Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

On Justice.

JUSTICE is one thing, directing man in good, and this embraces the other virtues; wherefore it is called General: Another is that correcting and Coercing from evil, which is called Iudicial; Finally another is that which renders to each one his own proper and due good, of which we treat here, and which is called Cardinal: This is Illustrated with various similitudes by St. Bonaventure, which I shall indicate below quaest. 3.

THIS also is at times confounded with the prior acceptation of Justice among the Fathers, by oratorical application; thus it is defined from St. Bernard by the Seraphic Doctor, lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42. Justice is a virtue, rendering to each one what is his own; render therefore to the three, what is theirs; render to the superior, render to the inferior, render to the equal, to each what is his own, the same pursues there: We have before us, superiors; after us, juniors; at the right, friends; at the left, enemies; let us render therefore to each what is his own, to superiors obedience; to juniors Doctrine; to friends joy; to enemies patience. But how far this stands from legal Justice, of which we dispute here, I shall show in quaestione 3.

Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE.

ALL Theologians, Jurists, and Philosophers hold that Ius is the object of the Virtue of Justice: but one must diligently see which Ius is established as the object of this virtue; and which Virtue Justice is understood to be by us; for each can be taken in many ways.

FOR JUSTICE is taken chiefly in three ways. First, for the habit by which we are made suited to all things equitable, both in order to ourselves, and in order to God and others: thus it is taken by all Philosophers, but more by Theologians, who understand in this sense what is delivered universally in the Scriptures, when someone is named just, namely endowed with all the virtues, which is everywhere met with, where they name Just men heroes, as Genes. 6. Noë a just man Genes. 6. Iob. 1. Eccles. 40. et seq. as the Saintly Doctor observes everywhere. The Doctor interprets it at ad 3. Luca:¹ Make straight your paths, according to 16. Isa. The path of the just is right. Prouerb. 4. I led thee by the paths of equity. So Prouerb. 8. I walk in the ways of justice. So Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de beat. oratione 4. understands it Matth. 5. Blessed who hunger and thirst after justice, in which sense it is taken also by St. Augustine at that place, cited by St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centiloquii, sect. 44. and lib. 2. Pharet. cap. 42.

IN like manner Justice is taken for the habit infused with sanctifying grace, by which one is constituted just, and holy, endowed with all the virtues. So Rom. 3. But the justice of God, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all who believe in him. Which is called the justice of God, not formally, but efficiently from God, or the gift of God, as St. Augustine teaches lib. de Spiritu, et litt. cap. 9. and the Holy Council of Trent often inculcates, and gravely defines, as I showed Tract. de Gratia, disp. 2.

THEREFORE we do not take justice in so general a sense, but as it is a particular virtue among the four Cardinal ones, whose proper praise and office is to constitute the due equality between men, as the Saintly Doctor notes in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. et in quaestionibus passim, et in 4. dist. 15. passim et 3. p. Cencil. sect. 44. et 5. p. Breuil. cap. 4. et lib. 2. Phar. cap. 42. et in Diata, tit. 5. cap. 8.

WISDOM takes it thus, c. 8. where it is said, to teach Soberness, and Wisdom, Justice and Virtue; where it calls Soberness Temperance; for Wisdom it understands Prudence; for Virtue, Fortitude; but it takes Justice for the Virtue of Justice, which is the second Cardinal virtue among those, as Gregory of Valencia notes disp. 5. quaest. 1. puncto 1. after St. Bonaventure in the Commentary on that place.

THIRDLY, in another mode the Saintly Doctor takes it in 3. § dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. for the judicial, coercing with punishments; But this is a species of the Cardinal, as I shall say; nevertheless all commonly call it this, when it is said: Justice inquired into Peter, punishes; or: Peter is afflicted in Justice.

¶ Further, Ius also can be taken in many ways.

¶ First, whatever in any mode is equitable, or good, as the Jurist Paulus says l. Ius, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure.

¶ Second, it signifies whatever is conformable to law, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 1. In which way St. Isidore said lib. 5. Ethymol. cap. 3. that Law is a kind of species (that is, norm, or idea) of Ius, according to the doctrine of St. Thom. art. 1. ad 2.

¶ Third, it signifies the lawful faculty, or power of doing, or acquiring, or possessing, or alienating something, as the Jurists distinguish between Ius ad rem, which is owed to someone; and Ius in re, which someone also possesses.

¶ Fourth, it is taken for the Sentence of a judge, as the Jurist Paulus has it loco citato.

¶ Fifth, it signifies the same as Lex, that is, the dictamen of prudence, whether natural, or in habit, or the authority for making laws, in which way Ius is divided into the Natural of nations, and Civil, by Ulpian in l. Iuri, et often by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. et 3. p. Centil. cap. 44. et other places, cited in the tract. de Legibus.

¶ In none of the said modes, or the others enumerated by Valencia, is Ius taken here, but it is taken for the same as Iustum, through equality with another. Hence Scotus lib. 3. de Iustitia, et Iure, quaest. 1. art. 1. says that Ius, by APOCOPE, is said as it were iustum: Whence also in Greek Ius and Iustum are expressed by the same word δίκαιον. The ethymology of which word Ius properly sounds, to be just through the equality of thing with thing. For, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 4. on that account it is called ius δίκαιον, because it is δίχα, that is, divided in two, as if to say bipartite; and what is divided in two is divided into equal parts according to the ratio of discrete quantity, inasmuch as it is divided into one and one. Whence, and Iudex, as Aristotle says in the same place, because he determines the just through the equality of thing with thing, is called Bipartitor. And by this reason Justice is called Equity. Thus Proverb. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad cap. 8. Sapientiae.

¶ Aristotle also used Ius in this sense cap. 4. when he said: Ius, which is in exchanges, is a certain constant equality according to Arithmetic proportion; but that ius, which is in distributions, he had said cap. 3. according to Geometric proportion.

¶ Moderns labor in this ius, which is the object of Justice, in making it clear; and as I see, Mastrius observes the matter Tom. 2. disp. 7. num. 163. saying, that it is That which constitutes dominion, which is twofold, of Jurisdiction, and of Property. This dominion however is defined by the Jurists: The faculty of using a thing at pleasure, without injury to another. In which definition, says Hurtado disp. 12. de Incarn. sect. 3. a circle is committed; for also in defining injury, they say it is the use of a thing against the right and will of the Lord. Thus Ius is defined through Injury, and this through Ius, which is to run in a circle against Aristotle 5. Metaph. cap. 15. Hence Cardinal Lugo disp. 1. de Iustitia, et disp. 3. de Incarn. sect. 2. num. 42. teaches, that this ius, which is the object of Justice, is nothing else than a certain moral prelation, by which this man is morally preferred to others in the use of this thing, by reason of a peculiar connexion, which the thing has with him. Which explanation Bellutus also embraces disp. 7. de Incarn. quaest 6. art. 1. and Mastrius num. 164. He adds, however, that this prelation must be explained, from what head it arises, namely from the disposition of laws, or the nature of the thing. Thus it is explained a priori.

¶ I indeed, weighing this new invention, find that all of these relapse into the same circle; for the Praelation in the use of a thing is an effect of ius. For each one is preferred in the use of a thing, namely a house, a garment, etc. because he has right to it before others, and so Ius is the fountain and cause of that prelation, and therefore ius is not expressed a priori. Again therefore if you seek the origin of that prelation, it must be taken a priori from ius; and so they walk in a circle.

¶ Tanner therefore disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2. n. 8. says, that Ius in re, in the mode of dominion, can scarcely be explicated by any common concept, since it is an analogon of proportionality to its inferiors, such as the dominion of Jurisdiction, and of Property, of which I shall treat in the Disputationes de Furto, et Rapina.

¶ These things pre-stated, it is now established that the object of the Justice of which we treat is Ius, that is, as he says, the Iustum through a certain equality.

¶ It is proved first from the definition of Justice; which is defined through such Ius, as through its proper object. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. We see, that this kind of habit is wont to be called Justice; from which men are made suited to doing just things. And cap 5. Justice is that by which the just man is called the doer of the just from election. Where he takes iustum for the equal.

¶ The Jurists also with the words of Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure, define Justice thus: Justice is a constant, and perpetual will of rendering to each his ius. Which definition St. Thom. also sets forth quaest. 58. art 1. and St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. where he asserts it to be of the Masters.

¶ So also St. Ambrose lib. 1. de offic. cap. 24. says: Justice renders to each his own ius, does not claim another's, neglects his own utility, and keeps the common equity. And St. Augustine lib. 19. de civit. cap. 21. There is not (he says) ius, where there is no justice: Justice moreover is that virtue which distributes to each his own,² So also St. Bonaventure reports loco citato.

¶ It is proved secondly by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. That is the object of Justice, which constitutes the virtue, standing in the mean, not declining to the vicious extremes through excess, and defect: Such is ius, or iustum: Therefore. The Major is Aristotle's 2. Eth. cap. 6. The Minor is proved; For then is one sinning against justice, when more or less is given than is owed. But the mean is the equitable, as Aristotle shows 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. cited by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. He says. Thus cap. 4. he says: Whence when men contend, they flee to the judge, etc. and they seek a judge in the mean, and some call him mediator, as if, should they have attained the mean, they should also attain the ius itself. Ius therefore is a certain mean, if indeed the judge also is in the mean; But the judge reduces to equality; and as, if a line be divided into two unequal parts, that by which the greater part exceeds the half, he takes from it, and joins to the lesser.

¶ The Saintly Doctor expounds it with an elegant Astronomical example: For as he says the Polar star, near the pole, is borne with a small gyre in the diurnal motion around the Pole; yet so, that it does not recede from the middle, that is, from the pole of the world; so also created Justice gyrates closely around the immovable Justice of God: And as, not declining, it keeps the straightness of the diurnal motion; so that as the line of the Equator in the middle of its circulation describes the Highest circle, on that account it does not allow the gyrating stars to decline to the right, or to the left, that is, toward the South, nor toward the North; although it is borne through the immense space of 1017. Millions of miles; so also Justice, keeping the equatorial line of equity, does not allow the various things snatched by the first mobile to decline from East to West, either to the right of excess, or to the left of defect, giving more to one; and taking from the other.

From these the Saintly Doctor draws, in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. and 5. p. Brevil. cap. 4. with St. Thomas as cited by Cajetan art. 1. and Valencia p. 1. at the end. And Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 1. the difference between justice and the other moral virtues; for Justice according to its proper reason makes right in order to another; but the others only in order to oneself. On this account St. Ambrose lib. 1. offic. cap. 28. says, that Justice is born rather for others than for itself. So also Cicero lib. 2. de Republica, and Seneca epist. 77. as the Saintly Doctor teaches in Pharetra, lib. 1. cap. 42.

It is GATHERED also, that the mean of Justice is the mean of the thing, even without comparison to the very agent; but of the other virtues, which turn about their own passions, and not about another, in no way does it consist in a mean without comparison to the very agent. But that equality is that very ius, which is called equitable between too much and too little, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 4.

This shines still more in that example of the Seraphic Doctor: For as without any thinking there is the pole, upon which the heaven moves, and the polar star; which, its small diurnal circle having been described around the pole, they keep the motion of both Hemispheres by the line of the Equator, the substance of the heaven being kept on both sides for each Hemisphere Mathematically; so also Justice, before every thought, and before all its operation, has that object alone, and only to be kept, which is not found in the other moral virtues.

HENCE also it is, that in the Disputation on Justice there is first treated of its object; then of the Virtue, because the object is presupposed before the virtue; not so in the other moral virtues. See Valencia at the end of the punctus.

IT MUST however be observed, that Ius, which is the object of Justice, includes two things; First, that it be owed: Second, that it be equal.

INASMUCH as it is owed, it can be either owed Legally by the force of some Law, or singular, arising from some pact, or convention of certain persons, such as is between buyer and seller.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is owed, is divided into natural Ius and human Ius. The owed thing of the first kind arises from the law of nature, namely, that if you give a measure of wheat as a loan; that he render that measure to you. This however is distinguished threefold by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 33. quaest. 1. The first is called that which is contained in the Law, and the Gospel, and this is called natural Ius commonly. The second is proper, and is defined at the beginning of the Decretals: Natural ius is that which is common to all nations; and this ius is that which reason dictates. The third, most proper, which nature taught all animals.

The owed thing from human law is, what has been established by some human law, as that between certain things vendible, and that price which is fixed by human law, it be the only price.

From the other head, however, inasmuch as it is something just, and equal; It is divided first by Aristotle lib. 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. into Ius, or the equal Geometric; and Arithmetic. The Geometric equal, which is according to proportion, is observed in the distribution of common goods among those who are members of the community, so that by as much as one surpasses another in merits, by the same proportion he may receive more of the goods of the community. But Aristotle says that Ius is exercised through Arithmetic equality, both in exchanges, which are done voluntarily between men, as in buying, selling, exchange, etc. and in compensating, or making amends for the dealings of men involuntary, and those without clandestine acts, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, the seduction of servants, deceitful homicide, false witness, etc. or manifestly violent, as flogging, captivity, slaughter, rapine, mutilation, reviling, contumely, etc. which examples the Philosopher brings in that cap. 2. and through this are distinguished two species of Justice properly so called, namely Distributive, and Commutative, which I exposed at length p. 1. Tract. 1. disput. 19. quaest. 1. et 2.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is equal, is divided into Ius, or the iustum simply, and Ius secundum quid. Ius simply is, what is altogether equal, or by which those are made equal between whom it is; and because equality is between distinct ones, therefore this equal is between those, of whom one is not a part of the other, as between two citizens, and it is called Political Ius. Ius secundum quid equal, is between those, of whom one is a part of the other, as between Father, and son, who is a part of the Father, since from his seed, as Aristotle teaches 8. Eth. cap. 12. So between Lord, and servant, who is something of the Lord, namely his instrument, and a part in goods, as Aristotle teaches 1. Polit. cap. 3. Such is also that between Husband, and Wife, as Aristotle says, because whichever spouse is of the other, as is gathered from the Philosopher 6. Eth. cap. 5. and more from Matth. 19. Ephes. 5. For they are one flesh, and on that account that ius is called by St. Thomas here, art. 4. Oeconomicum, and some dominion intervenes in bodies, and some other things, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 4. dist. 41. quaest. ult. Such improper ius seems to be also between citizen, and community, of which he is a part.

THEY DISPUTE: Whether this improper ius is also on the part of the father toward the son, since the father is not a part of the son. They respond affirmatively, Cajetan art. 4. Valencia punct. 2. for whatever pertains to the whole, pertains also to the part. Hence it comes about, that what the son renders to the father, he renders also to himself.

THEY ALSO DOUBT: Whether the son, even when emancipated, ought to be included under this improper ius. It is answered, that he is included by the reason made above, because to be a part of the Father came to him from generation, which always keeps sons, that they may be as it were other Fathers, as Aristotle says 8. Eth. cap. 11.

What JUSTICE is.

D. Bonav. brings forward VARIOUS definitions of Justice in various places in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. In Dieta tit. 5. cap. 8. et ad 3. et 20. Lucae et lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42.

The FIRST is taken from Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric: Justice is a habit of mind, which, preserving the common utility, assigns to each his own dignity.

The SECOND is in Macrobius: Justice is to preserve for each what is his own.

The THIRD is from D. August. de lib. arb. What shall I say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own? And lib. 19. de civitate, cap. 21. Justice is the virtue which distributes to each his own. D. Bernardus has the same serm. 3. in adventu Domini, and the Gloss Matth. 5. I referred to other definitions above.

But the definition more commonly received, which D. Bonav. says belongs to the Masters, is that of Ulpianus, l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure: Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. D. Thom. approves this quaest. 58. art. 1. and the Doctors commonly.

It is called will, not formally, but causally, as if it said: Justice is a habit which produces a voluntary act, one of election; for it belongs to the nature of virtue that it be a voluntary act, as Aristotle teaches lib. 2. Eth. cap. 4. and it is proper to Justice to rectify the will in order to the right of another, as D. Bonav. teaches 3. p. Brevil. cap. 4.

It is said to be constant and perpetual, because Justice has a firm and stable act, namely to operate constantly and immovably, as virtue operates, from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 4. D. Thom. ad 4. and D. Bonav. in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. where on that account he compares Justice to the polar star. By right is understood the just, according to equality, as I explained quaest. 1. By the particle his own is signified that which is due to each according to the laws, as D. Bonav. explains in the places cited, D. Th. art. 11. By the last word rendering is understood not only the very act of rendering to each his right, according to the form of just distribution or commutation; but also the omission of injury; since it belongs to the same virtue to do good in its proper matter and to omit the contrary evil, as Ulpianus says immediately after this definition. Wherefore Buridanus does not rightly find fault with this definition, as though it did not posit the adequate object of Justice, which includes also not injuring.

JUSTICE, according to the abstract notion, inasmuch as it perfects in order to another, is twofold. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. et 2. One is particular, which perfects man in order to another particular person, for instance a seller in order to a buyer. The other perfects man in order to another, not per se first, as the particular does, but in order to that other as he is a part of the community, and it is called Legal; for the Laws prescribe those things which pertain to the common good.

JUSTICE indeed particular is, without controversy, a special virtue, as D. Thom. says art. 7. D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 2.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau. ad caput citatum Sapientiae, and in Diaeta salutis, tit. 5. cap. 8. from those words: For he teaches Sobriety, and Prudence, and Virtue, and Justice, as I explained quaest. 1. Then in that Commentary he brings forward Prov. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude.

THEN it is proved by S. Doct. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 42. from the Fathers related above.

It is PROVED thirdly by the arguments of D. Bonav. in 3. distinct. 33. quaest. 2. et dub. 1. and other places cited above.

The FIRST argument is taken from the potency which it perfects; for Prudence directs the rational, Temperance the concupiscible, Fortitude the irascible; but Justice all of them, to render what is equal. And in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. he brings forward on this point an elegant similitude. For just as God, in the Megacosm of the world, ordered all things in number, weight, and measure, as is said Sap. 11., so Justice in this Microcosm orders all things in number, weight, and measure, in commutations and distributions. Whence with a graceful figure he adorns it with the name of a GODDESS, to whom David said Psalm. 4. Sacrifice the sacrifice of justice, that is, perform just acts, as Valentia also expounds punct. 1. et ad cap. 1. Sap. on those words: Love justice, you who judge the earth, he says from D. Anselmo: Love justice, that you may be conformed to God, because the Lord is just, and has loved justices. Love (says S. Bonav.) justice uncreated, which is the rectitude of the divine will; and created, which is the rectitude of the human will. Thus he expounds that: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice, with D. Ambrosio lib. 5. in Lucam, where he numbers Justice with the other Cardinals. So also D. August. lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15. apud D. Bonau. in Centiloq. in the place cited.

The SECOND argument of S. Doct. is taken from the acts, by which different habits are recognized as different; for the act of Justice is, as I said quaest. 1., to render to each his right, or the equal and the due, in the ways expressed quaest. 2. But this does not belong to the other virtues.

The THIRD argument of S. Doct. is taken from the object; for acts are distinguished by it, as habits by acts. That is a special virtue which is concerned with an object peculiarly laudable and difficult, as is confessed among all: Such is particular Justice, since it is concerned with the equal due to another, about which the other virtues are not concerned: Therefore. Valentia also uses this argument puncto 2.

The FOURTH argument of S. Doct. is taken from the contrary. For, if anyone behaves unjustly toward another particular person, e. g. by snatching something from him, etc., he commits a special vice, for which he deserves special blame, even if he commits it from no other vice: Therefore to behave rightly and equally toward another is a special virtue. This is the argument of Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 2. which Valentia loc. cit. follows.

The FIFTH argument of D. Bonav. is taken from the means of the virtues; for since these virtues consist in a mean, that virtue will be special which has a special mean: Such is Justice, which stands between too much, exceeding; and too little, detracting from the equal and the due. But the other moral virtues do not keep this mean, as all acknowledge.

As FOR legal Justice, it is certain that it is a general virtue, inasmuch as it is exercised in every matter of the moral virtues. For just as the Laws prescribe in every matter those things which conduce to the common good, as Aristotle teaches 5. Eth. cap. 1., so legal Justice perfects man, that he may behave rightly and justly toward the community in every matter of the moral virtues.

It is, however, CONTROVERTED: Whether Legal Justice is general not only in matter, but also in its formal notion.

BURIDANUS 5. Eth. quaest. 4. thinks that Legal Justice is any virtue whatever, as it operates for the common good; and thus Temperance, as it directs toward health on account of one's own advantage, is called temperance, but as it directs toward the common good of the Republic it is called Potency; inasmuch as it can serve the Republic by fighting, etc., it is Justice.

Yet the contrary opinion is that of S. Bonau. above, D. Thom. art. 6. whom Valentia follows punct. 2. Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 5. and others commonly, apud Mastrium in 3. disp. 7. num. 189.

I ASSERT, with this opinion, that legal Justice is not a general virtue.

It is PROVED first from Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. where he gives it special Encomia, by which a special virtue is confirmed; S. Doct. collected those elogia in Diaeta, titulo 5. cap. ultimo. Thus he proclaims it a perfect and most excellent virtue, and compares it to a star.

So also S. Doct. compares it to a straight way, which inclines neither to the right nor to the left, and applies to it that Psalm. 106. He led them forth into the right way, namely, that they might attain to the eternal prize.

THEN he compares it to the straight Rule, which is the measure of things: For as we measure all things by a rule, and divide all things equally, so also Justice. And as the Astronomical rule measures by the line of Fiduciae the altitude of the pole above the place of habitation, the Climate, etc., so also Justice measures the entire state of the land, of the city, that the due may be rendered to all.

THIRDLY he compares it to a straight Line. For as the straight line is the most beautiful of lines, as the Philosopher says, cited quaest. 1.: so also the rectitude of Justice makes man most beautiful in intention and conversation. As also the stature of the human body is most beautiful, because erect toward heaven. So the stature of the heart is most lovely, when through Justice it is raised up to God. Whence Cant. 7. Thy stature is like to a palm tree.

THEN he compares it to a Gem, set in gold. The four Cardinal virtues, he says, are gems in the golden Diadem. In the anterior part, or on the forehead, is Prudence, whose it is to see not only present things but also future ones. On the right is Temperance, because this makes man just in the right hand of prosperity; Fortitude on the left of adversity. But Justice in the posterior part, as the Bishop in procession, as the King at the end of the battle line, as the Pilot at the stern of the ship, as the just Sentence is pronounced at the end of the cause, and as at the end of the contest the triumphal Crown is given to the victor. Whence the Crown is named from it as from its principal part. So the Apostle prima Timot. 4. There is laid up for me a crown of justice. The Goldsmith, in whose Forge this precious crown is wrought, is Wisdom, of which Sap. 8. Then he compares it to the polar Star, and to God, as I showed above. Behold S. Doctor speaking most excellently.

It is PROVED secondly by the argument of D. Bonau. in almost all the places cited, because in the act of Legal Justice there is special praise and difficulty. Therefore. The consequence is proved from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 6. and 7. The antecedent is Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. and 3. Politic. cap. 3.

Here the arguments first laid down can also be applied.

YOU OBJECT with Buridanus. All the Virtues operate according to rectitude, and in order to the public good; otherwise the virtues could be not right.

Valentia answers from D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 2. ad 2. et 4. that all the virtues indeed have their own proper rectitude and mediocrity, declining from the extremes; nevertheless each has its own singular rectitude, from which Justice makes the right according to all circumstances, inasmuch as it is ordered to another, and this belongs to Justice, not to the other virtues.

It is CERTAIN first, that Justice is not in the intellect; for no one is considered just because he knows what is just, but because he chooses what is just, as D. Thom. and D. Bonau. warn here.

It is CERTAIN secondly, that Justice is in some appetite of man; for since a virtue is in that potency from which the act of virtue is elicited proximately, and Justice is not in the intellect, it remains that it be in another potency, which is the proximate principle of a good and just act, as distinguished from the act of the intellect, and it includes the election of the just object, or is itself the election of such an object. Now such a principle is some appetite, as the SS. Doctors affirm, and with them Caietanus art. 4. and Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 2. punct. 4.

It is CERTAIN thirdly, that Justice is in the rational appetite, that is, the will, as Aristotle teaches with common consent 5. Eth. cap. 1. et 5. and from Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure, defining Justice: It is the constant will to render to each his right, as D. Bonau. teaches in the places alleged, quaest. 2.

It is, however, CONTROVERTED: Whether a certain Justice concerning another's good is to be established in the sensitive appetite, which, although in reality distinct from the Justice which is in the will, yet agrees with it in name and in matter.

But the controversy about this is VERY SMALL; for commonly all place it in the rational appetite, namely in the Will, as D. Bonau. warns, while Buridanus alone places not only Fortitude and Temperance, but also Justice, in the sensitive appetite.

THEREFORE the common opinion is that of D: Bonau. here, D. Thom. art. 4. whom all the others follow, as Sotus says lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 4. Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 2. punct. 4. Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 2. dub. 1. numero 7. who, however, protests entirely.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau. first from D. August. lib. 1. Solil. cap. 6. where he says: Virtue is right reason, leading to the end. Which predication is causal, or material.

SECONDLY: Virtue is the principle of meriting, and of a meritorious and laudable work: Therefore it has being in that potency about whose act praise and merit consist: But such is the rational appetite: Therefore.

THIRDLY. Virtue is in that subject in which the soul has the image of God, since the other virtues have their origin from grace, of which man is capable inasmuch as he is the image: But it is not the Image except through the rational potency: Therefore. The major is D. August. 14. de Trinitate, cap. 8. et 15.

The FOURTH argument proves it singularly of Justice: That habit which consists in the proper election of good and flight from evil is in the rational appetite. Such is Justice: Therefore. The major is proved, because election signifies the selection of something, or of some things, after a comparison made with others. Therefore it is said in Cant.: My beloved is white, etc. chosen out of thousands; but the comparison of many, and the election of one from among them, includes at least virtually a discourse. The minor is proved; for the object of Justice is equality with another, inasmuch as it shuns the extremes, that is, Too much, or exceeding; and Too little, deficient from the equal, which is to be kept in proportion with another, as another's gift is.

But sense does not perceive this formal notion. For this reason D. Thom. and the Thomists also use it, as well as Valentia in the place cited.

FIFTH argument. Virtue is in the genus of the honest good, as Tully says lib. 2. de Invent. and de off. not rarely. But the honest good is the object of the rational appetite alone; for sense regards only the useful good: Therefore.

The RESPONSES of those who oppose these arguments, inasmuch as they prove it of every virtue, I referred to, and rejected, in prima secundae Tract. 2. disput. 2. quaest. 9. ¶

Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral virtues.

S. Doct. seems in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. to hold it the most noble of all the others. Therefore he compares it to a rule, a line, a straight path; he likens it to the polar star; he proclaims it the most precious gem among the others. It is the view of Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 3. and of Scotus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. post litt. L. Mastrii. disp. 7. quaest. 8.

First indeed legal Justice seems more perfect than all the moral virtues, because it has for its object the common good, and, as superior and more universal, it commands all the moral virtues, referring all their objects to the common good. Therefore Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. compares it to a most resplendent Star, and D. Bonav. in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. ultimo to the straight Rule, Measure, Line, polar star, etc. as I said quaest. 3.

SECONDLY particular Justice is not simply more perfect than all the other virtues which are toward another; for Mercy seems more perfect. Likewise Piety, and much more Religion, which regards God infinite proximately, as the object to which worship is due and rendered, not as the object Quod of the Theological virtues. And indeed it is most noble among the virtues which are concerned with one's own good.

The REASON is, because, as D. Thom. teaches in the cited article, the good of another is contained in a certain diffusion, in which the notion of goodness resplends most, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Rhetoric, cap. 9.

Then the object of Justice conduces most to the common good of human Society, as Cicero says lib. 1. offic. and Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 5.

YOU OBJECT with Buridanus after Scotus in 3. dist. 27. quaest. 1. that the virtues which are concerned with one's own good are more according to the inclination of Nature and of Charity.

It is ANSWERED that legal Justice is more according to the inclination, because it is toward the common good; but particular Justice has other excellences, which on that account preponderate, as I said in prima secundae, Tract. 2. disp. 2. quaest. 12. Then the Virtues which are concerned with one's own good for the moderating of the passions, such as Fortitude, Temperance, and others annexed to these, do not have so rational an object, but more a sensible one, as D. Thom. says and Valentia puncto 5.

I shall not repeat the excellences of Justice indicated quaest. 3. from D. Bonau. in Diaeta, which S. Doct. pursues again ad Psal. 18. on those words: Who shall direct my ways, etc.

What sort of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed.

In as many ways as Justice is called so, as related quaest. 1., in so many ways is the opposite Injustice called, according to the rule of opposites, in Aristotle 5. Ethic. cap. 1.

Therefore injustice first signifies all iniquity, as it is taken in prima Ioan. 3. and Valentia notes quaest. 3. punct. 1. This therefore is opposed to general justice, which makes holy. Of this in Psalm. 91. All the sons of iniquity shall be scattered: Immediately he sets the antithesis The just shall flourish like the palm tree. This injustice embraces all sins, whether from suggestion, or from one's own will, or from habit, whatever they may be of heart, of mouth, and of deed; as S. Doct. observes ad eum Psal. and just as every declination from evil, and pursuit of good, is justice, as is said Psalm. 33. Decline from evil, and do good, etc. The eyes of the Lord are upon the Just, so every pursuit of evil, and flight from the good due, is injustice, as S. Doct. warns serm. 18. Hexaëmeronis.

S. Doct. brings forward there another injustice, which is an imperfection in the virtues. Such is that of those who often fall: A just man falls seven times a day. Proverb. 24. On the contrary, some just men are perfect, who fall more rarely, of whom Proverb. 12. Whatever befall the just man, it shall not grieve him. And cap. 28. The just man, bold as a lion, shall be without fear. The Church teaches this perfection of justice Eccles. 4. Fight for justice even unto death, and Matth. 5. Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice. Behold S. Doctor.

Therefore he places justice in three things Psalm. 33. In the declination from evil; the election of good; and the progress in good, as S. Doct. notes in the place cited above, and ad Psal. 110.

But PRE-EMINENTLY general Injustice is any transgression of the Laws, just as he is just who observes the law: Such is said to be Simeon, Lucae 2. A just man. And Zacharias with Elisabeth: They were both just, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame. And Noë Genes. 6. Just in his generations; namely, in all the commandments of God, as is said Psal. 118. I was directed to all thy commandments; I have hated every unjust way. For whoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one, is become guilty of all, as is said Iacobi 2. and S. Doct. pursues it in cap. 1. Lucae.

But more PROPERLY Injustice is the vice and sin opposed to legal justice, which is the virtue directing to the common good: D. Thom. calls this art. 1. illegal, which is a special sin, if it is committed out of contempt for the common good, and out of a settled intention of acting against it, as D. Thom. teaches loc. cit. Sotus lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. ad 1. Valentia quaest. 3. punct. 1. Otherwise it will not be a sin distinct from those which are committed against those virtues whose acts are to be exercised under the command of legal justice; but it will be the common condition of sins of this kind, and as it were a common sin, as Sotus and Valentia call it, and as I said in disputat. 22. quaest. 1.

But MOST PROPERLY it signifies the particular vice and sin opposed to the equality due of one to another, which particular Justice safeguards. Now this injustice is mortal in its genus, as D. Thom. teaches art. 4. although it can be venial on account of the smallness of the matter, or on account of the imperfection of an act not sufficiently deliberate, or not sufficiently voluntary, as on account of lightly culpable ignorance, as D. Thom. teaches in the cited article and more fully D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 2.

But Injustice of this kind is DIVIDED into various subordinate species, namely first into Injustice against distributive Justice, and Injustice against Commutative. Then into various species of injustice against Commutative according to the very diverse ways in which one can offend against it, which S. Doct. enumerates and explains in the place cited, and which I enumerated with Aristotle quaest. 1. and shall explain in their proper places.

Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE.

You have the various significations of IUDICII in Navarro supra Rubricam de Iudiciis, and in Valentiam disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto primo.

The name of Judgment signifies MANY things. First it signifies the definition of that which is Just and equal among some, connoting at the same time a certain power of compelling the parties to the execution of the right defined. Such judgment is the sentence of a judge. Whence he is called Iudex whose it is to judge according to the laws, which in Greek is δίκαιος from δικάζω, as Valentia notes with D. Bonav. in 1. dist. 45. parte 1. dub. 1. litt. Therefore indico is ius dico.

SECONDLY by Metaphor it has been transferred to signify that which has been judged by a judge, as Ioan. 5. They who have done evil shall come forth into the resurrection of judgment. And prima Cor. 11. He eats and drinks judgment to himself. Therefore it chiefly expresses condemnation, as S. Doct. indicates in 4. dist. 18. p. 1. dubio secundo.

THIRDLY in the same way it also signifies, in a certain way, things pertaining to judgment, as the tribunal. Thus Judgment is divided into Secular and Ecclesiastical cap. Quanto, extra de Iudiciis.

FOURTHLY it signifies any definition of the intellect, in what manner it is said to pertain to Synesis, which is a part of potential Prudence, and it ought to be regulated to truth, as S. Doct. teaches dist. 25. citata, secundo sent. dub. 1. But this is twofold, Speculative and Practical, as D. Bonav. teaches in 2. dist. 23. quaest. 2. ad 2. et dist. 7. p. 2. quaest. 1. in corpore.

FIFTHLY it signifies that sentence of the intellect which is made concerning the probity of another, concerning which Matth. 7. Judge not, and you shall not be judged.

But this SENTENCE is from the will commanding, whose it is to judge. Therefore free choice also is defined as the judgment of reason, because in the free act, especially of judging concerning the probity of another, reason intervenes, and the judgment or decree of the will, as S. Doctor observes loc. cit. Secundi sent.

But S. Doct. OBSERVES in 1. dist. 3. p. 1. quaest. 1. ad 4. that to judge concerning something is twofold. The first, by discerning whether it is, or is not; and in this way judgment belongs to every intellect knowing with respect to every object. The second, by approving or reproving; and thus it does not judge concerning truth, but according to it concerning other things, as D. August. says de vera Religione, cap. 31. that a judge does not judge concerning the law, but according to it judges concerning other things, and in this way one judging exercises the judging power, and the Right over the judged. Therefore this judgment is reserved to God, but not conceded to us, as Matth. loc. cit. says and Paulus Galatas 6. Therefore do not judge before the time, until the Lord come.

In almost this manner he says three things of JUDGMENT. First the collation of merit or demerit to reward or punishment properly. Secondly he adds the discussion of merits and the pronouncing of sentence. Thirdly it is called, appropriately, condemnation itself, as S. Doct. notes in 4. dist. 47. art. 1. quaest. 3. in resol. Therefore we are prohibited from judging, that is, from condemning anyone, even privately, after the merits and demerits have been discussed, because this pertains to the judgment of God, as S. Doct. teaches ibi, et in Diaeta, tit. 9. in finem, citing that prima Corinth. 4. Elucidating which passage S. Doct. in Appendice Diaetae Dom. 4. Advent. says: The Law of the Emperor says, the lesser power ceases. Therefore the Apostle, considering the advent of the eternal judge, restrains it, saying: Judge not, etc. and in speculo animae, cap. 1. after he has said: suspicion is an evil opinion from slight causes, and this proceeds from the evil affection of envy; and then it has the notion of mortal, but otherwise it is not judged mortal; he adds: Judgment is perverse when one, ill affected toward another, not only suspects evil in him from slight causes, but also defines in heart or mouth, in the manner of a sentence, that mortal sin is committed by someone, and this of its genus is mortal, from whatever root it proceeds. Whence the Gloss on that, prima Cor. 4. Do not judge before the time says: We cannot avoid suspicions, because we are men; but judgment, that is, definitive sentences, we ought to guard against. But this judgment is always a sin too grave. This S. Bonav. says, and p. 3. Stimuli, cap. 8. he adds the reason why these judgments are forbidden to us, from the Apostle Rom. 14. Who art thou, that judgest another man's servant, and he repeats again: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord come, namely, because our neighbors are not subject to us in the forum of conscience, but to the Lord, and in the Sacrament, to His Ministers.

MOREOVER, if Judgment be right, it will be an act of Justice: But it will be right, if the due equality is established, both by a public Judge in the Tribunal of the Forum, and unto condemnation; and by anyone in the private judgment of conscience, namely, when in practice one judges according to that which is established to us, yet not unto condemnation, as S. Doct. warns opusc. de profectu Relig. cap. 1. Therefore what pertains to establishing the true pertains to prudence; but what pertains to establishing equality in order to the reputation of our neighbor, to which each one has the right of defending, will be an act of Justice, as Valentia declares loc. cit. But the Judgment which can be made privately by us concerning the inexcusable probity of our neighbor pertains to Prudence, not to Justice, because it does not pertain to us to speak the right concerning the crimes of all others. See also Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 1.

By what reason the public Judgment of the Judge is just.

IN this matter it is certain, first, that among Christians there can be just Judgments, against the error of the Waldensians and the Anabaptists, as Tannerus warns, disp. 4. quaest. 4. dub. 1.

IT IS PROVED

IT IS PROVED at length by the Saintly Doctor, p. 2. de Eccles. Hier. cap. 2., where the Saintly Doctor shows that Judges and Princes ought to be like the supernal Virtues, so that they may judge rightly. He brings forward several Scriptures on this point, 1. Reg. 14., where of King David it is said: But you, my lord the King, are as an Angel of God, who is moved neither by blessing nor by cursing. From this he deduces that the Judge must be strong, in order to judge rightly. Therefore Eccles. 7. Do not seek to be made a Judge, unless you have the strength to break through iniquities, lest perhaps you fear the face of the mighty. Sap. 6. Hear, O Kings and Judges, who judge the earth: to you is Power given by the Most High. The same is found in Psalm. 2. in the New Testament: Be instructed, you who judge the earth. Therefore in Exodus 32. rules for judging are given to the faithful: You shall not accept gifts, etc., and Deuter. 16. You shall not respect persons nor accept gifts, for they blind, etc. Second Paral. 19. See what you do: for you do not exercise the judgment of men, but of God. Isa. 1. Judge for the orphan, help the oppressed.

THUS David judged, 1. Reg. 30.: David rescued all that the Amalekites had taken, nor was anything missing from the spoils: but all things whatsoever they had seized, he brought back and restored. And 2. Reg. 22. Whom he shall repay fourfold, where he is called by the holy prophet to judge. And Solomon, 3. Reg. 3., judged — while he was holy — over those two little harlots concerning the stolen child. Many other passages from the Scriptures the Saintly Doctor brings forward in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 50. also for the law of grace.

THESE he also pursues at length ad cap. 6. Sap., in these words: Power has been given to you by the Lord, and strength by the Most High, who will question your works; for, though you were ministers of his kingdom, you did not judge rightly, nor keep the law of justice. Where he adduces that Rom. 13. There is no power but from God; Ioan. 19. You would have no power against me unless it had been given you from above. That Isa. 1. They do not judge for the orphan, and the cause of the widow does not come to them. The same he laments, Hierem. 5.

THE SAME authorities the Saintly Doctor pursues at length on that Ioan. 19. You would have no power, etc., where in the New Testament the power of judging is asserted by Christ, and by the Apostle, Rom. 13., and by St. Peter.

THE SAME he pursues in serm. 22. Hexaëmer., where he observes that it was promised in Isaiah, chapter 1: I will restore your judges as they were at the first: after this you shall be called the city of the just, the faithful city of Sion; she shall be redeemed in judgment, etc. Whence it follows that judgments erected in the Old Testament were not destroyed in the New, as regards power.

THEREFORE Paul also appealed to Caesar, Act. 25. and 26., and therefore, together with Peter, he exhorted the faithful to submit to the judgment of Princes, Rom. 13. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, etc. For he does not carry the sword without cause: for he is God's minister: an avenger into wrath upon him who does evil, as the Saintly Doctor shows in 2. dist. 44. art. 3. quaest. 1., and in the first Epistle of Peter, 2. Servants, be subject to your masters, not only to the good, but also to the froward, etc. Therefore in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, 6., Paul praises judgments.

IT IS PROVED more fully by the Saintly Doctor in Hexaëmer. serm. 16. from the constant usage of the Church from the times of the Apostles onward; for St. Peter condemned Ananias and Sapphira, Act. 5., and in the following centuries there were always ecclesiastical and secular judgments in the Church, as is shown in the Tract. de Legibus, and p. 1. Tract. 1. Disputationibus Prooemialibus. These are confirmed by the ancient monuments of Councils, histories, and Decretals. Only this was most constantly provided: that ecclesiastical judgments should be held among ecclesiastics, as appears in the Decretis; and secular judgments among the faithful, if they could be held, as the Apostle teaches, prima Corinth. 6.

IT IS PROVED thirdly by the Saintly Doctor, in 2. dist. 44. art. 2. quaest. 1. ad 1., by the most solid argument of St. Peter, prima cap. 2., where, having described the state of the holy liberty of the New Testament, he concludes: Be subject, therefore, to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the King, as excelling: or to governors, as sent by him to punish malefactors, but for the praise of the good: for so is the will of God. From this the reason is drawn out, which he magnifies against the fourth argument of the following quaestio, and which Valencia uses, disp. 5. quaest 4 punct 2.: What is useful and necessary by natural law for the good of the commonwealth is not abolished, but established by the decrees of the Christian Religion; for Religion does not destroy, but perfects, the law of nature. But judges and judgments are necessary for the Christian commonwealth: Therefore. The minor is proved by the example of all nations, and from God's ordinance, Deuter. 16. Judges and Magistrates you shall constitute, that they may judge the people. Then the minor is evident: for if there were no judges and judgments by which the disputes of men would be terminated, and punishments assigned to crimes, and rewards to rightly performed political works, the greatest disturbance and overthrow would appear. With this reasoning he argues at greater length in p. 2. de Ecclesiastica Hier. cap. 2., as I shall say below.

NOR do the heretical adversaries lean on a firm foundation.

THEY OPPOSE, indeed, Matth. 5.: If any one will contend with you in judgment and take away your tunic, give him also your cloak.

THE SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS on this passage, Lucae 6., that judgments are not forbidden; but contentions and quarrels, and the lust of vengeance, as St. Augustine says, epist. 5. Therefore, in sum, it must be held (says the Saintly Doctor) that the correction of a neighbor, or the hindering of evil, or the punishment of a crime committed by one who can and ought to hinder it — such as the Minister of the law — is not forbidden; but here the lust of revenge is forbidden and restrained, both as to the hand, and as to the sign, and as to the mind. In the same way St. Augustine says it is to be understood of what he said there also: And whoever shall strike you on one cheek, offer him the other also, and yet he himself, Ioan. 19., corrected the striker and did not offer the other cheek: similarly Paul, Actorum 23., struck on the cheek, answered: God shall strike you, you whited wall, and yet both were most patient in spirit, as the Saintly Doctor observes, loc. cit. ad locum Ioan., from St. Augustine, tract. 113. and epist. 5. — see him. Thus answers Valencia, disp. 3. quaest. 16. punct. 1. col. 742. and disp. 5. quaest. 4. p. 2., and Tannerus in the cited place.

THEY OPPOSE, secondly, Matth. 7.: Judge not, that you be not judged.

THE SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, p. 1. Concil. sect. 10., from St. Augustine, lib. 2. de serm. Domini in monte, cap. 28., that not every judgment is forbidden; but one rashly passed without firm reason. The same is the judgment of St. Hilar., Can. 5. in Matth.

THE SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, de septem Itineribus aeternitatis, Itinere primo, dist. 4., from St. Jerome, that the order of correction is taught, so that first, judging ourselves, we amend ourselves, casting the beam out of our own eye, before we contemplate the mote in another's eye.

THAT indeed he does not condemn every judgment is found in Ioan. 12.: Judge not according to the face, but judge just judgment, as St. Bonaventure there observes.

THEY OBJECT also from the first Epistle to the Corinthians, 6.: Brother contends with brother in judgment: and that before unbelievers? Indeed already altogether it is a fault in you, that you have judgments among yourselves.

IT IS ANSWERED, not that judgment is condemned, as I said above — indeed it is instituted; but that an undue one is reproved. Four conditions, however, are laid down by the Doctors that a judgment be just: thus St. Thomas, 2.2. quaest. 60. art. 1. and 6.; St. Bonaventure, in 2. dist. 44., in the cited places, and lib. 1. Pharetra, cap. 45.

T H E F I R S T is legitimate authority, such as ordinary Judges have, or Delegates, or even Arbitrators, who have that power by the law of nations over those who freely commit themselves to them. And such also would be one who, by a special judgment of God, fulfilled that office, as Phinees, Numer. 25., slew the Madianite and the Hebrew man, as the Saintly Doctor notes in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 51.

Because of the lack of this condition a Judgment is said to be unjust by usurpation, as St. Thomas says, art. 6.; St. Bonaventure, 2. dist. 44. art. 2. quaest. 1.

Y E T it can happen that the judgment of some Tyrant, who truly lacks legitimate power, be otherwise just and bind, namely if he be in peaceful possession. For otherwise the peaceful state of the commonwealth could not stand, unless what the ruler justly decreed is obeyed: Thus Valencia, punct. 2., who says that Victoria is held to have thought so, and it is the opinion of St. Bonaventure in the cited place, in the body and ad 2., where he teaches that the Tyrant, although he rules without legitimate power, and accordingly decides unjustly by reason of usurpation, must nevertheless be heard, if he decide justly, for the punishment of malefactors and the praise of the good, as is said in the first Epistle of Peter, 2.; and accordingly his decrees are just, and it is just to subject oneself to them.

T H E S E C O N D condition is, that the Judgment be conformed to the rule of Justice, namely, that what is decreed be just, even if the judge does not act from the virtue of Justice; but from the political rule, lest he be deprived — such was that Judge, Luc. 16., who finally sanctioned what was just for the Widow out of fear of punishment; as Valencia observes after St. Bonaventure on that passage. By the lack of this condition, the Judgment is said to be unjust, and it does not bind in conscience, as Innocent and Panormitanus teach, in cap. Plerique, extra de immunitate Ecclesiae; Sylvest., under the word Sententia, quaest. 11.; Sotus, lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 2.

¶ T H E T H I R D condition is the due judicial order: citation, hearing of the Accused, defenses, etc.

T H E F O U R T H condition, that he judge from the affection of Justice. So all the Interpreters of St. Thomas, quaest. 60. art. 2.; Suarez, 3. p. Tom. 5. disp. 4. sect. 7.; Tannerus, in the cited place.

Note, however, that this condition does not render the judgment invalid, as the cited authors warn. But an order failing in essentials renders it null. But of this there will be a sub-disputation.

A F I F T H condition is added: its conformity with the rules of Prudence. Now for this it ought to have two conditions: one, that it decide with due consideration; the other, that it not be from a depraved affection of hatred, or some other affection, or of gifts, etc.

¶ I T O U G H T also to be asserted that a Judge does not straightway lose his power because he lies in mortal sin, against Wicleph, whose error is condemned in the Council of Constant., sess. 8.

I T I S P R O V E D at length by the Saintly Doctor, in 2. dist. 44., where Peter, prima cap. 2., commands obedience to Masters, even to the froward. Iob 34. He makes the Hypocrite to reign. Osee 13. I will give them a King in my wrath. Ioan. 19. You would have no power unless it had been given you from above. The Saintly Doctor adduces examples of these in the Biblia, cap. 102. For thus of Nabuchodonosor it is said, Danielis 4.: Your power reaches to the ends of the whole earth. The same is asserted in cap. 5.; and to Ieroboam, 3. Reg., the Lord gave the kingdom of Israel, and to other wicked men, as the Saintly Doctor observes in the cited place. And Matth. 22.: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Now Tiberius was impious, which the Saintly Doctor elegantly discourses upon in serm. 5. Dom. 22. post Pentecosten.

T H E R E A S O N also is that of St. Bonaventure which Valencia uses: because the foundation of jurisdiction is not the grace of God, but his will in the order of political governance, and often also for the punishment of peoples, as he discourses in 2. dist. 44. art. 2.

N O W it is controverted: whether the judgment of a judge is rendered mortally evil because it is passed by a judge constituted in mortal sin — and indeed in the times of St. Bonaventure most Theologians held this, at least concerning Ecclesiastical Judges: Alens., 3. p. quaest. 40. membr. 3.; St. Thomas, 4. dist. 19. quaest. 2. art. 2. St. Bonaventure seems to suspect it in those words, Ioan. 8.: He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone, where he speaks of the danger for such judges, and more especially for those living in public sin, because they scandalize the peoples whom they ought to admonish and call away from evil.

F O L L O W I N G this were Paludanus, 4. dist. 19. quaestione 3. artic. 3.; Sylvester, under the word correctio fraterna, quaestione 16.

T H E O P P O S I N G opinion, however, is the common one: Thus St. Thomas, hic, art. 2. ad 3., where he abandoned the former opinion. Thus Caietanus; Sotus, lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 2.; Navar., in Comment. super Rubricam, de Iud. num. 42.; Valencia, disp. 5. quaest. 4. punct. 2.; and it is St. Bonaventure's, in the cited place.

I A S S E R T with St. Bonaventure that there is some sin in that case, but I do not lay down that it is always mortal, but dangerous, lest it lead to mortal sin.

I T I S P R O V E D first by St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., from that saying of Christ, He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone, which passage Anselm there expounds thus, and St. Augustine, tract. 33., who say that those unworthy to judge the woman were brought forward by Christ. Since, therefore, such judges are unworthy, it follows in some way that they sin, as Valencia confesses, freely responding.

I T I S P R O V E D secondly by St. Bonaventure, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 45., from many Fathers.

St. G R E G O R Y, homil. 26. in Evang.: It is hard, that one who knows not how to hold the measures of his own life should become judge of another's life. Lo, the peril to which a depraved man exposes himself, when he makes himself judge of another's life.

St. I S I D O R E, de summo bono, cap. 55. sent. 1.: None of the foolish or the wicked ought to be a judge: for the fool by sloth, the wicked man by wickedness, corrupts the truth which he has learned.

St. A U G U S T I N E, epistol. 174.: It is unjust that anyone should wish to judge another and be unwilling to be judged himself.

St. A M B R O S E, in 2. Apol. David, cap. 2.: Let each one who is about to judge another first judge himself, and let him not condemn lesser errors in another, when he himself has committed graver ones.

N O R does Valencia satisfy, saying that the Fathers only signify that it is illicit if it be done without humility. For indeed with relaxed sinews it cries out that it is in itself unjust and dangerous. Whether it be always mortal, the Saintly Doctor does not assert.

A S T O the foundation Valencia opposes — that there is a great difference between the use of the power of order and of jurisdiction, so that this is not so grave as to confect the Sacraments unworthily — I grant it; but he will not deny that even that is evil.

N O W the Saintly Doctor elegantly discourses on the requirements of Judges in the second part, de Eccl. Hier. cap. 2., where, likening them to the Angelic Virtues, he teaches: For the Virtues are Angels of the second order, of the middle Hierarchy, who are so called because of the strong and unchangeable virility for the reception of divine illuminations, not in any way weak, but virilely reduced to the imitation of God (as St. Dionysius teaches, cap. 8. de coelesti Hier.), not abandoning the deiform movement, but bearing it firmly into the superessential and potentific virtue deiformly proceeding. All these things he teaches are to be referred to those who have obtained the power of judging.

F O R, that peace and concord may be had in the Church of Christ, justice has been ordained by the Lord. But Justice and Peace accompany one another; for the Psalmist says: The mountains shall receive peace for the people, and the hills justice; because there would not be peace in the mountains, that is, in proud men, unless there were justice in the hills, that is, in the good and humble Prelates and Judges, in whom virility, or angelic virtuousness, is required, so that neither by blessing nor by cursing they be turned aside from the rectitude of justice, as is said of David, 2. Reg. 14.: But you, my lord the King, are as an Angel of God, who is moved neither by cursing nor by blessing. The judge, therefore, ought to be strong and virile, lest by fear, hatred, or love he be turned from the vigor of justice. Therefore the counsel is given, Ecclesiastici 7.: Do not seek to be made a judge, unless you have the strength to break through iniquities, lest perhaps you fear the face of the mighty. And Sap. 6.: Hear, O Kings and Judges, who judge the earth: to you is strength given by the Most High, etc.

N E X T, the Judges ought to be like the Virtues in the virtuous defense of justice, as is said, Ecclesiastici 4.: Fight for Justice, and be certain even unto death for justice. For when subjects see Prelates pusillanimous and tepid, they are easily terrified, as is said, Zach. 13.: I will strike the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered. Therefore it is said, Ezech. 3.: I have made you like an adamant and like flint; fear them not; where Marinus Brixiensis [reads] magnesem, because the Judge ought to be strong as the adamant, and at the same time benign, attracting, as the Saintly Doctor says. Therefore let them act virilely, lest there be said to them that of Ezech. 13.: You have not gone up against [them].

T H I R D L Y they are compared to the Virtues on account of the imitation of Divine wisdom, which the Judges ought to hold before their eyes in their sentences. For human wisdom is bound to imitate the virtue of divine justice. Therefore Sap. 6.: Love the light of wisdom, you who preside over the peoples, lest that of Hierem. 5. be said of them: Perhaps the poor and the foolish know not the way of the Lord, and the judgment of their God. I will go forth, therefore, etc. Isa. 56.: They have not known satiety; the pastors themselves have not understood understanding. Therefore it is said of the Virtues that virilely, through the reception of illuminations, they are reduced to the imitation of God. For those who are illuminated by God execute justice without offense, and this is said, Psalm. 88.: Lord, they shall walk in the light of your countenance, and in your justice shall they be exalted.

F O U R T H L Y they are like the Virtues in the swiftness of dispatching the causes of the poor; for true Justice, when it has become known to the judge, is not to be delayed in execution, but is to be decided and promulgated at once, and this especially in the causes of the poor, whose delay is harmful to them in many ways; and therefore the Virtues are said not to abandon the deiform movement, because virtuous Judges, the cause of the poor being known, do not defer judgment; as neither does God, of whom it is said, Ecclesiastici 35.: The Lord will not delay, but will judge the just, and will do judgment; and the Most Strong will not have patience with them.

F I F T H L Y they ought to be like the Virtues, not burdened with gifts, which are therefore forbidden, Exodi 23., Deuter. 16., because they blind and enervate the strength of Justice. Therefore they are likened to the Virtues, which arrive at the Potentific and superessential virtue, that is, in their movements and acts they regard only God, not their own advantage. For they are admonished, 2. Paralip. 19.: See what you do: for you do not exercise the judgment of men, but of God, as I also admonished above.

S I X T H L Y let them be likened to the heavenly Virtues, on account of the swift and virile liberation of the oppressed. For those Angels are held to restrain the demons, as Tob. 8.: Raphael seized the demon, and Dan. 6.: God sent his Angel and shut the mouths of the lions. For there are some powerful men, cruel as demons, oppressors of the innocent. Therefore it is said, Proverb. 24.: Snatch them who are led to death: and Iob 29.: Because I had delivered the poor man crying out, and the orphan who had no helper, I broke the jaws of the wicked, and from his teeth I snatched [the prey]. As in the first book of Reg. 17. David is said to have snatched the sheep and lambs from the jaws of the lion and the bear. So God commands, Isa. 1.: Judge for the orphan, help the oppressed, etc.

F I N A L L Y they ought to be like the Angelic Virtues, which are destined for working miracles, restoring eyes torn out, feet cut off, etc. For so also the Judges ought manfully to take care to restore goods unjustly taken away, of fame, body, fortune, and to compel unjust robbers to satisfaction; and this is figured in the deed of David: All things which the Amalekites had taken, nor was anything missing from the spoils, but all things whatsoever they had seized he brought back and restored. And 2. Reg. 12. Whom (he decreed) he shall repay fourfold, and 3. Reg. 3. Solomon restored the stolen infant to his mother.

H E P R O C E E D S elegantly to liken Princes and Kings to the Powers. Now the Powers are Angels, by whose special power the adverse powers are restrained, lest they harm as much as they would wish. Now St. Dionysius says of the heavenly Powers, cap. 8. de coelesti Hier.: The appellation of the holy Powers teaches a power both well adorned and undivided in its order around divine receptions, not tyrannically precipitating the inferior powers into things potestative, but potently reducing them into divine things, and assimilating them, as far as is lawful, to the potentific causal power, and converting the inferior things toward God, who is the prince of all power, according to the hierarchical disposition, making the divine and shining power resplendent in inferior things, etc.

Whence the Angels of that order restrain and curb all who impede the hierarchical order of prelation and subjection. Hence they do not allow the power of prelation to be contemned by subjects, nor do they permit subjects to be violently oppressed. In all these things Princes ought to imitate the heavenly Powers, so that they rule wisely, live orderly, potently repress and avenge evil, spare the innocent, and not allow injury to be done to wretched persons.

T H E R E F O R E they will be like the Powers, because animated by the love of Justice they avenge all wickedness upon the guilty and pursue the disturbers of peace, as is said, Machab. 3., of Judas. See the Seraphic Doctor discoursing throughout in the Angelic tongue.

A G A I N, and again resuming this discourse, part. 4. de Ecclesiastica Hier. cap. 3., he likens the judges of the earth to the heavens. To the heavens therefore also the first judges of the Church, the Apostles, were likened, Psal. 18., and thus Psal. 21.: The heavens shall declare his justice. Certainly the impious cannot represent the justices of the Lord; for it is said, Psalm. 49.: But to the sinner God said: why do you declare my justices? But the heavens, that is, heavenly men, whose conversation is in the heavens. I shall set down, therefore, parallels between Judges and the heavens.

A N D first indeed, the heavens are bodies so sincere that among the wise it is disputed whether they are composed of matter and form; incorruptible, inasmuch as where there is matter, there is potency for new forms, and accordingly for corruption. So the Judges ought to be so separated from every earthly admixture that it may be doubted whether they are concreted of flesh and blood, so that they do not feel the affections of parents or friends, and can be said, as it were: Melchisedech, King of Salem, without father, without mother, without genealogy — so incorruptible ought they to be with respect to gifts, to prayers, and to terrors.

N E X T, the Heavens are most subtle substances, diaphanous, transmitting the light with which they are suffused. So also the Judges ought to shine with integrity, purity, and innocence so preeminent, that they transfuse the heavenly light into the world by preeminent examples of life.

O F T E N U O U S substance, and fluid, are the heavens, according to the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor and of the more recent Astronomers, yet in their place standing in their orb Mathematically, as if riveted most firm in structure, or as Eugubinus read: and the species; so also the Judges, of a frail nature indeed, yet most firm, standing in the most perfect spherical figure, so that they halt about the mean of equity without deviation, and are, as it were, the mirror of Justice and of the other virtues.

T H E H E A V E N S are moved above the center of the world, along the line of the Equator, from east to west with a regular motion, in the space of 24 hours, and render day and night; and they carry with them all the stars, and indeed, the wandering and deviating ones, they vindicate by force from their errors toward the west, which meanwhile, repressed, shriek, as it were, mourning their sins. So also the Judges, above the Equator of commutative Justice, rendering rewards to the good and punishments to the impious, should most swiftly carry them along, correcting the wandering ones even unto the west.

W I T H an unequal eccentric motion above the points of Aries and Libra the heavens are seen to move from the West according to the succession of the signs, so that they distribute, as it were in Geometric proportion, lights and influxes to the various regions, and portion out the good with proportional distribution: but especially the Sun, for the preservation of all regions, bending between the Tropics, at due times toward the North through the boreal signs, and toward the South through the Antarctida, so that no region can complain that a portion of light and influx has been denied to it — which would happen if it were moved only above the Equator.

S O also the Judges ought not only to repay rewards and punishments by commutative Justice, but also by Distributive [Justice] above the Balance of Justice, where again an Equinox is made, the commutative nevertheless being also kept; and they are held, strong ones above Aries of gentle clemency, to apportion the goods of the commonwealth in Geometric proportion, the needs and merits of each member of the commonwealth having been computed; so that no one can justly complain that he is left naked in rigid winter, or scorched with want in torrid summer, but all are clothed with the flowers and fruits of the commonwealth, imitating the Sun of Justice, CHRIST.

T H E F I R M A M E N T is moved trembling above the pivots of Aries and Libra. So the Judges ought to fear lest they incline too much; and therefore, immovable, let them stand above the poles of Justice and mercy. For thus it is enjoined upon them: and now, O Kings, understand; be instructed, you who judge the earth. Serve the Lord in fear, and exult unto him with trembling; lay hold on discipline, lest you perish from the just way. Psalm. 2.

V E R Y S L O W L Y the eccentric of the Sun is moved, traversing one degree in each century of years, completing the year according to the measure of the Crystalline [heaven], the great year. So the Judges ought to be most deliberate in irregular movements, nor take a step unless the truth by which we are burned has been clearly recognized.

T H E M O O N, nearer to the earth, appearing great undeservedly, deviates with its moonlike motions among the other Wanderers. So those nearer to earthly things, in governing, deviate more in judgments and governances, and accordingly are sprinkled with earthly dregs. Such appears to our eyes the Ottoman Empire, a huge chaos of barbarians, where they hold cruelty for severity, and dissolution in place of mercy; therefore also, spotted, subject to earthly eclipses, often walking in the shadows of the earth, it is darkened by abomination, luxury, robberies, oppressions. Harsh appears the Moon, and wrinkled, full of hollow mountains and valleys; so that sordid empire, deformed with spots and wrinkles, strewn with earthly dregs, appears to wise eyes great, but to the most expert intellects most worthy of being cast away.

N O T far away is Mercury, Aser, intent upon treacherous trades and piratical navigations; who yet can say to the Ottoman predominant what that Pirate said to Alexander, or, according to some, to Pompey: You accuse me of robbing a single skiff, and do you not see yourself the despoiler of the world?

N E A R at hand is the effeminate kingdom of Venus in Assyria

Soon the body of the Sun, adored among the Persians.

H E R E the warlike Mars of the Thracians and the Greeks; the Jupiter of the Cretans; the Saturn of the Easterns, of the golden, as they fable, age. All these, wandering, are at last corrected by the Justice of God. These emblems are drawn from Bucellius at the end, and from Cassanaeus, p. p. Catalogi gloriae mundi.

L E T U S R A I S E our eyes to the solid Firmament, and set forth the images and stemmata also of Kings and Princes, even of Christians, that from them they may learn Justice.

T H E R E A R E in the circle of life, the Zodiac: the Aquarius of Lorraine; the Fishes, the Kings of Sicily. The Aries of the Argonauts. The Taurus of the Egyptians, and most noble of Certhes; the Taurus of Mechebel, and the Bulls of Savoy the Gemini; the Cancer of the Gambari; the Venetian Leo; the shining Virgo of the most powerful golden King of the Gauls, and the Libra adorned with lilies. The Scorpius of the Indians; the Sagittarius of the Scythians and Persians. The Leo of England, the Lyra of Ireland.

P R E S E N T are the Eagles of Austria, in the maternal boreal clime of the Crown; the Dragons of the Romans of Norway, the Bears of the Suevi; the Wolves and Horses of the Romulids. The Crosses of the Burgundians and of the Ethiopians. See also many other emblems of Justice in Bucellius and Cassanaeus, parte prima de gloria mundi.

In what way private judgment about one's neighbor is illicit.

THE PRINCIPAL difficulty concerns Judgment, by which one judges evil of another; for to judge good of someone is rarely, and only per accidens, a fault.

THEREFORE I suppose that to judge something for a just cause is not a sin. This is commonly supposed by S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas and others, and it is proved by the Holy Doctor on John 12 with that text: Judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment.

BUT WHAT cause is required for judging rightly is left to the prudent judge, as Soto noted, Book 3 de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 3; Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto 3.

THEREFORE I ASSERT: to judge deliberately that someone is evil, gravely harming his reputation, without a just cause, is mortal sin.

IT IS PROVED from the Holy Doctors, first from Matthew 7: Judge not, that you may not be judged. They confirm it from Bede on that passage, and from St. Augustine tract. 90. in Ioannem.

NEXT it is proved by 1 Corinthians 4: Do not judge before the time. So D. Thomas art. 3, and P. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 10, where he observes that rash judgment is measured according to the Savior's saying, Matthew 7: With what judgment you judge, you shall be judged. Where the Gloss says: If you judge anyone rashly with venial condemnation, you shall be condemned venially. If with mortal condemnation, you shall be condemned mortally. This, he says, is to be understood without prejudice to the opinion of others; for some say it is not mortal unless reputation is gravely harmed. Whence Valencia in the place cited, and Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 2. num. 18, with Aragon, just as they think it mortal to judge some light things of a Religious man, as that he is a liar; so they would not think it mortal to judge of a worldly young man that he has committed fornication, or of a soldier that he has killed someone unjustly, because the judgment is a grave evil insofar as reputation is gravely taken away or harmed. From similar things (they say) such men are not harmed. Valencia adds that it is also an undue and unjust judgment to judge rashly of the future, e.g. that man will perish, for that belongs to God, who perhaps will change that sinner's heart.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor opusc. de profectu religiosi, Lib. 1. cap. 1, from Romans 14: But thou, why judgest thou thy brother's servant? and Luke 6: Judge not, and you shall not be judged. He defines rash judgment as when I believe something was done with an evil intention, when it could have been done with another intention; or when someone is judged gravely fallen on light indications. For this is to usurp the scrutiny of hearts, which is proper to God, as is said in Jeremias 17.

THE SAME Holy Doctor cites on Luke 6 the words alleged, where he adds Proverbs 17: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both are abominable before God.

HE OBSERVES that to justify the wicked is abominable, not per se, but per accidens, when he is to be compared with another in order to something of justice, e.g. the distribution of honors, etc., and by that judgment an equality with another in good reputation is established or promoted, and the wicked man is preferred or made equal to the just, as the Holy Doctor noted in the places alleged, and Valencia puncto 1, and Navarre commentar. in Rubric. de Iudic. n. 47.

I ASSERT secondly: to judge of someone, even gravely, from light indications, but with fear/doubt, is not mortal sin. So S. Bonaventure in the places cited, and D. Thomas art. 3; Sylvester under the word Iudicium, quaest. 4; Cajetan on the said art. 3; Navarre loc. cit. num. 49 and following. So also Tanner loc. cit. num. 20, who says light indications are those by which a prudent man would not be moved to that judgment. So also Soto, Valencia, Aragon, and others.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, because the neighbor is not gravely harmed.

HE OBSERVES, however, in the place cited on the Judgment of suspicion that it is threefold. The first is of violent suspicion, when no or few signs of good appear, but all of evil; and this is not a sin. The second of temerity; when many signs of good, few of evil; and it is a grave venial sin. The third, when many of evil, but few are signs of good; and this is a lighter venial sin.

HE NOTES also in the place cited, de profectu religiosi, that fear is sometimes confused with suspicion, although they differ: for fear is directed to caution, as when, without suspecting evil of anyone, I close the Monastery as a precaution.

VALENCIA ADDS that such a judgment with doubt can be mortal by reason of the person; as if you judge some gravest evil of a most honest man, even with doubt, as incest with his mother or sister.

HE NOTES also punct. 4. that one can doubt by standing in suspense; but such doubt can be a sin, even if only venial, when one is lightly grounded and hangs between the two, so as not to incline toward judging the good. He adds, however, with Soto loc. cit. that it can be mortal by reason of a most illustrious person, as if someone is in doubt about Blessed John the Baptist, whether he was a saint or sinned mortally, etc.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ADDS, moreover, that thoughts of this kind belong more to a Prelate, who by reason of his governance can prudently be in suspense or doubt, and likewise to one who is enlightened from above, of whom the Apostle says: The spiritual man judgeth all things; but it is not true of those "spiritual" men who, like Catos, everywhere stick in their nose and judge with a quince-like zeal — say rather with a dog-in-the-manger zeal.

THE DIFFERENCE between Distributive and Commutative Justice is taken from the object. I distinguished and explained both p. p. Tract. 1. disp. 19. quaest. 1. Distributive justice, therefore, establishes equality among private persons, by dividing the goods of the Community among them equally, according to Geometric proportion, the dignity of persons being considered, in such a way, namely, that with the same Geometric proportion (as double, e.g., or sesquialter, etc.) by which the dignity of one is greater than the dignity of the other, he also obtains more of the common goods. But Commutative justice establishes equality among private persons, by giving or receiving an equal according to Arithmetic proportion, such as, e.g., between five and five.

THUS, then, Distributive justice has as its formal object the mean between excess and defect, according to Geometric proportion, just as, e.g., the quintuple is the mean between the sextuple and the quadruple; and therefore to him who exceeds another in dignity, e.g. by the quintuple, there ought to be distributed from the common goods quintuple more than to that other. But Commutative justice has as its formal object the mean between excess and defect, according to Arithmetic proportion; just as five is the mean between six and four; and therefore, of two men having five each, he who has taken one from the other must restore one to him, lest he himself have six and the other four, but each have five, which is the mean. Aristotle hands down this definition 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4, received by all. Nor is it necessary to dispute this doctrine with Geometric and Arithmetic speculations, for they would obscure the moral matter more, as Gregory of Valencia warns disp. 5. quaest. 5. puncto primo.

HE NOTES, however, that by Distributive justice an equality is established according to the relation of the Community to its parts, and by that very fact an equality is established also among the parts of the Community themselves; and in this last respect, he says, the formal reason of Distributive justice consists; for among these there is a quintuple equality, e.g., to the quintuple, a quadruple to the quadruple, which is an equality simply and properly, such as ought to be in proper justice, and this Aristotle teaches 5. Eth. chapter 2. Whence it happens that this Justice is not only in the Dispenser of the community, but also in the members of the community, in those capable of receiving this equality; for they can will it.

I ASSERT that these two Justices are specifically distinct. So Aristotle in the place cited, and the common view.

IT IS PROVED. Those virtues differ in species whose acts, from the formal reason of their object, have both a different praise and a different difficulty: such are the acts of Commutative and Distributive Justice: Therefore. The minor, as to praise, is evident; as to difficulty, however, it is proved, because by Commutative justice there is given to another what is truly his; but by Distributive justice there is given what is as it were his, inasmuch as what belongs to the whole community belongs also to the parts; but it is easier to give to another what is his absolutely, than what in another way is in some manner his.

From these things the answer to Buridan's argument 5. Eth. quaest. 7 is clear, where he contends he can prove that they are not specifically distinct, because both preserve equality. For we have already seen that the equality of each is different. See the rest in Valencia loc. cit., and Mastrius diff. 7. num. 179.

FURTHERMORE, the matter of Distributive and Commutative justice are the very things that are commuted or distributed; but the proximate matter of Commutative justice are commutations, either voluntary, as Buying, Selling, Exchange, Betrothal, Usury, Deposit, Hiring, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 2; or according to D. Thom. art. 3: Buying or Selling, which is the permutation of a thing for money; Usufruct, when someone grants gratis the use of a fruit-bearing thing, with the obligation of returning the same thing; Loan for use (Accomodatum), when the use of a non-fruit-bearing thing is granted gratis, with the obligation of returning the same thing in number; Mutuum (consumable loan), when likewise the use of a non-fruit-bearing thing is granted gratis, with the obligation of returning the same in species, not in number; Leasing and Hiring, when the use of a thing is granted for a price, with the obligation of returning the same: Deposit, when a thing is granted that it be kept and afterwards returned; Pawning, when a thing is granted to secure the obligation of satisfaction, namely that if he does not satisfy, it can be retained: Suretyship (Fideiussio), when someone simply obliges himself to satisfy for another. Add Bills of Exchange, Partnership, and other things to be discussed below.

THERE ARE ALSO Involuntary Commutations, from which some are clandestine, as Theft, Adultery, Poisoning, Pimping, the seduction of servants, Homicide treacherously committed, and false testimony. Others are violent, as scourging, Chains, Death, Robbery, Mutilation, Reviling, the infliction of Contumely. See St. Thomas.

BUT THE proximate matter of Distributive justice are the distributions of all the goods of the Republic, revenues, honors, etc. Indeed also of burdens, which ought to be distributed according to the distribution of goods and honors as well. See the same D. Thomas.

FROM WHAT has been said it seems to follow that Commutative justice does not observe Geometric equity, otherwise the species would be confused, as Valquez and Turrianus say: Yet Suarez, Card. Lugo, Poncius (in Mastrius n. 181) assert this for the case when someone, because of contracts, owes many and has gone bankrupt; and therefore cannot satisfy all equally; then he must satisfy all according to proportion; as if one creditor is owed a hundred gold pieces, another two hundred, let 150 be given to the latter, but only fifty to the former. Thus he will pay by Commutative justice, and Geometric proportion will be preserved.

YET FOR all that those equities are not confused, says Mastrius, because in Commutative justice an equity of quantity, of equality, and moreover of proportion is required; in Distributive justice, however, of proportion alone.

AMICUS, however, diff. 11. sect. 14, for that reason denies that they are specifically distinguished.

COLLECT MOREOVER that Commutative justice is a genus divided into subordinate species, as I related above; for in nearly each there is a different law, as Mastrius says num. 184; for the law concerning goods of reputation, life, fortune, etc. is different, as Amicus also says.

CARDINAL LUGO ALSO COLLECTS disput. 1. num. 43, on Distributive justice, that in every act it regards several persons compared, so that proportion may be preserved.

THIS, HOWEVER, Suarez denies, diff. de Iustitia sect. 3, as do Poncius and Mastrius, because a Bishop can confer a benefice on someone without comparison with others.

BUT THIS reason is frivolous; for Distributive justice to be preserved, the more worthy must be chosen, according to the decree of the holy Council of Trent; and this supposes a comparison, at least confused, or some distinct one with several; otherwise, if he confers it thinking nothing of it, he will not act according to the norm of Distributive Justice.