTINE, de moribus, et vita clerici serm 53.: With the help of the Lord our God we ought to guard both our life and our reputation, so that those who praise us do not blush before detractors. And de bono viduitatis, cap. XXII.: In all the spiritual delights which the unmarried enjoy, their holy conversation must also be cautious, lest perhaps, although their life is not evil through wantonness, their reputation be evil through negligence.

And a little later: Our life is necessary to us; our fame to others, and whatever we mercifully minister to others for salvation, redounds also to our own utility.

See also what is related in C. Noli, 12. quaest. 1.: He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation, is cruel. And l. 1. de civit. cap. 10.: No less guilty is he who admits a false crime about himself than if about his neighbor.

St. Jerome, epist. 2. ad Nepotianum: Beware of all suspicions, and whatever can probably be feigned, avoid beforehand that it not be feigned. And epist. 11. ad Agetuch.: Flee persons in whom there can be suspicion of evil conversation: nor have ready that saying of the street-corner. My conscience suffices me: I care not what men say of me. And certainly the Apostle provided good things not only before God, but also before men, lest through him the name of God be blasphemed among the nations.

And epist. 9. ad Salvian.: The fame of chastity in women is a tender thing, like a most beautiful flower, which quickly withers in a light breeze and is corrupted by a light gust.

St. Bernard, serm. 46. in Cant.: They who are placed over others must be strong and constant, who, spreading everywhere the good odor of their faith and conversation, can say with the Apostle: We are the good odor of Christ to God in every place.

And in sermon 71.: Virtue indeed will be joined with the whiteness of conscience, where the odor of fame cannot follow it; nor will it suffice to excuse the blemish of a discolored conscience; yet a man of good virtue will always provide, as far as in him lies, not only before God, but also before men.

And de considet. l. 3.: It concerns your perfection to avoid both evil things and equally evil appearances: in the one you consult your conscience; in the other, your fame. Be strong in faith, comely in glory, and you have proved yourself an imitator of God. Your strength is the faith of your conscience: and your comeliness is the splendor of good opinion. Such is St. Bernard.

Nor indeed are these simple admonitions, as Fagundez thinks, num. 4., but precepts for guarding against grave evils. Indeed, from this an occasion of scandal is given, a way is opened to sins, when a man of good reputation is heard to fall most disgracefully; but the rules must be taken from what usually follows. Usually also fame is necessary, as in a Father of a family, a Lord, a Pastor, etc.; usually it redounds to others, as to a family. Therefore the adversaries are forced to give many exceptions.

They object. Everyone is the Lord of his own reputation, as of his own goods.

It is answered with St. Bonaventure in the Speculum animae, cap. 1., by denying the parity; for, as is said in Proverbs 28., reputation is of a higher order.

They object secondly that of Matth. 23., where we are commanded not to seek the first places.

I answer; It is one thing not to seek the first places, and another to defame oneself, as the holy Doctor deduces from the authorities cited.

They ask here: Whether, in order to avoid tortures, someone can confess a grave crime that is false and imposed upon us, which they wish to extort by torments.

Many say many things at Fagundez l. 8. cap. 9., and Tanner num. 149.

First I say, that one cannot impose a false crime upon oneself. Cajet., 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 2.; Armill. and Sylvester, v. detract. num. 4.; St. Antonin., 3. p. tit. 8. cap. 4. §. 1.; Valencia, disp. 5. quaest. 17. punct. 2. The same judge those who teach that he who has imposed a false crime upon himself is bound to retract it in the place of execution. Thus the Abbot, in cap. ex parte 2. num. 2. de sepulturis.; Felin., C. causam, num 7.; Archid., 2. p. tit. 11. cap. 21. §. 3.; Socin., in repetit. C. Ad audientiam; Sanches, Tom. 1. Decal. l. 3. cap. 7. num. 12.

It is proved, because no one is the Lord of his own life.

Wherefore the opinion of Fagundez does not seem proven to me, num 2., who cites other Doctors, num. 9.; nor that of Tanner, who cites Valencia, Soto, Navarrus, and Lessius for the opposite opinion, which he subscribes to, holding that one can impose upon oneself a false defaming crime.

He asks also in cap. 10.: Whether a man, in dispensations that are sought from the Supreme Pontiff, is bound to defame himself by manifesting an occult coupling with an affine or blood-relative.

He answers that nowhere in the law is there a precept of explaining such a coupling and defaming oneself; but it is more probable that one is bound by the decree of the Congregation of the most Eminent Cardinals upon the Council of Trent, sess. 24. cap. 5., and this is the style of the Roman curia; for the style of the curia makes law, C. in causis, C. ex litteris de constitut., and C. quam gravi de crimine falsi. And for this he reports many Doctors. Mascard. vol. 3. de probat. consil. 1312. num. 21.