Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Whether there is order in CHARITY.
I ASSERT that the objects to be loved are in a certain order from the will.
IT IS PROVED first by the Holy Doctors from 2 Kings, Ordinavit in me charitatem [He ordered charity in me].
Next it is proved by St. Bonaventure from St. Augustine, book I of de doctrina Christiana, cap. 23, where he says: God, who is above us, is to be loved first; yet he did not say this, speaking of being loved first in time; but in the order of excellence and estimation.
THIRDLY from St. Ambrose in the Gloss brought forward on the words of the Canticles: First God is to be loved, second we ourselves, third parents, then children, after them the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to wicked children.
IT IS PROVED fourthly by the Holy Doctor. Prior and posterior is according to relation to some principle, from Aristotle 5 Metaph. t. 16. and to an end. Now order includes in itself some mode of prior and posterior; whence it is necessary that, where there is some principle and some end, there also be some order: but Charity tends to rectify the will toward God as toward a principle and supreme end, in the communication of which the friendship of Charity is founded; and therefore it is necessary that in those things which are loved by charity some order be attended to according to relation to the principle, which is God, who is also the supreme good, which is beatitude. St. Thomas also uses this argument. It is proved more fully by St. Bonaventure in 2 dist. 35 art. 2 quest. 1. On this the others rely, with Tanner disput. 2 quest. 3 dub. 2.
IT IS PROVED fifthly by the Holy Doctor. One habit tends to one principal object, and to other things by order toward it: but Charity is one habit, having for its principal object the divine goodness, from what was said in q. 19. Therefore the other things loved are regarded as ordered toward it; and thus the principal object is God, to be loved first; then the rest. He repeats the same in the body, and ad 2.
IT IS PROVED sixthly by the Holy Doctor. Order is owed more to deliberative love than to natural love; but natural love is ordered with respect to the things lovable: Therefore.
IT IS PROVED seventhly. A bond rightly connecting many things to an end ought to bind them in order to the same end: but Charity is the bond of perfection, from 3 ad Colossenses and from St. Dionysius cap. 4 of de Divinis nominibus, and it binds many things together, being a most liberal love, embracing many diverse things to be gathered in the end: Therefore it unites them in order.
IT IS PROVED eighthly by the Holy Doctor. What weight is in bodies, love is in spirits, from St. Augustine book 13 of Confessions cap. 9, and book 21 of de civitate Dei cap. 28, and 6 of de Trinitate cap. 10. But weight ought to be well balanced: Therefore also love.
You will OBJECT first. Where there is order, there is distinction; but charity with respect to diverse things is one: Therefore it is not ordered.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that order in a habit is attended to in relation to the object; and although charity is not multiple in itself, it nevertheless has many material objects and many acts, by reason of which there are many precepts.
You will OBJECT secondly. Where there is order, there is proportion; but among things lovable there is no proportion; for between the created and the uncreated there is none: Therefore.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that proportion is twofold. One is proportion properly so called, which is the commensuration of things of the same genus, and in this sense the major is false. Secondly, proportion is said broadly, and is any relation which is attended to according to the convenience of analogy; and in this way there is a proportion of created good to the uncreated, and also an order according to the ratio of primitiveness and causality; for the end is more worthy than those things which are toward the end, and in this respect order is attended to in Charity.
You will OBJECT thirdly. Order pertains to cognition, because it belongs to the wise to order: Therefore if order is not placed in cognition with respect to things to be known, much less ought it to be placed in Charity with respect to things to be loved. If you say that order is in the sciences. Against this: for charity follows the cognition of faith; but in its objects there is no order: Therefore.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that there are two kinds of order. The first is of parts in a whole, and of things in the universe: and indeed to order belongs to the intellect. The other is the order of things toward an end, and this is from the will, which tends toward the good, and thus toward the end; and such is the order of Charity.
He RESPONDS secondly that order in habits is attended to in relation to the objects; and because the Supreme Goodness by essence, with respect to the other things lovable, which are participative, is deservedly to be esteemed of more worth; and among those things lovable some participate more or less of goodness, as body less than spirit: hence it is that the love of charity ought to be ordered according to these. For thus also among things knowable there is order: first are the first principles, in which there is the greater evidence of truth; then the knowledge of conclusions follows; and so the assumption can be denied. Nor is it the same with faith; for all the articles are compared equally to the First Truth, from whose revelation all are believed uniformly.
You will OBJECT fourthly. Just as in faith there is one ratio of believing, namely the supreme truth; so in Charity there is one ratio of loving, which is the supreme goodness: but from the fact that the Truth, which is the ratio of believing, is one, Faith is one, assenting equally to all the articles: therefore from the fact that there is one ratio of loving, charity is one, having itself in the same way toward all things lovable.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that the ratio is dissimilar, for in Charity the objects terminating the affection are unequal, even if all are reduced to one.
You will OBJECT fifthly. Charity is one habit, naturally inclining to the good: therefore equally; for the same thing, always remaining the same, does the same.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that one thing always does the same given an equal disposition in natural objects; otherwise it acts diversely. Thus the sun illumines crystal more than stone; but the will is a potency acting by election, which is ruled by charity, and is itself also moved; it does not, however, remain always the same. Moreover it regards objects lovable in a diverse manner and degree.
You will OBJECT sixthly. If order is attended to in Charity, it is attended to either with respect to the habit or with respect to the act; not with respect to the habit, which is altogether one: if with respect to the act: then it is not ordered in a baptized infant, or in one sleeping, who have no act. Therefore I ask, what is attended to in the order of charity? and why is order attended to in it more than in the other virtues, since every virtue is ordered love, as St. Augustine says in de moribus Ecclesiae? And again, since about every good there are mode, species, and order, why is charity rather said to be ordered than moderated?
St. Doctor RESPONDS that order is attended to in the habit, in relation to the objects. Charity is therefore chiefly said to be ordered, because it is the weight whose it is to balance, and the bond of perfection, whose it is to gather all things in order.