Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

IOVINIANUS established by this heresy that there is no augmentation of charity, but that all are equal in merits and all in reward; which error I refuted in prima parte, Tract. 1. disput. 11, and prima secunda, Tract. de Gratia, disput. 4. Thus also I expelled, as infected, the Sectarians.

OTHERS with St. Bonaventure said that Charity is increased by another diverse one succeeding, as days are said to grow, not by addition to the days, for instance of April, but by others of May succeeding.

Others said that charity is increased, but by a deeper rooting alone in the subject. Thus the Thomists with St. Thomas here, and Valencia quaest. 1. p. 3.

The TRUE opinion of the Theologians, however, is that charity is increased by the addition of degrees: to this Cajetan tries to reduce St. Thomas.

St. Bonaventure observes, however, in quaest. 5. that augmentation is a passion of quantity, which is twofold: one of bulk, the other of virtue, from St. Augustine libro de quantitate animae, cap. 3. In spiritual things, indeed, that is virtue which in bodily things is bulk. Increment is also given in qualities according to the intension of degrees, as in heat up to the eighth; and in this way the question is raised about the augmentation of charity: whether it is increased according to intension and virtue, which is truly a physical augmentation, by which other forms also grow. But a moral augmentation can also be given, by which the subject, growing morally in the order of merit, meritoriously causes such an augmentation; and in this sense St. Augustine spoke, epist. 106, apud D. Bonav.: Charity merits to be increased, that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected.

Secondly, the Saintly Doctor observes, in the following question, that some said charity is increased by the sole diminution of the contrary concupiscence: but he himself asserts outright that it is increased by the intension of itself; otherwise it could not have been increased either in the Angels or in innocent man.

I ASSERT first that Charity is intensified substantially and meritoriously.

It is PROVED first by St. Bonaventure with the argument of St. Augustine epist. 106, which the Council of Trent uses, sess. 6. de Iustificatione cap. 10. The increment of charity is made by merit in Charity itself, which the just man has on the way, and it is perfected in the fatherland: but this is the true physical Charity, poured forth in our hearts: therefore. This argument supposes first that we can merit the increment of charity, which is proved from 4. ad Ephes.: Let us grow in charity. Philip. 1: This I pray, that your charity may more and more abound; and first Thessal. 3: May the Lord multiply you, and make you abound in charity. Apoc. 1: He that is just, let him be justified still. Eccles. 18: Fear not to be justified even to death. Prima Cor. 9: He will increase the growths of the fruits of your justice. Whence St. Augustine above: Grace merits to be increased, that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected. And St. Gregory, homil. 15. in Evang.: Every virtue is increased, as it were, by certain degrees; and thus, by the increments of merits, it is led to the summit. Finally Iacob. 2: You see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only.

Next, the argument supposes that the augmentation of the same charity is brought about, which the cited passages of Scripture prove; and therefore the Church prays: Grant us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and Charity; and the philosophical reason is at hand, for intension is the addition of a new degree, or of virtue, to the same thing, as Aristotle teaches 1. de Gener. text. 31, and St. Bonaventure observes quaest. 2. fund. 2.

THIRDLY it supposes that the same charity is perfected in the fatherland,¹ which is asserted in prima Cor. 13: Charity never falleth away. And therefore the Apostle says, prima Corinth. 15, speaking of merit and reward, to which it corresponds: One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon, another of the stars. For star differeth from star in brightness: so also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in ignominy, it shall rise in glory.

The MINOR is of faith, proved in prima secunda, Tract. de Gratia, disp. 3. This argument is strengthened also by the other foundations of the Seraphic Doctor.

THE SECOND foundation, therefore, is: Every motion from lesser to greater, the thing remaining, is an augmentation: but Charity, remaining essentially the same that it is on the way, is increased in the fatherland: Therefore. The major is evident. The minor is proved from 1. Cor. 13: Charity never falleth away.

THE THIRD foundation. To the quantity of the charity of the way there corresponds the reward of glory and of the charity of the fatherland; but in the fatherland the rewards will be unequal, as I showed from prima Cor. 15. Therefore.

THE FOURTH. A being which is not the highest can be made better: Charity is not the highest good; otherwise it would be the same in each individual, and accordingly would have equal effects in all and each, which is false; for in one just man it works more and higher things than in another. Nor is it the highest, that it could be, since it is the perfection by which a man is formally constituted on the way toward the ultimate term of the fatherland. Whence the Saintly Doctor forms the argument thus, which St. Thomas also uses, art. 4. That perfection by which a man is formally constituted on the way toward a term can be increased; but Charity is that perfection by which a man is constituted on the way toward beatitude, which is the ultimate term: Therefore. The major is evident; for it belongs above all to a wayfarer that he be able to advance on the way. The minor is proved by St. Bonaventure quaest. 2. fundamento 3, because Charity is as it were a Light, growing from the dawn of grace to the most brilliant noon of glory. Therefore Proverb. 4: The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forward, and groweth even to the perfect day. Valencia uses the same reason disp. 3. quaest. 2. p. 3.

I ASSERT secondly that this augmentation is physically from God.

IT IS PROVED IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, quaest. 2, fundamento 4, and his reply. A thing is increased by the same by which it is produced: but charity is infused by God: Therefore. The major is proved, because the same virtue is capable of acting upon the essence, and upon the degrees of the essence, and its accidents; the minor is proved from Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. Second Timothy 1: God hath given us the spirit of love; first John 3: Behold what manner of charity God hath given us, that we should be called, and be, the sons of God; and cap. 4: Charity is of God. Cajetan uses this argument on art. 6 of St. Thomas, and Valencia, disput. 3, quaest. 2, p. 3, assert. 7, where he discusses: whether, at least by God's absolute power, man could be, at least instrumentally, the physical cause of the augmentation of charity: and indeed he himself asserts it, thinking that charity is not created. But this was exploded in p. 1, Tract. 3, disputation 1, where I showed that infused habits are created.

You will object first. Every form is unchangeable, consisting in something indivisible.

The Saintly Doctor answers that this is true as to universal essences, and even singular ones as to what is essential, but not by reason of the subject, against Scotus, 1. dist. 17, quaestione 4. The Saintly Doctor does not will that the form be changed essentially in subjects, but by a certain substantial perfection of the individual, as is clear in the rational soul; but he wills that it be varied accidentally by intensive degrees per se.

You will object secondly. Simplicity does not admit magnitude.

He answers that it does not admit magnitude of bulk; but of virtue.

You will object thirdly. Augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, from 5 Phys. t. 8.

The Saintly Doctor answers that quantity is accidental to the how-much; but the augmentation of quantity is substantial to it; for it is made from its own entity by degrees, which in moral virtue are essential.

He answers secondly that the term of augmentation in bodily things is a quantity perfect per se; but per accidens it is increased also by the addition of substance, unless it comes about by rarefaction or protension; for when quantity is increased, the subject also is increased, in which it may be, although the formal term of augmentation is the quantity itself; so therefore in spiritual things the quantity of virtue is increased in Charity, which is indeed an accident, but one consubstantial with that form; as the third degree of heat, and the following ones, according to which it is intensified.

You will object fourthly. If Charity is increased substantially, it is changed substantially; but Charity never falleth away, from prima Cor. 13. Therefore.

The answer is made that Charity remains with respect to its being of itself; yet it is simply increased by degrees.

You will object first, to prove that charity is increased by itself, because it is more powerful than fire; but fire by its own heat increases itself by combustion: Therefore.

The Saintly Doctor answers that Charity is not active as to creation.

You will object secondly, with St. Thomas, to prove that it is not increased by the addition of degrees, because it is simple.

The Saintly Doctor answers that Charity has degrees of perfection, and therefore can be increased; nor do degrees according to intension repugn to a quality, even if it be a simple quality, for thus also heat is intensified. In the same way the Saintly Doctor answers in 2. dist. 27. art. 2. quaest. 2. ad 1.

You will say: The point has a quantity of virtue, and yet cannot be increased.

The Saintly Doctor answers that this happens because the point is complete in an indivisible of its genus, whence nothing can be united to it so as to be increased, because it is essentially such.

NEXT he answers that the point is indivisible in the genus of quantity of bulk; but in the genus of quantity of virtue, no perfection is indivisible simply, except the Divine. Moreover, the point is an act, imperfect in the genus of quantity, which is not perfect in act; but only terminative with respect to lines; therefore it has not an infinite active power, but passive; whence it cannot produce lines, but terminate them; wherefore it is not compared to the Divine virtue, nor can it be augmented, as Charity can.

You will object secondly. Every addition implies composition, and this induces a diminution of virtue: Therefore, the greater the addition, the feebler charity becomes; and the feebler, the less.

The Saintly Doctor answers first that as much as is added of formal parts to anything, so much is added of act and virtue; otherwise a lesser fire would be more powerful than a greater; and a syrup composed of many things would be feebler than one of its ingredients. Therefore charity is increased according to the degrees of the form.

He answers secondly that increased Charity is not more composite, but more simple; for things stand in a contrary way in the quantity of bulk and in the quantity of virtue; for in the quantity of bulk the simplest is the least and weakest, as the point; and therefore in that genus approach to simplicity is diminution; but recession from the simplicity of the point is by addition: but in the how-much of virtue, the simplest is the greatest, namely God; therefore approach to simplicity is by addition; for the more degrees of perfection a creature has, the more it approaches the perfection, and accordingly the simplicity, of God: thus the Soul and the Angel excel the other creatures in the imitation of God, and yet do not exclude the simplicity of quantity. Therefore also charity, the more perfect, the more like to God.

You will object thirdly. If some degree is added to charity; either it is charity, or it is not. If not: Therefore it does not increase it. If the first: Therefore the first charity, with respect to the incoming charity, is material: Or if they do not stand thus, one will not be made, because one is not made out of many, unless one be as matter; the other, as act.

The Saintly Doctor answers that the imperfect stands in the manner of the material with respect to a more perfect degree; thus heat as four stands with respect to itself intensified as eight; and in this way charity as four stands as in potency to the eighth degree, nor is there any inconvenience.

¶ From this the argument of Valencia assert. 4. is resolved, by which he strives to prove that charity is not increased by the addition of some degree of charity, otherwise there would be several charities: for by those degrees one intensified quality is made; as from several degrees of heat one heat is made as four, or as eight.

¶ But what he himself teaches, assert. 5. that the augmentation of charity is made by a certain mode of perfection actualizing the subject; I confess to be unintelligible to me, because a natural virtue always acts with its whole self in the same subject: ergo, remaining the same, it always does the same: Therefore the just man is not apt to elicit more perfect acts, even if he grows in charity, as the Saintly Doctor argued in quaestione 1, fundamento 5. For the greatness of the effect comes from the greatness of the virtue; and the greatness of the virtue from the greatness of the essence. For either that virtue is the essence itself, or not. If the first: Therefore, the virtue being increased, the essence is increased. If the second: Either that virtue has an essence from which it flows, or not; if it has one; either it is the essence itself of charity, or another; if the essence itself of charity: Therefore, the virtue being increased, charity must have been increased; but if it has another essence, I ask about it: whether it is charity or not; and then it will be necessary either to go on to infinity, or to arrive at some new entity of charity, which may be the cause of that virtue.

It is confirmed by St. Bonaventure fundamento 1, and quaest. 2, fundamento 4, because the moral act by which that charity is increased is new, from St. Augustine epist. 106. Likewise the physical act of God influencing: Therefore a new entity of Charity is produced.

Valencia answers that it is enough if a new effect, formally distinct, accede to the new act. Thus to a new local motion a new mode accedes.

Against this, first, because he equivocates: for that place, or Ubi, is an entity making in itself a new predicament, while with respect to the located thing it is a mode. Therefore let him concede to me that a new entity accedes to charity, which, since it is a virtue, must also accede with the new entity of Charity; and not a solitary new mode in the subject, without a new addition made to charity.

Therefore let there be the third Assertion, and proved, that the augmentation of charity is made by a newly added degree of charity. It is common to the Philosophers, and to almost all the Theologians.

Here many things are disputed by the Doctors. First: whether grace and charity are increased by whatever works of whatever Virtues; but of this I treated in t. 2, Tract. de Gratia, disp. 4. quaest. 4. Next: whether by every work, or act, the remission and the augmentation of charity are acquired together. Of this I treated loc. cit. quaest. 12. Thirdly: whether this augmentation accedes immediately. Of this I discoursed there, disp. 3, from quaest. 2, against Scotus; and it is the common opinion of the Theologians, according to Turrianus disp. 68. dub. 4. Therefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6. cap. 10. defines that the justified, by the observance of the commandments, grow in justice itself by the grace of God received: and therefore it says that the Church prays: Grant us the increase of faith, Hope, and Charity. And indeed the arguments brought forward above show that this augmentation is made immediately after meritorious acts, as it were through moral causes, upon whose operation God physically infuses charity. Therefore, on account of the authority of the Council of Trent, Mastrius asserts, in 2. disputatione 7. numero 359, that the opposing opinion cannot be sustained, and he reprehends Faber.

You will say: If the augmentation is conferred immediately after the first instant: Therefore, if the act of charity is continued for some time, in which there are infinite instants, it will be increased to infinity.

It is answered with Suarez opusc. de revivisc. merit. disp. 2. sect. 5, Caspensis disp. 2. sect. 6, from St. Bonaventure dist. 17. quaest. ult. that the augmentation is finite, because it is not reckoned according to duration by the division of time and of the act into aliquot parts; but according to the succession, or instantaneousness, of the work, in a physical manner; and works are done in a finite time; and according to the instants of the equal parts in which there is the operation; for as to the aliquot parts, to which finite things correspond, there are infinite instants, to which the aliquot parts of acts correspond; but they are not measured in this way, but according to a scarcely determined time.

From what has been said also, Disp. de merito, in the questions cited, especially 8, and from what is said here, that question lies resolved: whether the augmentation of Charity, of merit, and of glory grows from the inequality of the works which are commanded by Charity; so that, if charity, the same as four, commands two acts, one of Temperance, the other of Faith, the merit is increased from the mere inequality of these works, even though the commanding charity is equal.

And indeed the opinion of Bannes is false, quaest. 25. art. 6. dub. 5, saying that it grows only unto an accidental reward. But the true opinion is that of Victoria relect. de augmento charit. num. 11, Valencia disput. 3. quaest. 2. p. 3, and Caspensis sect. 7, after St. Thom. p. 2. quaest. 114. art. 4. ad 2, that merit grows substantially.

It is proved from the said cited passages. As simply corresponds to simply, so more to more: but merit simply is had from the acts of the other virtues: Therefore also its augmentation. Therefore in the Council of Nicaea, in which the heresy of Jovinian was condemned, excluding the inequality of merits, when the Pontiff had condemned it, he writes to Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, and to the others, epist. 81: The rustic, that is, the howling of wolves, is he who maintains no grace of virginity, no order of chastity, abolishing for different persons the degrees of different merits, as if there were one palm, and the titles of rewards did not abound. Here he beats back Jovinian, who wished conjugal continence from unlawful things to be as meritorious as virginity, which is against the Apostle, prima Corinth. 7: He that joineth his virgin in marriage doth well: and he that giveth her not in marriage doth better, which words the Council adduces, and subjoins: Better is virginity, by which the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom is acquired, and the succession of heavenly merits is found. By which it is shown that he speaks of the reward, and of essential merit: for he names virginity simply better, as the Saintly Doctor also observes, in 4. dist. 31. quaest. 1.

This is also expressed in those words Matth. 19: There are eunuchs who have castrated themselves for the kingdom of heaven, which St. Jerome uses, lib. 1. cont. Iovinianum. The same St. Bonaventure uses in Diaeta, titulo 6. capite 2.

The same is proved by St. Bonaventure ad 21. Lucae, by the example of that Widow, who, one mite cast into the Gazophylacium, pleased God more than those who were throwing in whole gold coins; but this was done because she cast in of her want: Therefore merit grows from the force of the work, as St. Gregory, homil. 5 in Evang., and Beda upon those words expound.

Bannes answers that she prevailed by a greater charity: it is confirmed by him from St. Gregory loc. cit., and the Glossa Interlin. on this passage, and St. Vincent, serm. 4. in septuag., saying that God weighs, not how much is offered, but from how much affection, as St. Bonaventure relates on that passage.

But it teems with equivocation: for they wish to say that God regards not only that which is given, but rather with what affection, which indeed is not only from charity, but from the object of that virtue. Therefore Christ says Matth. 10: Whosoever shall give a cup of cold water to one of the least of these, shall not lose his reward, as the Saintly Doctor observes on that passage of Luca, where he brings forward other passages of Scripture proving that even the affection of the other virtues pertains to essential merit. Thus 66. Isaia: Upon whom shall I look, except upon the poor, and the contrite of heart, and trembling at my words. Psalm. 101: He hath regarded the prayer of the humble. And Eccl. 35: Do not the tears of the widow go down to the cheek? for from the cheek they go up even to heaven. And Tobiae 4: If thou have but little, be studious to impart even a little gladly.

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength; but this precept is fulfilled with perfect execution only in the fatherland. Therefore it must be granted that it is then fulfilled completely when there is no other capacity in the heart; otherwise it would not be said with the whole heart. Nor is it true that a more intense quality makes the nature of the subject more disposed beyond its capacity; but within its limits. Therefore, if some subject is apt to receive so much heat as 4, it will not be able for 5 to accede. Thus therefore neither does the supernatural disposition dilate the power of capacity to infinity, but unto a limited term.

It is PROVED secondly by the Saintly Doctor. What in bodily things is bulk, that in spiritual things is virtue, and they stand proportionally, as St. Augustine teaches de quantitate animae, cap. 3. but in the quantity of bulk, by reason of the subject, the whole augmentation has a certain fixed state, because, as Aristotle says, 2 de anima, textu 41: Of all things constituted by nature there is a term, and a ratio, of magnitude and of augmentation: Therefore similarly in the quantity of virtue. Gallus uses this reason 3. dist. 13. quaest. 1. cap. 3, and the author of the controversiae, Sotus contr. 10, secunda Pars.

But the reason is taken in both genera also from the finitude of perfection; for as the quantity of bulk is finite according to the natural and ordinary course, so also grace, which is a participation of God. Therefore it is said Sap. 11: Thou hast ordered all things in number, measure, and weight. Thus Scotus also argues. For it is a finite participation of the infinite; otherwise heat could be infinite. By which the response is refuted, diff. to. Phys. quaest. 4. n. 65: That the fire of hell can grow on the part of the receptive subject.

Cajetan answers that the reason is not the same concerning natural things and supernatural things: for heat, for example, is a participation of the infinite, not with formal congruence; but Charity is with formal congruence; for God is formally Charity, but heat is not formally God. Further, concerning natural things Aristotle indeed says, 2 Animae text. 41: Of natural things also the augmentation has a state.²

BUT this response is cold; for it seems to suppose that Charity, by which we are perfected, is God himself, and not a created habit, which is an error. But suppose that God is formally Charity; nevertheless he himself is not that Charity by which we are perfected by habit, or act. Whence the parity runs, that since Charity is a created participation of God, it has a finite and terminated perfection. But that the object of love is infinite makes nothing, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad ultimum; for the object is God, infinite, with whom our created Charity is not commensurate.

Caspensis answers that the habit is not varied by the multiplication of the parts continuing it, and participating the same nature, but by the diversity of the essential degrees, of which the quiddity and the species of it consist; and this has more place in acts, which regard an infinite object. Mastrius answers the same loco citato, Scrin 3. disp. 2. quaest. 3. art. 1.

BUT this response is frivolous: for in accidental beings the degrees of intension are substantial, for example in heat eight degrees signify the summit of the perfection of heat, nor can it ascend to nine; for the virtue arises from the essence, nor does it transcend it. Therefore the degrees of Charity, since they arise from a finite essence, must be finite, as the Saintly Doctor argues; for an effect is not nobler than its cause. But although acts regard an infinite object, nevertheless they regard it, as the habit also does, according to their own capacity, and virtue, which is created; and accordingly from a finite potency they have a finite intension. This argument, however, is not to the taste of the Saintly Doctor, as I said p. p. Tract. 5. disp. 8. quaest. 5.

It is PROVED thirdly. That is perfect to which in its genus no addition is possible: but there is given a perfect Charity in the fatherland: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's, primo caeli, textu 12. The minor is proved from prima Corinth. 13: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away; but this perfect, he says, is Charity.

It is PROVED fourthly by the Saintly Doctor. The more perfect anything is among creatures, the more it is joined to an end: but Charity is perfect: Therefore; but if it were augmentable to infinity, it would have no end.

St. Thomas ANSWERS that Charity has an end, but in the other life. Yet this does not resolve it, because an end, which is a terminus, must be given to each finite thing in itself.

They have ONE reason only, taken from the infinity of God the agent, and from the part of the object, which is infinitely lovable.

BUT these are worn away by St. Bonaventure. For although the object be infinitely lovable, nevertheless the power of the creature is finite; whence, as it is infinitely intelligible, nevertheless the intelligibility is limited by reason of the created intellective power; so also in our matter. But that the principal agent is infinite makes nothing; otherwise all the effects of God would be infinite; but they are limited by their own capacity; for God does not act as much as he can act, as the Saintly Doctor observes.