Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues.

The Sectarians laugh foolishly, hearing this title asserted by the Catholics.

Nevertheless it must be observed with caution, with D. Bonaventure, in what sense Charity can be called the form of the Virtues, as I said also in disp. 1. quaest. 19. where I treated this question more fully.

¶ For the Virtues can be considered in three ways. First in order to the object, and in this sense, since they are specified or known by it, they must be formed by it, not by another extrinsic habit. Secondly they can be compared in order to the subject in which they are. Thus, although they are informing forms, they can nevertheless be perfected and actualized in order to God, inasmuch as, with Grace and Charity supervening, they are living and efficacious for meritorious works. Thirdly they are compared to the end; thus they are disposing forms, yet they are perfected and directed by charity, which is the directing weight. For the end, as end, is a good, which is the object of charity; and so, as regards this tendency, the remaining virtues are directed and completed in order to the end.

I assert therefore, in the last two senses, that Charity is the form of the Virtues.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure first, from that text to the Galatians 5. where the first fruit of the Holy Spirit is said to be Charity, as the life, according to 1 John 3. He that loveth not, abideth in death. And chapter 4. He that abideth in charity, abideth in God. And James 2. As the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead. Where the Apostle speaks of the works of Charity, according to that text Galat. 5. Faith, which worketh by charity. Hence D. Augustine, in the book on the knowledge of the true life, cap. 28. says: Faith is animated by love, as the body is vivified by the soul. And Dionysius, cap. 2. de Eccl. Hierarch. says: Charity most fittingly gives form to the habits of our soul. And D. Bernard, serm. 2. de resurrect.: Faith (he says) is animated by love, and charity is the life of faith.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonaventure. That which rectifies the principle of works also actualizes and perfects the works; but charity rectifies the affection, which is the principle of the works of the other virtues, which depend on it: Therefore it also perfects and informs.

It is proved fourthly. In moral matters the complement and the species are considered in order to the end; but the love of the highest good is that which makes the others tend toward their due end: Therefore the love of the highest good gives form and complement to all the gratuitous habits and to their works; but that love is Charity: Therefore. The same holds in Fulgentius, lib. 3. cap. 8. Basil, see Charitas, num. 3.

Hence it remains explicit by what reason Charity is the form of the Virtues; for it does not accomplish this by informing intrinsically, but by producing its own acts and commanding the others with the due ordination to the supernatural end, to which the studious life is ordered; the acts of the other virtues are rendered in the genus of completed operation when they are rightly ordered to the end of eternal life. So D. Thomas also holds, 2. 2. quaest. 4. art. 3. ad 2. and quaest. 23. art. 8. ad 2.

¶ But it does not inform intrinsically, because it is not joined intrinsically to the other virtues or to their acts, as a part; as Capreolus notes, disp. 1. sect. 5. num. 35. with D. Bonaventure in corpore, where he explains it outstandingly.

Therefore charity is called the form of the remaining virtues, either because it gives to their acts a certain moral dignity and meritorious being; or inasmuch as it refers them to the highest end they can have, that is, to God, inasmuch as he is good in himself. Thus S. Thomas explains it, also with respect to the arguments which are solved by this distinction: that Charity is not the intrinsic form constituting the Virtues in essential being; but only in right operation toward merit, as the end of eternal life; and accordingly they are not informed intrinsically, since all have their form in order to the objects, but only in order to the operations. From which it follows that faith and the other virtues without charity are still virtues, as I showed concerning faith in disp. 1. quaest. 21.

Here the Doctors dispute: Whether Charity is distinct from the grace of God. This I have sufficiently done in the prima secundae, Tract. de Gratia, disp. 2. quaest. 3. But S. Thomas inquires into it under a certain Title, dist. 27. quaest. 3. Whether the Habit of Charity is merely gratuitous. Here indeed an opening is given to another controversial question, which is treated under another title, namely: