Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused
Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal
Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven
Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime semiplenely proved.
A semiplene proof is the testimony of one witness above every exception, as all confess. The Gloss on C. in omni, where it cites many laws.
Nor does a denunciator suffice, because no one is a competent witness in his own cause, L. Nullus ff. de testibus. But what Sotus observes from Matth. 18., where the one correcting is bidden to take with him one or two, and it is added: That in the mouth of two or three witnesses, etc., is not pressing; for there the mere salvation of the corrected one is intended: If he hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother; and in these subtleties even Less. has been deceived, l. 2. cap. 30., and Fagundez, in octavum Praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 39. num. 14.
The first opinion is that not only a semiplene proof suffices, but even something less, such as indications, or at least presuppositions, or even suspicions. So Bess. tit. de exam. reorum, num. 6. and Carthar. in praxi interrog. Reorum, l. 1. cap. 2. But Clarus, quaest. 20., says that grave indications suffice for examining a person reputed as an Accused. They will assert the same thing much more strongly, saying that indications which do not amount to a semiplene proof suffice not only for questioning but even for torturing the accused.
GLOSS on Leg. cum probatio, ff. de probat; which there Bald. and Salicet. followed, and with them held it Albertus, Alex., Angel., Aymo Blan., Bossius, Castrensis, and Corneus, who testifies of the common view, also Conrad., Gomez, Mascard., and very many others, whom Farinac. quaest. 36. num. 218. reports; but in this matter of torture he does not follow them, as is clear at num. 224.
To this first opinion Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. seems to lend favor, and D. Thomas himself there, while they say that in a process by denunciation or accusation fame suffices for questioning the accused. And yet in criminal matters fame does not prove semiplenely, according to Decianus, Bertran., Saccum, Clarus quaest. 21., Baldus, Bero, Butrium, Abb., Felinus, Imola; and so Blancus, Bonacos., Crass., Duen. testify of the common view, whom Farinac. quaest. 47. num. 59. follows, where, citing several others, he brings forward a decision of the Roman Rota in corroboration, before Rebufferio decis. 82. p. 1. The same at last Nauar. murmurs, in Rubr. de iud. numero 25.
THE SECOND opinion, acclaimed with great applause, is that a semiplene proof suffices for questioning the Accused, that is, one given by the deposition of a single ocular witness above every exception, or by indications of equal force. That the Jurists, the Theologians, and all the Summists concur in this, and triumph without controversy, Philippus de Bictis de Reo, quaest. 80. loudly proclaims; and Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 4. num. 72. says it is common in criminal matters not excepted.
THIS is the opinion of D. Thom., 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 1., and of all the Thomists. So Caietanus, Salonius, Bannes, Aragon. there; Alphonsus de Vega in Summa T. 2. cap. 89. casu 1.; Ledes. in Summa, tomo 2. tract. 8. cap. 24. concl. 2.; Turrian. 2. 2 t. 2. disp. 50. dub. 2.; Pistigian. in pract. crimin. p. 1. cap. 7.; Sotus de iust. l. 5. quaest. 6. art. 2.; Corduba in qq. l. 1. quaest. 43. dub. 3.; Azor p. 3. l. 13. cap. 25. quaestio 5.; Sayrus in Clau. reg. l. 12. cap. 16.; Valentia T. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 13. punct. 1.; Sylvest. v. accusatio, quaest. 13. et v. confessio delicti, quaest. 1.; Navar. in Man. cap. 18. num. 57. et cap. 25. num. 36. et C. inter verba, dist. 21. quaest. 3. concl. 6. corol. 50.; Tolet. l. 5. Instruct. Sacerd. cap. 58.; Tabiena et Sà v. Testis.; Gabr. dist. 15. quaest. 6. art. 2.; Henricus quodl. 1. quaest. 33.; Palud. dist. 19. quaest. 4.; Couar. qq. pract. quaest. 6.; Gomezius t. 2. cap. 12., cited by Sayrus, loc. cit.; and Lessius, to be cited below; and Sylvester in 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 4. upholds it; Homob. tract. de stat. p. 2. cap. 4.; Miranda in l. ordin. Iudic. t. 2. quaest. 19. art. 8.; Aldret. de Relig. discipl. l. 1. tom. 1. num. 5. et l. 1. cap. 4. num. 8. et 24.; Cruz in Direct. p. 1. praecep. 8. art. 3. dub. 8. conclus. 2.; Clarus quaest. 20.; Graff. l. 3. decis. cap. 7.
Yet this opinion does not swallow up everyone, as our Bictus boasts; for Ioannes Valerius in diss. utriusque fori, diff. 49., Villalob. in Summa, tomo 2. tract 16. diff. 1. num. 10., Ioseph a S. Maria in Tribun. Relig. tract. 4. cap. 14. num. 5., Filliuc. tomo 2. tract. 40. num. 266. steadily maintain that a semiplene proof does not suffice for questioning the Accused; and, calling their own opinion the more probable, some on the opposing side imply this one to be probable: Less. de iust. l. 2. cap. 31. dub. 3. num. 18.; Navar. de rest. l. 2. cap. 4. num. 142.; Rodr. t. 2. qq. 19. art. 4.; Salzed. tract. crim. Piaz. cap. 128.; Malder. 2. 2. t. 6. cap. 3. sect. 3. Finally it is taught by Sancius, Select. disp. 43.; Petri. de relig. subd. l. 1. quaest. 1. cap. 16.; Octavian Spatarius in praxi crim. t. 9. cap. 7. et seq., saying ardently that it is practiced throughout the whole world in all courts, that by this right the Accused be permitted to use it short of a full proof, where a most grave punishment is imminent. Bassaeus v. Reus, num. 4., together with Reginald. t. 2. l. 24. cap. 3. sect. 3. and others, mildly follows him, whom Diana p. 1. tract. 15. resol. 27. praises, proclaiming that opinion most probable and safe in practice.
To all these I subscribe. Wherefore confessors ought not to force penitents to confess, if they have hope of escaping death, mutilation, the galleys, confiscation, or some grave disgrace, as Sà admonishes. But the more do I adhere to this opinion, since I see that it accords with the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, who even supplies an argument for this opinion.
He therefore says, in 4. dist. 17. p. 2. art. 1. quaest. 1. in corpore, that to confess one's sins to men is not dictated by nature, except in a general way, insofar as nature dictates that one must be reconciled to God by all the means instituted by the Divine majesty; and ad 4. he says that the accusation and disclosure of one's own sin for one's salvation is conformable to nature, if it be necessary by the institution of God, just as the disclosure of a wound, even in a shameful part, for the necessary remedy is conformable to nature; but that otherwise it is in accord with nature to blush and not disclose one's crime.
AND if it were for condemnation, it would be against nature; but by divine necessity it profits, that glory be given to God, according to that Iosue 7. Da gloriam Deo, confitere quid feceris (Give glory to God, confess what thou hast done), which he had also said, the foundation being 4. and in confessionali, cap. 1. particula 5. Now the confession which Josuë demanded from Achan was when the theft was already made known before the people by lots, a divine miracle revealing it. Therefore S. Bonavent. everywhere infers that, by Divine decree, that confession from Achan was established, required, and extorted; otherwise he would not have been bound. Wherefore the Clavis Regia ineptly brings forward this passage, that it may conclude that it is lawful absolutely to extort a confession from an accused person.
From these things is drawn a most valid reason, which the authors of our opinion extol in Diana. That which is against nature is not to be done, unless God establish honesty in it and command it; but to deliver oneself to death, or to grave loss of life, or indeed even of honor and possessions, is against nature; nor is God found to have commanded that we disclose our hidden sin, from which our ruin would flow: Ergo. Let them then find for themselves the law of God compelling to this, as it had to be found for sacramental confession of hidden sins (as D. Bonaventure says), and the more is it required, the graver this confession is.
ALL the adversaries answer in droves that the Judge has from God the power of judging, as is said, Rom. 13. et Sap. 6. et Psalm. 2.; and therefore, since a matter not juridically presented cannot be judged, he can question, and the accused is bound to obey him as a superior; nor can it be that the Judge have the power of questioning and the Accused the power of keeping silent; otherwise there will be a war just on both sides. This is the Achilles of the adversaries. This venerable asylum.
Yet it is an unwarlike defense. For first I say that, since the sin is in the knowledge of one witness, it is not yet public but hidden, as is gathered from C. Inquisitionis, de accusat. Therefore the Accused is questioned against the law of nature.
FURTHER, it is not repugnant that there be a war just on both sides, just as it is lawful for the Judge to forbid a condemned man under the last punishments to flee, and the Accused can flee, as Pesantius notes, quaest. 77. quaest. unica, and the precept in such a case can be judged given for terrifying the Accused. So Sancius, Reginaldus, Lessius, and others in Diana. For no one is bound to furnish arms against himself for his own killing, or to deprive himself of his goods, or to throw himself into prison.
In the same way, however, they do who disclose their sin when it is not fully proved: and indeed, as long as there is hope of escaping, it is safest to keep this precept, which scarcely one in a thousand would wish to observe, because it is against the dictate of nature; but human precepts ought to be conformable to the law of nature, not above it or against its powers.
MOREOVER no one in criminal matters is bound, or can be compelled, to testify against his kinsmen, as is clear from Leg. 4. ff. de Testibus, when the truth can be had otherwise, as Lazarius Papiensis teaches, lib. de quaest. canon. sect. 3. quaest. 11., and Rodriquez, T. 1. Summae cap. 69., except in a cause of faith, or on account of the good of the Republic, or of the Prince. But who is more akin to me than I am to myself? Nor say that the law speaks of hidden crimes. For it is against it, otherwise there would be no benefit of the law toward kinsmen; for indeed even strangers cannot be compelled to disclose hidden crimes.
FOR these reasons, according to others also, the Accused is not bound at least to answer for the avoiding of a grave temporal punishment; nevertheless, if the questioning be for a spiritual punishment, such as irregularity, excommunication, or interdict, which are easily removed and are rather medicines than punishments, it is otherwise. For this they bring forward Abbas, in cap. cum super, de confess.; Angelus, v. confessio delicti; Sylvest., v. delicti confessio quaest. 1.; Armilla, ibi, quaest. 8.; Alcozer., Summae cap. 16. §. et reo; Lessius, l. 2. cap. 31. dub. 3. num. 16.; Filliuc., tract. 40. in octavum Praeceptum Decal. cap. 9. num. 266.; Sà, v. reus.; Petrus Navar., l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 136. Also Navar. is cited, C. Inter verba, coroll. 64. num. 733.; Vega, Summae cas. l. 5. casu 603.
FINALLY Fagundez also judges it most probable, in octavum praeceptum Decal. l. 8. cap. 31. a num. 11., and Bictus does not reject it, quaest. 81. num. 21.; who adds, num. 25., that even one convicted can deny the external fact, if it be not criminal, as when he killed a man thinking it to be a wild beast. So also others with Diana, 3. p. Tract. 5. resol. 66.
The opposing arguments collapse in four words, saying that, even given that the Judge use his right to question, and the Accused use his right to save his life, etc., and hence a war can be waged and carried on justly on both sides by reason of probability; nevertheless the right of nature to preserve life is stricter than that of obeying the Judge, because the former is merely natural; the latter, however, is mixed with human law, or with power and human law compelling to confession.
But as to what they infer, that shortly the places will be filled with evildoers, as is gathered from C. cum dilecti, de accusat. et cap. 2. de confession. — I say that this follows per accidens, for the wicked are not to be extirpated for any reason whatsoever, but by the best right.
Much less, however, is the Accused bound — indeed even a witness — to confess, if there be doubt whether the inquiry is juridical. So commonly in Baffaeo.