Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Whether any war can be just.
strike no one, wound no one; but because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not homicides, but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries, but defenders of the public safety: he answered them: shake no one down, etc.; but be content with your wages.
John the Baptist was certainly speaking on behalf of men even of the New Testament; for he was the precursor of Christ.
IT IS PROVED secondly from the Heroes, praised in Scripture as saints, who waged wars: thus Abraham, Moses, Josue, Gedeon, Sampson, David, Josias, the Machabees, and others.
IT IS PROVED thirdly from holy Pontiffs, who praised wars waged by Christians, or urged that they be waged: Damasus, in Theodorus book 5, chapter 10; Gregory book 1, epistle 72; Chrysostom on Psalm 45; Nazianzen oration 3, on peace; Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapters 40 and 41; Jerome on Micheas 4; see the Holy Doctor in the sermons of the Hexaemeron.
IT IS PROVED by reason, D. Bonaventure at the place cited, drawing on Aristotle 7 Politics, chapter 14, and D. Augustine epistle 207: because peace is necessary to the human commonwealth, that we and ours may have the means of living; but this is often impeded by acts of violence, which cannot otherwise be repelled than by war; and it is a law of nature that we repel violence, whence the opposing arguments collapse.
The Holy Doctor confirms all this on Luke 6, in these words: and he who strikes you on the cheek, etc., from D. Augustine book 1 of the City of God, chapter 21, where he says, expounding that precept: Thou shalt not kill: Against this precept they did not act who, by God's authority, waged wars, or who, bearing the person of public power, and according to its laws — that is, by the most just command of reason — punished criminals with death.
It is confirmed from the chapter Fortitudo 23, question 3, which is by D. Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapter 27: Fortitude, which either defends the fatherland from barbarians in war, or at home defends the weak, or one's companions from robbers, is full of justice.
YOU WILL OBJECT first. It was said in Isaias 2 and Micheas 4 that wars are to be put away in the time of grace.
IT IS ANSWERED with D. Ambrose on Psalm 45 and D. Jerome on chapter 4 of Micheas, that what was foretold was the peace to come in the whole world at the time of Christ's advent, so that it might be prepared to receive the Gospel.
YOU OBJECT secondly that in the Gospel it is commanded: Matth. 5. Whoever strikes you on one cheek, offer him the other also. Matth. 26. Whoever takes up the sword shall perish by the sword. Rom. 12. Rendering to no one evil for evil.
IT IS ANSWERED from D. Augustine epistle 5 to Marcellinus, that this is forbidden lest it be done by private authority.
TAKE NOTE that in the Council of Nicaea, canon 11, those are condemned who, after first laying down the military belt lest they sacrifice to idols, returned again as a dog to its vomit, serving Pagan Emperors, Diocletian, Licinius, and others, who all dishonored the military belt of Christians unless they sacrificed to idols.
Some Fathers indeed condemn only unjust wars, or those which are occasions of sinning proximately, or dissuade men in religious orders, or urge them to enter religion, etc.
From these you have that wars even against the Turks are lawful; for if God uses the Turks for our exercise, he also uses pestilence and famine, and yet we are bound to defend ourselves, lest they overwhelm the Christian world with superstitious clouds. See Valentia at the place cited and Bellarmine, chapter 16. For the Turks are unjust possessors of Christian kingdoms.
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
What conditions are required for a just war.
Most excellently, after D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74, and epistles 5 and 207, the following wrote on this matter: D. Thomas here; Alensis part 3, question 76, member 3; Gandavus quodlibet 15, question 16; Gabriel book 4, distinction 15, question 4; Victoria relectio on the Law of War; Castro book 2 on the just punishment of heretics, chapter 14; Covarruvias relectio on the chapter Peccatum, on the rules of law, part 2, §§ 9 and 10; Bellarmine book 3 on the Morals of the Church, chapter 14; Bannes, Cajetan, and other Thomists here; Valentia question 16, point 1; Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 3; Sylvester and other Summists, under the word Bellum. The Canonists question 23, qq. 1, 2 and 3; and D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, at the end, and in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82, where from the Scriptures he gathers wondrous examples, outstandingly proving that the integrity and prayers of the Saints contribute more to victory than arms.
FIRST, then, the Holy Doctor requires three conditions for a just war in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, from D. Augustine. The first is legitimate authority. So D. Augustine at the place cited, against Faustus, chapter 74. The second is a just cause; so D. Augustine question 10 on Josue. The third is a right intention; so D. Augustine epistle 207.
AS TO the first condition, only the Prince, or the Republic, ruling absolutely, can declare offensive war. Hence Princes who are parts of some whole dominion cannot do so: so Molina disputation 100, Tannerus number 30, and the common view. For defensive war, however, all peoples and Magistrates are admitted, because anyone may repel force with force.
AS TO the second, the cause must be against an enemy unjustly and gravely injuring, as D. Augustine admonishes at the place cited. I shall set out, moreover, the specific injuries for which war may be declared, which D. Bonaventure relates in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82.
THE FIRST is if what is owed is denied: thus the sons of Israel made war on the Amorrhites, because they denied them an unmolested passage Num. 21, and D. Augustine notes this question 43 on the Book of Numbers.
NOR indeed did Julius Caesar have a just cause, on the ground that the Romans denied access to the city, as Alphonsus a Castro thinks book 2 on the penal law, chapter 14, and Covarruvias at the place cited, § 9: for he was bound to lay down his arms at the Rubicon, since he was a subject of the Republic commanding it. Nor is just war made against the Indians on the ground that they deny free access to their provinces. So Molina disputation 105, Tannerus number 34 — provided, however, they do not resist the preaching of the faith.
THE SECOND cause is for recovering one's own possessions. Thus David fought against Isboseth, 2 Reg. 2.
THE THIRD cause is to resist invaders of the Republic. Thus the Jews often fought against the Philistines, and the Machabees against Antiochus and Demetrius.
THE FOURTH, if they render aid to unjust enemies; thus David fought against Syria of Damascus, because it brought aid to Adarezer, 2 Reg. 8.
THE FIFTH, to avenge a public injury. Thus David fought against Hannon, who had dismissed the messengers with contempt, 2 Reg. 10.
THE SIXTH, against rebellious subjects, thus David 2 Reg. 20. Hence D. Gregory infers that war against pertinacious heretics is just, book 1 of the Register, chapter 72.
THE SEVENTH, if some defend public malefactors, as D. Augustine teaches, question 10 on Josue; thus in Judges 20 the Hebrews fought against the Benjamites, their own fellow-citizens.
THE EIGHTH, on account of a violated pact; you have an example in Jotham and Josaphat, 4 Reg. 3. Therefore the sole cause of a just war is injury — to be repelled by the right of defense, or compensated by the right of commutative justice, or avenged by the right of vindicative justice — and that, when due satisfaction is not otherwise rendered. So all agree with D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74.
Making war, however, against infidels not baptized, Castro and others approve; but the common opinion is that it is not lawful; for no Prince has a right to this except as a member of the Church, which has no right over those not subject to it.
The Archbishop of Valencia relates in his History of America that not a few armies of Christian warfare went astray in this, who, making war upon the most wretched Indians for the sake of winning them to religion, utterly destroyed that people even to extermination: the Gospel surely does not command that nations be destroyed with such savagery, but that they be redeemed with supreme humanity and patience; it would rather be fitting to spend one's own blood on their behalf by labor and long-suffering preaching than to draw their blood off into streams; for the Apostles, Christ commands, are to be as sheep, handing them not a savage sword, but the sword of the tongue — namely, the word of God, which is more penetrating than every two-edged sword.
One who makes a just war, however, CAN call others to his aid and partnership in the war; for so the Machabees demanded the alliance of the Romans, as Tannerus notes number 52; so also everywhere among the nations, while wars are waged, we have it as established that this is done. Yet I do not refuse that where the scandal of the Christian name threatens, it is not lawful; so Molina disputation 112, Azor tomus 1, book 8, chapter 25, question 14, and Tannerus as above.
But since the necessity of the one calling them is so well known that he is recognized as compelled to do so for his own defense, not to the injury of the faith, no one will deny that scandal will arise from it for anyone. By this is clear the answer to what Valentia objects disputation 3, question 16, point 2.
One CAN also lay ambushes, and is not bound to announce the battle beforehand, as the Holy Doctor notes in the Bibliotheca, chapter 82, which he proves by the examples of Abraham Genesis 14; Josue 8 and 10; and of Gedeon, Judith 8. So Tannerus.
In doubt, however, about the just cause, the condition of the possessor is the better one, as is commonly taught, according to Valentia. Nevertheless it is reasonable also to satisfy even the adverse party, as Victoria notes number 28, Molina disputation 103, Valentia question 16, point 2, Tannerus number 41.
TAKE NOTE, moreover, that a just cause once recognized does not mean war is at once to be declared, but satisfaction must first be sought, as is had in Deuteron. 20; otherwise the undertaking will be against justice, and consequently with guilt and the obligation of restitution. So Bannes dubium 8, Tannerus numbers 32 and 51, Valentia point 2, at the end.
If, however, neither party is in legitimate possession, the thing must be divided or done by the other according to the reasons, in proportion to compensation. See Tannerus number 43.
AS TO intention, it is so necessary that if the other conditions are present but this one is lacking, it does not give rise to the necessity of restitution. So, from the common view, Cajetan teaches, Bannes here, Valentia point 2, Molina tomus 1 on justice, disputation 123, Tannerus dubium 2, number 28.
War can indeed be just on both sides per accidens, if on one side there is invincible ignorance, in which way the wars of the Amorrhites with Israel seem to have been, as Tostatus teaches on Josue 10; and then, once the truth is recognized, they are bound to withdraw and restore those things that still survive, and by which they have been made richer; as Valentia notes. But Princes must first consult the learned; otherwise, in a matter of the gravest moment, they expose themselves to the danger of guilt. So Victoria on the law of war, number 20, Valentia question 16, point 2, Molina disputation 109, Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 4, number 37.
BEYOND the conditions stated, to the substance of a just war there follows the manner of conducting it. First, indeed, in the damages to be inflicted: necessary reaction is indeed allowed, both to repair the damages inflicted and to establish peace; yet not all excesses are allowed — for instance, to kill innocents, such as women and infants, as is decreed in Exodi 23, Deuteron. 20. But if God at some time commanded that even women and infants be killed — Josue 6, in Jericho; 1 Reg. 15, against Amalech — there was a special cause by the will of the supreme Lord. So Molina, Valentia, Victoria, according to Tannerus number 66.
BEYOND children and women, however, others must be presumed innocent, as is had in the chapter Innovamus, on truce and peace, from Alexander III: Innovamus, that Priests, monks, conversi, pilgrims, merchants, rustics, those going and returning, and the animals with which they plough and carry seed to the field, be let be with fitting service. To these are added Legates or Orators, in the chapter Paternarum 24, question 3. See there.
It would nevertheless be lawful per accidens, if the citadel could not otherwise be stormed, and that storming would bring very great advantage. So Tannerus number 67, with Victoria.
It is nevertheless lawful, Valentia says, to despoil innocent enemies — namely, those who are parts of the Republic which inflicted the injury. For this can contribute both to repairing the public damage and to confirming the peace, so that the enemies, deprived of those things and weakened, may seek peace. Or if innocents of ours have been despoiled; therefore Repressalia are granted. So also Cajetan under the word bellum, Victoria on the law of war, number 41, Covarruvias on the rule Peccatum, part 2, question 4, Molina disputation 121, Tannerus number 71, Valentia at the place cited, and others.
Clerics and Churches, however, are excepted on account of their immunity, unless the enemy cannot otherwise be defeated, as Valentia notes disputation 3, question 16, point 3, with Sylvester under the word bellum, question 3, 6, and the holy Bannes article 2, last dubium.
FURTHERMORE, such a manner is to be kept that neither the Leaders nor the soldiers act against justice — the former by not paying the soldiers their stipends; the latter by pillaging; for in Luke 3 John laid it upon them: be content with your stipends.
Likewise, let them not act against fortitude by rashly exposing themselves to danger.
The manner, too, constituted by the law of nations, must also be kept: that movable things acquired be the army's; immovable things, the Prince's. See Valentia and Bellarmine at the place cited, and Tannerus number 75, who assigns movables to those who take them; immovables are designated to the Prince, the law si captivum, ff. de captivis.
TAKE NOTE, with D. Bonaventure on the passage adduced from Luke, that soldiers sin knowingly who fight in an unjust war, or are ready to fight in every war. So, from the common view, Cajetan under the word Bellum, Bannes here, question 40, article 1, dubium 6, Valentia question 16, point 2, Molina disputation as above, 103, Tannerus number 47. The reason is that to do evil, or even to expose oneself to danger, is not lawful.
Indeed, in a doubtful cause, subject soldiers, or perpetual stipendiaries, are not bound to know and examine the justice of the war, unless perhaps they have serious indications of injustice; but the rest are bound to inquire first, before they give their name to the militia. This is the common doctrine, according to Cajetan, Bannes, and others here, question 40, article 1, Victoria number 25, Molina disputations 114 and 118, Valentia point 2, Tannerus number 48. The Father, from the canon Qui culpantur, 23, question 1, after D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 75. But Fuliensis book 3, chapter 11 adds that even foreigners can fight in the first case, if the Prince be of good repute and a Christian, of whom well is presumed.
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
By whom, then, WAR can be waged.
First it is certain that Clerics constituted in sacred orders, and monks even if Laymen, are prohibited by ecclesiastical law. Concerning Monks it is had in the canon Eos qui, d. 20, question 3. Concerning Clerics, 23, question 8, especially the canon Clerici, and the canon Quicunque ex clero. So D. Thomas and others.
That these, however, can fight by the license of the Pontiff in a case of necessity, Covarruvias notes Relectio on the Clementine si furiosus, Bannes article 2, Cajetan in the same place, Valentia point 4.
The reason is; because then the ecclesiastical law yields to the natural obligation. Yet the cited Canons do not forbid clerics to be present, to exhort, to help with spiritual aids. See D. Thomas article 2, Valentia at the place cited, Molina disputation 108, Suarez tomus 5, disputation 47, section 6, Tannerus number 80.
Therefore if Clerics fight without due justice and license, they become irregular, as is gathered from the chapter De caetero, extra on homicide, provided that someone is there killed.
Indeed, even if they merely exhort in an unjust war, it is gathered from the chapter Quod in dubiis, extra on penalties, and the chapter Clericus, extra on homicide.
Therefore if Clerics fight in a just war by the Pope's license, even if they kill, they do not become irregular.
But if they fight in a just war, yet without license, they still do not incur irregularity, according to the common opinion — Sylvester under the word Bellum, question 3, 2, Covarruvias at the place cited, part 2, § 3, number 9, Castro book 2 on the penal law, chapter 14, Valentia at the place cited, point 4.
The reason is, because odious laws are not to be extended. Laws burden with irregularity only illicit homicide and the killing of public ministers of justice.
Nor is it credible that on account of an act to which one is bound by the law of nature one should incur an impediment to one's own office.
You will ask, at what time war is lawful. This is asked on account of feast days; it is certain, indeed, that on these days defensive war is lawful, as is had in 1 Machab. 2. It is proved: for if it is lawful to draw the ox out of the pit, as is said in Luke 14, and to heal a man, as is said in John 7, why would it not be lawful to fight for the preservation of the Republic? So Nicholas also decrees, the canon si nulla, 23, question 8.
It is also lawfully done when it is necessary to the end of the war, namely to victory. This the aforesaid Nicholas affirms, that with urgent necessity it is lawful.
It is nevertheless not a mortal sin, outside necessity, to fight on a feast day, provided Mass is heard, as Cajetan says, according to Valentia and Tannerus number 87, adducing Bannes here, and Molina disputation 111.