Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

On the Vices contrary to Prudence.

The higher seat in which a virtue is placed, and the more virtues it presides over, the more frequently is it assailed by the more common vices; wherefore Prudence, which is set over the other virtues for directing them to the mark in the citadel of the mind, is assailed by a very great troop of vices.

But the vices opposed to the virtues standing in the mean are of two kinds: some from defect; others from excess. The vices from defect of prudence, opposed to it, are four: Precipitation, Inconsideration, Inconstancy, Negligence.

The sins by excess opposed to prudence, which indeed bear before themselves a false species of prudence, are six: the Prudence of the flesh, Astuteness, Guile, Fraud, Solicitude for temporal things, Solicitude for things to come: All these are under the genus Imprudence, contrary to right discretion, which belongs to Prudence; of all these we shall inquire briefly.

PRECIPITATION is taken metaphorically from the precipitation of bodies from the highest to the lowest with a certain impetus, either innate or impressed; not by order gradually, but ruinously. Thus therefore someone precipitates, when reason and will rush down, not descending to operations by the due means and memorable degrees of considering the past, understanding the present, providing for the future, etc. But it rushes with the impetus of passion without counsel. This, if it is done from mere impulse of the will, is called precipitation; but if contempt is added of those things which ought to have been counseled, it is called Temerity, as D. Thom. ad 2. and D. Bonav. infra, Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 5. dub. 4. and Caietanus quaest. 53. art. 3. teach. Therefore the Saintly Doctor in speculo animae, cap. 3., saying negligence, which from contempt leads man precipitantly to works contrary to salvation, without due consideration, says it is mortiferous. That this is to be noted Caietanus art. cit. and Valentia disp. 4. quest. 5. punct. 1. admonish, that we may know when the penalty of some Law, or Canon, enacted against those doing something rashly, is incurred, namely when it is done from contempt. Gather this from D. Bonav. loc. cit. and cap. 1. of the same speculum; and in the Confessional.

Sylvester ADDS under the word Temeritas, that those also are held to act rashly, and to undergo the penalties enjoined for that rash transgression, who knowingly under some fraudulent pretext exercise an act prohibited by law, as is clear from C. Venerabilem extra, qui filii sint legitimi. So also Tannerus.

ANY audacity about evil is also wont to be called Temerity, as is clear from l. Iubemus C. de Sacrosanctis Ecclesiis, as Sylvester notes above, and Tutte-rem. in Clem. 1. de Sacrosanct. Eccles. But this temerity is not opposed to Prudence, but to Fortitude. Now we are treating of precipitation, and temerity, opposed to Prudence, by reason of the Eubulia annexed to it, whose act is to counsel well, as D. Thom. quaest. 53. art. 2. and 3. teaches. Therefore it is also opposed to the gift of Counsel, as I said. From which you also have that such temerity is a sin.

INCONSIDERATION is thoughtlessness, or a not sufficiently attentive cognition of those truths from which one would judge rightly, as D. Thomas says. And so this sin is opposed to Prudence by reason of Synesis, and Gnome, annexed to it, which are judge of right judgment. On that account Cautelam and Incircumspectio are enclosed under this sin, against Cautela and Circumspection, which are integral parts of Prudence: For those ordinations are made toward right judgment, from which those two opposites fall short, which for that reason constitute one vice, and at the same time, together with Inconsideration, as Valentia and Tannerus say numero 52.

But it happens for the most part, when someone, otherwise having knowledge of the Law or of fact, sins inconsiderately against either; whence he is recalled to that ignorance which the prudent man ought to have avoided; hence he has culpability when it arises from that inconsideration which is called affectata, by which someone, letting himself be carried away by the impetus of his passion, ceases to consider what and how he ought to act; But often he does not have culpability, if from the sudden presence of some unexpected thing the mind is suddenly snatched into oblivion, and is otherwise prepared to act rightly; for often, from the surreption of some affair, the mind is dispersed into various things, and however attentively you had considered, they are scattered into alien thoughts; wherefore inconsideration taken in this sense is not adverse to prudence; since it passes into the inculpable nature of Ignorance.

Nor does culpable Inconsideration intervene only in choosing evil simply; but also in rejecting the greater, or better good; which happens when a sensible good allure more vehemently, and reason does not weigh all with mature deliberation; whence it follows that this vice always precedes sin; although sometimes it is the effect of that sin of which it is not the cause; for the more the will succumbs to the appetite of sensible things, the less the Intellect can attend to the due pondering of things.

INCONSTANCY is a cessation from that decree of Prudence which ought to have been continued; or the reprobation of it, as D. Thomas says. Therefore it is opposed to the essential act of Prudence, which is right practical judgment about persevering in the purpose.

HENCE Inconstancy is defined: A light passage from one purpose to another, as is drawn from D. Bonavent. 3. p. Centiloquii, cap. 43.; wherefore aptly by similitude of the Leopard's defects, the inconstant man, with D. Bernard in serm. Gilleberti, serm. 29.: Man is like the Leopard, unlike himself, a man various and inconstant, straightway changing his counsels. For by the variety of colors, As it were the Leopard wills; and wills not, as is said in the same place.

INCONSTANCY differs from Impseverance in this; that this is a discontinuation from the due end, proposing another to itself; that from the purpose undertaken, choosing another thing; but both are adverse to prudence, dictating that one must persevere in the good and remain in the purpose, according to more and less.

THIS, by opposition to Constancy, has three degrees, as is gathered from the Seraphic Doctor de Gradibus virtutum, cap. 14. The first is, when someone is stricken from what he has begun by the praise, or indeed the blame of good men: The second, when someone is easily seduced by the praise or adulation of Players, or of evil men: The third is when someone is moved from a good purpose by mockery, or by any other light cause; These inconstancies are noticed especially in heretics, who, lacking the Anchor of Hope, and consequently the helm of infused prudence, are easily carried about by every wind; far from these went Job cap. 27., who, as much caressed by the adulation of prosperity as buffeted by the storms of adversity, prudently answered his friends: The justification which I began to hold, I will not abandon, as the Seraphic Doctor notes, ubi supra: Of Inconstancy D. Greg. speaks most excellently, cited by D. Bonau. in Pharetra lib. 3. cap. 5.: While the heart in adversities hopes for prosperity; in prosperities it fears adversity, hither and thither it is rolled by certain waves, and is turned about by the mutability of the various modes of alternating things.

NEGLIGENCE in the purpose is a delay, or slowness, of reason and appetite in promoting what has already been well counseled and judged. And so it is opposed to Prudence by reason of due solicitude. Hence D. Bonau. p. 1. Centil. sect. 8. describes it: It is the dereliction of a due circumstance in a good work.

But Gregory of Valentia OBSERVES that these sins are specifically distinct, and are to be specified in confession, when they have been directly willed, as they are against Prudence, but not when indirectly, in order to the work; for then it is enough to say the work of sin, for instance theft, etc. But if, from negligence of grave examination, you omit a mortal thing, it will have to be said, as D. Bonau. says in spec. animae, cap. 3. at the end: So also if you neglect to learn by heart the things necessary for salvation.

He OBSERVES secondly that these sins, since they are of reason, arise especially from Lust, as D. Gregor. 31. Moral. cap. 31. teaches, although they arise also from other sins, especially Sloth, as the Saintly Doctor says.

But they are MORTAL, either on the part of the object and matter, if they are about something necessary for salvation under a mortal [aspect]: or on the part of the cause, if they are committed from such carelessness, or neglect of salvation, that one makes nothing of the friendship of God; otherwise, if from negligence some things not necessary for salvation are omitted, it will be venial, as D. Thom. quaest. 54. art. 3. teaches, and universally concerning all the vices opposed to Prudence teach Sylvester under the word negligentia, Valentia quaest. 5. p. 1., Tannerus num. 54., with D. Bonau. in spec. animae, cap. 3.

Nor indeed are they necessarily to be explained distinctly in confession, unless when they have been directly willed, otherwise they are only the conditions of sins. So D. Thom. Valentia, Caiet. Tannerus with D. Bonau. loc. cit. Centil. and more clearly in speculo animae, cap. 3.; and Prov. 19. brings it forward: He who neglects his own life shall be killed: He adds that negligence properly is the omission of a circumstance; but that sloth is a desistence from the work.

NOW we must treat of the vices opposed to Prudence by excess, which bear a false likeness of Prudence.

PRUDENCE OF THE FLESH is the scheming of reason, clever, and adapted to attaining some perverse end, conformed to the depraved carnal appetite; and it is a mortal sin, if it sets itself up as the ultimate end.

Of this the Apostle speaks, Rom. 8. The prudence of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God. See St. Thomas quaest. 55. art. 1. Valencia quaest. 5. punct. 2. Tanner num. 55. with St. Bonaventure cited at the beginning.

This sin, however, is not distinct from that which is committed by a perverse work, unless this prudence is directly willed, as I said in quaestione 4.

CRAFTINESS is the devising of means which, toward some end, whether good or evil, are such that they indeed appear good, but are in reality false and feigned. Thus it is gathered from the Philosopher lib. 1. Magn. Moral. cap. 33. and lib. 6. Eth. cap. 12. and St. Thomas art. 3. See Tanner disp. 3. quaest. 1. dub. 4. It is often called Prudence Proverb. 1. yet it is a vice¹, as is said 2. Corinth. 4. Not walking in craftiness. For the crafty and the dissemblers provoke the anger of God, whether for hidden iniquity or for open simulation; as St. Bernard says, de ordine vitae, finem versus. It usually attacks the weaker and the less discerning; thus the Devil, before the Master of Craftiness, in the serpent, the most cunning of Animals, deceived not the man but the woman, endowed indeed with less discretion, by feigned speech.

WHEREFORE St. Gregory says, lib. 9. moral. cap. 17. Two things are to be feared in good works, sloth, and deceit. Sloth is caused by lesser love of God; Craftiness is caused by greater love of self, the latter, proceeding from private love of self, issues outwardly in the circumvention of one's neighbor, simulating one thing in deeds while putting forward another in words, or the contrary.

MANY examples of Craftiness from the Sacred Letters the Saintly Doctor records in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 54. as when Laban was searching the household goods of Jacob, and came to the tent of Rachel, she, by feigning the custom of women, craftily deluded him Genes. 31.

SO the Gabaonites, knowing what Joshua had done to Jericho and Hai, cunningly plotted how they might so act as not to be utterly destroyed Ios. 9.

SO Absalom, coveting the kingdom of his Father, maliciously began to flatter the people, cunningly boasting that he would judge with all equity 2. Reg. 15.

TO these add in the New Testament the Craftiness of Herod, wishing to learn the time of the star Matth. 2. so that coming he might rather kill than adore, though he cunningly simulated the latter; thus also the Pharisees, often seeking to catch the Lord in his speech, now sent disciples to him, simulators of Justice, now brought a woman taken in adultery; and many other things, which see in the place cited above.

On DECEIT.

Deceit is, when one thing is done and another feigned, as St. Bonaventure says on that passage of John 1. In which there is no deceit. To be deceitful is said to be to have two hearts, as the Psalmist says: They spoke in heart, and heart.

Deceit is also a kind of execution of Craftiness, now by words, according to Psal. 5. With their tongues they dealt deceitfully; now by deeds, according to Psal. 105. That they might work deceit against his servants. For Craftiness meditates deceits, as is said Psal. 37. and Eccles. 19.

It can be, either expressed outwardly in speech, as when one contracting betrothal calls himself Peter, though he is called John; or it can be hidden, as when one speaks in such a way as one who simply consents. Thus St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 17. dub. 2. literal reading.

On FRAUD.

It is defined by St. Bonaventure in Comp. term. Theol. It is a will deceiving the expectation of one's neighbor for earthly gain.

It is divided, 1. p. Coenil. sect. 8. according to the variety of objects; whence habits are known through acts.

Fraud is the execution of Craftiness, but precisely through deeds, and also through words (says St. Bonaventure ad 1. Ioan. in the place cited). It is a mortal or venial sin according to the subject matter, as Cajetan notes under the word Fraus, Valencia quaest. 5. puncto 2.

It therefore differs from deceit in this, that deceit is either through words or through deeds; while this executes craftiness more through deeds, as Tanner notes with St. Bonaventure there.

On solicitude for temporal things.

This is immoderate study about temporal goods, either because in them the ultimate end is placed, or because it has joined to it a superfluous fear of lacking them. This solicitude Christ forbids, Matth. 6. Be not solicitous. So St. Bonaventure, Opusc. Explicatio terminorum Theologiae, and in the first part of the Centiloquium, sectione 8. It is defined by Cicero here, sectione 22. It is immoderate Love of possessing.

It has especially three species: The first is great anxiety for acquiring temporal things, whether the effect follows or not; and this is found both in those who possess much and those who possess little: The second is great tenacity in retaining, which allows nothing to be spent on pious causes or the relief of the poor: The third, finally, is a burning thirst for amassing worldly riches from every quarter, whether by fair means or foul. So St. Bonaventure, de profectu Relig. lib. 1. cap. 34. and most excellently in the Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 6. he compares the man solicitous of temporal things to the Mole; for the wickedness of this solicitude is dark and its imprudence blind; as many possessions as it has, so many tombs it has, which it digs for itself, burying itself in continual solicitude. Then the Saintly Doctor reproves this care for riches with various other similitudes set forth there, which see.

Toward the end of the Chapter he records several effects of this solicitude, the chief of which is servitude of Idols Ephes. 5. For to this Avatus refers all his works.

The second is folly opposed to prudence; for as the fool does not guard against danger, however near,¹ so the man solicitous about the world, though near to death, does not guard against his peril, as is said, Lucae 12. Fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee, other effects see in the same place.

On solicitude for things to come.

Immoderate solicitude for the future is reproved, Matth. 6. Be not solicitous for the morrow. Of this the Saintly Doctor treats in the exposition of cap. 2. of the rule, at those words: And let them not be solicitous.

In Religious, though small, this withdraws from perfection; in a Father of a family, when moderate, it is laudable; in anyone, however, when immoderate, it is culpable; and it destroys that prudence and confidence by which we ought to cast all our solicitude upon God; who feeds the fowls of the air, to die on the morrow; and clothes the lilies of the field, though soon to be cast into the oven.

Of this solicitude St. Bernard says excellently, de verb. Psalm. 23. There are other thoughts, more violent, which pertain to the necessities of nature; For often the Carnal thought about drink, about food, or about clothing so affects us, that it can scarcely be eradicated from our hearts. He gives the reason, because solicitude of this kind, viscous and muddy, will find muddy ground too, to which it may adhere; for man, formed not of other earth than muddy earth, conscious of his need, distrusts the providence of things to come, and directs every thought toward it, that he may follow upon it. But since our providence is uncertain, according to true prudence all our solicitude must be cast upon God; for to trust to oneself in those things whose outcome is uncertain is to distrust, as St. Bernard has it, serm. 5. de vigil. Nativit. Domini.

On the precepts of PRUDENCE.

It is not doubtful that the Virtue of Prudence, which is the rule of all the virtues, is a matter of precept; for all the other affirmative precepts about the acts of the virtues presuppose the affirmative precepts of prudence, both in general and in species, by this very fact, that they must be done prudently from right election through prudence. Similarly all the negative precepts, forbidding the contrary acts of the vices, presuppose the negative precepts of prudence, inhibiting the acts of imprudence by which vicious acts would be badly directed.

AND hence is had the reason why precepts of prudence had not to be given in the Decalogue: for these stand antecedently to all the precepts of the Decalogue.

BUT these precepts of Prudence are set forth in many places, Leuit. 19. Thou shalt not do Calumny to thy neighbor, namely through craftiness, deceit, or fraud. Deuter. 25. Thou shalt not have in thy sack divers weights, a greater and a less. Prouerb. 3. Lean not upon thy own prudence; that is, be not, assuredly, tenacious of thine own judgment.

Prouerb. 4. Acquire prudence, and seize it, and cap. 9. Walk by the ways of prudence. And Matth. 10. Be ye therefore prudent as serpents, and simple as doves, where St. Jerome says: That by prudence they may avoid snares; by simplicity not do evil. And the craftiness of the serpent is put as an example, because with its whole body it hides its head, that it may protect that in which life is. So let us guard with the peril of our whole body our head, who is CHRIST, that is, the faith whole and incorrupt. This is the interpretation also of Hilary, can. 10. in Matth. Epiph. haeresi 37. and St. Bonaventure everywhere, as I said disp. hac quaest. 2. where I also brought forward other properties of the serpent, of which some also bring forward Rabanus, Remigius, and many others.

TO the precept of prudence also pertain those words Rom. 12. Be not prudent in your own selves according to Prouerb. 3. Lean not upon thy own prudence. Be not wise in thine own conceit. And cap. 4. Possess prudence. And below: Let thine eyes see things that are right, and let thy eyelids go before thy steps. Direct the path for thy feet, and thy actions shall be established. Tit. 2. Let them be sober, chaste, prudent, etc. first Peter 4. Be prudent therefore, and watch in prayers. Matth. 10. Be ye therefore prudent as serpents.

There are also negative precepts of abstaining from the things opposed to Prudence, related above.