Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
INQUISITION is the third mode of proceeding, distinct from accusation and denunciation, while the two former are often exercised separately; often also they are, as it were, the handmaids of the latter, since they follow it in order better to inquire into the crime: That this mode of proceeding is lawful no one skilled in canon law doubts, since various texts there plainly intimate it, as C. qualiter et quando 2. de accusat. C. inquisit. eodem, as P. Elizzus has it, tract. 2. de modo proced. quaest. 1. num. 3., where he also gathers the authors. The reason is public security, upon which the Judge has undertaken the burden of providing, which he cannot discharge unless he also inquire into offenses; and when an end is enjoined upon anyone, the means of attaining that end are commanded to him.
FURTHERMORE, it falls to the Judge by a stronger right to inquire than to the Plaintiff to act; for that concerns more the substance of the judgment; but the laws command the Plaintiff to put forward an action, as P. Elizzus has it, tract. 2. ubi supra; and he proves it in tract. 1. quaest. 10. num. 14.
Whether however it is lawful also by civil law or by custom in the secular court is disputed before the same Elizzus num. 4.; see him.
From these, Inquisition is defined as a certain lawful investigation, which the Judge carries out ex officio, inquiring into some crimes, or into some offender laboring under the infamy of a crime, intending primarily his amendment. Thus Iodoc in pract. crim. tit. de Inquis. cap. 8., Clar. §. fin. quaest. 3., Farinac. quaest. 1. num. 3., Rodriquez Tract. de Ordinario, cap. 2.; and it is plain from C. qualiter, et quando, 2. de accusat.
INQUISITION, moreover, is twofold. The first is general, in which, the offender being uncertain, it is generally inquired, who committed the offense? Particular is that which is done specially against some person.
A GENERAL, or most general, inquisition, of which in C. perniciosa, de off. Ord. and C. Trident. sess. 7. cap. 7. et sess. 24. cap. 3., can be made in Visitations without preceding infamy, according to cap. Romana, §. sane, de censibus in 6. and C. Trident. cap. 8. et 20. de reform. sess. 7.; and Bonac. notes this, citing others, de praeceptis decal. disp. 10. quaest. 2. p. 5., Fagundez in octavum Praeceptum decal. lib. 8. cap. 46. num. 7., where he says it is the common view of the Doctors, except Alciato cap. 1. de off. ordin. num. 5.
IN this inquisition, however, one cannot inquire about Peter or Titius; or whether he committed such or such an offense, but only, who offended in such a matter, or in such. Thus Rodriquez tract. de ord. iudic. cap. 2., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 19., Angel. v. Inquis. §. 1., Sylvest. ibi, quaest. 4., Sotus l. 1. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 5. concl. 5. et relect. de reg. secreto, quaest. 6. membr. 2., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 12. controv. 6., Aragon. and Bannes ibidem., Navar. Man. Lat. cap. 18. num. 38., Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 14. p. 1., Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 4. num. 74. It is gathered expressly from C. qualiter, et quando, dist. 2. and C. cum oporteat. And C. Inquisitionis, de accusat. and C. Heli, de simonia, and C. Deus omnipotens, dist. 2. quaest. 1.
IT IS PROVED by these authorities in Fagundez num. 9., many from St. Bonaventure, from that Genesis 18., where the Lord awaited the cry of the Pentapolitans, and soon says: I will go down and see whether the cry that comes to me has been fulfilled in deed.
IT IS PROVED secondly by St. Bonaventure ad 16. Lucae, that parable of the steward who was defamed, because he had wasted the goods; for he is not called to singular examination before a clamorous defamation. For this reason, because he neglected his reputation, he merited to be called to question by severe inquisition.
IT IS PROVED thirdly by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 10. cap. 3.; for the Lord did not proceed to the inquisition of fratricide against Cain until he heard the voice of his brother's blood crying out and invoking the justice of God. The Pontiff relies on this testimony in the said cap. qualiter, et quando.
IT IS PROVED fourthly by St. Bonaventure ad 3. Ioan., from the act of Christ, who tolerated Judas as long as he could hope for his amendment; and because the crime was still secret, he corrected him so as if between himself alone; for none of the disciples understood. The Pontiff determines the same, C. si quis potestatem 23. quaest. 4., where it is said: It is not for a judge to condemn without an accuser, as neither did Christ cast off Judas.
HENCE, although a Judge may know of an offense of his subject, of which there is no public judgment, nor clamorous intimation, or scattered rumor; but it is still altogether hidden; and he even knows that three or four witnesses know of it; he cannot inquire into it specially by the way of particular inquisition in order to punish him. Thus Innocent III declares expressly, C. Inquisitionis de accusat. §. Tertia dubitatio ibi: It does not suffice for inquiring specially against someone not defamed, even if two or three sworn witnesses, even greater by exception, assert that they saw the man commit that offense; and this is the practice of the whole world, as Farinac. testifies, quaest. 9., and others cited by him. For an accuser is necessarily required to punish anyone, or clamorous intimation, and such indications as take the place of an accuser and virtually accuse, as the Fiscal and the promoter of justice, who is bound ex officio to accuse, and who even in conscience cannot accuse unless what he can prove, and unless sufficient indications precede. This truth Cajetan hands down, 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 1. et 2., Sotus relect. de teg. secr. membr. 2. quaest. 6., Navar. in C. inter verba, 11. quaest. 3. concl. 6. coroll. 48. num. 579., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controv. 6., Aragon. quaest. 67. art. 3., Valentia disput. 5. quaest. 14. p. 1., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 200., Rodriquez de ord. iud. cap. 3. num. 4., Fagundez l. 8. cap. 46. num. 10., Tanner. loc. cit.
BUT if a general inquisition is made into crimes, a particular one cannot be made about Peter or Paul, unless they labor under infamy, as Cajetan teaches, 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 1. et 2., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 22., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controv. 7., Sotus de seg. secr. membr. 2. quaest. 6., Palud. 4. dist. 19., Adrian. quodl. 11., Aragon. ibi disp. 2., Ioannes ibi disp. 10., Valentia, and Tanner. with Rodriguez above.
It is proved, because one is presumed good while he does not labor under infamy; and therefore a grave injury is inflicted upon him by inquiring whether he is a wrongdoer.
And the same follows, if some crime has been perpetrated, and Peter does not labor under infamy, one cannot inquire in particular whether he is the perpetrator. Thus the Doctors cited; suppose, for instance, that the corpse of the slain lies in the road. And this alone the Doctors cited wish, Cajet. and Adrian., as cited by Diana p. 1. tract. 13. resol. 63. Sotus alone refuses it. Yet one may inquire in genus: Who committed it? and hunt for indications; for example, who passed through there at that time? whether armed? whether in haste and fleeing? and from those indications proceed to the person who has begun to be defamed. Thus the Doctors commonly, Rodriq. num. 5., Sayrus num. 21., Sotus de teg. secr. membr. 2. quaest. 6., Nauarrus C. inter verba, concl. 6. correl. 46. num. 214., Corduba Summa, quaest. 64. p. 1., Petrus Nauar. l. 1. de restit. cap. 4. num. 154., Aragon. loc. cit., Fagundez num. 18., Malderus 2. 2. Tract. 6. cap. 1. disp. 119., Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 14. diff. 7., Valentia, and Diana loc. cit., Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 70. art. 1. disp 2., Sà under the word Iudiciales actus §. de modo procedendi, Salonius controv. 7., Tabiena, v. Inquisitio, §. 8.; and of this opinion was also St. Thomas, as Sylvester reports, v. corrept. quaest. 8. St. Bonaventure seems to think the same, serm. 3. in decem praecepta, where he teaches that this is to be observed as to substance, in the purgation which was made by oath by the nearer population, when a corpse was found whose killer was unknown, after inquiry had been made about the killer and he had not been found.
BUT this has been introduced by custom, that in such a case one proceeds without an accuser; yet a custom, lawfully prescribed, can take away or limit positive law, C. ult. de consuetudine, et Leg. de quibus, ff. de Legibus; and Innocent says this is observed in the whole world in C. Bona memoriae, and the Canonists in C. Inquisitionis, and Diana p. 2. Tract. 15. resol. 63., where he cites many.
Yet neither will the accused be bound at once to betray himself; for, although the Judge has the right of interrogating witnesses, he does not yet have the right of interrogating the accused, whether he is the one, except after it has been sufficiently proved, as I shall say in the following question.
But if only one knows the Offender, he is not bound to betray him, as Sayrus notes, l. 12. cap. 10. num. 26., Fagundez num. 20.; then, however, they say he is bound to confess, when there are several who know the crime.
I add, that if someone is defamed of one crime and not of another, one may inquire only about that of which there is infamy.
BUT here it is necessary to explain what it is to be defamed of some crime, or clamorously defamed. Infamy is the frequent voice of good and honest men, which renders a man suspect of such a crime. It is said, the voice of good men, to exclude rumor even among the wicked. It is said, of such a crime, so that it is implied that one cannot inquire about another. Thus Cajet. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 1., Sotus l. de iust. quaest. 6. art. 2., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 12. Whence Sotus rightly inveighs against magicians or soothsayers, who by diabolical art inquire into the crimes of others, and he sharply reproaches those judges who, from their utterances, inquire into something in particular against anyone. The same the Pontiffs gravely rebuke in St. Bonaventure, in confessionali, cap. 3. particula 37. et 38.; and against proceeding with such, he notes ex dist. 26. quaest. 5. Non oportet, si quis Episcopus.
THIS infamy, however, Beia says, casu 32., with the experts of both laws, must be proved by at least two witnesses, who depose that they heard it so publicly, or that it is so said everywhere, as Lessius also says, cap. 29. dub. 16.
The other conditions required for proving fame Delrius recounts, l. 5. sect. 5., citing many jurists who say they never saw a process in which fame was proved by statute.
The Doctors, however, labor in assigning a necessary number of men for proving infamy; the Canonists in C. Inquisitionis, de accusat. teach that the number of ten is necessary. See Tannerus, saying from the common view num. 76. that the greater part of the people or parish is required.
Truly nothing is defined by law, as Sotus notes, l. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 2. concl. 6. et relect. de teg. secr. membr. 2. quaest. 6. disp. 3., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 13., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controv. 1., Fagundez l. 8. cap. 46. num. 26. Thus it is left to the judgment of the prudent man. Clamorous intimation is the voice of the people, or public rumor among many about such a crime outside of court, as Baffaeus says, v. Indicium publ. num. 4.
As to the indications, or circumstances, they must gravely indicate the fact, as St. Thomas notes, quaest. 69. art. 2., Cajetan, and Salon. there, Sotus l. 5. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 2., Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 13. p. 2., Sayrus l. 12. cap. 10. num. 13.; such as, if one is found naked in bed with a naked woman, they gravely indicate the crime of fornication. If someone is caught with a drawn, bloodstained sword beside the slain, and the like, they indicate homicide.
Now if one begins to name someone as guilty of an offense, that naming will open the way to inquiring specially against the one named, that is, to taking against him other informations: Thus Farinac. quaest. 1. num. 49., Innocent. above, who says the whole world observes this by custom, Bart. in Leg. 2. §. si publico, num. 9. ff. de adult., Baldus in Leg. edita Cod. de eden. and others cited by Clatus, §. fin. quaest. 5., Aretin. in C. cum oportet, num. 44. de accusat. and Nauar. rubric. de Iudice, post numerum 88., where he says the opinion of Innocent has been received in theory and practice: Thus also Tannet num. 79., Lessius cap. 89. disp. 15. numero 124.
Yet Philippus de Bictis notes, quaest. 11. primum testem, that the one who names the offender is held as a denunciator, with Deciano resp. 93. num. 125.; therefore, since the denunciator does not prove, and against Judges acting to the contrary Dettas exclaims, conf. 251. n. 103., and Guez follows, defens. 29. cap. 2. num. 18.
Bictis adds, that if someone, juridically interrogated, unduly reveals a hidden author, the judge may nevertheless proceed to a special inquisition against the one detected, according to Nauar. rubr. de ind. num. 87.; Franciscus Arretinus does not object, in pract. cap. 13., nor Less. de iustitia, et iure lib. 2. cap. 29. dub. 15., where against Sotus he holds that the judge not only may, but is bound to proceed; Thomas a Iesu and Lezana concur, tract. 1. cap. 27. num. 4. The reason is, because the Judge uses his own right, since the crime is already public, even though impiously detected; provided, however, that the informer is not the cause of that impiety.
Yet this opinion is false, as Bouerius notes in Direct. p. 2. cap. 4. v. 3., who with Soto, Navarro, and Sayrus judges it better, in the proposed case, to abstain from proceeding.
Hence I wish to examine the doctrine of Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 4. num. 73. in the way of judicial denunciation; when no witness is produced, a general inquisition indeed can be instituted; but neither the Accused, nor others about the Accused, can be interrogated specifically, unless perhaps in place of an accusation there occur indications, or infamy, or something similar; but it is otherwise, he says, when one proceeds by the way of fraternal enunciation, for then, indeed, it suffices that the denouncer [act], and he brings in Valentia quaest. 13 p. 2., where he nevertheless says that regard must be had to the estimation owed to the brother.
This last doctrine is certainly to be moderated with this caution, because even in a paternal inquisition a stain can be brought upon the fame and good estimation of the one about whom the inquiry is made.
HE ADDS at num. 81. that the practice of judges is to be approved, who proceed from denunciation to seeking indications, so as thus to form the libel of inquisition; and he thinks Lessius holds that infamy precedes, which from the common teaching of the Theologians is necessary, and from the canons; but this with Navarro in rubr. de Indiciis, num. 66., I think is false. For what infamy precedes here? They fear perhaps lest crimes remain unpunished; but let them be punished by the proper means.
THIS indeed I affirm with Tannerus: that a Judge, on account of a denunciation made to him not as Judge but as a private person, cannot proceed to a special inquisition; otherwise the whole process is null by law, as Clarus quaest. 5. num. 4. and Less. dub. 15. n. 136. also teach; for it can tend only to a general inquisition, as Tannerus notes, num. 84., with Cajetan and Salonius.
THIS, as a crown, is to be gravely noted, and underlies every inquisition, namely the body of the crime, without whose notice the Judge cannot proceed. Thus all the Doctors exclaim, in Farinac. quaest. 2. num. 1. and Clarus §. fin. quaest. 4., who at quaest. 66. says: If the body of the crime is not established, the Accused cannot be condemned, even if he were convicted. Nay, neither can he be tortured, Leg. 1. §. Item illud, ff. ad Sillan. Nay, neither can the Accused be examined, as the Doctors say in Farinac. quaest. 2. Nor can he be seized, as Marsil. Bossius and others testify in the same Farinacius, among whom Bonacos attests it is of the common teaching of the Doctors; and if a Cleric is seized while the body of the crime is not established, the Judge is excommunicated, as Farinac. notes there after Ioan. Andr. and Cornerus, who attests it is common. Nor can one inquire specially against the Accused. Farinac. quaest. 7. per Leg. necessario, §. 1. ff. ad Sillan., and many other laws, citing Baldus, Angelus, Marsilius, Boss. and others, and he says it is common. Finally, unless the offense is established, the Judge ought neither to inquire generally nor proceed to any act. Thus Clar. quaest. 4., Bouër. p. 2. cap. 7. §. primo modo, who cites many Doctors.
THE REASON of these things is, because where the Law disposes about some matter, that matter must first be established, Leg. Decime, ff. de testam. milit.; and he who wishes to prove a quality must first prove the substance in which that quality is founded, Gloss. in Leg. si arbiter, ff. de probat.
NOR must only the body of the crime be established, say a homicide; but also its qualities; and therefore the universal practice is that the Judge go, or send a notary, to visit the corpse of the slain, and reduce to the acts how many blows or wounds it has, by stabbing or cutting, and in what part of the body it has them, and the like. See Clarus quaest. 4., Farinacius quaest. 2.
THE corpse must also be recognized by witnesses, if possible. This, however, it does not compel, if the corpse is proved to have been burned or cast into the sea, as Baiard. says, quaest. 4. ad Clarum, citing very many. See Biotus quaest. 12.
AFTER the body of the crime has been established, the Judge is bound to pursue the cause diligently, and if he neglects it he can be punished, Clar. quaest. 4., Bursat. and Guaz. tract. ad defens. cap. 1. num. 22. defens. 4., Baiard. ad Clarum quaest. 66. num. 7.; and St. Bonaventure presses this gravely, in speculo animae, cap. 2. et in Apolog. Min. quaest. 2.
These things, however, are not understood in the general inquisition of Visitations, and in the syndicate of our Prelates.
LIKEWISE neither in offenses that leave no signs, as in fornication, nor in hidden offenses of difficult proof, as in theft, while it ends in breaking. Yet one cannot proceed to condemnation before the stolen thing has been found. Likewise neither in cases in which it is ambiguous whether an offense intervened, as in someone found suffocated in a well, killed by poison, etc.
BUT in these cases he must first inquire into the truth of the fact, and so, the crime detected, proceed further; otherwise, let the process be silent. Clar. quaest. 4., Farinac. quaest. 2. num. 29., whom see also at num. 30. On this matter see Clarus §. fin. quaest. 4. 55. 64. and 66., Farinac. quaest. 2., Guaz tract. ad defensam, defens. 4.
NOTE further that, although against ordinary persons fame suffices for instituting a cause, yet against Prelates and eminent persons clamorous intimation is required, and that the same fame has often come to the ears of the Judge, according to Card. Alex., who says the Doctors commonly hold thus, C. accusatoris, and Clar. quaest. 6. and 7. and Farinac. quaest. 9., where he warns that the fame must be proved in the process through witnesses, who must at least depose that they heard it so publicly, or that it is so said everywhere among the honest, Bald. Leg. litteras, num. 2. de praesumpt.; and thus it is observed passim, as Clarus testifies, quaest. 6.
BUT the Judge, being cautious, if he sees anyone's fame unjustly darkened, ought not to accept denunciations, as Bouerius warns, p. 2. cap. 4., with Soto de teg. secr. quaest. 2., Navarro C. inter verba, 11. quaest. 3., Sayro l. 2. cap. 9. num. 18.
IN more atrocious cases, however, one may proceed from grave indications without fame, as on heresy, he holds in C. Excommunicavimus, §. adiicimus, with all the Interpreters; and Farinac. notes it, quaest. 9. num 14., citing Bartolus, Bossius, Menochius, Felinus, who attests it is of the common view; and Clarus reports it, quaest. 6., and Decianus with others, concerning the crime of lèse-majesté and other enormous crimes. It is the common opinion of the Doctors in C. qualiter, et quando, de accusat., and Farinac. held it, above num. 15., with Gigante, Alciat., Cephalus, and Decianus.
IN these cases indeed the inquisition must be made upon the indications; these failing, since neither does fame precede, the inquisition would be null. Farinac. quaest. 1., where he cites innumerable ones. See him, differing in much.
HERE they ask lastly: whether the Judge can relax the punishment, on which St. Thomas, art. 4.
THE GENERAL RULE is, that it cannot be done to the prejudice of a party. See Valentia p. 4. and St. Bonav. ad 8. Ioan., in the sentence pronounced against the adulteress, where Christ the Judge absolves her.
HE SINS also unto death by absolving the Accused to the prejudice of the public good, giving the wicked occasion to sin more freely: Thus Molina tomo 4. tract. 3. disp. 48., Clau. Reg. l. 12. cap. 12. and others cited by Bassaeus, v. Indicium publ. num. 12.