Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
There WERE some with D. Bonau. asserting that all the Virtues are indivisibly one substance, multiplied in acts, yet in such a way that one has the acts of the others; whence Justice is prudent, and Prudence is just, Faith loves, Charity believes, and especially Charity, which, as the Apostle says, 1. Corinth. 13. is patient, is benign, and enumerates there fifteen works of virtue. They strongly lean on this opinion of D. August. from his saying de moribus Ecclesiae, where he says: Virtue is nothing but the highest love of God.
OTHERS said that Charity, since it perfects the concupiscible power, which is diffused through all the other powers, is a general virtue, embracing the rest.
The TRUE opinion is that Charity is a special Virtue, distinct from the others. So S. Bonau., D. Thom., and the rest of the Theologians.
I ASSERT first that Charity is a special virtue, distinct from the others.
IT IS PROVED by D. Bonau. first from the Apostle 1. Cor. 13. There remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three: but the greater of these is Charity. Since therefore he calls charity one of the Theological virtues, and greater than the others; he admits that it is distinct, as Valencia also notes disp. 3. quaest. 1. p. 1.
IT IS PROVED secondly by S. Doct. with the reason used by D. Thom., Valencia loc. cit., Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 3., Fuliens. lib. 3. cap. 8. That is a special virtue which has a special formal object. Such is charity: Therefore. The Minor is proved, because it tends to God insofar as in himself he is the highest good of the supernatural order, which cannot be had naturally. But no other Virtue regards this formal ratio, neither a moral one, as is evident per se, nor a Theological one; for Faith and Hope, which are Theological virtues, regard God under other ratios. For Faith regards him as he is the first and highest Truth: Hope regards God as a supernatural good, and the object of our beatitude, not in any way whatever, but as arduous to attain.
IT IS PROVED thirdly by S. Doct. from the acts. Habits are found to differ by diverse acts; but the acts of charity are altogether diverse from the acts of the other virtues: Therefore.
IT IS PROVED fourthly by S. Doct. from the subject. The Theological virtues are ordered to rectifying the powers in relation to God; but charity rectifies a different power, namely the concupiscible; as Faith the rational, and Hope the irascible: Therefore.
IT IS PROVED fifthly by S. Doct. by comparison to its opposite. Because the vice opposed to charity, namely the hatred of God, is distinguished from all the others: Therefore by reason of a special habit of one opposed Virtue; for one thing is opposed to one.
IT IS PROVED sixthly by comparison to the reward. When some things are so related that when one is perfected the others are evacuated, those habits must differ essentially; but the habit of Charity is perfected and consummated in the fatherland; while the habit of Faith and Hope is evacuated, as is said in prima Corinth. 13. Therefore.
IT IS PROVED seventhly in corpore from the principle which it represents. That the image of God be in the soul expressly, it is necessary that three distinct potencies be found; and that, reformed supernaturally, they have similitude, it is necessary that they be clothed with supernatural habits toward God; but on account of the image of creation they are one essence in three potencies, representing one Divine essence in three Persons: Therefore that it may express the supernatural similitude, for which it was created Genes. 1. God created man to his Image and similitude, it is necessary that the essence be endowed with sanctifying grace, and the three potencies with Theological habits: the Intellect indeed with Faith; Memory with Hope; and the Will with Charity. See disp. 6. quaest. 10. in calce.
YOU OBJECT first, prima Corinth. 13. Charity is patient, benign, etc. Therefore it is general.
S. Doct. answers that the acts of the other virtues are elicited by them; but commanded by charity, which also elicits its proper acts of loving God.
YOU OBJECT secondly: Charity is that Virtue by which every thing to be loved is loved, as D. Hieronymus says.
S. Doct. answers that this definition is causal, because Charity moves all the virtues to operating, and what is chief, meritoriously; for without charity nothing profits for eternal life, as is said 1. Cor. 13.
YOU OBJECT thirdly, from D. Bernardo lib. de diligendo Deo, and D. August. lib. 15. de civit. cap. 22. Virtue is nothing other than the order of love.
S. Doct. answers first that this is a causal definition; for charity is the commanding Cause, and thus even the efficient of the acts of the other virtues. It is also a form; for it gives to all their perfect being in the genus of merit. Finally it is the End of the whole law and of the precepts, and joins to the ultimate End.
RESPONDET: S. Doct. answers secondly that that love which is put in the definition of Virtue is the love of whatever virtue, not charity.
You object fourthly. As the precept of charity is related to the other precepts, so the habit of charity to the other habits: but the precept of charity embraces the other precepts: Therefore also the habit of charity all the other habits.
S. Doct. answers that Charity comprehends the other precepts not by identity, but by a certain reduction, in that they are reduced to the root of charity, as D. Gregor. says, homil. 27. in Evang.: not that the other virtues do not fulfill the precepts in their own genus, as Temperance abstaining from fornication; but because the other virtues without charity do not execute the precepts according to the divine execution.
You object fifthly. As the object of charity is related to the objects of the other virtues, so the acts of charity to the acts of the other virtues; but the object of charity is the good, which is the common object of all the objects of the other virtues: Therefore the habit also is common.
S. Doct. answers that Charity does not regard the Good as it is a passion of being, but the highest good immediately; and this is its material object, by which it is distinguished from the Cardinal virtues, which regard created good: Nor does it regard a good begun in any way whatever, but under the formal motivating ratio, as I said quaest. 2.
You object sixthly. That which is superfluous is not admitted by God and nature; but the other virtues are superfluous: Therefore. The Minor is proved; for Charity suffices for merit. Therefore D. August. says Hold charity, and do whatever you wish. It suffices also for beatitude; for to enjoy is to adhere in love, as D. August. says, lib. 1. de Doctrina christ. cap. 4. Therefore either the other virtues are superfluous; or Charity itself is General.
S. Doct. answers that charity is said to suffice for merit and for reward on account of the connection it has with the other virtues and dowries. For whoever has Charity has the other virtues; and whoever has the corresponding dowry has also the other dowries. Therefore it is not rightly inferred that the others are superfluous, because no one can merit unless he believes and hopes; nor is he fit for believing and hoping except through Hope and Faith.