Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Thus far we have dealt with homicide committed by private authority; now we must deal with homicide by public power.
First, I suppose that a judge is bound by CHARITY under pain of mortal sin to deliver an innocent man from death, if he can by any means, even if he is proven guilty, whether he does so by terrifying or obstructing the accusers, or by examining the witnesses most rigorously, etc.
Secondly, many admit that a judge, when he cannot deliver the innocent man, is bound to make his innocence manifest in the courtroom.
Thirdly, they say that an inferior judge, bound by the allegations and proofs made to condemn the innocent man, is bound to send to the superior with the information, proofs, and indications of his innocence.
The whole difficulty is: whether, when none of these things can be done, it is lawful to condemn the innocent man to death or to another punishment.
The first opinion is that the judge is indeed bound to condemn him. So St. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 67. art. 2, and quaest. 64. art. 6. ad 3, and there all the Thomists; Soto L. 5. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 2; Petrus Navarrus L. 2. de restitut. cap. 3. num. 157, speaking only of civil matters; Covarruvias lib. 1. var. cap. 1. num. 6; Navarrus summa Latina, cap. 25. num. 13; Bartolus Lex, Illicitas, §. Veritas, ff. de offic. praesidis; Innocent cap. Venerabilis, de censibus; the Archdeacon in cap. 1. de offic. ordin; Cardinal and John Andrea in cap. Pastoralis, de offic. delegati, with the Gloss there, §. quia vero; Sylvester V. Iudex 2. num. 5. and 6; Toletus Lib. 5. summa, cap. 6. num. 11; Fagundez in 5. Praeceptum Decal. cap. 14; Cajetan, Bannes, Salon, Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 67. art. 2; Valentia Tom. 2. disp. 5. q. 11. punct. 2; Sayrus L. 12. cap. 8. n. 13; Sirouerd tf. de Iustitia, 2. 2. quaest. 67. art. 2; Lezan V. Iud.; Tanner tract. 3. disp. 4. quaest. 4. dub. 2. num. 51. Corduba is finally inclined to this, as cited in Diana, part. 5. tract. 4. Resol. 22.
The second opinion denies altogether, both in civil and in criminal matters, that a judge can condemn an innocent man in the manner described; but that he is bound to resign his office, even if he knows nothing will come of it, when he can deliver him by no other way. Nay, this opinion adds that he is bound to deliver him, even if he were to lose his life. So teach Lessius Tom. 1. dub. 29. L. 2. num. 78. and 82; Lyranus in cap. 23. Exodi, expounding that: The innocent and the just, etc.; Adrian quodl. 6. art. 3; Angelus V. iudicare, num. 7; Petrus Navarrus L. cit. num. 161; Hostiensis, Calderinus, Panormitanus cap. Pastorali de offic. deleg.; Corduba lib. 1. quaest. 37, where he fights with 16 arguments (though defeated at the end); Raynaldus in gloss. cum Syl. V. Iud. 2. quaest. 5. Sà num. 13; Bonacina tract. 1. disp. 20. q. 2. punct. 2; Filliucius tract. 40. cap. 6. q. 5; Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 67. art. 2; Bassaeus V. Iudex, num. 5; Biel, sent. quaest. 138.
The third opinion is that indeed in civil causes, and grave ones, and in criminal causes of lesser moment, the Judge can proceed according to what is proven; but in causes of death he is bound to acquit the accused. So Lessius Tom. 1. L. 2. cap. 29. disp. 10. num. 84; Petrus Navarrus L. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 157; Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 60. art. 5. DIANA part. 5. Tract. 4. resol. 22 concludes: If a grave loss should befall the Judge from the deposition of his office, he is not bound to lay it down; but he can condemn: and he refers to Filliucius Tom. 1. tract. 48. cap. 6. num. 171, and others. Tostatus holds almost the same ad cap. 25. Exodi, quaest. 6.
What St. Bonaventure thought I shall make clear. Therefore serm. 6. de decem praeceptis, he says, the Public Minister of the Law can kill, provided there be a just cause, a just order, and a just mind. A just cause must be present, because it is said in Deuteronomy 16: That which is just thou shalt execute justly. Hence there must also be a just order of proceeding. Likewise it must be done from love of Justice, not from lust for vengeance, and thus there will be a just mind. And in the speculo animae, cap. 2. post medium, he has almost the same.
He brilliantly defends the second opinion, however, in part. 2. de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 2, and proves it. And again in part. 4. cap. 3 he subscribes.
This opinion is so deeply fixed in me that I greatly wonder that so many Princes of Theology depart from it.
I ASSERT, therefore, that a judge can by no means condemn an innocent man to any punishment, and especially to death, however much, according to the allegations and proofs, he may deserve death.
IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, first, serm. 6. in Decal. on Deuter. 16: Judges and Masters shalt thou constitute in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God shall give thee, throughout thy tribes: that they may judge the people with just judgment, and not decline to either side. Thou shalt not accept person nor gifts: for gifts blind the eyes of the wise, and change the words of the just. Justly thou shalt pursue that which is just: that thou mayest live, etc. Where the Hebrew has: Justice, justice shalt thou pursue, that thou mayest live.
He alludes, however, to Exodus 23, as the Marginal postils note, where it has: The innocent and just thou shalt not kill: because I abhor the wicked, where Pagninus has: for I will not justify the wicked.
But that we may understand this phrase, we must note with St. Bonaventure loco cit. and Tostatus quaest. 6. in 16. Deuter., that it is not enough to do a just thing, unless it be done justly, because the manner belongs in moral matters to the species of the act. For it does not suffice to do a just thing, but it must be done justly; yet it is not just to condemn an innocent man, even if it be just to judge according to the allegations and proofs; for to condemn an innocent man is a most grave crime against the natural law: but to judge according to allegations and proofs is only according to human laws extra de constitut. cap. Canonum statuta, and cap. Ne innitaris prudentia tua, and Cod. de legibus, and Cod. de iuris, et facti ignorantia in Lege, Constitutiones.
Indeed Laws and Canons, according to the Politicians, fall under part of the natural law or part of the positive law, as is clear in 5. Eth.; nevertheless, if they per accidens depart from the natural law, they are not to be interpreted as if they commanded in every eventuality: they decree, however, that judgment be given according to allegations and proofs from the fact that right knowledge of the accused is required of the judge, that he may give sentence; but among things proven, those of lesser weight are those which are true, whencever they come.
Therefore God, who is above the Laws, commands that two be not killed, namely the innocent, and that the just be not killed. Indeed it would be the same thing repeated, because in such a case the innocent and the just would be the same. Now he forbids the innocent to be condemned, that is, him who is proven guilty by false witnesses, but is in truth innocent; and thou, O Judge, knowest this, as a private person, thou shalt not kill this man. But the just thou shalt not kill, that is, him who has been thus proven in judgment; and in this way Tostatus himself expounds it.
Behold that double justice, Deuter. 16: Justice, justice thou shalt pursue, that is, delivering both the innocent, proven guilty in the forum, and him who has been proven just.
By this argument you dissolve all the opposing foundations, taken from the necessity of the Laws of judging according to allegations and proofs. For against them stands here the law Divine and of Nature in this case.
IT IS PROVED, secondly, by St. Bonaventure loco cit. Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, from Proverbs 24: Deliver them that are led to death: and cease not to deliver those that are dragged to destruction. If thou say: Strength is not enough: he that is the inspector of the heart, he understandeth, and nothing deceiveth the keeper of thy soul, and he shall render to a man according to his works.
Behold: in order to the internal judgment of conscience he commands that the innocent, condemned to death by the laws, be diligently delivered, because, namely, it is Divine and Natural law, as our Doctors cry out.
I LAUGH at the answer of the opponents, that judgment is rendered justly according to nature, when judgment is given according to allegations and proofs, because the public good is preferred, while innumerable scandals are warded off.
THESE are flattering little words. For where is the scandal, while an innocent man is being weighed and the Judge publicly protests that he knows it, in attestation of his own honor?
NAY, these opinions are received with the applause of the whole world, just as the deliverance of Susanna was received, who by the sole slight diversity of the tree under which she was accused of having fallen was proven innocent.
But that which they keep forever in their mouths, that the natural law commands that judgment be given according to allegations and proofs, and that although this order is of positive law, one is nevertheless bound by the natural law to keep it, as Fagundez answers; it is so ridiculous that it provokes even the scant smiles of the wise to loud laughter. For where does any merely positive law compel its observance by the law of nature? Surely the law of observance arises from the law of the law itself. And is the public good really that the innocent be condemned? Is it because again the laws condemn according to the allegations? Be it so; since nevertheless the laws are human, must they not at least be taken with their epieikeiai?
FURTHERMORE the end of the law is the heart of the law, and it commands judgment according to allegations and proofs, that judgment may be given justly according to the truth, which is ever the companion of justice. But if, as a public person, the judge is bound to smile upon the public clamor, as Fagundez and the others cry in their principal foundation; then let them believe the clamoring and tumultuous people crying against CHRIST: Crucify him, who nevertheless had been proven innocent by a private interrogation alone. Surely Pilate is not thereby excused.
The public GOOD is that which is more profitable for the Republic. But nothing is more necessary than to foster and protect the innocent, as the Saintly Doctor expounds at length part. 2. Ecclesiast. Hier. cap. 2. These zealots fear scandals. What greater scandal than to pave the ways for calumnies and to lay snares of death for the innocent? Away with that scandal.
They URGE that the judge is a public person, and therefore must not follow what he knows as a private person.
COME NOW! I should like to know: does he not use the knowledge of the sciences and arts which, as a private person, he imbibed in the University amid his studies?
But let us hear St. Bonaventure in the cited place on Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Part 2, cap. 2: The Virtues are called Angels on account of their strong and unchangeable manliness in imitation of God, a Deiform motion that does not sin. All these things, understood figuratively, are to be referred to those who receive the power of judging. For that peace and concord may be had in the Church of Christ, justice is ordained of the Lord; Psalm 71: Let the mountains receive peace for the people, and the hills justice. He shall judge the poor of the people, and shall save the children of the poor, and shall humble the calumniator. Because he shall deliver the poor from the mighty, and the poor that had no helper. Because there would be no peace in the mountains, that is, in proud men; unless there were justice in the hills, that is, in good and humble prelates and Judges, in whom Angelic manliness, or virtuousness, is required, so that by neither blessing nor cursing are they moved from the rectitude of justice, as of David, 2 Kings 14: But thou, my Lord the King, art as an Angel of God, who is moved by neither malediction nor benediction. Therefore the Judge must be strong and manly, lest through fear, hatred, or love he be deflected from justice. Hence counsel is given in Ecclesiasticus, cap. 7: Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have strength in virtue to dash down iniquities, lest thou haply fear the face of the powerful, and lay a stumblingblock in thy equity; and Wisdom 6: Hear, O ye kings and judges, that judge the earth: to you is given power from the Most High, who shall question your works, and search out your thoughts, because, being ministers of his kingdom, you have not judged rightly, nor kept the law of justice, nor walked according to the will of God. Horribly and speedily shall he appear to you, for a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule. To you therefore, O kings, are these my words, that you may learn wisdom, and not fall away. For they that have kept just things justly shall be justified. And Ecclesiasticus 44: Men rich in virtue, etc. Making peace in their houses: they are therefore the Virtues as regards the manly execution of justice.
Likewise, on account of the virtuous defense of justice: For it is said Ecclesiasticus 4: Fight for justice, and strive even unto death for Justice, etc.
Likewise, on account of the imitation of Divine Wisdom. For human justice ought to imitate the Divine, as far as is possible, and, that it may not err through ignorance, to be enlightened by the divine light; Hence it is said, Wisdom 6: Love the light of wisdom, all ye that are over the peoples.
Likewise, on account of the swift and manly deliverance of the oppressed, the Judges are called Virtues: For the virtuous judge manfully snatches away the oppressed innocents, and sets himself with all his strength against him who does the injury. Whence in Proverbs 24: Deliver them that are led to death. But if thou say: Strength is not given to me: he that is the inspector of the heart, he himself understandeth, and nothing deceiveth the keeper of thy soul, and he shall render to everyone according to his works. Where the Hebrew: Deliver them that are carried captive unto death, and thou shalt forbid them that stagger unto slaughter; and Job 29: Because I had delivered the poor man that cried out, and the orphan that had no helper. The jaws of the wicked I broke, and out of their teeth I snatched away the prey: the blessing of him that was perishing came upon me. Where the Hebrew: The blessing of those perishing came upon me.
Isaiah first: Judge for the orphan, help the oppressed. Where the Hebrew: Direct your affection to the injured.
Behold the duties of the public person expounded by St. Bonaventure from the storehouse of the Scriptures.
And on Wisdom 6 he observes the apparatus of the Holy Spirit, to admonish judges: Better is wisdom than strength. Hear therefore, ye kings; learn, ye judges, etc. — the reason taken from the peril of their office. Hence also Proverbs 1: The wise man hearing will be wiser: and understanding, he shall possess governments; and on John, cap. 19, he observes that Pilate, who had known in secret the innocence of CHRIST, nevertheless condemned him unjustly on the testimony, and he brings forward Proverbs 17: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both are abominable before God. And he considers gravely that Christ discoursed so gravely with Pilate about the truth, because in it consisted the whole equity of the judgment, that the Governor might judge according to the truth, snatching the innocent from the hands of the calumniators. But because knowing the innocent he condemned him, most certainly, the Divine Justice so ordaining, he was condemned by the Emperor and rejected by God.
All of them, crowding in ranks, hurl the argument of St. Thomas, which indeed Bannes calls a moral demonstration. The judge in judging sustains the public person of the Republic: therefore he ought to use only public knowledge, which is rendered probable to the community itself. It is confirmed, because a man ought not to use that opinion which opens the way to frauds. They labor to prove the same by the authorities of the Fathers and the Canons, which Tannerus reports in number 52.
It is answered easily with St. Bonaventure in the cited places. The public person is bound to the defense of the innocent, and therefore so to bear himself that in the face of the Republic he be an asylum of innocence, as I showed above. Nor indeed does he open the way to frauds who uses certain private knowledge; nay, rather there is to be feared the false witnesses, with whom the whole world overflows.
Furthermore, the Holy Fathers and the Canons enjoin a due public skillfulness in conducting causes.