Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

On Mercy.

What MERCY is.

Mercy is defined by D. Bonaventure, 3. part. Centil. sect. 44.: Mercy is the virtue by which the innermost heart is moved over the calamity of the afflicted. This virtue thinks nothing human foreign to itself; it reckons the losses, or the goods, of others as its own.

It is drawn out from D. Augustine, 19. de civit. cap. 5., where he defines, or describes, it thus: Mercy is compassion for another's misery in our heart, whereby, if we can bring help, we are compelled.

Valentia thus describes Mercy from D. Thom. art. 1., D. Augustine in the place cited, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 8.: Mercy is pain, or sorrow, over an involuntary evil of another, reckoned as one's own, and in some way against the dignity of the miserable person, whom the one merciful wills to relieve, as far as lies in him, and as he conveniently can.

It is called a Virtue by D. Bonaventure; for it is a virtue distinct from Charity, as the Apostle teaches, Coloss. 3., where he first teaches: Put on the bowels of Mercy, benignity, humility, modesty, patience; but soon after says: Above all these things, have Charity.

It is proved, because it has a peculiar object, namely the evil of another, and the calamities of the afflicted, as able to be relieved by our works. But this is the reason of a peculiar object, and it begets a peculiar difficulty in the act of mercy in efficacious execution. For indeed, in efficaciously relieving another's misery, there remains a principal difficulty even in one having Charity.

Observe, however, that in the description of the last-mentioned mercy it is placed that it is sorrow over another's misery; for, as Damascenus teaches, 2. de fide, cap. 14., Mercy is a certain species of pain, or sorrow, over the evil of one's neighbour indeed, but reckoned as one's own.

It is said to be over an involuntary evil; for misery consists in suffering involuntarily; just as Beatitude, to which misery is opposed, consists in this, that one have those goods which he wills, according to that word of Augustine, Lib. 13. de civit. cap. 4.: Blessed is he who has whatever he wills, and wills no evil. Yet that misery need not be altogether involuntary; for we can have mercy on a sinner, as D. Thomas teaches, art. 1. ad 1., from the opinion of D. Gregory, homil. 34. in Evangelia.

Then it is said to be over the evil of another reckoned as one's own. For sorrow and pain are over one's own evil: whence the motive of mercy must touch one in some way regarding oneself, as D. Thom. teaches, art. 2. Whence, when the Saintly Doctor, in the explanation of the terms of Theology, near the end, describes mercy: Mercy is compassion for the misery and need of one's neighbour; he does not intend to hand down a definition, but to explain the term; otherwise he would have added: for the miseries of one's neighbour, as one's own.

What kind of Virtue MERCY is, and of what sort.

The Saintly Doctor discourses most excellently on Mercy in the passages alleged. But he shows first that Mercy is a peculiar and distinguished Virtue, which is occupied with the miseries of one's neighbour to be relieved, with that affection as if they were one's own; as D. Thom. also says, art. 1. and 3.

Then he prefers it to the other virtues, especially the more distinguished ones.

Indeed, first he prefers it to Penitence, because this immolates the body; but that, the soul. For bodily exercise, that is, penance, is profitable to little. But piety is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come, as is had, first Timothy 4.

Secondly it surpasses Justice: therefore it frees the guilty, Matth. 5.: Blessed are the Merciful, for they shall obtain Mercy. From Matth. 6.: If you will forgive men their sins, and your heavenly Father will forgive you your sins. Luke 6.: Forgive, and you shall be forgiven. Proverb. 19.: He that is merciful to the poor lends to the Lord. He also brings this as an argument, because in God Mercy exalts itself above judgment, James 2., and Psalm. 144.: His tender mercies are over all His works. But he hints that this avails only in him who has no superior, as D. Thom. says, art. 4.

But he shows especially that for some reason it is more excellent than Charity. The reason is, which D. Thom. also uses. For Charity only loves, and thus, as it were finite, is contained in the other, tending toward the good through love: but Mercy, overflowing its banks, pours itself out, communicating itself to inferior agents, and therefore bears not only the goods of one's neighbours, but most willingly also their evils.

Second Corinth. 11.: Who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is scandalized, and I am not inflamed? Therefore mercy, considered in itself, surpasses Charity.

But this doctrine can be accommodated to Charity, and Mercy in two ways. In one way, as they are certain good habits, that is, virtues, which are found adequately in man according to their rationes: but inadequately also in God, the formalities being prescinded, namely of habit, which they call imperfections; and in this sense Charity and mercy are compared in themselves, and according to the perfection which it exacts in itself, without respect to object or subject, and considering only the ratio of the act. In this sense Valentia says D. Thomas spoke; for he compares these virtues as they are habits, of which one is for loving, the other for relieving, as Tannerus notes, disp. 2. quaest. 4. dub. 2. num. 31.

Secondly they can be considered, not as they are habits, but in the most abstract reason, inasmuch as mercy is relieving of misery: but Charity is the faculty of loving God; and in this way, say Cajetan and Bannes, D. Thomas is to be understood, that Mercy indeed, in its most abstract perfection, is better than Charity: For that which consists in relieving the misery and defects of the needy ought to be pure act, not a certain potentiality, or lack; otherwise it will not be able to reduce need to act; and in this sense it resplends in God, who is pure infinite act, who can fill all defects and potentialities.

As to D. Bonav., I judge that he spoke in both senses. In the former indeed, because he compares the habit of Charity, and others, with the habit of mercy in general, as is evident from the examples alleged above. But in this latter sense; because he brings some examples of the mercy of God from the Scriptures indicating it, as we have seen. Therefore in both ways mercy, considered in itself, seems more perfect.

Truly, however, if both are considered in order to the subject, Charity is better in him who is not the highest, inasmuch as the highest perfection stands in union with the highest good; but if it is the highest good, then the greatest perfection is to diffuse goodness to all inferiors. See the Saintly Doctor, also giving the motives by which we are moved to mercy, loco cit. The first motive is to consider the miserable to be of our nature. Whence Matth. 23.: For all you are brethren, and Isa. 58.: When you shall see one naked, cover him, and despise not your own flesh. The second motive of mercy is one's own need and misery; for man, considering his own misery, compassionates that of another, whence Ecclesiasticus 31.: Learn from yourself what things are for your neighbour.

The third motive is the unity of Christ and his members, and the love in it, that he reckon as done to himself, or poured out for them, what is done, Matth. 25.: What you have done to one of the least of mine, etc. At the end he enumerates the fourteen works of mercy. See him there, uttering wondrous things.