Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

The first opinion denies that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves. So Coninck, disp. 24, doubt 3, alleging in favor of it St. Bonaventure, Giles, of Auxerre, and other older authors.

The second opinion is that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves. This opinion is explicitly held by St. Bonav. here, as we saw in the preceding question, and it is clear in the body, the foundations, and the replies to the arguments, where nothing clearer could be read; for he asserts, and repeats, that nature, as nature is, inclines more toward God, even though by reason of depravity and corruption it be pressed more by self-love. St. Thomas follows him here, and with him all Thomists, Cajetan, Bannes, Aragon; Scotus 3 dist. 27, single question, § Istis igitur rationibus, whom all Scotists follow, per Mastrius in 3 disp. 6 quaest. 25; Casati, treatise on Charity, disp. 3 sect. 5; Valencia here p. 2; Vasquez in I-II, disp. 194; Tannerus disp. 2 quaest. 3 dub. 3, wrongly citing St. Bonaventure 3 dist. 25 to the contrary.

I assert, with this opinion, that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves.

Many reasons are brought forward by many. And many refute them, so as to exalt their own.

The first reason is that of St. Thomas in the body, which St. Bonaventure intimates in 3 dist. 29 dub. 1 litt. and in the Diet, title 5 cap. 5, and serm. 2 on the One Holy Doctor. Every part naturally loves the common good and the good of the whole more than the good proper to the part; but the good of any created thing is compared to the Divine good as the good of a part to the good of the whole: Therefore. For God is the highest good, by whose participation other things are good, and without whom there is no good, and hence he is every good, and the good of the whole universe. The major is proved by the example of the serpent, which, so that it may save its head, in which is life, exposes its parts to blows; and the hand naturally exposes itself so that the head, and consequently the whole, may be saved; and water ascends lest there be admitted into the nature of the universe the absurdity of a vacuum.

Scotus attacks this reason in § Istae rationes: for the examples by which the assumption is supported only show that the whole loves itself, or its principal parts, more than the less principal ones; for water does not ascend by its own form naturally to fill the vacuum, but is violently snatched by nature, which cares for the order of the universe; nor does the hand expose itself, but man exposes it: similarly the serpent exposes its more principal parts so that the head may be saved. Hence therefore you have only that God loves the good of the Universe more than that of a part; or that the good of a principal part is loved more than that of a less principal one; but you do not conclude that any part of the Universe loves the good of the whole more than its own.

Scotus adds, even were this granted in the examples; nevertheless the case is disproportionate; for those parts, by saving the whole, save themselves, which are parts of it; but a creature is not any part of God, although it be his effect. So also Mastrius.

But these things are frivolous. First indeed, the nature of a part is ordered to the whole as to an end; and therefore it appetizes the good of the whole more. That it is violent for the form of water to ascend, if no necessity of the whole universe urges, amounts to nothing; but if a vacuum is at hand, it is moved by a natural motion, as being formally a part; for it is not moved miraculously by God, nor attracted by another: for does the vacuum have an active power? But suppose the nature of the universe naturally operates thus. Acting therefore is most innate to the part, and likewise to each of the parts,¹, and thus it is natural to be acted upon; for the particular nature follows the common nature, which is its rule. Hence Aristotle says in 1 Phys. text. 78: Each thing is apt to be acted upon and moved as it naturally acts and moves.

Nor is it true that the cause for which a part in the world, or in a serpent, or in a man, exposes itself to danger is that, by preserving the whole, it preserves itself, which is a part of the whole, etc.; on the contrary it is the opposite: for it undergoes its own destruction and perishing, so that by its own destruction the whole may be saved. For what preservation of water is there in departing from its natural place against its inclination?²

To the disproportion last alleged by Scotus, St. Bonaventure replies at ad 6. For although a creature is not a component part of God, nevertheless it depends on him more than a part on the whole, and more than on itself, such that upon the destruction of God there follows, by way of intrinsic connection of Creatures, annihilation. Moreover God is an intimate pervader, penetrating, containing, and hence more intimate to us than we ourselves are to ourselves.

Mastrius repeats the same things, adding that water is drawn to fill the vacuum, from Aristotle 4 de Caelo, text 34: for it is drawn by nature on account of the common good.

Durandus attacks the reason of the Holy Doctors, because it does not follow that he who exposes himself to danger for another loves that other more than himself; for a friend exposes himself to danger for a friend, or for money, and yet loves himself more than the friend, or money. Similarly a good citizen exposes his life for the Republic, and yet does not love the Republic more than himself, because in that act he wills for himself a greater good, namely the good of virtue, which he would not wish to lack for the whole Republic. Hence Aristotle in 9 Eth. cap. 8 says that the serious man in these and similar acts loves himself most.

Yet Durandus labors over equivocations, as Casati saw in num. 32; for the Holy Doctors intend that when a part is naturally exposed on account of the common good, as the adequate cause, the whole is loved more; but he who exposes himself to danger for a friend, or the Republic, or money, does not expose himself naturally, nor on account of the good of the friend, or of the Republic; much less for money, as is clear from the things said by Durandus himself. Therefore it is beside the point. Then, willing the non-Being of self for a friend, etc., he loves more him whose Being he wills, with the destruction of his own Being, as Scotus also notes.

Mastrius adds, with St. Bonaventure at the end, that with God destroyed, the creature itself is not destroyed³, not only formally, because it depends on God; but also eminently according to the being it has in God; but if God remained, the creature itself would remain in the cause, from which it could be reproduced, as the Friend also notes, diff. 29 sect. 3.

Hence therefore Scotus extracts another reason, which is St. Bonaventure's at the place cited. A valiant citizen ought, according to right reason, to expose himself to death on account of the good of the Republic, from Aristotle 9 Eth., because the public good ought to prevail over the private: Therefore much more ought man to love the Highest Good more than his own singular good; for it is incomparably greater than the common good of the Republic in respect of his own singular good.

But the objections of Durandus lie dissolved.

From these you have that also Scotus, who subtly divided the reason of St. Thomas, in which it was assumed that a part is exposed for the whole reasonably, at length fled to nearly the same middle term.

¶ It is proved thirdly by St. Bonaventure at ad 4. Rational nature loves beatitude supremely, from Aristotle and Augustine 13 de Trinitate cap. 5. But it does not love beatitude more than the beatifying object; rather it orders beatitude toward the Highest Good, God, by an ordered motion of friendship.

From this also the hackneyed reply of Scotus lies rebuffed, which the Holy Doctor saw; namely, that from this it would follow that he loves himself more, for whom God is concupiscenced for fruition; for the love of concupiscence, by which I concupiscence a good for myself, presupposes the love of friendship, by which I love myself, and love God for my fruition.

The Holy Doctor indeed replies that this comes about by the love of concupiscence; he warns, however, that this love of concupiscence does not make one number with the love of friendship of self, and thus one cannot properly be said to be prior to the other — which the P. also notes in his Treatise on the Angels, disput. 7 quaest. 2, where Scotus urged that the Angel first loved himself with the love of friendship, and afterwards wished glory for himself; while the love of beatitude is ordered according to right reason toward the highest good and last end, God, and hence God is loved more than our fruition, if we follow reason. Add that with God taken away, beatitude is taken away from us.

It is proved fourthly by St. Bonaventure in the foundations and the body, by his own proper reason, which the more recent authors commonly use, and which Mastrius declares proper to Scotus in num. 619. The reason of natural love follows the dictation of nature; but nature dictates that God is to be loved supremely above all things: Therefore. The major is certain; for the will depends on cognition, and natural volition on the natural light, as elicited volition on elicited cognition. The minor is proved: for ordered nature dictates ordered acts, but nature in itself is right and ordered: Therefore it dictates ordered acts of the will. It is confirmed by St. Bonaventure's minor to the third, because right reason dictates that what is truly the greater good is to be loved more, and that God is the highest good: Therefore he is to be loved above all things.

It is confirmed secondly by St. Bonaventure at the first. Grace and charity do not disorder nature, but perfect it; but charity inclines to loving God above all things: Therefore nature too; otherwise, if nature inclined to loving self more, it would follow that charity does not perfect, but perverts nature.

The whole reason is confirmed further, because nature is from God: Therefore it is good: Therefore its inclination too is from God. But it would be absurd for God to have instilled a disordered nature, since every effect tends to its cause: hence All the Lord has worked for his own sake.

It is confirmed further: for things loved below another are for use, and what is loved above all things is to be enjoyed; such an object is God alone, who is the last end and highest good: Therefore. So argues the Holy Doctor in the body, and more broadly in the first dist. 1 art. 3 quaest. 1 and 2, from St. Augustine lib. 1 de doctrina Christiana cap. 4 and 33.

It is confirmed further in the body. God created all things in number, weight, and measure. But charity is a weight, as I showed in quaest. 30, and a right weight, inasmuch as it is from God; and hence rightly balancing the affections according to the greater dignity of the objects.

Coninck replies that indeed an appreciative love of God above other things is dictated by nature, but not a more intense one; rather it is borne toward ourselves more strongly and vehemently, and in this sense he tries to reconcile the authors of both opinions.

But our question concerns appreciative love, and the authors of the first opinion contend by their arguments that nature dictates an appreciative love of ourselves more than of God, as we shall see. From this you also have that the Seraphic Doctor was wrongly alleged for the first opinion, for this reason: because he asserts an appreciative love indeed of God, but not an intensive one, to be connatural, since sensible nature is borne more vehemently toward itself. If this love were the question, there would be no controversy.

You will object first. The whole reason for loving is congeniality; for the ratio of good and of the congenial are convertible; but nothing is more congenial to any thing than its own proper being: Therefore nothing is more loved according to the inclination of nature. It is confirmed, because whatever nature loves, it loves as united and conjoined to itself, as is gathered from Aristotle in the Elenchi cap. 2: The good lovable is proper to each thing: Therefore the more conjoined and one it is to itself, the more it is loved; but a creature is more united than God, since it is united to itself by identity, whereas God by the causality of efficiency. It is confirmed from Aristotle 9 Eth.: Friendly things toward another are taken from friendly things toward self: Therefore natural love toward God comes from natural love of ourselves: Therefore a creature naturally loves itself more than God.

Mastrius replies in num. 631, from St. Bonaventure at the end, that the reason of congenial lovability is found prior and more perfectly in God, as in the universal good and origin of all good, as the Holy Doctor explains in the body; whence there is no good lovable except as it participates in divine goodness. To the confirmation he replies that, even were it more united to itself by identity, nevertheless God is still more united to it by power; for since the creature depends more wholly on God its principle than on itself, and is more sustained and conserved by God intimately penetrating, therefore God is more united to the creature than it is to itself by power.

Scotus replies secondly in dist. 27 at the title in the solution of the principal arguments, and Mastrius in num. 632, from the last words of St. Bonaventure at the end, that unity indeed moves the affection of love; nevertheless goodness is properly that which is lovable: but God is infinitely better than all.

To the third confirmation Aristotle speaks of friendship among equals, in which ordered self-love is the measure of love toward another; for friendship toward another becomes known when I seek for another things similar to those I seek for myself; but if the friendship is of the lesser toward the greatest, it is denied that self-love is the measure; whence with respect to a superior, especially God, it is a super-friendship, because he is the fountain of goodness, which is rather the reason that other things are loved. Aristotle indeed speaks of particular foreign goods. So also Tannerus disp. 2 quaest. 5 dub. 3 num. 48.

You will object secondly. It is established by experience that we incline more toward ourselves than toward God; whence when the necessity of dying for Christ occurs, nature flees, as appeared in many martyrs, and even in Christ the Lord.

It is replied first that that repugnance comes from sense; for the spirit indeed is prompt, but the flesh is weak, Matth. 26. Nor is it absurd to follow what Casati introduces: that sense naturally loves nature more than God; for this is not absurd, because sense is not capable of enjoying God. Hence it has neither the light nor the cognition of preferring God to itself. So also Tannerus.

Casati replies secondly, from St. Bonaventure at the first, that this happens from a more vehement apprehension of one's own good, which is sensible; and therefore it moves nature more, weakened and depraved as it is.

You will object thirdly. If natural inclination were more toward God than toward us, grace would not be necessary for loving God above all things, which is against the Councils and the Fathers. Nor does Mastrius satisfy by saying that the Councils and Fathers speak of the state of fallen nature. For the contrary is the case, because St. Augustine in the Enchir. cap. 106 and the Council of Orange can. 19 assert the same of the state of innocence.

Mastrius replies that it is true of supernatural love; but not of natural love, and that imperfect one by which nature strives toward God as a natural object, namely the Creator — an affection which is weakened in corrupted nature.

You will object fourthly. If this were true, man would never have sinned in the state of innocence, since nature would incline more toward God.

It is replied by denying the sequel; for a created object could be offered more vehemently and attract, as the Friend notes.