Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
AFTER the Theological virtues the theologians treat of the Cardinal virtues, the first of which is reckoned to be Prudence. For this is set over the whole OEconomy of the moral virtues, and directs them, either by discerning, as Counselor, or by defining, as Commander, to their acts: it reviews things past, disposes of things present, and provides for things to come; hence it has as its subjective parts the Memory of things past, the Intelligence of things present, and the providence of things to come; moreover it holds the reins of the passions, and if ever they rise up with a sudden impulse, it restrains them at once and reduces them to concord; sometimes it is worldly, in heaping up riches; human, in pursuing the comforts of the flesh; but Divine, it is enslaved to eternal observances, as the Holy Doctor notes in the places to be noted below; its nature and quality still remain to be investigated.
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
What PRUDENCE is.
THE name of prudence is taken in various ways, as St. Bonaventure teaches, book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, and in the Pharetra, book 2, chapter 27.
First, indeed, it signifies any knowledge of truth acquired by human study; thus it is taken by St. Ambrose, book 1 on offices, chapter 24, by Tully, book 1 on offices and book 2 on Invention, cited by St. Bonaventure, in the Pharetra and part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41, and sermon 6 of the Hexaëmeron.
SECOND, it signifies only practical knowledge of things that ought to be sought or repudiated. Thus St. Augustine takes it, book 1 on free choice, chapter 13, and book 83 questions, question 31: that Prudence is the science of things to be sought and avoided: thus it is taken also by the Holy Doctor, in the Pharetra, and by St. Isidore, in the Etymologies, book 10, under the word Prudentia: The prudent man is so called, as it were one seeing far ahead; for he is perspicacious, and foresees the chances of uncertain things. Whence in Greek it is φρόνησις. And in this way it is taken by the Holy Doctor, in the Exposition of the Terms of Theology, and in the Centiloquium, loc. cit., and by St. Gregory. But neither is this proper Prudence, which ought both to know and to provide.
THIRD, Prudence is taken for all the faculties of the practical intellect that contribute, or are even necessary, to rightly instituting the actions of human life. Thus it is frequently taken by the Philosopher, book 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5, 10 and 11.
FOURTH, Prudence, in the most proper sense, names a certain faculty of the practical intellect for rightly determining what is to be done in any particular act.
Furthermore, Aristotle defines this Prudence, book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 5: Prudence is a habit of the intellect, active with true reason, concerning those things which are good and bad for man.
The same St. Doctor wills, in On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, defining: Prudence is to direct all things according to the norm of reason.
And in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues: Prudence is the discernment of good things and bad, both with the flight of evil and the choice of good: from which proceed circumspection, docility, and caution. Circumspection is the wariness of contrary vices, by which we flee avarice and guard against prodigality, etc. Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others. Caution is the prudence of discerning vices that bear the appearance of virtues.
To this is referred also the definition of Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to direct all things, which it considers, whatever it does, according to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing besides what is right. Thus St. Bonaventure, book 6 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34.
It is defined also by Tully, On the repose of the mind: Prudence is the science of good things and bad, with the love of one or the other and the detestation of the rest: cited by St. Bonaventure, part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41.
SIMILAR is the definition of St. Augustine, On the morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 15, cited by St. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Centiloquium: Prudence is love, sagaciously discerning those things by which it is aided toward God from those by which it is hindered. And book 83 questions, 52, he defines: It is the knowledge of things to be sought and fled.
He DESCRIBES, moreover, Prudence as it is a purgatorial virtue, from Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to despise this world, and all things that are in the world, through the contemplation of divine things, and to direct all the knowledge of the soul to the divine alone. But Prudence, as it is the virtue of a purified mind, is defined: It is to know the divine alone, and to gaze upon it as if nothing else existed. Thus it is defined in book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and elsewhere.
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
IT IS CERTAIN that Prudence is a Virtue.
IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, book 1 on chapter 8 of Wisdom, and in book 3, distinction 33, questions 1 and 4, from those words: He teaches Sobriety, and Prudence, and Justice, and Virtue, that is, Fortitude. The same is proved by that verse of Proverbs 8: Prudence is mine, fortitude is mine. By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things.
IT IS PROVED secondly by St. Bonaventure in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and by other places of Scripture, Proverbs 28: A leader lacking prudence shall oppress many, etc.
PROVERBS 6: O sluggard, go to the ant, and learn Prudence; which, though it has no guide, nor master, nor prince, prepares for itself food in the summer, and gathers in the harvest what it may eat.
PROVERBS 30. The prudent man is compared to four little animals, praised in the same place. There are four little ones of the earth, and they are wiser than the wise: The ant, a people without strength, which prepares its food in the harvest: The rabbit, a weak folk, which makes its bed in the rock: The locust has no king, and goes forth all together by its bands: The stellio supports itself on hands, and dwells in the houses of kings. These four animals are set before us as Masters of prudence, as Lyranus notes there, together with St. Bonaventure, who there excellently expounds these animals for us in mystical parallels; that we may imitate the rabbit, making our bed in the rock, which is Christ, as is said 1 Corinthians 10. The stellio, or lizard, which, having no wings, supplies by its hands the lack of nature; so too let diligent prudence supply in acting the defect of nature: the locust, which mounts on high and at once descends to the earth; for so also the prudent man mounts high through holy desires, and at once descends to the knowledge of his own infirmity, and thence acknowledges the necessity of divine help; according to Psalm 110: He ascends even to the heavens, and descends even to the abysses. And according to St. Gregory below. Lastly, let us imitate the ant, that we may prudently lay up merits for ourselves, according to John 9: Work while it is day.
Matthew 10: Be therefore prudent as serpents, to which comparison the Holy Doctor best expounds in the place cited with five parallels.
FIRST, indeed, the serpent exposes its whole body to blows, that it may save its head; so the prudent Christian exposes all things, that he may preserve the honor of Christ the Head, as is said Philippians 3: Those things that were gains to me, I have counted as loss for Christ.
SECONDLY, the serpent, among narrow and smooth rocks, strips off its old skin; so too the Christian ought to put off the old man, as the Apostle admonishes, Ephesians 4.
THIRDLY, the serpent beguiles the charmer, as is said Psalm 57. So too prudent Saints beguile the demon, stopping one ear with the tail, that is, the memory of last things; according to Ecclesiastes 7: Remember your last things, and you shall not sin forever; and they stop the other ear, in the manner of the serpent, in the earth, by the memory of their own fragility, because it is said Genesis 4: You are dust, and into dust you shall return.
FOURTHLY, the serpent lies in wait for the heel; so prudent men conquer the desires of the flesh, attending to what the end of pleasure is, namely infernal death, according to Romans 6: The end of them is death.
FIFTHLY, the serpent flees woman on account of the enmities, Genesis 3, declared against it; so the prudent man flees the occasions of fornication, according to the counsel of Paul, 1 Corinthians 10.
ANOTHER prudence of the serpent the Holy Doctor expounds in the sermon on the Holy Apostles Philip and James, for when it feels itself weighed down by poison, it eats a certain herb, by whose virtue it vomits up the poison; then it hastens to a bath of water, and there washes itself, and remains fasting for many days; whence the skin is loosened from the flesh, and amid the smooth narrows of the rock it sheds its skin, that it may put on a new one. So too man, prudent, wishing to become a new man from the old, ought to wash himself with tears, eat the bitter herb of penance, and thus vomit up the poison of sins by confessing; then pass through the narrow gate of satisfaction, and thus, stripped of the spoils of faults, put on grace. See the holy Doctor there.
The SAME comparisons he has in sermon 2 on one Holy Doctor, which is sermon 31, and sermon 33, where he speaks according to Aristotle in the book on the history of animals, book 8, chapter 17:
IN THE sermon 2 on St. Anthony of Padua, from Job 38, he praises the prudence of the cock: Who gave the cock understanding. And in the sermon on St. Lucy he recounts many examples of prudence from sacred and profane histories. That it is a virtue, indeed, confess Aristotle, books 3 and 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5 and 13, Cicero, books 1 and 2 of the Tusculans, 99, Seneca, letter 68, Plutarch, in the book on the virtue of morals, Juvenal, Satire 10, Valerius Maximus, on prudence. See the Holy Doctor also in book 3, distinction 33, question 3, citing them.
IT IS PROVED thirdly by the Holy Doctor, in the book cited, the Pharetra, chapter 27, from the Holy Fathers unanimously asserting it.
ST. AUGUSTINE, book 1 on the morals of the Church, chapter 15, divides the four Cardinal virtues, as St. Bonaventure also teaches in book 3, distinction 33, question 2, to the first argument; then in the Soliloquies, book 1, chapter 14, he teaches that the perfect work is made by prudence, saying: Great care must be taken, while we act in this body, lest the feathers of our wings be impeded by any viscous thing of the senses: these must be whole and perfect, that we may fly forth to that light from these darknesses.
ST. AMBROSE, on offices, book 1, chapter 10: The wise man, that he may speak well, first considers many things, what he may say, and to whom, in what place and time, and chapter 27, says: The first fount of duty is prudence. St. Gregory, book 2 of the Morals, chapter 36, says: The solid edifice of our mind is sustained by these four virtues, of which the first is prudence, and book 7 of the Morals, chapter 15: When the uprightness of Saints raises men to liberty of voice, consideration of one's own infirmity guards them in humility.
St. Bernard on the Canticle, sermon 49: Discretion is not so much a virtue as a certain moderator and charioteer of the virtues, and the orderer of affections and the directress of morals: Take this away, and virtue will be vice. In the same way speaks St. Isidore, the book On Synonyms, chapter 16: Whatever you do well with discretion is virtue; whatever you carry out without discretion is vice. For virtue without discretion is reputed as vice. And book 2 on the supreme good, chapter 25: It helps nothing, that we discern with a more prudent sense between good and evil, unless by our works we guard against ill-conceived thoughts, or carry forward good things begun.
And St. Jerome on Hosea, book 2, chapter 7: Prudence without goodness is malice.
And Cassian, Conference 1, chapter 23, from the opinion of Abbot Moses, on Discretion, or Prudence, says: This holds among all the virtues the citadel and primacy.
And conference 2, chapter 2: For this is that which is named in the Gospel the eye and lamp of the body, according to that saying of the Savior: The lamp of your body is your eye; and Matthew 6, and Luke 11. Because (he says) it discerns all the thoughts and acts of man, it foresees and surveys all things that are to be done. The same the Holy Doctor has here, and on that place of Luke, though he expounds the lamp as intention. In which way also St. Gregory mingles prudence with intention, homily 22 on Ezechiel: It remains that at last we be wearied in the ministry of the word, or bestow on the needy, or tame the flesh by abstinence, or be moved by Zeal, or at times mildly bear with evil things through patience, that we ought above all to examine our intention, that whatever we do we may do not with our own, but with the Zeal of the Lord.
He recounts OTHER places of the Holy Fathers, the Holy Doctor, in book 3, distinction 33, as of St. Jerome on chapter 8 of Wisdom, St. Augustine, book 12 on the Trinity, chapter 14, and book 14, chapter 9, Bede, in the Gloss, on chapter 26 of Exodus; and the Gloss on Genesis 1: A fountain went forth from Paradise, which is divided into four heads. Juvenal, Satire 10, closes all the Encomia of this virtue:
No deity is absent, if prudence be present. — And this is what the Holy Fathers cited say, that prudence is the Leader and Charioteer of all the virtues.
IT IS PROVED fourthly by the reasoning which the Holy Doctor uses in nearly all the places cited, especially in book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 33, throughout. Every habit good and fitting to man is a virtue; But that habit of prudence is of this kind: Therefore. The major is evident; for virtue is that which makes its possessor good, leading him to his end, and renders its act good, as Aristotle teaches in the Ethics, book 3, chapters 1, 8 and 12, and book 6, and Tully, book 2 on Invention, cited by St. Bonaventure, book 3, distinction 33, question 3, and St. Augustine, book 83 questions, question 31, and book 1 of the Soliloquies, chapter 6, cited by St. Bonaventure, in the place cited. The minor is proved: for it is best and most fitting to the nature of man for reason to establish and set before itself for pursuit or flight those things which according to right reason are to be sought or fled, which is the office of Prudence. The Holy Doctor confirms this, questions 1 and 3, from the contrary. For evil is that which is against prudence, which is the same as against reason, which indeed St. Dionysius confesses to be perverse, chapter 4 on the divine names, part 4.
I ASSERT secondly, that Prudence is a rational, intellectual, and moral Virtue. It is indeed rational, because it is in reason, as the Holy Doctor observes in book 3, distinction 33, question 3, in the body, §. To make evident. For it directs in discerning, which is proper to reason, as the Holy Doctor notes from Aristotle, book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 3. The same St. Thomas teaches, part 1-2, question 57.
THE office of reason, however, is twofold, to discern and to define. These, however, are the functions of prudence, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in the places cited above. Hence in the Dieta salutis, chapter 5, he compares it to the assessor of a judge, who by judging directs the judge, or king, yet not by commanding; so Prudence rules reason: Wherefore Valentia does not define it rightly, first point: It is a faculty of the practical intellect for rightly determining, by an act of imperium, what is to be done. For imperium is nowhere conceded to the intellect, against the Thomists, part 1-2, question 57, article 6, and Tanner, dispute 3, question 1, dubium 1, and others, refuted in part 1-2, treatise 1, Disputation on Imperium. It is truly a moral virtue extrinsically, inasmuch as the intellect is moved and stirred by the appetite rightly ordered through the inclinations of the moral virtues, that through Prudence it may follow the good to be done, consentaneous to the right appetite.
I ASSERT thirdly, that Prudence is a Virtue distinct from the others.
IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure above with the authorities, which reckon it to be a special virtue.
SECONDLY it is proved by him in book 3, distinction 33, questions 2 and 3, from the diverse reason of the object, which is the ratio agibilis according to reason, as conforming to the right appetite, and thus as the practical true, or good. Tanner uses this reason, number 12.
THIRDLY it is proved by the Holy Doctor from the acts of Prudence, which are to direct all the acts of virtue according to the right dictate of reason.
IT IS PROVED fourthly from the powers in which the Cardinal virtues are subjected, and which each directs; for Prudence directs the Rational, Temperance the Concupiscible, Fortitude the Irascible.
IT IS PROVED fifthly by St. Bonaventure from the opposed vices; for one is opposed to one; for under one aspect there are opposed to Prudence Precipitancy, Inconsideration, Inconstancy, Negligence, Craft, Guile, Fraud, which are surely not opposed to the other virtues.
IT IS PROVED sixthly by the Holy Doctor from the mean points; for Prudence is a mean between extremes, between which the other virtues mediate; for so Prudence is between Inconsiderateness, Precipitancy, Craftiness, Guile, etc.
You will object, first. The ratio agibilis, as it is the practical truth by conformity with the right appetite, is so widely extended, and is more common, than the ratio agibilis as it is moral good, by conformity with right reason, or with the right appetite; but this ratio of good does not constitute any special virtue, but only the genus of moral virtue: Therefore neither will that ratio constitute the special virtue of Prudence.
The Holy Doctor answers, distinction 33, question 2, to the fifth, that they are equal in a certain universality of predication; but not at all in order; for the Practical True has order only to reason, because it is difficult to rectify in one way, therefore one virtue is necessary: But the matters of the powers, in order to good, suffer various difficulties.
You will object, secondly. It belongs to Prudence to inspect the mean, which also befits every virtue; for whatever sees the essential mean of its end: Therefore it is not a special virtue.
The Holy Doctor answers, that to see its own mean by the mode of a determinate inclination is appropriated to each virtue; but that it is nevertheless proper to prudence to see the mean by the mode of direction. Wherefore Prudence sees the mean for itself and for others by directing; for it perfects the rational power, whose it is to consider and discern, and in this mode it is proper to Prudence. Wherefore as the eye sees for itself and for the other members, so prudence directs, seeing itself and the other virtues. Although as regards inclination all tend toward their end, and move, as it were, like a weight, in the manner in which gravity is said to look toward the center of the world; for so every virtue is said to look toward the mean of right living.
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
What are the gifts of PRUDENCE.
From the argument recently adduced we have, first, with D. Bonaventure, that the office of Prudence is not to propose to the moral virtues their intrinsic ends, insofar as they are formally ends, but only to propose to them the means by which they may attain such ends. The same is held by D. Thomas here, art. 6. and his disciples, and by Tannerus disput. 3. question 1. dub. 3. against Scotus in 3. dist. 36. single question, art. 2., where he contends that the ends themselves are set before the moral virtues by Prudence.
It is proved by D. Bonaventure loc. cit. from the doctrine of Aristotle 6 Eth. cap. 12., where he affirms that the moral virtue intends the end at the impulse of reason, namely through Synderesis; while Prudence directs and makes right those things that are toward the end: The work (he says) is effected from Prudence and from moral Virtue: for Virtue proposes the goal; Prudence, however, makes right those things that tend toward it, and cap. 13. Virtue [assigns] the end; Prudence [makes right] those things that tend toward the end, so that we may act.
Secondly it is proved by Valentia disp. 4. question 1. punct. 3. with a reason drawn from the difference between Synderesis and Prudence; for the office of Synderesis is to set before the virtue the good appointed to it as an end, as that Temperance should use pleasures moderately, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 2. dist. 39. art. 2. question 1., and this indeed moves the affection as a kind of weight, as S. Bonaventure teaches there, and in 3. dist. 33. question 2.. Prudence therefore directs toward the means, by ordering reason; otherwise, if both were directed to the same thing, it would be necessary to posit another directive habit of reason.
It is proved thirdly from the connection of Counsel and Prudence; for Prudence is concerned only with those things about which there is consultation, as the holy Fathers teach, as related from D. Bonaventure and from other cited places of the Seraphic Doctor, as is evident. But consultation is about means to an end, not about the formal ends of the virtues themselves: Therefore also Prudence. The major is clear from the Philosopher lib. 6. Eth. cap. 5. and 7., where he says: Prudence is concerned with human goods, and with those that fall under consultation. For we say that the chief task of the prudent man is to counsel well. The minor is proved; for consultation is only about doubtful things, and the ends of the virtues themselves are not such, as Aristotle teaches cap. 7., saying: About those things no one consults which cannot come about otherwise, nor about those whose end is not some [end].
Note, however, with D. Bonaventure opusc. de septem donis, cap. 6., that Prudence and Counsel are toward the end: first, insofar as it sets forth means in order to it, and so intends it as that for whose sake, as Caietanus also teaches question 47. art. 6., and Valentia puncto 3..
Then, Prudence is said to tend toward the ends, insofar as it judges and determines, in the manner of Affection, in which mediocrities the reason of the end of the virtue lies, as the S. Doctor teaches in Diaeta, loc. cit., with Aristotle 2 Eth. cap. 6. and D. Thomas art. 7..
The S. Doctor assigns, moreover, in Diaeta, tit. 6. cap. 12., the difference of Prudence from Counsel; for Counsel, he says, [determines] whether something is to be done: Prudence, however, shows for what end and with what circumstances applied, of time, place, etc.; just as it belongs to one science to know whether it is expedient for someone to be saved, and to another to know how he is to be saved, etc.
You will object, first, with Scotus. Every moral virtue supposes the dictate of Prudence: Therefore [it is] toward the end.
It is answered, that it supposes this dictate only in order to the means; but toward the end it supposes the dictate of Synderesis, as I said.
You will object, secondly. Unless prudence sets the end before the virtue, there will not be able to be one prudence in the matter of each moral virtue.
It is answered, that there is one Prudence, common to all the virtues.
I assert, thirdly, that Prudence does not set the means before the virtues by the command of reason.
It is proved, because command belongs to the will, which is as it were the queen, as I showed in the Treatise on the Soul, disp. 9. cap. 5. question 8. and in other places.
Nor indeed does Aristotle 6 Eth. cap. 10. make it preceptive by the command of reason, as Valentia thinks.
I assert, fourthly, that the dictate of Prudence is with a certain solicitude. Therefore Aristotle lib. 6. Eth. cap. 9. says: The things you have counseled are to be done quickly; but one must counsel slowly and at length, especially in grave matters, as D. Gregory also teaches lib. 2. Regist. indic. 10. cap. 6., cited by D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetra, cap. 27., where he says: In the highest matters, counsel ought not to be hasty.
It is proved from the contrary. For negligence, sloth, and torpor are reproved, as you will see in D. Bonaventure p. 1. Centil. sect. 8. and lib. 3. Pharetra, cap. 8. and in Diaeta tit. 1. cap. 7.
Hence he observes there that the slothful man is greatly reproved. Proverb. 21. The desires of the slothful kill him. Proverb. 10. the slack hand has wrought poverty. So Matth. 12. an idle [house] is entered by seven demons. And Matth. 25. Take from him the talent. Eccles. 22. On a lump of mud the slothful shall be stoned. Prov. 18. Fear casts down the slothful. Prov. 24. I passed by the field of the slothful man: and behold it was all filled with nettles. And in the same place: How long, sluggard, do you sleep? And Proverb. 6. Go to the ant, O sluggard. See there the S. Doctor differing excellently.
I ADD, that Prudence sets forth means for all ends, even those of the public good.
IT IS PROVED: For in 6. Eth. cap. 5. Aristotle says that Prudence is right reason of things to be done: Therefore also concerning the public good; especially since this is the more necessary, the more necessary the public good is, truly especially for the Christian; of whom it is said in 1 Cor. 13: Charity seeketh not her own. The Romans observed this, as related by Valerius Maximus lib. 6. cap. 4. For every man was hastening to increase the goods of his country, not his own. The reason is because, as Aristotle says 1. Eth. cap. 2., even if the good be the same for one man and for a city, yet the good of the city seems a greater and more divine thing both to acquire and to conserve. And indeed even each man can be content, if it be for one alone; yet it is more beautiful and more divine if the good be brought about for one people and for cities.
THEREFORE Prudence can be divided, so that one kind is Regal, or Legislative in the community of a Kingdom: another Political in a City: another Oeconomical in a household: another Military in an Army; as Aristotle seems to hold 6. Eth. cap. 8. See D. Thomas at greater length, question 50.
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Who are the sharers in PRUDENCE.
FIRST a question arises: Whether Prudence is in subjects; for Aristotle 3. Eth. capit. 3. seems to deny it; but he speaks of subjects, as subjects are. For truly, since Prudence is connected with the other moral virtues, with which even subjects can be endowed, there is no doubt that prudence is in them. Aristotle therefore speaks of subjects formally, as subjects are, as D. Thomas says in article 12.
There is doubt also concerning sinners; for Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 12. says: It is manifest that no one can be prudent unless he be good. But on the contrary it stands strong, because in cap. 5. he says that even many wicked men are strong in counsel.
I SAY, first, that in sinners prudence is false; I speak of those sinning mortally: Of this Rom. 8. The prudence of the flesh is death. And Luke 16. The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their generation, as S. Bonaventure notes on this passage, and in the places adduced at the beginning of quest. 1.
I SAY, secondly, that infused prudence is not in those sinning lethally.
IT IS PROVED: For the moral virtues are infused, connected with Charity; as I showed in the first part of the second part, Treatise on the Virtues.
I ASSERT, thirdly, that acquired true Prudence is not in those who sin very frequently. For it is connected with the moral virtues, and is destroyed by frequently opposite acts.
I ASSERT, fourthly, that infused Prudence concerning one's own good is in the just.
IT IS PROVED, because it is connected with charity, as I showed in the place cited above.
I ASSERT, fifthly, that in the young there is no acquired prudence.
IT IS PROVED from Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. But the cause is, that prudence is of particular things, which become known to us by experience; but the young man is without experience; for experience is produced by length of time.
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
How Prudence is acquired and is lost.
FIRST, therefore, it is acquired by experience of long time, as is said Job 12. And in much time Prudence. And Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 8. and 11.
SECONDLY, by the instruction of wise elders, as Aristotle teaches in that cap. 11. and D. Gregory Nazianzen oratione ad Nicolaum; and Cassianus coll. 2. cap. 10. Therefore we are warned in Proverb. 3.: Lean not on your own prudence; be not wise in your own sight. And Eccles. 6. If you have loved to hear, you will be wise. Stand in the multitude of prudent Elders, and join your heart to their Wisdom. See Cassianus above.
It is indeed LOST, partly by forgetfulness, and by wicked affections. By forgetfulness indeed, insofar as it depends on experience, and this on memory, as the Philosopher teaches 1. Metaph. cap. 1. By wicked affections, however: for it depends on a right appetite. Therefore Exodi 23. Do not accept gifts, which even blind the prudent. Rom. 1. When they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, etc. for their foolish heart was darkened.
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE.
UNANIMOUSLY the Philosophers acknowledge that Prudence has certain parts; of which Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. and following. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. relates them; from these the S. Doctor everywhere lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. And 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. and the opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.
The parts of Prudence are of THREE kinds. Some are integral, without which the perfect use of Prudence is not had: Others are subjective, in the manner in which species, subjected to a genus, are called subjective parts of the genus, as Man and Lion are parts of animal, because, namely, animal is predicated of them as of a subject. Others are potential parts of Prudence by similitude with the potential parts of the soul.
The Integral Parts of Prudence, which integrate it as it were in the manner in which members integrate a body, are eight. Memory, which is cognition of past things; Understanding, which is cognition of present things; Docility, which is cognition through another's instruction; Solertia, which is cognition through one's own discovery; nem; Ratio of this, is because it is cognition by the inference of one thing from another; Providence, which is the ordination of means to an end; Circumspection, which is the consideration of the circumstances of the business; Caution, which is a certain contrivance against those things which can stand in the way and be an impediment.
The perfect use of Prudence indeed depends on Memory, because it depends on experience; and this on many experiments, and experiments on many memories, as D. Thom. teaches quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotle at the beginning of 1. Metaph.
It depends also on Understanding, which is the cognition of particulars with which Prudence is concerned, which cognition is from the intellect, partly through conversion to phantasms, partly also in the interior sense, or the cogitative power.
It DEPENDS on Docility, which Cicero praises Lib. 2. qq. Academ.; hence the S. Doctor defines it to be the power of instructing first oneself; then others.
It DEPENDS on Solertia, which is swift conjecture, as Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 9. and D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.
It DEPENDS on reason, which is the cognition of one thing from another by inference; for Consultation, on which the decrees of Prudence depend, is altogether with ratiocination, as the Philosopher teaches 6. Eth. cap. 10. and D. Thomas art. 5.
It DEPENDS on Prudence, which is the ordination of suitable means to an end; for Prudence is concerned with things to be done on account of an end, as the S. Doctor explains in the places alleged, and D. Thom. art. 6.
It DEPENDS on Circumspection; for prudence is concerned with particular things to be done, good on every side, consonant with reason; but the goodness of human actions depends on the circumstances, as I showed prima secundae, Treatise 1. disput. 9. question 5. and 10.
It DEPENDS also on Caution, which is provision against contrary evils, which the S. Doctor calls the Prudence of discerning vices, bearing the appearance of virtues.
As to the subjective parts of Prudence, D. Thom. treats quaest. 50. It is divided into governing Prudence and the particular prudence of the one acting. Again, Gubernativa is divided into Legislative, which is in the Prince, or Republic; into Political, which is in subjects concerning the same good of the Kingdom, or city; into Oeconomical, which is concerning the domestic good; and Military, concerning which the good of the army is concerned. Of the Gubernativa the S. Doctor treats excellently de Eccl. Hierarchia. But particular prudence is one most special species.
The potential Parts of Prudence are three intellectual virtues adjoined, serving prudence, namely, EUBULIA, which is rightly counseltative, as you have 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS is rightly judgmental by common rules; and GNOMES, which is rightly judgmental in natural reason beyond the common rules, when these fail because of the circumstances of a particular case. See D. Thomas quaest. 51., easily declaring these.
Of these S. Bonaventure also treats in the places everywhere adduced here.
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
How certain rules of prudence are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy, applicable to the Monastic and Political state.
SINCE the Church Militant is governed and ordered according to the order of the Church Triumphant, as it is said sap 9. Thou hast commanded me to build a temple, and an Altar according to the likeness of thy holy Tabernacle, which thou hast prepared from the beginning, the Seraphic Bonaventure, the wonderful sublimity of whose genius shines forth pre-eminently here, discourses on how the threefold state of those to be saved is conformed to the threefold Choir of Angels, both in public and private governance: And he says this threefold state is designated in that Ezechielis 14. If there be in the city these three men (namely Daniel, Noe, and Iob), shall they deliver their own souls. Daniel indeed, obtaining that supernatural Understanding by the merit of Abstinence, bears the Type of the Cloistered, who by abstaining even from things licit and illicit merit to be illumined from above. Noe, however, Governing the Ark, indicates prelates, to whom the Ark of the Church, to be saved from the Deluge of sin, has been entrusted by God. Truly Iob, a married man, intent on the works of piety and mercy, designates the assembly of the active and of married men.
Of these, the first, entrusted to God by the vow of Religion, and emulating the supreme perfection and the better Charisms, are compared to the supreme choir of Angels; for these indeed pre-eminently surpass the others both in the fire of Love and in the privilege of Knowledge and in the balance of Justice.
The SECOND, however, who exercise the office of Prelacy, are assimilated to the other Angelic choir; for Prelacy was instituted by God, either for the discipline and correction of morals, on account of which there is the sacerdotal dignity — to the Dominations they correspond: or for rescinding disputes and composing peace, which the judicial power serves, conformed to the Powers: or finally for coercing malice and Tyranny; and for this end the Regal, or Imperial Power was given, configured to the Potestates.
The LAST are truly compared to the third choir; for if they are subjects and humble, they are like the principalities; if continent, like the Archangels; if finally devoted to the works of piety, they are configured to the ANGELS.
Of the first state we must first treat briefly in certain sections.
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
On Prudence, which men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels.
S. Doctor SUPPOSES here those three Hierarchical operations, to Purify, to Illuminate, and to Perfect; and by the names of Angels he proves at once private persons on account of certain excellences, and also rectors and Princes on account of their governance. Thus Matth. 11. John is called an Angel; and II. Reg. 14. and 19. David is compared to an Angel. So too in Apoc. the Rectors of the Churches are called Angels.
Therefore he first applies the supreme Hierarchy to the Religious, and to all perfect in vows.
He calls the Religious SERAPHIM, named from the divine fires of Charity, to whom he applies Heb. I. Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire, and Apoc. 10. I saw an Angel, whose face was as the sun, and his feet as a pillar of fire. And Isa. 6. One of the Seraphim flew to me, and in his hand a live coal, etc. Therefore thus the servants of God, kindled, ought to imitate the nature of fire: for fire is always raised upward, it consumes rust, and resolves earthly things into itself; it is moved most swiftly, it spreads itself to all things to be converted to itself.
THUS the Religious, kindled with the fire of Charity, will be proved, if they ascend swiftly, despising earthly things; if they strive to resolve all things into the love of God; if they work swiftly and with speed, as it is said: Isa. 18. Go, ye swift angels, and Ezech. I. Whithersoever the Spirit went, the wheels were lifted up following him, for the spirit of life, etc.; that is, they ought to shine with the best example of Charity, for the life of the religious is the exemplar of others. Therefore Deuter. 17. They shall receive the exemplar of the law from the priests, and I Timot. IV. Be thou an example of the faithful.
They ought moreover to PURIFY others, as it is said Malach. III. He shall sit like a refiner's fire, and shall purge the sons of Levi. Therefore the Seraphim say to Isaias: Thy iniquity shall be taken away, and thy sin shall be purged.
They ILLUMINATE also, Matth. V. You are the light of the world, Ephes. V. Walk as children of the light in love.
FROM the Seraphim of Isa. VI. shining forth, he argues what kind of flame the religious ought to shine with, for the example of others.
FIRST they are said to have been two, whereby is expressed their dwelling together in Charity. Therefore also the Lord sent his disciples two by two. Lucae X. and Ecclesiasticus IV. It is better that there be two together than one: for they have the advantage of their society. And Genes. XIX. Two Angels were sent into Pentapolis. Whereby a grave precept of prudence is given, that life in the Coenobia is safer than in the solitude of the Anachoretic life.
SECONDLY, those Seraphim were not seated, but stood. Whence in Psalm. 121. Our feet were standing in thy courts, O Jerusalem.
HIEREMIAE VI. Stand upon your ways, and see, and ask which is the good way? and Psalm. V. In the morning I will stand before thee, and will see, and Habac. II. I will stand upon my watch, and Apoc. VIII. An Angel stood near the altar of the temple. Therefore the unwearied raising of the intention to God is handed down in all things.
Each had six wings singly, that is twelve, whereby the spiritual and corporal works of mercy are signified, and they were joined one to another, as is said Ezech. I. With these wings he ought swiftly to work for the salvation of all.
With these wings they veiled their hands and their feet, by working, that they might not be seen, of which Matth. VI. Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth. Therefore he veils his head, hands, and feet, who desires neither in the beginning, nor in the end, nor in the middle to be praised for his works.
THESE flew, because the religious ought always to be borne higher into God. Whence Psalm. 54. Who will give me wings, etc. Therefore with the multiplied motion of spiritual wings, they ought assiduously by contemplation and action to ascend on high, never languishing, nor ever idling.
THESE cried: HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, one to the other, because in the Divine praises they are held to cry out perpetually. Thrice they pray, that they may be rightly instructed, promoted, and brought to salvation. Therefore Ioan. XVII. Sanctify them in truth, that they themselves may be sanctified, and consummated in one, etc.
WHEN indeed the lips of Isaias, defiled, were purged with a burning coal, and it kindled him, that he might offer himself for the divine missions, it expresses that the religious, most pure in themselves, are held bound to purify others with holy fire, to illuminate, and to kindle them unto works of salvation; thus Moses Num. XI. purged Mary the leper by prayers in a figure, and S. Job his friends, Iob in the last chapter.
There FOLLOWS the order of the Cherubim from the wisdom, with which religious men are held to be endowed and to illuminate others. Now this wisdom is practical, or prudence, as the holy Doctor advertises, Lib. I. cap. 3., which is not worldly wisdom, of which Lucae XVI. The children of this world are more prudent than the children of the light, which is in the avaricious; nor ought it to be the prudence of the flesh, which is death, as is said Rom. VIII., and it is in the voluptuous, because this wisdom is not found in the land of them that live sweetly, Iob 28.; nor ought it to be diabolical, of which Isa. V. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, etc. Therefore recourse must be had to the wisdom that is from above, which is chaste, peaceable, etc.
Now TWO Cherubim of gold are indicated Exodi 25., because there must be in them a twofold wisdom, and prudence. One of the things to be done concerning themselves and their neighbor: the other of the things to be done concerning God; and both golden, that is of Charity. Therefore gold most pure is given for the Cherubim, primo Paral. 28., which signifies the purity of conscience, from which it follows that they see God, which is beatitude, given to the clean of heart. Then indeed it follows that, radiated with divine light, they see most clearly (as the holy Doctor says). Therefore the Cherubim Ezech. I. and Apoc. IV. were full of eyes before and behind, because men compared to the Angels, the Cherubim, by the grace of circumspection, and the gift of providence, which are parts of prudence, see gilded on every side, they provide, and each keeps watch over the perils of the other. Whence also the Cherubim looked upon one another above the Propitiatory.
THESE are raised up into God with holy quiet. Therefore God dwells in them, who sitteth over the Cherubim; and these also draw others. Therefore Ezech. X. when the Cherubim were lifted up, the others also were lifted up; for upon the holiness of the religious hangs also the salvation of seculars. Therefore Iudith, cap. 8., says: and now, brethren, since you are the priests in the people of God, upon you depends their soul.
THESE are the interpreters of God; therefore in a figure from the propitiatory, between the two Cherubim, the voice of God went forth, Num. VII. and Ezech. I.: The sound of the wings of the Cherubim was as the voice of God.
THESE ought to keep the way of the tree of life, and to show it with the flaming sword, as is said Genes. III., and to cry out to all that word of Hierem. VI. This is the way, walk ye in it.
The THIRD order is that of the Thrones, in which Divine Justice dwells, Psalm. IX. Thou sittest upon the throne, who judgest justice.
God dwells upon the humble, as Isa. 66. says, and Dan. VII. His throne is a flame of fire. These are the Religious, as Origenes expounds there: For as the Thrones are the seats of God, compacted and joined into one, as D. Hieronymus says, cap. 7. de coelesti Hierarchia; so the religious, compacted into one place of quiet, are the Thrones of the Most High: These are the ivory Thrones, shadowed forth in the Throne of Solomon, of which II. Paral. IX. III. Reg. X. and Cant. II., the symbol of chastity, in which God rests, who feeds among the lilies: Therefore he rested in the womb of the B. Virgin, which is called ivory, Cant. V.
They ought to be Thrones of Sapphire, of which Ezech. I.
Ezech. I. The likeness of the Throne was as the appearance of a Sapphire. Now the Sapphire is a gem of heavenly color, starred, which signifies heavenly conversation. In the Sapphire the Law of Moses was written by God: so the religious are raised up from earthly things by poverty. To them it is said Isa. LVIII. I will lift thee up above the height of the earth, and I will feed thee with the inheritance of Jacob thy father, etc.
See the holy Doctor there, wonderfully eloquent, on how he becomes the best of religious who shall have drawn these lessons from things above.
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
The S. Doctor compares the Dominations to Pontiffs and other Prelates of the Church.
Now they are called Dominations because, as S. Isidorus says, Lib. VII. Ethymol. cap. V., dominating over the inferior Angels, they instruct and inform them how in the office of prelacy they ought to recall their subjects to the Deiform likeness, and, without tyranny, liberally to order the deeds of their subjects. Whence S. Dionysius, de coelesti Hierarchia, cap. VIII.: The naming of the Dominations declares an absolute and free Anagogy, bearing itself liberally without any tyrannical servitude, and removed from all ignominious subjection. As if to say: As by Anagogy, that is, by universal excellence over the other Angels, they are raised up without subjection; so by no tyranny are they inclined to the depression of others. Of whose domination is both liberal and severe: liberal in benignity; severe in power; and this properly befits Prelates, who singly dominate in spiritual things; as Priests and Bishops, who are accounted worthier than others in the spiritual office. Such is the word of the S. Doctor.
Therefore they are called Dominations, who preside purely in spiritual things; because true dominion is obtained, when vices are overcome, and virtuous works dominate in the kingdom of the soul, or of the Church. But evils cannot be extirpated, so that goods may effectively dominate, except through the ministry of prelates, to whom authority has been conferred from heaven, that through their office and the Ministries of the Sacraments vices may be done away, and morals corrected in men, and thus the minds of subjects be reformed by the discipline of morals to the Deiform likeness. And therefore in Prelates of souls is the authority of such a Domination left by the Lord, that, with them cooperating, the servitude of sin may be banished, and the true liberty of the Spirit may dominate through their ministry. Whence it is said Sap. IX. In thy wisdom thou hast constituted man, that he may have dominion over thy creature, which was made by thee, that he may dispose the circle of the earth in equity, and direction of heart, and justice.
Let them recognize therefore (says the S. Doctor) the Pontiffs of Christ and the Priests, that from the Dominator of the whole earth they have received supreme Dominion, and from the days of the ages utterly unheard of not only by men but by Angelic spirits, because, as Bernardus says in his sermone de coena Domini, it is nowhere read as attributed to Kings or Princes, to make the glorious and most holy body of Christ, offering it to God. This gift has been granted to Prelates not for extorting base gain, nor for boasting, or oppressing subjects; but rather for reducing subjects to the state of true liberty through the ministry of Priests; and this Zachar. VI. says: He shall sit, and shall rule, and shall be a priest upon his throne, and there shall be a counsel of peace between them, and the crowns shall be memorials in the temple of the Lord.
Therefore the Priests of Christ are so called, not that they should bear themselves as dominating in their chapters unto pride, but that they should show themselves in heart and deed a pattern to the flock, prima Petri V., and unto the likeness of the Angels promote their subjects by word and example.
Therefore the Prelates of the Church are compared to the Dominations. First, because, as these are subject to the dignity of no earthly domination, as S. Dionysius says, de coelesti Hierar. cap. VIII.: so Ecclesiastics have pre-eminence over Laymen, nor are they subjected to any of their laws pressing against Ecclesiastical immunity. Whence there is said to them the same Deuter. XV. Thou shalt have dominion over every nation, and none shall have dominion over thee.
Next, because, as the heavenly Dominations exercise no tyrannical or heavy power over the subject Angels, but simply condescend to them; so ought the life of clerics to be.
Thirdly, because, as the Dominations are called by S. Dionysius in the place cited onward and higher, because converted in their own order they convert other inferiors, and perfect in themselves they perfect and illuminate others; so those who preside should allure by word and example; and he who hears, let him say: Come, Apoc. in the last chapter; and let it be as Ecclesiasticus X.: Such as is the Lord, or ruler of the city, such are they that dwell in it.
Fourthly, because, as the Angelic Dominations are called Liberal with severity; so Ecclesiastical Prelates, liberal and benign toward the humble, severe toward the proud and rebellious, punishing them with censures. Thus the Apostle admonishes Bishops, Timotheum, and Titum, that they do so: Reprove, beseech, etc.
Fifthly, because, as the Angelic Dominations are set apart with a great dissimilitude of perfection, because nothing unseemly of divine likeness is found in them; so Ecclesiastics should have pre-eminence from sinners with a great disparity of life, lest there be said to them the word Rom. II. Thou that preachest that men should not steal, dost thou steal? Or that of Isaia VIII. Hear ye deceivers, who rule over my people.
Sixthly, because as the Dominations of the Angels are so called because they dominate most powerfully even over themselves, as S. Dionysius says loco cit., so those dominating in the Church ought to dominate their own passions, that even as Melchisedech, without father, without mother, without genealogy, they acknowledge not even their dear ones, where the duty of their office must be fulfilled.
Seventhly, because as the Angels are called Dominations because they hold a good and stable immutability of affection in God, so that nothing appearing to them may dominate, but they be perpetually converted to the true immutable Being: so also Ecclesiastics should so stand in God as not to be converted to vanities and follies, as Tobias says cap. IV. Never suffer pride to rule in thy sense.
Therefore thus the Ecclesiastics purge, illuminate, and perfect all inferiors, that they may not be purged by them, etc. For as the Spirit has pre-eminence over the body and excels it, so the Spiritual power over the corporal. Whence it rightly receives the name of Domination. Whence the Regal power is subject to the spiritual Domination. Therefore Petrus, prima cap. II. You are a Regal Priesthood, a holy nation. For the temporal kingdom, as a certain thing adjoined, is subject to the Priesthood in the new testament; albeit in the old testament the Priesthood of temporal promises, being but a figure, seems to be adjoined to the regal power, Exodi 19. a regal Priesthood, as the S. Doctor says with D. Hieronym., lib. 1. cont. Pelag., and epist. ad Dardan., August., quaest. 33. in Num., and lib. 19. cont. Faust. cap. 31. Although it is adjoined there also as adding the dignity and virtue necessary to the superior Order; for without Religion kingdoms fall. Hence 27. Num. God commands even the Prince Josue to depend on the Pontiff, and Lev. 4. a higher Sacrifice is exacted for the Priest than for the King: as seems to be Philo lib. de victoria, Theodoretus quaest. 1. in Levit., Procop. in cap. 4. Levit. But if it be objected that Abiathar the Pontiff was deposed by Salomon; say with S. Bonav., according to the former Doctrine, that the case is unlike: or that it was done by the word of the Lord, as is said 3. Reg. 2. See on this matter at large the Seraphic Doctor, cap. 1. de ecclesiast. Hierarchia, part. 2., near the end.
Now truly, that Pontiffs may be able to be free for God, and at the same time raise and reform the vast multitude of the people to the Deiform likeness, they ought to take others into a share of the solicitude. Therefore also Iethro advised Moses, Exodi 18.: The business is above thy strength; thou alone canst not sustain it, etc. Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God, to refer what is said to him: and show thou to the people the ceremonies and the rite of worshipping God, and the way by which they must walk, and the work they must do. Provide therefore able men, and fearing God, in whom there is truth, and who hate avarice, and appoint of them Tribunes, who may judge the people at all times, and it shall be lighter for thee, the burden being divided among others: And such are the Decani, Praepositi, Archidiaconi, and Iudices, whether ordinary or delegated, who soothe lawsuits and strive to recall men to concord. And such are compared to the heavenly Powers and Virtues, as I shall say at once sect. seqq.
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
The ANGELS are called Virtues on account of their firm and immutable virility for the reception of divine illuminations, as S. Dionysius says cap. 8. de caelesti Hierarchia, in no wise infirm, but virilely reduced to the imitation of God, not forsaking the Deiform manner of life, but firmly bearing it toward the supersubstantial and potentific virtue proceeding deiformly.
The VIRTUES are especially commended for the zealous defence of Justice, for the imitation of Divine wisdom, for the prompt determination of the cause of the poor, for the constant flight from Avarice and gifts, and lastly for the vigorous liberation of the oppressed.
LET these things be directed to those who exercise judicial power; for without these, Justice is easily perverted in giving judgments; for those who violate Justice, how can they administer it to others? Those who do not devote themselves to the pursuits of divine wisdom will in no wise be able to set forth the Judgments of God; nor can those who indulge the Rich bestow equity upon the poor, etc.
BUT since these things pertain not so much to the prudence of Judges as to the unblemished equity of Judgments, therefore I defer them to the next disputation, where I shall treat of Justice.
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
HERE there would be question of the government of Princes, on which D. Thomas interweaves a prolix little work, which is the twentieth.
REPEAT moreover the subjective parts of prudence, numbered above.
Aristotle indeed asserts, 3. Eth. cap. 3., that Prudence is the proper virtue of the Prince. The reason is, because to prudence belongs to govern and to command; and therefore where the special character of government and of command is found in human acts, there also the special character of prudence is found. Now it is manifest that in him who not only governs himself, but also a perfect community, or a kingdom, there is found the perfect character of government. For the more universal a government is, extending itself to more things and attaining a further end, the more perfect it is; and therefore to the King, to whom it belongs to govern a city or a kingdom, prudence belongs by a special character, and indeed the most perfect one.
To this there corresponds the Political prudence in subjects, that they be moved and governed; for since they are not governed and moved in the manner of irrational creatures — nay, they move themselves by free will — therefore there is required in them a certain rectitude of government, by which they direct themselves to obeying those who rule; and to this pertains that species of prudence which is called Political, as D. Thomas says in article 3.
FROM these however differs another prudence, which is called Oeconomical, and is midway between the prudence of princes and of individual persons; for it is ordered to the government of the household, which is a part of the city.
THAT however I may come nearer: the fourth subjective species of governing Prudence is the Military, as is intimated Proverb. 24. The reason is, because things done according to art and reason ought to be conformable to those that are according to nature, which were instituted by the divine reason. Now nature tends to two things. First indeed to governing each thing in itself; second truly to resisting external assailants and corruptive agents. Wherefore it gave to animals not only the concupiscible power, by which they are moved to those things that are accommodated to their salvation, but also the irascible power, by which the animal resists assaults. Wherefore also in those things that are according to reason there must be not only Political prudence, by which those things are ordered that pertain to the common good, but also Military prudence, by which the assaults of enemies are repelled.
BOTH indeed shine forth in the celestial Potestates, as D. Bonavent. teaches; for they are ordered both to governing the inferiors subordinated to the Dominations, and especially to blunting the assaults of the infernal enemies, as St. Dionysius teaches de caelesti Hierarchia, cit. whence he defines the celestial Potestates thus, in the Seraphic Doctor.
THE designation of the holy Potestates teaches a powerful, and well-adorned, and undistorted ordination with regard to divine receptions, not precipitating the inferior things tyrannically by sheer command, but mightily reducing them to the divine; and assimilating them, as far as is lawful, to the potent causal power; and converting the inferior things to God, who is the prince of all power, according to the hierarchical disposition, making the divine and luminous power resplendent in the inferior things. Whence the Angels of that order restrain and check all who impede the hierarchical ordination of prelation and subjection. Whence they do not permit the power of prelation to be contemned by subjects, and they do not allow subjects to be oppressed by violence by iniquitous lords; nay, they meet every injury of these and of those most powerfully, and resist it.
¶ NOW Princes and Kings ought to contemplate the holy and celestial potestates, namely that they rule wisely, live in an orderly manner, and mightily repress and vindicate evil, spare the innocent, and not permit injury to be done to wretched persons; so that they also do not grow proud of the power they have received, but rather condescend to the humble.
¶ THEREFORE secular Power will be well ordered, disposed in the similitude of the celestial potestates, if those placed in power be wise, that is, proceeding in each matter not according to the impulse of will, but according to the helm of reason, as is said Proverb. 1. The wise man, hearing, will be wiser, and the understanding man will possess governments. Hence Solomon at the beginning of his reign asked for wisdom, saying 3. Reg. 3. Thou, O God, hast made me to reign in place of my father, and I am a little child, ignorant of my going out and my coming in. Give therefore to thy servant an understanding heart, that he may be able to judge thy people, and discern between good and evil. For as in spiritual jurisdiction, so neither in temporal ought anything to be done without wisdom and discretion. Hence it is commanded Deuter. 17. When the King shall sit on the throne of his kingdom, he shall cause the Deuteronomy to be written out for himself, etc. Hence men of advanced age, and old men, were wont to be chosen as Princes and as kings, because wisdom is found not in children, but in the aged, who compose many experiences from the memory of things past, whence prudence is perfected, as I said. Hence Roboam lost the kingdom 3. Reg. 12. because, having left the counsel of the elders, he yielded to the counsel of the young. Wherefore it is said Eccles. 10. Woe to thee, O land, whose king is a child.
¶ THEN they will be like the celestial potestates if, adorned in morals, they show to subjects a good and innocent life. For nothing profits to be clothed in purple, to be marked with the diadem, to shine with glittering gems, and to be sordid in disordered morals; hence the Potestates are said to have received from the Lord a well-ordered and undistorted power. For as the Poet says:
Virtue is not sought from without. He who abounds in morals within needs nothing outward; Nobility alone is that which adorns the soul with morals.
¶ THEREFORE the Lord does not attend in potestates to the nobility of the world or of the flesh, or to the comeliness of body or of dress, but to the nobility of morals and the honesty of conscience; and this is what is said primo Reg. 16. Do not look on his countenance, nor on the height of his stature; because I have rejected him; nor do I judge according to the look of man.
¶ ALSO they are like the celestial Potestates who, animated by love of justice, pursue all malice in the reprobate, and those disturbing the public peace, as is said of Iuda, 1. Machab. 3. He persecuted the wicked, searching out those who troubled the people, etc. For the power of Kings is among men ordained by the Lord, that by their fear the audacity of the wicked be restrained, which would so prevail that, did not the public power resist, even human society would be utterly dissipated. Hence Exodi 18. Choose for thyself men of power. And Psalm. 44. Upon thy thigh, O most mighty one.
¶ ALSO they imitate the celestial Potestates who govern subjects, and guard the innocent, not with tyrannical cruelty, but rather with human, nay Angelic benignity. Hence it is said Esther. 12. When I commanded over many nations, and had subdued the whole world to my dominion, I would not abuse the greatness of my power, but to govern my subjects with clemency and lenity, that passing their life without terror they might enjoy the peace they desired.
¶ LIKEWISE Princes and Kings are compared to the Potestates if they do not grow proud of power. Nay, the more they excel the rest, the more they should humble themselves before every one, as Eccles. 3 admonishes: The greater thou art, the more humble thyself, etc. As the Son of God, the supreme power, Virtue, and arm of the Father, emptying himself, was made subject to all, and redeemed the world by meekness; so they are warned Psalm. 146. He shall not have his will in the strength of the horse. Therefore he is most powerful who, trusting in God, distrusts himself. Whence observe that Kings and Leaders have always triumphed more by the aid of God than by arms; and that those who trusted most in the strength of their armies were scattered. Therefore a great act of prudence is to provide for oneself before God, and afterwards before men, and not to wish that the power over the whole earth be in the hand of God, as is said Eccl. 10.
¶ SIMILARLY Princes are likened to the supernal potestates, procuring the peace of the whole earth, which indeed would not be preserved unless the Royal potestates endeavored it, as the Machabaei acknowledged, Lib. 2. cap. 4. Therefore the Princes ought to remember that they carry the sword, that they may crush the potestates that rise up against, and are rebellious to, the Church, which fear their power, as is said Rom. 13.
¶ SIMILARLY, as the celestial potestates make the luminous power of God resplendent in the inferior things, as St. Dionysius says; so that the truth, goodness, and power which shines forth in them may, through the mediation of the superior angels, transfulge into the lower ones, who are thereby reduced to like participations of grace and glory: so Princes should, now by severity and justice, now by clemency and benignity, lead the simple people back to the knowledge of God, and the powerful to the inviolable observance of the laws of divine justice. Hence it is said Eccles. 44. Those ruling in their potestates, men endowed with great virtue and prudence. For thus they ought prudently to preside, that by the light of their virtues they may shine forth before all their subjects, more than they superintend by power. As God made the Sun into the power of the Day, and the Moon into the power of the Night. Psalm. 135. So, as the Sun presides over the Day with a resplendent and beneficent light, dissipating the darkness, drawing upward the depraved humors, that they may be resolved into rains and dews fertilizing the earth, aiding all inferior causes toward their effects, as a universal cause; so Princes, the darkness of vices having been put to flight, should scatter, illuminate, warm, kindle, and inflame virtues everywhere, terrifying the animals inimical to the light. Hence Proverb. 19. As the roaring of the lion, so also the anger of the king; and as the dew upon the herb, so his cheerfulness. Thus will they be worthy that every soul be subject to the higher potestates, as is said Rom. 13. Whence Peter also says, prima, cap. 2. obey your lords, etc., whether to the King as to the preeminent one, etc.
¶ ANOTHER treatise the Saintly Doctor has on the government of prelates, which is graced with this title: De sex alis Seraphim. For since the Seraphim preeminate among the Angels, therefore they are likened to the prelates of the Church. But since these appeared adorned with six wings, Isa. VI. Apoc. IV. Now the senary number is perfect, consisting of its aliquot parts; therefore he labors to expound the virtues of the Antistes from this winged number, that by them they may fly to the mark.
THEREFORE the FIRST Wing of the Rector is the zeal of justice, whereby he cannot without murmuring tolerate any evil whatsoever. For anyone is to be esteemed so much the better, the more he detests evil and pursues good: not only by way of disposition, so as not to be willing to desert the sweetness of his own quiet, after the manner of the Fig tree of Iudit. IX. which was unwilling to forgo its sweetness so as to preside over the trees; but such men ought to be such that, forgetful even of their own quiet, they take no delight in the profits of their own salvation, unless they promote others to salvation, as Paulus. prima Cor. XIII. seeketh not the things that are his own, but those that are Jesus Christ's. With this zeal indeed they ought to burn above all who bear the person of Christ; for of Christ it is said Psalm. XLIV. Thou hast loved justice, and hated iniquity; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of joy. This justice is the observance of all those things that are necessary to salvation, as are the precepts of Charitas, of the Decalogue, and the rest, which flow from the eternal law; as the virtues, humility, chastity, mercy. Then also those which are constituted by human law in the law of the Church, as the rites of the Sacraments and of the rest, with the positives belonging to the law that are adjoined.1
THESE however let them take care to observe both in themselves and in others, but in due order, lest they be of those of whom Lucae XI. you pay tithe of mint, and rue, and leave the things that are weightier, as certain Praelati, who are more inflamed for one inclination in the choir than for grave transgressions; more for one rubric neglected than for a scandal.
THEY ought moreover diligently to offer remedies rather for public sins; especially that the study of prayer, which is necessary, be preserved.
EVERY Religion is arid (says D. Bonavent.) that is not fattened with this oil. Unstable is the structure of good works which is not compacted by the frequency of devout prayer, like a wall of stones without cement. In every religion, where the fervor of prayer has grown tepid, the fabric of the other virtues also begins to fail, and to approach ruin; and the lamps of the foolish virgins, without oil, are extinguished, as is said Matth. XXV.
THEN there is to be guarded against negligence of exterior discipline, lest anything be left uncorrected or unpunished, lest he be condemned with Heli primo Reg. IV. This mark, for discerning laudable religion from the relaxed one, the Saintly Doctor offers: not that no one sinning be found in the reformed religions, but that no one be allowed to sin with impunity, and the approaches to sinning be studiously precluded, and the incorrigible and the other infecters be eliminated, and the good be cherished and loved, that they may persevere. For since depravity has been found even in the convent of Angels and the college of Apostles, although they lived under the mastership of God; what order of good men in this life will arrogate to itself that no sin be found in it?
THEREFORE the Saintly Doctor concludes, the Prelate will render a heavy account to God; First for his own non-observance and omission of office, Sap. VI. When you were ministers of his kingdom, you judged not rightly, you kept not the law of justice, nor walked according to the will of God. Horribly, and speedily shall things appear to you: for the judgment shall be most hard on those who preside. Second, for the sins of the subjects, which they could and ought to have corrected and forestalled, and did not correct or forestall. Hence it is said Ezech. XXXIII. If thou hadst not spoken, to keep the wicked from his way: the wicked himself shall die in his iniquity, but his blood I will require at thy hand. Which exposition the Saintly Doctor learned from the Seraphic P. Francisco. Third, they will render an account for the abuse of power for their own profit and honor. Hence Matth. XXV. Take away the talent from him, and cast the unprofitable servant out.
THE SECOND Wing of the Antistites is Pietas, that as the Charitas of God inflames him to the zeal of justice, so fraternal love may form him to piety; for although to vices there is due the striking rod, yet to infirmity there is necessary the sustaining staff; of these Psalm. XXII. Thy rod, and thy staff, they have comforted me. The Praelati moreover ought to be prudent spiritual physicians, that they may discern the various infirmities, and have remedies apt for all. Nor let them be of those of whom Psal. LXVIII. For whom thou hast struck, they have persecuted. And so let them flourish in piety, lest he who is cast off utterly perish, as the prudent Tecuitis says II. Reg.; but as is said primo Reg. XXIII. let them be able to have the subjects say: Blessed be you of the Lord, for you have had compassion on my case.
NEITHER say (says the Saintly Doctor.) Worthily is help given to those of whom there is hope of convalescence; but in those of whom it is not presumed that they will ever recover, the expenses are uselessly consumed; for mercy is exhibited on account of the merit of Charitas, and not on account of its own utility; therefore it behooves the Pontiff to experience infirmities, that he may be able to be compassionate, as is said Heb. IV.
ADMONISHES moreover the Saintly Doctor that in his mind regarding the infirm there are three kinds. The first are those who from an affect of devotion, prone to scandals, easily fall, as the Apostle says, prima Cor. XI. Among you many are infirm. The second, who, although devout, yet are either easily moved to impatience by correction, or despair through diffidence. The third are all the imperfect, who, agitated by the passions, waver. Of these, he says, the occasions of scandal are to be removed, the opportunities of sinning, lest they see or hear what would weaken them; nor let them be allowed to wander outside the house. For Dina Genes. XXXIII. having gone out of the house, was corrupted. These are to be removed by examples, and exhortations, nor let them be provoked to anger, as is said Coloss. III. Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, that they become not pusillanimous. The Praelati ought to be compassionate with all these, as Iacob said XXXIII. Thou knowest that I have little children, tender, and the sheep and cows with young with me, which, if I make them labor more in walking, all the flocks will die in one day. Hence Paulus prima Thessal. II. We became little ones in the midst of you, as if a nurse cherish her sons, which doubtless means: thus humbly and piously was I gentle with you, condescending to your tenderness and imperfection.
ON THE CONTRARY the Lord complains of the hard pastors, Ezech. XXXIII. That which was infirm you have not strengthened, and that which was sick you have not healed, and that which was broken you have not bound up, and that which was lost you have not sought, etc. but you ruled them with harshness, and with power. Hence Bernardus, sermone XXIII. in Cant. Why do you weigh down your yoke, when you behold the disciples, whose yoke you ought rather to carry? Lay aside the burdens, bring forth the udders, milk the breasts, let them rest. And if at times severity be needed, let it be paternal, not tyrannical, according to that Num. XI. Bear them in thy bosom, as the woman bears her infant, and carry them into the land for which I swore, etc.
THE THIRD Wing of the Antistites is patience, and constant longanimity; for as the covering of the tabernacle received the rains, the winds, and the dusts, that the interior things might remain clean; so the Prelate ought to receive the tempests, that he may preserve the interior things, and, like the Hen for her chicks, expose himself to the Kite. For three reasons however is patience necessary to them: First, on account of the various occupations pressing in. On account of this also Moses was most wretched Deuter. 1. I am not able alone to sustain your affairs, etc. Second, on account of the slow progress of those for whom he labors; wherefore Psalm. 118. My zeal hath made me to languish. Third, on account of the ingratitude of those for whom he labors, who, never contented, always complain.
WITH these, and other adversities, by which he is assailed, let the prudent man oppose himself with the triple shield of patience. First, that he answer maturely, and benignly, each thing, and repress the impulse of fervor, lest he show impatience by voice, or countenance. For then he more calms the impatient, as Iudic. 8. Gedeon checked the quarrelers; for, as the Wise man witnesses: A mild answer breaks wrath; a hard word stirs up fury. Second, let him strive to be peaceable in the house, that he neither avenge himself of the injuries inflicted, nor hate them in his heart, but imitate the supernal Father: Who is benign over the ungrateful, and the evil. Third, that he not on that account less promptly apply himself to his office, as is said 2. Paral. 15. Be you therefore comforted; and let not your hands be weakened.
THE FOURTH Wing is the exemplary life. For he himself ought to be the norm of living, that what he teaches in words he may show in the figures of his actions, as one who teaches Geometry describes the demonstrations of the figures on the tablets, that what he says may be better grasped. Thus of Christ it is said, Act. 1. Jesus began to do, and to teach, and Ioan. 13. I have given you an example, and Iudic. 7. Gedeon says What you shall see me do, that do.
ALTHOUGH however the rector ought to precede the subjects in all examples of the virtues; yet especially in these three: in the conformity, namely, of common observance; in the humility of meekness; and in the honesty of maturity. Whence ad Titum 2. In all things show thyself an example of good works, in doctrine, in integrity, in gravity, etc.
LET him observe a common life with others in food, clothing, and labor, that he be not given to banquets and drinkings, nor be unlike in habit to those with whom is his common profession: he ought to become all things to all men, that he may make all men saved, as is said 2. Cor. 9. See the Saintly Doctor.
THE FIFTH Wing of the Praelati is Prudence, and circumspect discretion. This is the chief one, as the Council of Trent teaches, which the Saintly Doctor pursues at length cap. 7. Therefore also Solomon 3. Reg. 3. having from God the option of asking whatsoever he wished, asked for this: Give therefore, Lord, to thy servant an understanding heart, that he may be able to judge thy people, and discern between good, and evil. And Sap. 6. To you therefore, O Kings, are these my words, that you may learn wisdom, and not fall. And Psalm. 2. And now, O Kings, understand; be instructed, you that judge the earth. For the Rector is the eye of the people, and D. Bernardus, sermone 49. in Cant. Take away discretion, and virtue will be a vice. On this account, Levit. 2. in every thy oblation thou shalt offer salt. See the Saintly Doctor, treating these wondrously differently: From the Rational of the ancient Pontiff, and from the four orders of gems, the rector has four things necessary to observe. First, how he may govern the subjects in the due state, that they may profit by his good example. Second, how he may raise up the fallen, and correct the straying. Third, in what manner he may dispose the exterior affairs. Fourth, how he may guard and conduct himself in these.
IN each order of stones there were three, signifying three things pertaining to each of the aforesaid, that the burdens of whomever may be aptly, and gently disposed, as is said Num. 4. Aaron, and his sons shall go in; they also shall dispose the burdens of each one.
NOW there is a threefold observance expressed in those triple gems.
THE FIRST, concerning those things that are of the necessity of salvation, according to the profession of each one.
THE SECOND, concerning those things that respect the exercise of a higher, singular perfection: namely the patience to be admitted, the stupendous humility, the arduous Charitas, the eminent sobriety, etc. to which the Rector ought to allure sweetly. Therefore let him hold this gem in his breast, that he may direct the subjects, animated to eminent virtue.
THE THIRD are those which are instituted for the attainment of both, as silence, fasts, etc. In these let the Prelate conduct himself discretely, even by dispensing, if it be necessary.
FOR the correction of the fallen, Prudence is necessary, as is said Galat. 6. If a man be overtaken in any fault, you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of lenity, supporting him, as Christ tolerated Iudam, and as Matth. 13. the zizania are left untouched until the harvest. But they are to be cut off, when they bring perdition, as is said Galat. 5. prima Cor 5. secunda Cor. 7. Lucae 13. and in Numer. 5. lepers are permitted apart; yet he warns with that Eccles. 32. Do all things with counsel, and after the deed you will not repent.
IN the affairs, some it is expedient that the Prelate accomplish by himself, others through others; thus Christ committed the purses to Iudas, and was unwilling to divide the goods between two brothers; thus the Apostles said, Actorum 6. It is not equal that we leave the word of God, and serve tables, etc.
THEREFORE he ought to preside as the head, and share out motion, and sense with the members, and so act, as about to render an account for the subjects, Heb. 15.
SUPERFLUOUS affairs however it is expedient to cut off, as is said Ecclesiastici 11. Son, let not thy acts be many, etc.
ABOVE all the Rector ought to look around upon himself. For what does it profit a man, if he save others, and harm his own soul? Matth. 16.
THEREFORE let him always keep his conscience clean, that he will nothing, act nothing, or permit nothing illicit, and indecent, contrary to his profession, in which sin, or scandal be detected, etc. See the Seraphicum cap. 7. setting forth wondrous things.
ANOTHER circumspection is concerned with exterior morals; for since he desires to live as an example for many, he needs great discretion; lest he be of those of whom Ezech. 34. But you ruled them with harshness, and with power, and my sheep were scattered. And Eccles. 4. Be not as a lion in thy house, etc. Let him rather imitate the meekness of Christ.
FINALLY let the circumspection itself look around upon itself, lest it be as the eye that sees others, not itself, namely that it savor not more than it ought, nor be wise to itself. Whence Prou. 26. Have you seen a man wise in his own eyes? the fool shall have more hope than he. Therefore he ought to consult others; for thus Moses also, to whom God spoke face to face, consulted his father-in-law Exodi 18. and the Apostle, who had been rapt to the third heaven, consulted the other Apostles. But let him avoid the counsels of flatterers, as is said Isa. 3. and of detractors, as is said. Esth. 16.
THE SIXTH Wing of the Praelati is devotion; for by this the zeal of justice is kindled, piety is fostered, patience is strengthened, the good example is founded, discretion is clarified. This is the unction of the Spirit, teaching all things 1. Ioan. 2. See the Saintly Doctor, in the cited chapter de sex alis Seraphim, ala 5.