Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

In what way private judgment about one's neighbor is illicit.

THE PRINCIPAL difficulty concerns Judgment, by which one judges evil of another; for to judge good of someone is rarely, and only per accidens, a fault.

THEREFORE I suppose that to judge something for a just cause is not a sin. This is commonly supposed by S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas and others, and it is proved by the Holy Doctor on John 12 with that text: Judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment.

BUT WHAT cause is required for judging rightly is left to the prudent judge, as Soto noted, Book 3 de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 3; Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto 3.

THEREFORE I ASSERT: to judge deliberately that someone is evil, gravely harming his reputation, without a just cause, is mortal sin.

IT IS PROVED from the Holy Doctors, first from Matthew 7: Judge not, that you may not be judged. They confirm it from Bede on that passage, and from St. Augustine tract. 90. in Ioannem.

NEXT it is proved by 1 Corinthians 4: Do not judge before the time. So D. Thomas art. 3, and P. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 10, where he observes that rash judgment is measured according to the Savior's saying, Matthew 7: With what judgment you judge, you shall be judged. Where the Gloss says: If you judge anyone rashly with venial condemnation, you shall be condemned venially. If with mortal condemnation, you shall be condemned mortally. This, he says, is to be understood without prejudice to the opinion of others; for some say it is not mortal unless reputation is gravely harmed. Whence Valencia in the place cited, and Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 2. num. 18, with Aragon, just as they think it mortal to judge some light things of a Religious man, as that he is a liar; so they would not think it mortal to judge of a worldly young man that he has committed fornication, or of a soldier that he has killed someone unjustly, because the judgment is a grave evil insofar as reputation is gravely taken away or harmed. From similar things (they say) such men are not harmed. Valencia adds that it is also an undue and unjust judgment to judge rashly of the future, e.g. that man will perish, for that belongs to God, who perhaps will change that sinner's heart.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor opusc. de profectu religiosi, Lib. 1. cap. 1, from Romans 14: But thou, why judgest thou thy brother's servant? and Luke 6: Judge not, and you shall not be judged. He defines rash judgment as when I believe something was done with an evil intention, when it could have been done with another intention; or when someone is judged gravely fallen on light indications. For this is to usurp the scrutiny of hearts, which is proper to God, as is said in Jeremias 17.

THE SAME Holy Doctor cites on Luke 6 the words alleged, where he adds Proverbs 17: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both are abominable before God.

HE OBSERVES that to justify the wicked is abominable, not per se, but per accidens, when he is to be compared with another in order to something of justice, e.g. the distribution of honors, etc., and by that judgment an equality with another in good reputation is established or promoted, and the wicked man is preferred or made equal to the just, as the Holy Doctor noted in the places alleged, and Valencia puncto 1, and Navarre commentar. in Rubric. de Iudic. n. 47.

I ASSERT secondly: to judge of someone, even gravely, from light indications, but with fear/doubt, is not mortal sin. So S. Bonaventure in the places cited, and D. Thomas art. 3; Sylvester under the word Iudicium, quaest. 4; Cajetan on the said art. 3; Navarre loc. cit. num. 49 and following. So also Tanner loc. cit. num. 20, who says light indications are those by which a prudent man would not be moved to that judgment. So also Soto, Valencia, Aragon, and others.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, because the neighbor is not gravely harmed.

HE OBSERVES, however, in the place cited on the Judgment of suspicion that it is threefold. The first is of violent suspicion, when no or few signs of good appear, but all of evil; and this is not a sin. The second of temerity; when many signs of good, few of evil; and it is a grave venial sin. The third, when many of evil, but few are signs of good; and this is a lighter venial sin.

HE NOTES also in the place cited, de profectu religiosi, that fear is sometimes confused with suspicion, although they differ: for fear is directed to caution, as when, without suspecting evil of anyone, I close the Monastery as a precaution.

VALENCIA ADDS that such a judgment with doubt can be mortal by reason of the person; as if you judge some gravest evil of a most honest man, even with doubt, as incest with his mother or sister.

HE NOTES also punct. 4. that one can doubt by standing in suspense; but such doubt can be a sin, even if only venial, when one is lightly grounded and hangs between the two, so as not to incline toward judging the good. He adds, however, with Soto loc. cit. that it can be mortal by reason of a most illustrious person, as if someone is in doubt about Blessed John the Baptist, whether he was a saint or sinned mortally, etc.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ADDS, moreover, that thoughts of this kind belong more to a Prelate, who by reason of his governance can prudently be in suspense or doubt, and likewise to one who is enlightened from above, of whom the Apostle says: The spiritual man judgeth all things; but it is not true of those "spiritual" men who, like Catos, everywhere stick in their nose and judge with a quince-like zeal — say rather with a dog-in-the-manger zeal.