Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Whether Charity is one most special species.
I assert that it is one ultimate in species. So the Theologians commonly hold, as at Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 2. dub. 1. num. 19.
It is proved first by D. Bonaventure. Just as Faith regards God as the highest truth, so Charity regards him as the highest goodness; but because the first Truth is one, Faith is one, as the Apostle says Ephes. 4. One faith: Therefore. It is confirmed by 1 Corinth. 13. And now there remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three: where Faith and Charity are said to be one in the same way. With this argument Valencia deals in disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 1.
It is proved secondly by S. Thomas. As the rational power is related to the true, and the irascible to the arduous, so the concupiscible is related to the good; but the rational power is perfected by one virtue in believing the truth, and the irascible in hoping for the arduous: Therefore also the concupiscible in loving the good; but this virtue is charity: Therefore.
It is proved thirdly by S. Thomas. The more unitive a thing is, the more one it is in itself; but Charity is the bond of perfection from 3. ad Coloss. Therefore.
It is proved fourthly by S. Thomas. In every genus in which there is an order of motions, the first mover must be one; but charity is the mover of all the virtues, commanding all the others: Therefore it is altogether one in species in all.
It is proved fifthly by S. Thomas in corpore. If the ultimate object is one and the principal act is one, the habit is one; but the object of charity is one as ultimate, because it is the highest good, and the act of willing that highest good is one: Therefore, although that highest good be willed — God loved for his own sake, and for itself, and for the neighbor — there will be one Virtue; and by this the opposite argument is resolved, which labors to multiply charities because Charity is borne toward God and the neighbor.
For S. Thomas answers, and Valencia with him, that both are loved for the sake of one thing under one formal aspect, by which the habit is unified and distinguished.
And if you say that charity wills for the neighbor not only the highest good but also other goods.
S. Thomas answers that the principal act is to will the highest good; the others only secondarily; and not elicited, but imperative, commanding the other virtues, say almsgiving, that it may give succor, etc.
You will object secondly. Where there are two diverse precepts, there are several habits enabling; but there are two precepts of charity: Therefore.
S. Thomas answers that those two precepts are diverse materially, not formally; because one is included in the other. Hence it does not follow that the habit of charity is diversified formally.
You will object thirdly. Where there are diverse acts, there are diverse habits; but the acts of loving God for himself and the neighbor for God are diverse in genus: Therefore.
S. Thomas answers that that diversity comes from a diverse comparison of the same formal object, not from a diversity of object, which is one; and therefore it does not follow that the formal object is diverse.
You will object fourthly. Wisdom, which is about eternal things, is another habit than science, which is about temporal things: And likewise Latria, which is the worship of God, is another virtue than Dulia, which is the worship given to one superior: Therefore by equal reason, the virtue by which God is loved is other than that by which the neighbor is loved.
S. Thomas answers by denying the parity: for Wisdom deals with eternal things according to eternal reasons; Science with temporal things, with a motive diverse from wisdom, namely according to temporal reasons; but Charity has one motivating aspect, namely the Divine goodness, which, since it is supremely lovable by any will whatsoever, not only as it is in itself but as it is participated by a creature, loves it under both aspects under one formal motivating aspect. The same diversity is found between Dulia and Latria, which worship with diverse motives.
You will object fifthly. Just as the Contemplative and the Active life differ from each other, so the acts of the contemplative and the active life ought to differ more than the acts of the contemplative life among themselves: Likewise the habit rectifying contemplation ought to differ more from the habit rectifying action than two habits rectifying contemplation itself differ; but Faith and Charity rectify contemplation and action, and they are not diverse; as appears from 1 Corinth. 13. Therefore charity does not differ in species according as it regards God or the neighbor, but only as the motive differs, according as it bears on contemplation or action.
S. Thomas answers that "contemplative" and "active" denominate a state or the exercise of the virtues; but the diversity of state does not induce a diversity of habits, which arises rather from the diversity of objects. Hence the same virtues direct men in both lives. Thus Faith directs toward both lives. Likewise Charity; hence it is not necessary that there be several.
You will object sixthly. Love of friendship and love of concupiscence are objects of Charity; but these two loves are diverse in genus: Therefore.
Responds S. Thomas that Charity cleaves to the Highest Good with both loves, of concupiscence and of friendship, the latter indeed being principal, as D. Augustine says de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 14. to which the other love of concupiscence is reduced; for something is loved with the love of concupiscence by him who is loved with the love of friendship. Therefore, because the formal object is one, namely God as good, to be united to whom, as D. Dionysius says cap. 4. de divin. nominibus, p. 1. according to the opinion of Hierotheus; Therefore there is one virtue in both loves, of friendship and of concupiscence.