Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

To the example of a good work, whereby the Church of God is built up, Scandal is opposed, whereby the hostile man labors that it fall into ruin: for he dissolves the cement of Charity, and places in its stead stones of offense, upon which, falling from the structure, they strike their feet who walk iniquitously, as I shall soon say.

Scandal signifies the striking of the foot against some stumbling block, as D. Jerome says in cap. 15. Matth. and D. Bonaventure p. p. Compil. sect. 31.

It is from the Greek Scandalon, which signifies an obstacle, a stumbling block; Σκάνδαλον, which among the Greeks signifies that little wooden trigger in the trap, which when the mouse touches it, to gnaw the bait, the fall of the little board follows.

THEREFORE Scandal among Theologians is that which is the occasion of spiritual ruin given to one's neighbor. Hence they define it: Scandalum est dictum, vel factum minus rectum, praebens proximo occasionem spiritualis ruinae, Thus D. Thom. here, Alensis part. 2. quaest. 189. memb. 1. Richard 4. dist. 38. art. ult. quaest. 1. Durandus there, quaest. 3. Maior quaest. ult. art. 1. Adrian quodl. 1. art. 1. Sylvester and other Summists under the word Scandalum. Couar. R. l. CL. in cap. Peccatum, de reg. iuris, part. 1. num. 5. and D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 1. et parte prima Centiloquii, sect. 31.

It is said dictum, vel factum (a word or deed), because it must be something external. It is said minus rectum (less right), because it is not necessary that it be absolutely evil; but it suffices that it be less right, deficient in one circumstance of those integral ones whereby the good is constituted, according to D. Dionysius, cap. 4. de divin. nominibus. The omission of a duty is also included.

Scandal is DIVIDED first into Active and Passive. Active is that which we have just defined; Passive is the spiritual ruin itself of another. See S. Bonaventure in the place cited of the Centiloquium.

SECOND, active Scandal is divided into Scandal per se, and Scandal per accidens. Scandal per se we call in this place, when from a certain and express intention the occasion of ruin is given, promoting it, soliciting it, persuading to it, exhorting to it. Per accidens is twofold: one with respect to the agent, not with respect to the work, as when one sins in the face of others with such a crime, as induces of itself to sin, even if he does not intend this; with such Scandal one sins in maintaining a concubine in the face of his sons, and it is called general. The other is per accidens, both with respect to the agent, who does not intend to induce others to sin; and on the part of the work, which is not of its own nature an incentive to sin, even if it abound with a defect (naevus).

They DIVIDE the Active per se further into that whereby the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended; and into another, whereby only the pleasure or utility of the sinner is intended, but not formal ruin. And each of these is called special by many.

Passive SCANDAL is subdivided into Given (Datum) and Taken (Acceptum). Scandal Given is that which arises from the Active Scandal of another; and it is called the Scandal of the little ones, which is to be guarded against, according to the saying of Christ, Matth. 18. Qui autem Scandalizaverit unum de pusillis istis, expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius, et demergatur in profundum maris; this also arises from the weakness of the beholders. Scandal Taken is that which arises not from the occasion given, but taken, from one's own malice, and it is also called Pharisaical. Of this Christ says Matth. 15. Sinite illos: caeci sunt. For of this one must not be concerned.

Whether SCANDAL is a special sin.

It is CERTAIN first, that every Scandal, even per accidens given, not by direct will, but from the work, is mortal of its own nature.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 31. et ad 17. Lucae from that passage Matth. 18. Vae homini illi, per quem Scandalum venit. Expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius, et demergatur in profundum maris, which the B. Lucas likewise testifies, where from Bede in the Gloss he observes, that a most grave punishment is imposed to be rather endured than eternal; and that the former will be useful to him.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure there. Because it fights against Charity, leading souls down to hell. It is also against justice, snatching from Christ souls created, and redeemed by his blood; of which it is said Sap. 11. Tua sunt omnia Domine, qui amas animas. Hence the Apostle gravely, prima Corinth. cap. 8. says: Peribit infirmus in tua scientia frater, propter quem Christus mortuus est? Sic autem peccantes in fratres, et in Christum peccatis. Wherefore Apoc. 2. he declares: Habes tenentes doctrinam Balaam, qui docebat Balac mittere Scandalum, etc. Poenitentiam age: si quo minus, etc.

It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doctor, because as for one who builds up by good example a great reward is prepared, so for one who destroys the work of God, a great punishment. Wherefore Rom. 14. Noli propter escam destruere opus Dei.

It is PROVED fourthly from S. Doctor, because it is a great cruelty to seduce the simple, as it is said Levit. 19. Nec coram caeco pones offendiculum.

It is PROVED fifthly, because one who scandalizes is held to that penalty: Animam pro anima.

But this is a greater sin in public persons, as Prelates and religious, of whom Malach. 2. Legem requirent ex ore eius. Vos autem recessistis de via, et scandalizastis plurimos in lege: Propter quod et ego dedi vos contemptibiles.

You will OBJECT that in Matth. 18. it is said: Necesse est ut veniant Scandala. But what is necessary is not a fault.

S. Doctor ANSWERS, in the place cited that it speaks by supposition, that they are evil, and most truly of Passive Scandal by supposition of the active; nay, by supposition of malice, which is scandalized even at holy works, as the world was scandalized at Christ John 7. Matth. 13. Mark 11. prima Petri 2. and Paul says Christ was a Scandal to the Jews, and in Luke 2. it is said: Positus in ruinam multorum. Thus Valencia also answers puncto 2. and others.

It is CERTAIN also, that passive Scandal per se is a mortal or venial sin, according as the sin itself will be.

It is CERTAIN also, that Scandal from the intention of drawing into the ruin of souls, or into some crime, as such, is a special Scandal; for it is opposed to beneficent Charity.

The QUESTION is now: whether he who induced another by command, counsel, etc., even if he did not directly intend his ruin, is guilty of the special crime of Scandal. Moreover, whether also not only he who intends merely to draw others to that pleasure for himself, but also he who kindled by the sole wickedness of the work gives evil example, is guilty of a special Scandal against Charity.

The FIRST opinion is that it is a special sin. Thus Adrian in 4. dist. 38. quaest. ultim. Antoninus 2. part. titul. 7. §. 4. cap. 4. Navarre relect. in cap. Consideret, de Poenit. disp. 5. and in the Manual, cap. 6. number 19. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 18. puncto 2. where he also cites Alensis part. 2. quaest. 189. memb. 2. The same think Peter Soto Lect. 9. de confess. Suarez de Charitate, disput. 10. sect. 2. Layman Lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 8. citing also Victoria and the modern Thomists, Sylvius 2. 2. The SECOND opinion is, that this scandal is a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. dub. 2. lit. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Caietan there, and in summa, V. scandalum, Couar. relect. in cap. Peccatum, part. 1. num. 5. Bannes quaest. 43. art. 4. Durandus 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3. Palud. there, quaest. 6. Fagundez part. 2. Lib. 4. cap. 4. Ledesma Tom. 2. Tract. 4. cap. 5. concl. 5. Lorea 2. 2. quaest. 43. sect. 3. diff. 56. num. 7. Villalob. summa, Tom. 2. tract. 3. diffic. 8. Becanus 2. 2. cap. 27. quaest. 2. Coninck de act. supernaturalibus, disp. 33. dub. 5. num. 35. Filliucius in Tom. 1. tract. 28. cap 6. num. 216. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Sanchez summa, Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 102. cap. 4. Azor Lib. 4. cap. 7. quaestio 1. Diana part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 114. and part. 5. Tract. 2. which is entirely on scandal, where resol. 2. he refuses to recount the opinions of the Doctors, because this disputation seems metaphysical; for as to practice it matters little, because according to the common opinion of D. Bonaventure, in whatever way you give the occasion of spiritual ruin, you are bound to confess it. In the same manner speak some of those cited above, especially Layman, and Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 8. §. 61. Fuliensis lib. 2. cap. 12. Bassaeus, and others.

I ASSERT with this opinion, that scandal of this kind is only an aggravating circumstance.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure and D. Thom., because sin is not named from the person against whom it is; whence if anyone offended several with one contumely, he would commit one sin; but it is taken from the act about which it is, and about that which is per se intended, not about that which is per accidens. Therefore that which is beyond the formal intention pertains to the species of the act only reductively, as Valencia also acknowledges.

Valencia ANSWERS that the assumption is true of that which is beyond every intention and without all voluntariness; and that it does not look to the moral act, nor has anything whereby it is reckoned among moral acts. But it suffices for the Seraphic Doctor, if the act does not have moral being per se, but needs to be reduced to something else, that it not constitute a distinct species of moral act.

Valencia OBJECTS. In every other matter in which sin is specified by the harm or injury inflicted, the tacit and indirect, or virtual intention, is equivalent to an express intention, at least for the commission of a sin of such a species: Therefore also in the matter of scandal. The antecedent is proved: For he truly commits the sin of detraction who rashly says something, from which follows damage to the reputation of his neighbor. Likewise he truly commits the sin of theft who takes another's property, not with the intention of harming his neighbor, but of benefiting himself; and he who commits fornication in a sacred place commits Sacrilege, although he does not expressly intend to inflict injury on the sacred place: Therefore. Caietan admits the knot of this argument, saying he does not know how to solve it, quaest. 53. art. 2. ad 3.

Yet it is ANSWERED that the cases are different: for all have moral entity per se, nor do they need to lean on another; not so in our case. As to the first; many judge it probable that it is not a sin. As to the second case, there is a direct will, for he necessarily wills to snatch from another to benefit himself. The third case is of a different matter, about which the act per se takes place in the Church, if the fornicator wills certainly to fornicate in that place, even if he does not principally intend this.

You OBJECT secondly. He who scandalizes by a good act truly commits the sin of scandal, as Caietan and Paludanus concede; although he only indirectly wills the ruin of his neighbor: Therefore also he who scandalizes by an evil act. For the latter is not in a better condition than the former; nor does the fact that his act is otherwise evil stand in the way of its being, for another reason, at the same time in another species of sin, as appears from the doctrine of D. Thom. prima secundae, quaest. 18. art. 10. I do not think (says Valencia) this argument can be solved.

It is ANSWERED with D. Bonaventure by denying the Antecedent: For the former sins against prudence, and so that circumstance of the act is not a sin per se; and by this the third objection is answered.

You OBJECT thirdly: If the formal intention is necessary for the special sin of scandal; rarely, or never, will one sin by the sin of scandal. For how rare is the man so imbued with diabolical poison as to will the special and spiritual ruin of others? and yet in Scripture this sin is described as frequent Matth. 18. prima Corinth. 8.

It is ANSWERED easily, that a direct intention is not necessary, namely that you will to lead him directly into spiritual ruin, namely to hell; but it suffices that you will to lead him to sin in such a way, and persuade, solicit, threaten, etc. Alas, how frequent are these acts. In this sense some of the second opinion do not deny that it is a special sin. Thus D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 1. et lib. 3. Phar. cap. 39. where the SS. Fathers cited seem to think this, and ad 17. Lucae, and in 4. in the place cited he seems to speak the same.

From what has been said you will gather how one who has given scandal ought to behave in confession.

INDEED it seems that this circumstance need not be confessed, according to the doctrine of D. Bonav. de circumstantiis aggravantibus, and I shall say 3. part. Tract. de Paenit. diff. 2. sect. 3. quaest. 5. Thus many affirm on this matter.

However, COMMONLY they teach that it is to be confessed. Thus Lorea, Villalobos, Becanus, Coninck, Fagundez, Ledesma, cited above, to whom Diana almost subscribes Part 3. Tract. 4. resol. 114. with D. Bonaventure. Nay, Sylvius, Filliucius, Sanchez, Layman above, Bonacina de sacrament. disp. 5. quaest. 5. sect. 2. puncto 2. §. 3. diff. 3. num. 21. and Diana point out that the number of persons and their condition must be expressed, to whom the scandal was given, even with a single sin, and in what way, whether in conversations about fornication? about unspeakable things? or about betrothed women (conjunctis)? Wherefore these two last cry out blind confessors who do not ask these things. Diana again subscribes Part 5. Tract. 7. resol. 3. adding Paludanus, Molsheim (Molfesium), Leo, and others.

NOTE truly first, that soliciting a defiled (patatam), or a prepared (paratam) woman,¹ is a probably direct scandal, to be said in confession, according to Sanchez lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 14. Bonacina tract. 1. disp. 5. quaest. 5. puncto 2. §. 3. Vasquez quaest. 91. art. 1. disp. 4. Fill. tract. 28. num. 231. They make an exception, if by an explicit act it were sufficiently perceived, as was said, that you fornicated with a woman, one could gather that you sought this; for a woman, for the most part, is not accustomed to ask.

Others, however, admit it is not to be confessed; for it does not induce, since he finds it prepared. Thus Fagundez praecept. 2. lib. 4. cap. 5. Suarez 3. part. tract. 4. disp. 22. sect. 4. num. 18. Henriquez lib. 2. de paen. cap. 6. num. 7. Diana part. 1. tract. 7. res. 34. Azor tract. 2. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 5. Bassaeus §. 1.

To SOLICIT one not yet prepared, however, is called by Diana indirect scandal; but I refuse it, for many do not excuse doing works in the face of the perfect which inflame; for even these fall, as David 2. Reg. 11. seeing Bethsabee in the bath. Solomon 3. Reg. 11. See D. Thom. art. 5. and 6. Perhaps you will excuse yourself, if you opine that the beholders are not to be moved, as many say with Diana, Tract. de scandalo, resol. 3. or if they have been so carried along that they are not moved on that account. See there.

What things must be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal.

WE do not treat here of scandal per se special, or inherent; but of the general kind arising from an action alone.

MANY rules are given on this matter by Gregory of Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. puncto 4. Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 9. after D. Bonav. p. 1. Centil. sect. 31. whose full import Bassaeus delivers, 2. Scandalum, from num. 8.

THE FIRST is, that to avoid scandal it is not lawful to do a thing, or to omit one, which to do or to omit would be a sin mortal of itself intrinsically. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 7. and D. Bonav. loc. cit. and others cited below. The first reason is, because sin is not ordainable to good.

It is PROVED secondly: For, as it is said Rom. 3. Evils are not to be done that goods may come of them. And it is confirmed from the order of charity, for each man must keep himself more immune from spiritual ruin than another.

THE SECOND rule is, that neither is it lawful to do anything intrinsically venial. So D. Thom. art. 1. ad 5. Valentia loc. cit. and D. Bonav. above, Tanner. disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 9. Diana p. 5. tract. 7. resol. 21. and seq. Bass. num. 12. and others among these authors.

THE THIRD rule is, that to avoid the scandal of the weak, all those things are to be avoided which can be avoided without sin, lest the weak and simple fall. So D. Gregory homil. 7. in Ezech. Beda on cap. 9. of Mark, and the Doctors commonly.

It is PROVED from the nature of charity, which is bound to provide for the neighbor's salvation in necessity, if it can. So also D. Bonaventura after D. Bernard, and the Saintly Doctor gathers this from that passage of Matthew 17. But that we not scandalize them, go to the sea, etc. Truly Christ was not bound to the tribute, nor the Apostles. Bassaeus adds num. 12. that when their scandal cannot otherwise be avoided, they must be made capable of the thing.

THE SAINTLY Doctor gathers this rule also from the Gloss, on that passage Matt. 15. Know that the Pharisees, having heard this word, were scandalized, where it says: Everything that can be set aside, with the threefold truth preserved, namely of life, of doctrine, and of justice, is to be omitted on account of scandal. The Truth of life comprehends all actions conformable to reason, and therefore true, practically containing the precepts, indeed even the counsels. The Truth of doctrine contains those things which the duty of truth imposes on masters. The Truth of justice looks to Prelates, as to punishing the wicked and rewarding and sustaining the just, and therefore in relation to another. So nearly also Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. punct. 4. with Adriano quaest. 1. art. 2.

These things truly, after D. Hieronymo, are not to be omitted for fear of scandal. But if scandal arise from the mere malice of the beholder, it is to be despised, as the Saintly Doctor admonishes there on 6. of John, citing that passage Matt. 15. Let them alone: they are blind. The Saintly Doctor has the same doctrine on 18. of Luke on those words: It is impossible that scandals should not come. The Apostle said he would abstain from meats lest he scandalize, Rom. 14. and first Corinth. 8. because scandal could arise from it. See also Tanner at number 15.

THERE arises indeed the question: whether at some time, to avoid scandal, we are bound to omit some precept.

Vasquez denies it, opusc. de scandalo, art. 8. dub. 1. Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 1. disp. 96. dub. 1. Becanus 2. 2. Tom. 1. cap. 27. quaest. 5. Basilius Pont. de matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. 2. Castrus Palaus T. 1. tract. 6. punct. 16. num. 3. It seems gathered from Innocent III. cap. Cum ex iniuncto de novi operis nunciatione.

YET many AFFIRM it: Hurtado 1. 2. disp. 173. sect. 20. a §. 256. Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 18. punct. 4. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. num. 9. Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 8. concl. 2. Tanner. T. 3. quaest. 6. quaest. 6. dub. 9. num. 120. Gordonus Tom. 1. lib. 6. quaest. 16. cap. 5. §. 1. Sà on the word audire missa, num. 3. Lorca 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 8. num. 10. Henriquez lib. 8. cap. 47. Bannes brings the example of a woman who, lest she offend her jealous husband, omits the sacred rite.

DIANA Tom. 5. tract. 7. de scandalo judges both probable, but embraces the first more; Yet if anyone wishes to follow this latter one, he ought to attend to when precepts are to be omitted to avoid scandal, which Hurtado delivers §. 268.

FIRST, when the precept is human, and no evil follows from its omission, then it is to be avoided. For example. If I cannot hear the Sacred rite without giving someone occasion of grave anger, hatred, lust, I am bound to abstain from the Sacred rite. Valentia teaches the same loc. cit. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3.

YET they judge the OPPOSITE of a woman who would be an object of concupiscence if she went to the Sacred rite: Castro Palao T. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. punct. 16. Granado 2. 2. contr. 3. tract. 13. disp. 5. sect. 5. num. 28. Azorius tom. 2. lib. 12. cap. 18. quaestio 12. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, quaest. 43. art. 8. dub. 2. num. 27. Diana loc. cit. resol. 22. Tannerus num. 121.

BUT IF from the omission of the precept another grave harm to the neighbor impends, the precept is not to be passed over; e. g. if I am bound to assist a needy person, and another, on seeing it, would detract and judge wickedly of a suspected conversation with that person, e. g. a widow, I am bound to help her. Whatever Bannes may say at art. 8.

HENCE you may easily also discover: whether a woman is bound not to adorn herself, and not to go out in public, to avoid the scandal of others.

FOR I JUDGE that, no necessity existing, wanton adornments and empty outings are to be avoided. So many Doctors in Diana resol. 31. See also concerning the adornment of women Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. n. 10. Gordonum tom. 1. lib. 6. quaest. 16. cap. 5. §. 2. num. 15. Sanchez T. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 17. Layman lib. 2. t. 3. cap. 13. num. 11. quaest. 13. who nevertheless says that women adorning themselves, exposing their breasts bare, are excused according to the custom of their country.

THE DOCTORS also report VERY MANY cases, teaching when we are bound to undergo dangers to avoid scandal.

FIRST indeed the danger of damnation is not to be undergone, for instance if the necessity of confession presses, and no one is present except an unworthy Priest.

INDEED many, in Diana resol. 4., beyond necessity, assert it is lawful to seek the Sacrament from an unworthy minister exposed; for he is not thereby induced to sin; indeed it is lawful to seek it even from an excommunicate who has not the absolving power. So Sanchez de Matrim. tom. 2. lib. 7. disp. 9. n. 8. Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 113. sect. 18. §. 249. They rely on the decree of the Council of Constance, and of Martin V. Therefore it will not be a scandal to ask.

SECOND, SECOND, there would not be a sin of scandal in the painter, ¶ should he paint the disgraceful image of the lover of Amasia, to avoid death. So many with Diana resol. 5. Bassaeo. §. 5.

For that cause many, in Diana resol. 6., say it is permitted to paint an Idol; nevertheless that seems so evil that no excuse is left.

The same some say, in Diana resol. 27., of servants carrying disgraceful love letters; but this seems absurd, as Peter Ledesma notes, sum. tom. 1. tract. 27. cap. 9. diff. 3. and Martinus Ledesma in 2. p. q. quaest. 17. art. 7. Alphonsus de Leone de offic. Confess. tom. 1. recoll. 14. num. 63. Rebell. p. 1. lib. 2. quaest. 14. num. 53. Bonac. de matrim. quaest. 4. p. 14. num. 6. Laym. lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. and it seems Sanchez tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 7. num. 26. who nevertheless teaches the opposite lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 46. num. 34. as Diana notes.

SOME assert, in Diana resol. 28., that it is lawful for a servant, to avoid grave harm, to hand the ladder to his master ascending, to have intercourse with a woman. So also Bassaeus num. 10. §. 1. Similarly others, in Diana resol. 29., for a like cause, say a maidservant can lead her master's concubine into the house of the heir. Bassaeus in the place cited.

SIMILARLY many, in Diana resol. 30., say that Christian galley slaves can help the Turks in war, and in laying waste the houses of Christians, that they may avoid death. So also others with Bassaeo num. 10. excepting, however, the case in which, if they did not help in the war, they would give us the victory.

In the same manner, to avoid death, many say, in Diana resol. 33., that it is lawful to use the cap of the Jews, or the Turban of the Turks. So Gordonus Summa, Tom. 2. lib. 6. quaest. 12. cap. 9. §. 3. Duallius 2. 2. Tract. de fide, quaest. 3. art. 3. Vuigers 2. 2. quaest. 3. art. 2. num. 50. Tanner. tom. 3. disp. 1. quaest. 7. dub. 5. num. 110. Palaus Tom. 1. tract. 4. disp. 1. punct. 17. Coninch. de fide, disp. 15. dub. 3. concl. 8. Hurtadus 2. 2. disp. 48. sect. 3. §. 27.

Similarly others, in Diana resol. 34., say that under such necessity it is lawful to use garments and other signs instituted for superstitions. See them there.

SIMILARLY many say, in Diana resol. 35., that it is lawful for one passing through the lands of heretics to eat meats, to avoid grave harm.

NOR do others, on a like reasoning, assert, in Diana resol. 36., that it is lawful to sell an idol to a gentile, to avoid grave harm. See other cases in Diana himself there.

THEY ASK also: whether the rule holds that one must not seek money from a usurer, ready to commit the sin of usury, without an honest cause.

Palai ASSERTS it, Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. p. 10. Poncius de matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. num. 50. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, art. 8. num. 33. Suarez disp. 10. sect. 3. Molina Tom. 2. tract. 2. disp. 335.

BUT Hurtad. DENIES it more probably, 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 14. § 176. et 177. Diana resol. 8. Indeed Sanchez T. 1. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 27. Valentia tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 21. punct. 4. Molina de Iustitia T. 2. disp. 335. concl. 5. Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 78. art. 4. dub. 2. say that one may say to the usurer: give me a loan, even with interest, which opinion Suarez judges probable de Religione, T. 2. De Iurament. lib. 3. cap. 13. num. 9. Diana resol. 8.

From what has been said you have what must be said of the one paying usury; for the same reasoning holds in both cases. Wherefore Valentia judges the same of the one paying and the one seeking. See Diana resol. 12.

From what has been said also you have nearly the manner in which goods, whether spiritual or temporal, are to be given up on account of scandal; of which Tannerus treats dub. 9.

FIRST therefore every action having the appearance of evil is to be omitted, as D. Thom. says quaest. 43. art. 2. and commonly among Sylvestrum, Caietanum, and Sà, see Scandalum, according to that text Thessal. 5. From every appearance of evil abstain. And first Corinth. 6. All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient. In a case, however, of great utility, which would greatly outweigh the ensuing scandal, Tannerus judges it not illicit. Peter seems an example of this, whom many Fathers also excuse from sin, and yet he was reproved by Paul. Galat. 3.

THEN spiritual goods, here and now necessary to salvation, are not to be omitted to avoid scandal. So with Thom. art. 7. and D. Bonav. above, all Theologians teach.

THIRDLY, spiritual goods which are not necessary to salvation are not to be omitted on account of the scandal of the Scribes. So D. Thom. art. 7. and it is established by that text Matt. 15. Let them alone. See Bassaeus.

FOURTHLY, spiritual goods, not necessary to salvation, are to be deferred, lest the weak suffer scandal, until they become capable of them.

FIFTHLY, certain works ordered to removing scandal are to be omitted, if scandal would arise from them. Such is the punishment of certain criminals. So D. August. lib. 3. contra epistolam Parmen. cap. 2. Such also is fraternal correction.

SIXTHLY, the truth of doctrine indeed is not to be abandoned on account of scandal, so that falsehood be taught; nevertheless the act of teaching is sometimes to be omitted. So D. Bonav. above, and D. Thom. art. 7. Yet not so that instruction necessary in the faith be omitted.

SEVENTHLY, the Evangelical counsels, and works of mercy, are not to be omitted simply on account of the danger of scandal. So D. Thom. and D. Bonav. above; because, according to D. Hieronym. ad 15. Matth. in Gloss. ordin. related above by the Saintly Doctor: On account of scandal everything is to be given up that can be set aside, with the threefold truth preserved, of life, of justice, and of doctrine. Under these are comprehended those things by which one comes to salvation more easily.

AS TO temporal goods. Those of which we are masters are, on account of the scandal of the weak, either to be given up, or the scandal otherwise to be settled: yet not on account of the scandal of the Scribes. So D. Thom. art. 8. and commonly.

Tanner. ADDS num. 116. that this is true, unless elsewhere, for the good of others, the loss of such temporal things is to be disregarded, as if a Prince were rather to introduce heresy into his Province than by restitution of ecclesiastical goods, as Caietan. Valentia, Bannes, and Sà teach in the places cited.

But those goods which are not ours, but handed over to us to conserve, as the goods of the Church, entrusted to Prelates, are not to be given up on account of scandal, according to D. Thom. loc. cit. and the common opinion; since we are bound to defend them under necessity: and this is confirmed by the example of S. Thomas of Canterbury.

Add nevertheless, that Prelates ought sometimes to dissemble usurpation.

YOU WILL ASK first: whether it is lawful to invite to dinner one ready to break the fast.

THE FIRST opinion is negative. So Vasquez de scandalo quaest. 43. art. 1. disp. 3. num. 17. Palai Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. p. 9. Turriani, Tract. 1. in 2. 2. disp. 95. dub. 6. Poncii de matrim. lib. 3. cap. 8. §. 7. Suarez de charitate, disp. 10. sect. 3. (they say) otherwise anyone could invite one ready for venery, for that, and not for the feast.

BUT Hurtado ASSERTS this to be LICIT, 2. 2. disp. 175. sect. 12. §. 154. Azorius p. 1. lib. 7. cap. 31. quaesito 12. Salas de empt. dub. 47. num. 10. who cites Sà and others.

The same teach Naldus v. Ieiunium, Nauar. and Caietanus, v. Ieiunium, Tanner. 2.2. disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 5. num. 94. Filliuc. de offic. Sacer. Tom. 1. p. 2. lib. 3. c. 25. and Tom 2. tract. 27. p. 1. cap. 5. num. 94. Ortiz in Summa, cap. 19. mand. 2. Villalob. Sum. Tom. 1. tract. 23. diff. 3. which opinion Diana says is probable Parte 1. Tract. 9. resol. 38. et part. 5. tract. 7. resol. 7.

By these servants and maids are excused, who sell and cook forbidden foods for masters unwilling to fast. So Azorius p. 1. lib. 7. cap 31. quaestio 11. et p. 2. lib. 12. cap. ult. quaestio 5. Villalob. above, Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 147. art. 4. Bassaeus num. 9. citing others; for they do not serve the breaking of the fast. But this reason is vain.

Hence Diana Tom. 1. tract. 9. resol. 39. dispatches another question: Whether Innkeepers, setting out dinner indifferently to all on a fast day, sin.

He ANSWERS, however, negatively with Ledesma in Summa, Tom. 2. tract. 27. cap. 2. concl. 6. diffic. 4. fol. 698. For it Sanchez T. 1. lib. 1. cap. 7. num. 34. citing Saloniam, Martinum de Ledesma, Rodriquez, and others, and Homobonus follows it de exam. Ecclesiae, p. 2. tract 8. cap. 7. quaest. 21.

Yet the Opposite opinion is held by Fernandez in exam. Theol. p. 2. cap. 8. §. 2. num. 22. Toletus Summa, lib. 6. cap. 5. Nauar. in manuali, cap. 21. num. 26. Gabriel. in 4. dist. 16. quaest. 3. art. 3. dub. 9. Medina, and others.

Yet the middle opinion seems probable, that it is lawful when it cannot otherwise be done without grave inconvenience. Filliuc. holds it Tom. 2. tract. 27. p. 2. cap. 4. num. 93. Lessius lib. 4. cap. 2. dub. 4. num. 24. Sanchez Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 7. num. 37. nor does Diana refuse it loc. cit. Bassaeus says, provided they would otherwise find the preparer elsewhere.

¶ You will ask secondly: Whether it is lawful to seek an oath from someone when I fear he will perjure himself.

Suarez ASSERTS it, T. 2. lib. de Relig. lib. 3. de iuram. cap. 15. Hurtado 2.2. disp. 173. sect. 15. §. 197. Diana Tract. 7. de Scandalo, resol. 9. Provided, however, that a just cause be present, and it be not sought so that he swear falsely.

The Opposite opinion is held by D. Thom. in Sylvium 2.2. quaest. 98. art. 4. D. Bonav. 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3. and others in Suarez loc. cit. Sotus de Iust. lib. 8. quaest. 2. art. 14. Vasquez opusc. de Scandalo quaest. 43. art. 9. Basil. Ponc. de Matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. 8. num. 57. But it is the opinion of D. August. serm. 2. decoll. S. Ioannis. If you say: Let him look to himself, destroying himself. S. August. answers serm. 28. de verbis Apostoli, cap. 10. That one destroys himself by his own perjury; but this one pressed the hand of the killer, as S. Bonav. relates arg. 2. to the opposite. If you say, it concerns you to receive an oath from that man. S. August. answers in that sermon 2. Was it not better that you lose your goods, than that you destroy the soul of that man by false swearing? Hence the argument of Suarez loc. cit. and of Diana is solved.

¶ You will object first. Would not men take from this an occasion for frauds, if they understood that it is not lawful for actors to seek an oath from those swearing falsely?

It is Answered, by denying the consequence; for robbers fear hanging from the testimonies of others, and tortures are applied to deniers to extort the truth.

¶ You will object secondly. It would follow that a Judge cannot require oaths from the accused; for he ought to doubt whether they wish to speak the truth.

It is Answered, that the accused can often evade and deny. But if the Judge knew that the accused would perjure himself, and could otherwise draw out the truth, he would do badly in requiring the oath.

¶ You will ask thirdly: whether I can persuade someone to swear to a thing true, yet unknown to him.

Hurtado ANSWERS disp. 173. sect. 15. §. 200. that it is not lawful, unless the one about to swear first persuades himself that the thing is so on a probable foundation, from which a practical judgment of the honesty of the oath can be formed. See also Diana loc. cit. resol. 10.

Moreover, when they are scandalized from their own malice, it is not to be heeded, as Christ says, Matt. 15. Let them alone; they are blind, as the Saintly Doctor observes, and all follow him.

Bassaeus ADDS num. 10. § 4. that masters and parents are excused, who do not take from their sons or servants the occasion of stealing, that they may test them; nor yet as it were offer them the thing; just as neither can a husband persuade his wife to pretend assent to her lover, that he may be caught.

This question pertains to the matter of scandal. It is understood, however, on the supposition that you cannot recall him in any other way; and he is thinking only of that great evil, not rather of choosing that lesser one, because if he were thinking of choosing that, you would be suggesting an evil absolutely.

The first opinion is negative. So teach Cajetan 2.2. quaest. 78. art. 4. notab. 3. Gabriel in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 11. art. 3. dub. 4. Azorius t. 1. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 8. Covarruvias in 4. decr. p. 1. cap. 4. in princ. Valencia Tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 21. punct. 4. Sà, s.v. peccatum, number 8. Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp 6. p. 6. num. 9. Hurtado 2. 1. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 110. Layman lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. where he cites others. So Lyra Genes. 19. et Iudicum 19. St. Bonaventure also seems to, in 4. dist. 33. quaest. penult. ad 2.

The second opinion is the affirmative one. So Abbas in cap. super eo, num. 4. de usuris Adrian quodl. 1. art. 3. et quodl. 9. art. 3. Navarre cap. 14. num. 40. et cap. 17. num. 263. Soto lib 6. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 5. Bartholomew Medina prima 2. quaest. 96. art. 4. Rodriguez tom. 1. sum. cap. 12 concl. 9. Molina t. 2. disp. 335. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. §. 11. num. 15. Becanus cap. 27. quaest. 4. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, super quaest. 40. art. 1. dub. 1. Turrianus t. 1. Tom. 1. disp. 99. dub. 6. Basil Pontius de matrim. lib. 3. cap. 28. §. num. 16. Diana Part 3. Tract. 5. resol. 37. et p. 5. Tract. 7. resol. 18. Bassaeus, s.v. Restitutio, num. 4. and others cited by these.

¶ I assert first, that the first opinion is the more probable.

It is proved first. Evils are not to be done that good may come of them: therefore much less, that lesser evils may; yet that sin is truly an evil, and (as I suppose) forbidden: therefore. It is confirmed, because you are truly the cause of that sin by inducing it. This is the argument of St. Bonaventure loc. cit.

They answer, that that evil is not being urged absolutely; but under a condition, that the greater evil be willed; and that what is being urged is not that evil, but the preferring of the lesser evil, so that the greater be avoided, being otherwise unavoidable.

Against this; because it is still an evil, not to be chosen so that any good whatsoever come of it, as the Apostle presses; much less, so that a graver evil be avoided. For that lesser evil is still forbidden, and nowhere is it granted to be chosen, but to be avoided.

I assert second, that the second opinion is also probable.

It is proved first from Genes. 19. where Lot spoke to the Sodomites, that he might turn them away from that unspeakable intercourse with the young men: I have two daughters who as yet have not known man; I will bring them out to you, and abuse them, provided you do no evil to these men.

Layman answers that this was not counsel or an inducement, but a comparative permission, thus: Rather would I prostitute my daughters than permit this. In which sense Absalom spoke, that he might induce his Father to admit him freely into the hall: If thou rememberest my iniquity, kill me. So interpret Cajetan, Basil, Sà, Valencia in the places cited, Sanchez loc. cit. disp. 1. num. 28. Molina disp. 335. In this way the Holy Doctor concedes it.

Although St. Augustine, Abulensis, and Lyra think that Lot sinned; but less gravely, on account of the perturbation of mind, says Layman.

Surely his words clearly show the opposite, indeed a command: abuse them, and not merely a manner of speaking, which is set aside.¹

That Lot did not sin, however, I show; for at the time when he went out from Sodom, he is said to have been Just, 2. Petri 2. as Diana, Pontius, and others observe with St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 43. dubio 2.

It is proved second from that passage of Iudic. 15. where the Levite urged fornication upon those most filthy men, that they might be recalled from things more unspeakable. That he did not sin, many assert, citing Lyra, although Lyra himself does not excuse him.

It is proved third from St. Augustine lib. 2. de adulterinis coniug. cap. 15. and it is cited in cap. si quod verius 33. quaestione 2. If he is going to do what is not licit, let him now commit adultery, and not homicide; and while his wife lives let him take another, and not shed human blood (that is, of his wife).

The Gloss answers that it was not the counsel of St. Augustine, but a comparative permission, namely, that if one of the two sins must be committed, he would rather permit adultery, although he urges neither; wherefore he straightway adds: But if both are unspeakable, namely, to kill the wife, and while she lives to take another, he ought not to perpetrate one for the other; but to avoid both.

It is proved fourth; for all confess that it is licit to ask justice of one's own cause from a Tyrant, as Cajetan, Armilla, Sà s.v. Tyran. Navarre cap. 14. num. 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 29. dub. 9. teach; and yet the Tyrant sins in exercising jurisdiction.

Layman answers that the Community tacitly consents that the Tyrant, meanwhile, while he will not yield his principate, judge at least justly. Hence no sin is committed while justice is demanded of him, as Lessius also notes num. 73.

Layman concedes loc. cit. with Azorius c. 17. quaestio 1. that the lesser sin can then be urged when it is part of a greater sin; as to a robber who wishes to carry off everything, I can urge that he at least leave part; to one who wishes to kill, that he be content with a blow on the possessions [as pledge]; to one who wishes to commit adultery, that he fornicate with an unmarried woman.

Yet he admonishes that the urging of the lesser evil ought not to be to the detriment of a third party, e.g. that he who wishes to commit adultery fornicate with such and such a determined woman; or that he who wishes to steal a hundred from Titius steal fifty from Caius.

Diana moves another example resol. 19. whether it is licit, for one who wishes to rob a poor man of his money, to urge him to steal a determined sum from a rich man.

Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. part. 6. num. 12. Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 156. deny this last.

Yet Vasquez, as cited by Palao, Basil Pontius de Matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. num. 28 Turrianus 2. 2. tom. 1. disp. 95. dub. 6. hold the opposite.

But that it is not licit when the person is not determined, Palao teaches. But Sanchez teaches the very opposite de matrim. Tom. 2. lib. 7. disp. 11. num. 24. Molina de Iust. tract. 2. disp. 335. Diana, Sanchez, and others add consequently that the one urging is not bound to make restitution to the rich man, if the theft has followed.

Diana adds nay more, that the one urging the lesser theft, with respect to the same person, can even cooperate, because he works for a good.

Yet it is not licit to cooperate for the goods of life, e.g. to cut off the nose of him whom he wished to kill: the reason for the disparity is, because he is master of the goods of fortune, and is presumed to assent, but not of the goods of life. So teach Diana loc. cit. Basil. Pontius loc. cit. cap. 18. §. 5. num. 28. Vasquez art. 1. num. 13. Turrian. disp. 95. dub. 6. Hurtado § 122. who §. 119. concedes even that to one who wills a greater evil another lesser evil can be proposed, not by urging, if he wills an unspeakable sin; let a greater pleasure be proposed, taken with women. But here he returns to our opinion; for such a lesser evil is proposed so that he be allured to it, and consent.

They raise a doubt: Whether, to prevent the betrayal of a city, it is licit to make a traitor drunk, if you cannot in any other way turn him aside.

Less. lib. 4. cap. 1. diff. 4. Villalob. tom. 2. tract. 60. diff. 6. assert it is, because drunkenness is then not an evil, and as I could strike him, so, etc. I wonder that Bassaeus reproves this, with Vulgers tract. de Temper. cap. 1. disp. 7. Laym. lib. 3. sect. 4. For the public good prevails over the private.