Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Whether a man is bound, in the first instant of the use of reason, to turn to GOD.

The state of the use of reason begins when discretion between good and evil works appears; which is reckoned to be the seventh year.

The first opinion is that of D. Thomas, here assertive; almost all his disciples follow him; yet some depart from him, who call that opinion too severe and difficult to believe, as Alvar. notes, disput. 191. Moreover, his followers do not agree on the manner of conversion. Some wish him bound to elicit an act of the love of God above all things. Others judge it sufficient to turn to what is morally good. Some compel one to turn to God as a supernatural end. Others say it suffices to turn to God as a natural end, for instance the Creator, etc.

The second opinion is that of D. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 21. art. 1. quaest. 1. at the end, that no such precept exists. Scotus follows him, 2. dist. 21. quaest. 1., and all the disciples gathered by Master in 2. dist. 4. quaest. 3. Vulpecula, art. ult. de peccat. Poncius disp. 31. de praecept. charit. quaest. 1., and all the Nominalists: Gabriel, etc. Durandus, Richardus, Paludanus, and almost all the Moderns, as gathered by Arriaga, tomo 3. disput. 48. sect. 7.; also Suarez, Vasquez disp. 149. cap. 1., Valentia, Sanchez, Conchinus, Amicus, Auersa, Granadus, Corduba, Lorca. And it is common outside the School of D. Thomas. Bassaeus, num. 10. explicat, holds that one is bound when he has acknowledged the debt of serving God, or shortly after. Hence he exhorts parents, parish priests, and confessors to instruct them that they were created by the Lord to serve him, to love him, keep his commandments, and aspire to beatitude.

I assert, with this opinion, that no such precept is given.

The principal foundation is this: I did not know sin except through the Law, as the Apostle says. But no such express precept for this time is to be found, nor any promise of God of necessary help for that instant; nor do they agree on what the conversion is that is commanded: for even the Thomists differ among themselves. For if it is not required at once of the sinner, why do they require it of one habitually converted by grace, such as the baptized?

Therefore, by keeping the commandments a man is saved, as is said, Matth. 19. But the first commandment is: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc. But this precept does not bind at every moment; for it is not there expressed. Why then in the first instant, in which he is baptized and endowed with Charity? Thus the Saintly Doctor indicates in 3. dist. 30. quaest. 3.

The Thomists have no testimony to oppose, except the precept of conversion from sin, which is beside the point.

Hence it follows that one in the first use of reason can sin venially, and if he is not baptized, depart with original and actual venial sin; either because he can first have an imperfect use of reason and sin venially with full cognition, or advertence; or because, even if such a precept were given, it can happen that he omits it through venial ignorance and inadvertence.

You will object. The Council of Florence makes room only for the damned who die with original sin alone, or with actual mortal sin alone.

I answer: the Council explains only the ordinary modes, to which the others are reduced: for it can happen that an infidel dies with original and mortal sin. It can also happen that one dies with actual venial sins alone, and mortal ones. Thus it does not enumerate all cases adequately, but the intention was to declare that a different place is assigned to the damned from sin merely contracted, and from sins committed.

You will object secondly: Innocent III, cap. Maiores de Bapt., teaches that original sin cannot be remitted to adults who are asleep or insane, as it is to infants through Baptism without their own consent, because original sin cannot be remitted without mortal sin: therefore he supposes that an adult having original sin has mortal sin also.

It is answered: the Pontiff commands this because it can easily happen that an adult, long delayed without baptism, has sinned lethally through the force of concupiscence, since no one living long without Baptism can rein in temptations; yet the Pontiff does not suppose this; nor is it shown that in the opinion of D. Thomas this is supposed, for it can happen that such a one in the first instant of the use of reason turned himself to God, even if he could not afterwards be baptized.

You will say: Innocent, in the preceding section, says that an infant, because he did not sin by his own consent, did not need that consent for justification through baptism; he teaches otherwise of the sleeping adult: therefore he supposes that one having original sin has also mortal sin, committed by his own act.

It is answered: by denying the consequence: both because he speaks cautiously, only of the case in which he has mortal sin on this head; and because in another respect the adult ought to will Baptism. Therefore that argument is not adequate for every adult needing his own consent for Baptism. Wherefore Medina says ineptly that the opinion of D. Thomas is supposed by the Council of Florence and by Innocent.

Suppose, however, they do suppose mortal sin together with original sin: whence do the Thomists prove that it came about through omission of that act?