Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Envy is thus opposed to Charity, that as for the latter all things, even evils, cooperate unto good, so for the former all things, even goods, cooperate for evil; and as Charity covers the multitude of sins, so Envy covers all the goods of the neighbor, that they may not be seen; whence the envious one is said to be from non-seeing, as the Seraphic Doctor has, where below.
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
On Envy the Fathers have written many splendid things: Cyprian, serm. de Invid., Basil homil. 11. et 21., Chrysostom homil. 44. et 45., Cassian collat. 18., Prosper lib. 3. de vita contemplativa, cap. 9., and others as gathered by St. Bonaventure, Lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 8., where, drawing on St. Gregory (Lib. 2. moral. cap. 20. Lib. 3. cap. 17.), he lists the daughters of Envy, which are Hatred, Whispering, Detraction, Anger; and others, from other Fathers, chiefly St. Augustine (de disciplina Christiana, cap. 1.) and Jerome (epist. 99.), where they call it a diabolical vice.
Envy is defined by all as: Sadness over the neighbor's good, judged as an evil of one's own, insofar as by comparison it diminishes the excellence of one's own good. So the Socratic Doctor (opusc. explic. Terminorum Theologiae; et p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence Aristotle (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 9.) says the cause of Envy is equality, or similarity, and proximity. And the Saints have similar things: Augustine in Psalm. 104., as gathered by St. Bonaventure loc. adducto, Damascene Lib. 2. cap. 24. St. Augustine also, Lib. 11. de Genes. ad litt. cap. 14., describes Envy, saying: Since each loves his own excellence, he envies equals, that they be made equal to him; inferiors, lest they be made equal to him; superiors, because they are not made equal to him; etc. The same is taught by the Angelic Doctor (p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence also Lucan sang:
— Emulous virtue gave the spur, and now each can no longer bear that Caesar be before him, or Pompey his equal. —
Therefore not only the surpassing good of one's neighbor begets Envy, but anything even equal, insofar as it is apprehended as diminishing our excellence or impeding our surpassing others. In this sense St. Gregory is to be understood, Lib. 5. moral. cap. 33. We cannot envy except those whom we think better than ourselves in some respect; for he does not call them better simply, but insofar as they diminish our excellence, as Tancretus noted (diff. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 1.), Valencia (disp. 3. quaest. 14. puncto 1.). Hence St. Augustine (Lib. 11. in Genes. cap. 15.), as cited by St. Bonaventure loco cit., says the differences of envy are three: namely, envying superiors, because one is not their equal; equals, because they prosper for the better; inferiors, lest they be made equal to oneself. But one must note that Envy agrees with the other three affections in the character of sadness, but differs by the other parts of the definition, as the Angelic Doctor indicates (p. p. Censil. sect. 19. et in speculo animae, cap. 1.).
For first, there is a certain effect of fear, which is sadness over another's good insofar as it is feared to bring ruin upon us; and this is not a sin, as is clear from Aristotle loco cit. and St. Thomas (hic art. 1. et 2.) and St. Bonaventure in speculo animae. The envious man, however, is not saddened over another's good under this aspect, but as in fact judged to surpass him in his own excellence.
The second effect, similar to Envy, is when one is saddened not over another's good, so as to envy it, but over his own deficiency, insofar as he himself does not have that good; and this is not a sin, as St. Bonaventure says. This affection is called zeal and emulation, as the Philosopher teaches (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 11. and St. Thomas art. 1.). But Envy is saddened over another's good insofar as it diminishes one's own excellence. Hence 1 John cap. 3. says, For this reason Cain slew his brother, because his brother's works were just. Here the Angelic Doctor notes that Envy is sometimes called by the name of anger, Genes. 4. Why are you angry? where the Gloss reads: you are tormented by envy; sometimes by the name of hatred: His brothers hated him, Genes. 37.; sometimes by the name of emulation, 1 Kings 1. Her rival afflicted her. To this belongs what Nyssenus says, Lib. de vita Moysi: The envious man grieves at the happiness of others, and rejoices in their calamities. And Chrysostom, homil. 44. ad pop. Why do you grieve, O man, at your neighbor's goods? We ought to grieve at the evils we suffer, not at the goods by which we seem to be held in esteem by others. Therefore this sin is without any pardon. And Isidore, Lib. 3. sent. cap. 25. There is no virtue that has not for its contrary the evil of Envy; only misery is without envy.
The third affection, similar to Envy, is sadness over another's good insofar as we judge him unworthy of that good; and this affection is called Nemesis, or Indignation. So Aristotle loco cit. cap. 9.; and St. Bonaventure asserts that this affection, with regard to temporal goods, which more often bring ruin, is not a sin (in speculo animae, supra citato.). See him also, Lib. primo de profectu Religiosi, cap. 13. Hence St. Gregory (in Pastorali, part. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.) says: It often happens that, without losing Charity, we are gladdened by the ruin of an enemy, and again saddened by his glory without the guilt of envy: since we believe in our mind that some are thereby well raised up; and as he advances, we fear that very many are unjustly oppressed. So reports St. Bonaventure, Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 21.
From what has been said it follows that Envy does not exist among those who are not equals or similar in some state, as Aristotle teaches (cap. 10.); for among these only the excellence of one obscures the excellence of the other. Hence he infers that neither the dead, nor those most remote at the pillars of Hercules, are envied; but envy, he says, exists among neighbors and rivals, and among those who desire and strive for the same things, whence the saying: The potter envies the potter, and the smith the smith.
Hence you infer that those prone to envy are the faint-hearted, since to them all things seem great, as St. Gregory noted above; to this Job 5: Envy slays the small one. On the contrary, the magnanimous are free from envy, as Silius Italicus says. See Valencia.
From all these things the Angelic Doctor concludes in the place cited in the Summa that Envy is opposed to piety, which arises from Charity.
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
How perverse ENVY is.
{ D Thom. art. 2.
I assert first that Envy, of its genus, is a mortal sin.
It is proved first by St. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 3. From Romans 1: The Lord delivered them up to a reprobate sense, that they may do things that are not convenient, filled with all iniquity, etc. full of envy, murder, etc., and Galatians 5: Among the works of the flesh are named enmities, concerning which he adds: Those who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God.
It is proved by the Angelic Doctor Lib. 2., Pharetrae, cap. 8., and the Holy Fathers, who gravely exaggerate this sin, chiefly St. Gregory 2. moral. cap. 20. and Lib. 31. cap. 17. Lib. 3. Dial. cap. 15. and homil. 5. in Evang., Chrysostom homil. 54. in Ioan., Augustine de disciplina Christiana, cap. 1. de Virginitate, cap. 31., Jerome epist. 99., Isidore in Synop. cap. 9., Anselm de simil. cap. 45. The Angelic Doctor describes Envy admirably in sermons, in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 4. and in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 42.
It is proved second by St. Bonaventure in compend. Theol. Lib. 3. cap. 16., because it is opposed to the divine goodness, which is communicative; so good indeed is God, says St. Augustine in the Enchiridion cap. 27. as is had in offic. Septuagesimae, that he makes good out of evils; but the envious man is so perverse that he sucks evil out of the very goods; and the goods cooperate toward evil for him. See the Angelic Doctor.
It is proved third by the Angelic Doctor cap. 28. De profectu religiosi, and Lib. 3. compend. Theol. cap. 23., because Envy is opposed to the virtue of Mercy and of Charity, and to its joy. Hence he also infers that it is a sin of envy not only to be saddened over another's good, but even not to rejoice in it, and not to grieve over the evil. He adds, however, that it can be venial by the surreption of the act. See him in the Compend.
I assert second that Envy is a capital sin. So St. Gregory 31. moral. cap. 31., St. Thomas art. 4., St. Bonaventure in the places cited here and in the preceding question; for from it many vices are born, per St. Gregory 31. moral. cap. 17.: namely, Hatred, which is to will evil to someone and to refuse a good. Second, exultation over the neighbor's adversities, affliction at his prosperities, whispering, detraction. See the Angelic Doctor de profectu Relig.
Of Envy the Angelic Doctor also says (in speculo animae citato) that two branches issue. These are: exultation over the neighbor's adversities, and sadness at his prosperities. The same is had in the place already cited.
From the First are designated first Machination, which is the hidden procurement of evil. Second, scandal, which is a word or deed less right, affording others the occasion of ruin, as St. Jerome says (in c. 15. Matth.) and St. Augustine (locis allegandis disp. 18.). Third, Snares, which are the investigation of another's deeds, so that the neighbor may be accused from them. Fourth, Betrayal, when one feigns friendship with another in order to deceive him. Of this Boethius says, there is no pest worse than an enemy in one's own household. Fifth, Suspicion, when one is quick to suspect evil of another. Hence Tully: suspicion is an evil opinion arising from slight causes; and this proceeds from the evil affection of Envy, and then it has the character of mortal sin; otherwise it is not judged mortal, as the Angelic Doctor says, whom Suarez and others follow, as gathered from him. Sixth is perverse judgment, when one, ill-disposed toward another, not only suspects evil in him from slight causes, but even determines it in his heart or pronounces it judicially with his mouth; and this is always mortal sin of its genus; hence the Gloss on 1 Cor. 4. Do not judge before the time, condemns this.
From this branch sprouts the sowing of discord, which is a mortal sin, Proverb. 6.; as also the revelation of secrets, when they are to someone's ruin.
From the other principal branch of Envy, which is Sadness at the neighbor's prosperities, proceeds Detraction, by which the neighbor's prosperity is impeded; and this is done either by removing the neighbor's good, or by keeping silent, or by denying, or by perverting it. Or by willing to reveal, aggravate, impose, confirm the evil, and to hear it gladly, as St. Bonaventure notes (in speculo cit.); and they are the ten horns of the beast seen by Daniel, cap. 7., as the Gloss expounds.
The Angelic Doctor observes, moreover, that a reputation is blackened by hidden words and nods, according to Ecclesiasticus 10: If a serpent bite in silence, he is no better that backbiteth secretly. But it has the character of mortal sin of its genus; since, according to the Wise Man, Proverb. 22. A good name is better than great riches, just as it is a mortal sin to steal, and the thief is bound to restitution, so too is he who detracts from a good name. He warns, however, that not every word is mortal.
TO detraction belongs keeping silent, when there is a need to defend a neighbor unjustly reviled; for as in temporal necessities we are bound to succor him, so also in spiritual ones. Thus also one sins by gravely diminishing or perverting a neighbor's good, as though obtained for an evil end: of this it is said Eccles. 11. He that turneth good into evil lurketh, and in the chosen he will lay a stain. Thus to deny another's known good is gravely to detract. Likewise gladly to hear evil of someone, or to give occasion for detraction, or to dissemble when one can correct, is mortal. Hence the Apostle, Rom. 1. Detractors are hateful to God, says: Not only those who do them, but also those who consent. The Angelic Doctor adds, however, that if someone does not correct a detraction out of bashfulness or human respect, it is not mortal, unless it be a person upon whom the duty of correcting falls. He also says that to confirm another's evil report, and to amplify it to infamy, is mortal. Yet it makes a great difference whether this proceeds from Envy or rather from an indiscreet zeal for justice; for sometimes the evils of others are spoken out of indignation or levity of speech, which it would be harsh to judge mortal, as the Angelic Doctor says.
From Envy, St. Bonaventure says, Rancor also arises, which is a grave motion of the heart proceeding from an evil affection toward one's neighbor, and has the character of mortal sin if it proceeds from Envy; from rancor, moreover, Hatred is born — so the Angelic Doctor.