Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Whether SCANDAL is a special sin.
It is CERTAIN first, that every Scandal, even per accidens given, not by direct will, but from the work, is mortal of its own nature.
It is PROVED first from D. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 31. et ad 17. Lucae from that passage Matth. 18. Vae homini illi, per quem Scandalum venit. Expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius, et demergatur in profundum maris, which the B. Lucas likewise testifies, where from Bede in the Gloss he observes, that a most grave punishment is imposed to be rather endured than eternal; and that the former will be useful to him.
It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure there. Because it fights against Charity, leading souls down to hell. It is also against justice, snatching from Christ souls created, and redeemed by his blood; of which it is said Sap. 11. Tua sunt omnia Domine, qui amas animas. Hence the Apostle gravely, prima Corinth. cap. 8. says: Peribit infirmus in tua scientia frater, propter quem Christus mortuus est? Sic autem peccantes in fratres, et in Christum peccatis. Wherefore Apoc. 2. he declares: Habes tenentes doctrinam Balaam, qui docebat Balac mittere Scandalum, etc. Poenitentiam age: si quo minus, etc.
It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doctor, because as for one who builds up by good example a great reward is prepared, so for one who destroys the work of God, a great punishment. Wherefore Rom. 14. Noli propter escam destruere opus Dei.
It is PROVED fourthly from S. Doctor, because it is a great cruelty to seduce the simple, as it is said Levit. 19. Nec coram caeco pones offendiculum.
It is PROVED fifthly, because one who scandalizes is held to that penalty: Animam pro anima.
But this is a greater sin in public persons, as Prelates and religious, of whom Malach. 2. Legem requirent ex ore eius. Vos autem recessistis de via, et scandalizastis plurimos in lege: Propter quod et ego dedi vos contemptibiles.
You will OBJECT that in Matth. 18. it is said: Necesse est ut veniant Scandala. But what is necessary is not a fault.
S. Doctor ANSWERS, in the place cited that it speaks by supposition, that they are evil, and most truly of Passive Scandal by supposition of the active; nay, by supposition of malice, which is scandalized even at holy works, as the world was scandalized at Christ John 7. Matth. 13. Mark 11. prima Petri 2. and Paul says Christ was a Scandal to the Jews, and in Luke 2. it is said: Positus in ruinam multorum. Thus Valencia also answers puncto 2. and others.
It is CERTAIN also, that passive Scandal per se is a mortal or venial sin, according as the sin itself will be.
It is CERTAIN also, that Scandal from the intention of drawing into the ruin of souls, or into some crime, as such, is a special Scandal; for it is opposed to beneficent Charity.
The QUESTION is now: whether he who induced another by command, counsel, etc., even if he did not directly intend his ruin, is guilty of the special crime of Scandal. Moreover, whether also not only he who intends merely to draw others to that pleasure for himself, but also he who kindled by the sole wickedness of the work gives evil example, is guilty of a special Scandal against Charity.
The FIRST opinion is that it is a special sin. Thus Adrian in 4. dist. 38. quaest. ultim. Antoninus 2. part. titul. 7. §. 4. cap. 4. Navarre relect. in cap. Consideret, de Poenit. disp. 5. and in the Manual, cap. 6. number 19. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 18. puncto 2. where he also cites Alensis part. 2. quaest. 189. memb. 2. The same think Peter Soto Lect. 9. de confess. Suarez de Charitate, disput. 10. sect. 2. Layman Lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 8. citing also Victoria and the modern Thomists, Sylvius 2. 2. The SECOND opinion is, that this scandal is a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. dub. 2. lit. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Caietan there, and in summa, V. scandalum, Couar. relect. in cap. Peccatum, part. 1. num. 5. Bannes quaest. 43. art. 4. Durandus 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3. Palud. there, quaest. 6. Fagundez part. 2. Lib. 4. cap. 4. Ledesma Tom. 2. Tract. 4. cap. 5. concl. 5. Lorea 2. 2. quaest. 43. sect. 3. diff. 56. num. 7. Villalob. summa, Tom. 2. tract. 3. diffic. 8. Becanus 2. 2. cap. 27. quaest. 2. Coninck de act. supernaturalibus, disp. 33. dub. 5. num. 35. Filliucius in Tom. 1. tract. 28. cap 6. num. 216. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Sanchez summa, Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 102. cap. 4. Azor Lib. 4. cap. 7. quaestio 1. Diana part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 114. and part. 5. Tract. 2. which is entirely on scandal, where resol. 2. he refuses to recount the opinions of the Doctors, because this disputation seems metaphysical; for as to practice it matters little, because according to the common opinion of D. Bonaventure, in whatever way you give the occasion of spiritual ruin, you are bound to confess it. In the same manner speak some of those cited above, especially Layman, and Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 8. §. 61. Fuliensis lib. 2. cap. 12. Bassaeus, and others.
I ASSERT with this opinion, that scandal of this kind is only an aggravating circumstance.
It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure and D. Thom., because sin is not named from the person against whom it is; whence if anyone offended several with one contumely, he would commit one sin; but it is taken from the act about which it is, and about that which is per se intended, not about that which is per accidens. Therefore that which is beyond the formal intention pertains to the species of the act only reductively, as Valencia also acknowledges.
Valencia ANSWERS that the assumption is true of that which is beyond every intention and without all voluntariness; and that it does not look to the moral act, nor has anything whereby it is reckoned among moral acts. But it suffices for the Seraphic Doctor, if the act does not have moral being per se, but needs to be reduced to something else, that it not constitute a distinct species of moral act.
Valencia OBJECTS. In every other matter in which sin is specified by the harm or injury inflicted, the tacit and indirect, or virtual intention, is equivalent to an express intention, at least for the commission of a sin of such a species: Therefore also in the matter of scandal. The antecedent is proved: For he truly commits the sin of detraction who rashly says something, from which follows damage to the reputation of his neighbor. Likewise he truly commits the sin of theft who takes another's property, not with the intention of harming his neighbor, but of benefiting himself; and he who commits fornication in a sacred place commits Sacrilege, although he does not expressly intend to inflict injury on the sacred place: Therefore. Caietan admits the knot of this argument, saying he does not know how to solve it, quaest. 53. art. 2. ad 3.
Yet it is ANSWERED that the cases are different: for all have moral entity per se, nor do they need to lean on another; not so in our case. As to the first; many judge it probable that it is not a sin. As to the second case, there is a direct will, for he necessarily wills to snatch from another to benefit himself. The third case is of a different matter, about which the act per se takes place in the Church, if the fornicator wills certainly to fornicate in that place, even if he does not principally intend this.
You OBJECT secondly. He who scandalizes by a good act truly commits the sin of scandal, as Caietan and Paludanus concede; although he only indirectly wills the ruin of his neighbor: Therefore also he who scandalizes by an evil act. For the latter is not in a better condition than the former; nor does the fact that his act is otherwise evil stand in the way of its being, for another reason, at the same time in another species of sin, as appears from the doctrine of D. Thom. prima secundae, quaest. 18. art. 10. I do not think (says Valencia) this argument can be solved.
It is ANSWERED with D. Bonaventure by denying the Antecedent: For the former sins against prudence, and so that circumstance of the act is not a sin per se; and by this the third objection is answered.
You OBJECT thirdly: If the formal intention is necessary for the special sin of scandal; rarely, or never, will one sin by the sin of scandal. For how rare is the man so imbued with diabolical poison as to will the special and spiritual ruin of others? and yet in Scripture this sin is described as frequent Matth. 18. prima Corinth. 8.
It is ANSWERED easily, that a direct intention is not necessary, namely that you will to lead him directly into spiritual ruin, namely to hell; but it suffices that you will to lead him to sin in such a way, and persuade, solicit, threaten, etc. Alas, how frequent are these acts. In this sense some of the second opinion do not deny that it is a special sin. Thus D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 1. et lib. 3. Phar. cap. 39. where the SS. Fathers cited seem to think this, and ad 17. Lucae, and in 4. in the place cited he seems to speak the same.
From what has been said you will gather how one who has given scandal ought to behave in confession.
INDEED it seems that this circumstance need not be confessed, according to the doctrine of D. Bonav. de circumstantiis aggravantibus, and I shall say 3. part. Tract. de Paenit. diff. 2. sect. 3. quaest. 5. Thus many affirm on this matter.
However, COMMONLY they teach that it is to be confessed. Thus Lorea, Villalobos, Becanus, Coninck, Fagundez, Ledesma, cited above, to whom Diana almost subscribes Part 3. Tract. 4. resol. 114. with D. Bonaventure. Nay, Sylvius, Filliucius, Sanchez, Layman above, Bonacina de sacrament. disp. 5. quaest. 5. sect. 2. puncto 2. §. 3. diff. 3. num. 21. and Diana point out that the number of persons and their condition must be expressed, to whom the scandal was given, even with a single sin, and in what way, whether in conversations about fornication? about unspeakable things? or about betrothed women (conjunctis)? Wherefore these two last cry out blind confessors who do not ask these things. Diana again subscribes Part 5. Tract. 7. resol. 3. adding Paludanus, Molsheim (Molfesium), Leo, and others.
NOTE truly first, that soliciting a defiled (patatam), or a prepared (paratam) woman,1 is a probably direct scandal, to be said in confession, according to Sanchez lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 14. Bonacina tract. 1. disp. 5. quaest. 5. puncto 2. §. 3. Vasquez quaest. 91. art. 1. disp. 4. Fill. tract. 28. num. 231. They make an exception, if by an explicit act it were sufficiently perceived, as was said, that you fornicated with a woman, one could gather that you sought this; for a woman, for the most part, is not accustomed to ask.
Others, however, admit it is not to be confessed; for it does not induce, since he finds it prepared. Thus Fagundez praecept. 2. lib. 4. cap. 5. Suarez 3. part. tract. 4. disp. 22. sect. 4. num. 18. Henriquez lib. 2. de paen. cap. 6. num. 7. Diana part. 1. tract. 7. res. 34. Azor tract. 2. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 5. Bassaeus §. 1.
To SOLICIT one not yet prepared, however, is called by Diana indirect scandal; but I refuse it, for many do not excuse doing works in the face of the perfect which inflame; for even these fall, as David 2. Reg. 11. seeing Bethsabee in the bath. Solomon 3. Reg. 11. See D. Thom. art. 5. and 6. Perhaps you will excuse yourself, if you opine that the beholders are not to be moved, as many say with Diana, Tract. de scandalo, resol. 3. or if they have been so carried along that they are not moved on that account. See there.