Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Whether winnings from illicit games are to be restored.
I do not speak of gains made through games of lawful industry, which one may use moderately for refreshment; for this is the virtue of Eutrapelia, as Aristotle teaches in book 4 of the Ethics, chapter 8, and St. Thomas in question 168, article 2, and commonly others. What is acquired in this way is not to be restored.
The question therefore concerns games that depend wholly, or for the greater part, on chance; and thus the game of dice is forbidden to all, both Clerics and Laics, C. Episcopus 35, distinction; and C. Clerici 2, extra, de vita et honestate clericorum, and l. solent ff. de aleae usu et aleatoribus. And Auth. alearum usus, C. de religiosis et sumptibus fund. Under this game, too, all similar games of chance are forbidden, as Navarra observes, chapter 20, number 6, Valencia question 6, point 5, with St. Bonaventure in the place cited.
The question is: whether dominion is acquired by such games.
The FIRST opinion is that dominion is acquired, if there be no fraud or deceit, and the player may alienate what he wins, and no law exists forbidding the transfer of such dominion. So Alensis, book 4, question 86, member 3, article 6; Adrianus de Restit.; Ioan. Maior in 4, distinction 15, question 13; Gabriel, same distinction, question 13, articles 1 and 2; Couar. in Reg. Peccatum, part 2, § 4; Caiet. 2. 2, question 32, article 7, and in the Summa, v. Ludus; Ioan. Medina de rebus restituendis; Sotus, book 4, de Iustitia, question 5, article 2; Navar. in Manuale, chapters 20 and 29; Valencia, disp. 5, question 6, point 5; Fagundez in octavum Praeceptum, chapter 17, number 11; Molina, Tract. 1, de Iustitia, disp. 99; Syluest. v. Lex, question 18; Castro, question 41; Salon. question 5, de dominio, article 6; Lessius, book 2, chapter 16, dub. 3; Tannerus, dub. 8. And much more strongly do those hold this who say that he is not bound to restitution who, having lost much money at dice, compelled the player to persist in the game and redeemed all the losses and others besides, as Lessius, book 2, chapter 26, dub. 1; Gerfias de contractibus, part 2, chapter 19; Diana, part 1, Tract. 17, resol. 27; and those who compel payment of the money lost at dice: Azor. part 3, book 5, chapter 24, question 7; Bannes 2. 2, question 32, article 7; Rebell. part 2, book 12, question 8, number 6; Salon. 2. 2, question 62, article 6, question 5.
The SECOND opinion is that winnings from such games are subject to restitution. So Palud, book 4, distinction 15, question 3, article 5; Rich. article 5, question 8; Panorm. on cap. Clerici 2, de vita et honestate clericorum, and on cap. Quia plerique, de Immunitate Ecclesiae; and certain other Canonists whom Gabriel cites, book 4, distinction 15, question 13, article 1. St. Bonaventure in 4, distinction 15, part 2, article 2, question 1, is also alleged by Valencia and others.
BUT let us hear the Saintly Doctor in his reply to the fourth objection. For when he had said that a possessor in bad faith cannot spend in alms the things he possesses in bad faith, such as stolen goods, he adds: If, however, the question concerns a gambler, it must be said generally that he is a possessor in bad faith and possesses under an unjust title; and therefore he must in no way keep for himself what he has won, since such a game is base and reprobate, against God and against all the laws. Whether, however, he is bound to restore, some distinguish: for either the one from whom he won is such a person as cannot govern his own affairs, as for instance a Minor, or a Pupillus, a Deaf man, a Mute, or one languishing with perpetual disease; and thus he is bound to restore. But if he is such a person as could lose; or whether he was dragged into it and induced by him, or not: if he was dragged in by him, he is not bound to restore to him, because to him no repetition belongs in vindication of sin, but he may make alms of it. But if he himself dragged him in, he cannot make alms of it, but is bound to restore, at least in the forum of conscience; because, although no one wishes to lose, nevertheless he who does not wish to lose, nor to play, but is induced, seems less culpable; and the other who induces, more so; and therefore the former ought not to be damaged, nor ought the author or the inducer to be in any way bettered: yet no one may on that account convert any of the acquired gain to his own uses. The same judgment must be made concerning Tournaments; and it must be said that in those pacts which they make among themselves, goods are not transferred between them, but are turned to the uses of the poor on account of the dishonesty of the game and the interdiction of the law. Thus St. Bonaventure.
Likewise in the Speculum animae, chapter 2, he says: The fifth fruit of rapine is the game of dice, or of dice-boards, which is forbidden both by Canonical and by Civil law. Hence some say of it that it is mortal sin, in that it is against Canonical and Civil law; and that what is gotten from play is possessed under no good title, nor can it be retained, but ought to be distributed to the poor. For he who gains in play gains unjustly, and he who loses loses justly; therefore he who gains is not bound to restore to him from whom he gained, unless perhaps he induced him to play. But since play seems to have from its root the character of mortal sin, because it evidently proceeds from avarice, and because many sins are communicated in play, namely fraud, lying, perjury, blasphemy, scandal, and frequently the loss of time, therefore this seems to be the cause of the prohibition of play. When one plays for the sake of recreation, with the aforesaid sins excluded, it does not seem to have the character of mortal sin. Thus the Saintly Doctor.
From all this you have that St. Bonaventure spoke as reporting the opinion of others, and is not to be reprehended by Valencia and others in anything.
First, indeed, he says that the game of dice is forbidden by both Laws; and this I showed above, with the laws adduced.
Next he teaches that playing at dice and dice-boards seems on this account to be mortal sin.
As for Clerics and Religious, they sin mortally by transgressing these laws, where the contrary has not been abrogated by custom, if they play for a notable sum, and especially from the fruits of benefices, as Navar. chapter 20, number 9 and Sotus, book 4, de Iustitia, question 5, article 2 assert, although Cajetan sometimes hesitates in doubt concerning Clerics who are prelates. The same he asserts in the Summa, verb. Ludus; concerning these Sotus asserts the same less doubtfully, and it is proved from C. Episcopus 35, distinction, and C. Inter dilectos, extra, de excessibus praelatorum, where a cleric is ordered to be deposed for the use of dice, a penalty that is not inflicted except for mortal fault, as is gathered from C. Non affirmamus, 24, question 1 — Valencia subscribes.
¶ As for Laics, however, Navarra, Sotus, Cajetan, and Valencia himself judge that they do not sin mortally, the other few circumstances against the natural law being excluded, of which mention was made above. The reason is that either those laws do not bind Laics so severely, and are derogated by custom, at least as regards mortal sin. The Saintly Doctor speaks almost in the same way and to the same effect.
He adds, that these games are not forbidden by these laws and Decrees if they are instituted principally for recreation: and this the Doctors gather, and among them Valencia from l. Quod in convivio, ff. de Aleae usu; but if it is exercised principally for gain, as Navarra notes, number 6, and Valencia in the place cited from the cause.
He teaches, therefore, that he who dragged another in, and efficaciously induced him to play, if he prevails, is bound to restitution; the same St. Thomas asserted, question 32, article 7, ad 2; and Valencia teaches this to be clear even before the sentence of the Judge; and he alleges the Doctors related above for his opinion; for this St. Thomas signified by the same words concerning him who dragged another to play; but Valencia says that traction is understood not as any kind of attraction whatever, for this does not suffice to impede the translation of dominion — in which Adrianus, deceived, expounds St. Thomas badly, as Valencia, Couar., and Medina, adduced above, noted — but it is understood of violence, with manifest force, or with most importunate prayers, which suffuse with shame, for instance if he object that he is a poor man, as the same Doctors above expound, and with them Valencia.
Furthermore, that he is bound to restitution — besides those alleged by Valencia — hold Clavis reg. l. 11. cap. 15; Malderus 2. 2, Tract. 1, chapter 12, dub. 3; Fernandez in suo examine Theologiae moralis, part 1, chapter 15, § 6; Molfesius Tom. 2, tract. 12, chapter 21, number 59. Add Toletus book 5, chapter 27; Megalam 2. 2, book 2, chapter 19, question 2, number 16, speaking of him who knows and compels his companion to persist in the game, and recovers what was lost, and besides gains other things besides: they say he is bound to restore at least these super-gains, as Diana relates, part 1, resol. 27, adding it for the opinion of St. Bonaventure; Alphonso de Vega in summa, part 2, chapter 13, case 12; Rebellius de obligatione iustitiae, part 2, book 12, question 3; Azorius part 3, chapter 29, book 5, question 1; Valencia loc. cit.; Comitolus in resolutionibus Moralibus, book 3, question 9; Salam Tract. de Ludo, disp. 6; Bannes, and Aragon. 2. 2, question 32, article 7, ad 7.
It is proved, because he who thus plays plays involuntarily. This is the reason of St. Bonaventure above, which opinion, because of the reasons by which it is supported, Reginald says is to be followed, Tom. 1, book 10, chapter 25, number 385; and Diana judges it not improbable, loc. cit., and Lessius book 2, chapter 26, dub. 2, number 9.
The Saintly Doctor adds that he who was dragged in and won is not bound to restore, which nearly all those alleged sustain. The reason of St. Bonaventure is that the privilege of repetition, granted by law, does not belong to the one who dragged him in, because by the dragging he renders himself unworthy of it.
He asserts also that he who won money — truly in a notable sum — from those who cannot govern their own affairs, whom he enumerates with other similar cases, is bound to restore; which Valencia also holds, loc. cit., and others with him. Nay, Molina tom. 1, disp. 142; Sanchez book 6, disp. 38; Lessius book 2, chapter 17, dub. 8, after the Gloss, Navarra, Lopez, Corduba, and others with Sanchez, teach that boys within a decade and a half year of puberty, and girls within nine years and a half, remain naturally bound by onerous contracts, yet not concerning immovables and other things that must be preserved for themselves — unless, however, they contract even with Tutors. Which doctrine relieves Confessors of the burden.
Whether, however, he who neither dragged another in, nor was dragged, but played as an equal partner, is bound to restitution, he defines nothing; he only says, If he acquired, he is a possessor in bad faith, inasmuch as he acquired against the laws, and he ought not convert those monies to his own uses, but ought to give them to the poor, because absolute dominion is not transferred peacefully, inasmuch as the laws resist and give rise to repetition, and because it is base gain, acquired against the laws. Yet he does not assert this in his own settled sense.
For therefore he who lost is not compelled to pay in court, and an action is given for recovering what was lost, if he has already paid — which the Saintly Doctor understands after the sentence of the judge, with Medina, Couar., Soto, and others who thus expound St. Thomas, with whom Valencia subscribed.
Finally, that he who lost is not bound in conscience, and played in hope and in good faith, teach Malderus 2. 2, tract. 3, chapter 12, dub. 3; Lessius book 2, chapter 26, dub. 4; Aragon. 1. 2, question 21, article 7, and question 62, article 1; Ledesma Tom. 2, tract. 31, chapter 2; Molina Tom. 2, tract. 2, disp. 515; Philiarc. T. 2, p. 2, book 5, chapter 2, number 11; Toletus book 5, chapter 27; Diana part 1, Tract. 17, resol. 8, and Tract. 5, resol. 44, and Tract. 4, resol. 169.
The same he says of him who won from one playing with false cards. The reason is that to him to whom an action for recovering is given, an exception not to pay is conceded a fortiori, according to the rules of both Laws; but in a forbidden game, as I said, an action for recovering is given. Medina subscribes, book 1, chapter 14, § 29; Couar. reg. Peccatum, part 2, § 4, number 8; and eighteen Doctors with Salam Tract. 1, de contractibus, disp. 20.
¶ Understand this standing in the common law; for if in some places repetition is not granted to the loser, nor is the exception conceded that he need not pay.
¶ This is the opinion of St. Bonaventure loc. cit., where he concedes repetition to him who lost, and consequently the exception not to pay.
Many, however, with Diana teach that he is bound to pay; Azor. part 3, book 5, chapter 24, question 7; Bannes 2. 2, question 32, article 7; Rebell. part 2, book 12, question 8, number 6; Valencia loc. cit.; Salon. 1. 2, question 62, article 6, question 5; Garzias de contractibus, book 2, chapter 29; Tanner. disp. 4, question 6, dub. 11; and others. The reason is that a promise, unless it is void by the law itself, binds: but this one in play is not void, but only an action for recovering is given, l. Alearum, C. de Religiosis et sumptibus.