Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.


Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Of that fear there is chiefly to be disputed, whence God begins to taste of wisdom to the mind, and the creature to be foolish; of this the Seraphic Doctor says on the seven Gifts, cap. 3. on the gift of fear, that it never departs from wisdom, but grows with it, and advances unto the perfect day: and he brings forward Hugh of S. Vict. lib. 2. de Arca morali, cap. ult. saying: In the hearts of the Saints Wisdom is sown through fear, watered through grace, dies through sorrow, is rooted through faith, germinates through devotion, rises through compunction, grows through desire, is strengthened through charity, flourishes through Hope, buds and spreads its branches through circumspection, etc. With this gradation the Seraphic Doctor shows also in this fear the twilight, the noon, and the evening of Wisdom: but since it seems to be identified with hope, therefore this must first be seen.

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

To the virtue of Hope is attached the gift of Fear, which labors in the flight from evil, as will be clear from what is to be said.

NOTE that Fear is sometimes taken for a sensible affection, which consists in the flight from an evil apprehended [by the senses]. Second, for the flight from evil as apprehended by the intellect. Third, for the flight from some future evil, which bears some order toward God, and in this way it is considered by the Theologian; and among these Fears is also the gift of Fear.

I ASSERT that this Fear differs from Hope.

IT IS PROVED from Cardinal Bonaventure first, because according to the Saints and the Philosophers there are four distinct affections of the soul: Joy and Sorrow; Hope and Fear. Now thus they retain their essentials in respect of any evil whatsoever.

SECOND: Because just as the affections concerning the present are opposed, such as Joy and Sorrow, so too are the affections that look to the future, such as Hope and Fear.

THIRD. The habit of a virtue differs more from the habits of the gifts than the habits of the virtues differ from one another: but the habit of Fear is reckoned among the Gifts, and the habit of Hope among the virtues, as Cardinal Gregory says, book 11, Moralia, chapter 4.

FOURTH: When things are separable, they are distinguished really: but the fear of the Lord is holy, enduring unto ages of ages, Psalm 18; hope, however, is emptied in the fatherland, as I showed in disputation 4, question 11. Therefore.

FIFTH: The causes of things whose effects are opposed are themselves opposed. But Fear makes one timid; hope makes one secure: Therefore.

SIXTH. Whose formal acts are diverse, their habits also are diverse; but the act of hope is a kind of confidence and stretching forth toward arduous eternal good; while that of Fear is a flight from evil; Therefore. That these acts are diverse also comes from the variety of objects, for Potencies are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects, as Aristotle has it, book 2, de anima, 33, as Cardinal Bonaventure teaches 1 dist. 7 art. 1 q. 1 ad argumenta, and q. 3 ad argumenta, and in 2 dist. 7 p. 1 art. 2 q. 1 ad arg., and dist. 24 p. 1 art. 2 q. 1 ad arg., and in 3 dist. 23 art. 1 q. 3 ad arg., and dist. 26 art. 1 q. 2 ad arg. — they are distinguished, I say, at least a posteriori by their objects, insofar as they have the character of motive. But the object of hope is good, future, eternal, arduous: the object of Fear is a future evil, surmountable: Therefore.

YOU WILL OBJECT first: The same power abstracts from one extreme and is drawn toward the other; for indeed the same weight abstracts from the summit and is drawn to the center. The same is the power in spirits that weight is in bodies, as Cardinal Augustine says, book 11 de civitate Dei, chapter 18, and book 6 de Trinitate, chapter 10, and book 13 of the Confessions, chapter 9. Therefore there is one habit by which we flee from evil in fearing, and tend toward good in hoping.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying the parity; for in local motion, by the same motion we recede from the terminus a quo and approach the terminus ad quem, because local motion is between two extremes, one of which has the character of a principle, the other of a terminus. But in voluntary matters it happens otherwise; for when there are two opposites, the soul can be affected with regard to one while considering nothing with regard to the other; for it can be affected with regard to the good while considering nothing regarding the evil, and conversely; and therefore it is moved by diverse affections with regard to opposites.

YOU WILL OBJECT second: In the disciplines there is one discipline of opposites, as of the straight and the curved, of the healthy and the sick: But the habit of virtue is a kind of art: Therefore it directs toward opposites: Therefore the same moves both to pursuing the good and to fleeing evil.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying the likeness with the habits of the virtues, for two reasons. The first is, because the will separates things that are really conjoined; hence someone wills the antecedent, and yet does not will the consequent. But cognition does not separate things that are naturally conjoined; hence whoever knows and asserts the antecedent asserts also the consequent. And since, by reason of consequence, opposite properties follow opposites in the very thing by which they are to be known — as if white gathers, black gathers — hence it is that there can be one cognitive habit of opposites, although there is not one affective habit.

The second dissimilitude is, because the cognitive power can busily deal with either opposite by a like act; for it judges of the oblique by the rule of the straight itself; but the affective power not so; rather, if it appetites one of two opposites, it rejects the other; if it loves one, it hates the other, speaking per se. The reason is, because the affective power is more united to the appetible than the cognitive to the knowable; hence love transforms the lover into the beloved; and therefore it does not follow that, if there could be one science of opposites, there could also be one affection, or one directive virtue of affection.

YOU WILL OBJECT third. Of two extremes there is one mean: but between Despair and Presumption Hope and Fear intervene: Therefore they are one.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS: between two extremes there is one mean dividing equally, and this is a point; but with the mean taken broadly, which is not indivisibly between the extremes, there can be several means: Thus between Brixia and Venice lies Verona, Vicenza, Padua. Therefore between the extremes of presumption and of Despair there are Hope and Fear, yet so that Fear inclines more toward despair, and Hope declines more toward presumption; yet neither reaches the defect of the other.

The Holy Doctor ALSO answers otherwise: that this is to be understood of a mean which is composed of both extremes, as Liberality intervenes between Prodigality and Avarice: but Hope and Fear do not intervene in this manner.

THIRD he answers, by denying that Fear and Hope are means of the same extremes: For Hope holds the middle between Despair and Presumption; but Fear between Rashness and Timidity, or pusillanimity; and thus it is not necessary that Fear and Hope agree in the unity of virtue, unity of affection, etc.

YOU WILL OBJECT fourth. What is begotten is like its begetter; but Hope is begotten from faith, which believes both good and evil: Therefore Hope also tends toward goods and flees evils.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying that there should be a likeness in this, all the more because Hope is produced by faith as an equivocal cause; for faith, because it regards goods and evils under the aspect of the truth revealed, can regard both: but Hope and Fear are affective habits, which do not regard good and evil [indifferently]. Furthermore, faith is a habit directed to cognition, which is not diversified on account of the contrariety of objects; but affective habits must be diverse, because they regard under diverse aspects: the good indeed under the aspect of the fitting, but evil under the aspect of the noxious.

YOU WILL OBJECT fifth. Of opposites the same is the reason; but vice, the opposite of virtue, turns away from good and turns toward evil: Therefore the same virtue performs the same.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS that the acts of aversion from God and conversion to creatures are two, although they can be referred to one sin; because one and the same can be compared and referred to diverse things; and thus it is not the same with the affection of Fear and Hope, because one potency cannot at once and in one act be affected with regard to diverse contraries; therefore it does not follow that, if aversion and conversion can be about one action and form, likewise Fear and Hope have being about one and the same affection.

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

FEAR has for its object evil, professedly to be fled.

The Holy Doctor observes here, in dub. 1 and 2, that there are four Fears. The first is worldly, and it is that by which someone, fearing some inconvenience of this life, in order to escape it, offends God.

From this fear Christ taught us to beware, Matthew 10: Do not fear those who kill the body. The second Fear is servile, by which one is frightened away from sins on account of punishments. This however is twofold: one is merely servile, mechanical, which is so frightened by punishments that, if these did not loom, it would still commit sins freely; and this is still inordinate, and is therefore censured by all, especially by Cardinal Bonaventure; the other is indeed servile but does not exclude flight from fault, such as that of a man who is crushed by his committed sins out of fear of gehenna, and such is good and a gift of the Holy Spirit, as the Council of Trent teaches, session 14, chapter 4, and session 6, canon 8, as I shall say in question 3. Christ enjoins this fear at once in the place cited of Matthew: Fear him, who after he has killed the body has power to send into Gehenna, and 1 John 4: Fear is not in Charity: but perfect Charity casts out fear. In this text the third Fear is also hinted at, which is called Initial, by which one so fears God's offense that he fears punishment at the same time; and this is touched in the place cited where it is said: Fear is not in Charity: but perfect Charity casts out fear. He means that this is not with charity — truly perfect — which is clear from that clause, but perfect Charity, etc.

The FOURTH Fear is filial, which detests evil insofar as it is against God and redounds to his offense. Of this it is said, Romans 8: You have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear — that is, you have not received servile fear, like the ancients, who heard the observance of the law through terrors and threats — but you have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry Abba (Father). Of this fear it is also said, Psalm 18: The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring unto ages of ages. Where Augustine and others read chaste; for the just are compared to God as a most chaste bride to her bridegroom, acting indeed out of fear lest they wound the bridegroom, but with love. So 1 Corinthians 10 [actually 2 Cor. 11]: I have espoused you, etc.

One must then note with Cardinal Bonaventure, opusculum 15, On the Seven Gifts: On the Gift of Fear, chapter 1, that the variety of Fears is born from the variety of loves; for Fear is love fleeing whatever opposes it, from Cardinal Augustine, book 14, de civitate Dei, chapter 7. And in the Gloss on John 10, which is St. Augustine's, we have: Fear is a flight, lest man lose what he loves. Therefore Fear arises from love, and thus from ordered love arises ordered fear, and from inordinate love, inordinate fear; and such as is the love of the good, such is the fear of the opposite evil.

Hence Adam, who at first loved God filially, feared to offend him; but after he offended out of inordinate love, he feared servilely and said: Lord, I heard your voice, and I feared, Genesis 3.

HUGH, book 2 de sacramentis, part 13, chapter 5, distinguishes five Fears. The first is Human, or natural, which is a passion, arising from natural love, by which each one fears harm to his nature; but by passions we neither merit nor demerit, because they are not subject to free will, except when one conducts himself rationally with regard to them. With this fear Christ feared to die, but only as much as he willed, for our example and instruction.

The SECOND is Worldly, which is truly born of inordinate love of the present life or of things pertaining to it, and is always evil; because, as John says, 1 John 2: Whoever loves the world is constituted an enemy of God. This, however, according to the variety of the goods of the world, of the flesh, etc., of its loved objects, is subdivided materially, as Cardinal Bonaventure notes, dub. 1 literal.

The THIRD is Servile, which from God is (as the Holy Doctor says) not as "merely servile" sounds, but as implicitly excluding offense; of this Psalm 118: Pierce my flesh with your fear, and Cardinal Augustine, enarratio 25: The servile fear, the pedagogue of the law, came first, which leads to Christ; it arises from love of eternal things, lest one lose them by eternal damnation; it is twofold, as I shall say in question 3, near the end of the arguments.

The FOURTH is the filial fear of beginners, of which it is said: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and it is from charity begun. Therefore of this it is said that it is not with charity, that is, perfect, because: perfect charity casts out fear, 1 John 4; and Cardinal Bernard, sermon 22 on the Song of Songs, says: Not undeservedly this Fear is called the beginning of wisdom, which often first sets itself against folly. For this fear is a kind of entrance to wisdom.

The FIFTH is the Fear filial, which arises from charity perfected, as I said.

OBSERVE third, with Cardinal Bonaventure, here dist. 34, dub. 3, that this last fear is divided with respect to specific objects, so that one is the chaste Fear, which is the bride's; another the friendly, that is, of the Friend; another the son's: for the son fears to offend the Father, the Friend his friend, the bride her bridegroom. But with respect to God there is one, both because of the motive, in which generically those mentioned also agree, and because there is one grace with respect to God, constituting the soul daughter, spouse, and friend of God.

He also notes, in dub. 4, that Initial and servile Fear agree in some way, for each is the beginning of wisdom, but servile begins from outside, the other through some charity. Fear is truly called the beginning of wisdom because it begins to ascend gradually to the gifts, up to the highest, which is wisdom.

From what has been said, then, elicit with Cardinal Bonaventure, dub. 1, that Fear regards evil by fleeing it; and because from the varying of objects arises the variety of Fears, by a broad division the definitions of each fear can also be given. Fear, therefore, is thus defined by Cardinal Augustine, Tractate 46 on John: Fear is the flight of the soul, lest it lose what it loves. For it flees the evil, which is the loss of the beloved good. It is also defined by Damascene, book 2 de fide, chapter 18: Fear is the expectation of a future evil; and expectation is taken broadly for the estimation, shuddering at the looming danger; for thus unlucky tidings are awaited, as the Holy Doctor notes, dub. 1. Therefore Fear in general is the flight from an arduous evil to be avoided, and from a good to be reverenced, as St. Bonaventure teaches, part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 45.

HENCE, given this division of Fears, each can be defined from its various motives. Thus natural Fear is the flight from an evil noxious to nature. Worldly Fear is defined: it is the inordinate flight from the evils of this life. Servile Fear: it is the flight from penal evils, without excluding the flight from offense against God, and so with the rest.

Fear, therefore, of whatever kind, is a recoil from the arduous — which is evil in the fears adduced, and also good in the perfect filial fear; for it recoils, not indeed from the good, but from the arduousness, which is the excellence of the good, yet it recoils with reverence; and for this reason they admit filial Fear even in the fatherland, as is said, Psalm 18: Enduring unto ages of ages — truly in this life it recoils from evil as it is offense, as I shall say in question 7.

From this variety of objects the Holy Doctor deduces that there is not one univocal specific object of all, but an analogical one; for the good which is the object of perfect filial fear — which fears to lose the highest good on the way, and in the fatherland is borne reverently toward that sublime good — are analogical objects.

IT IS PROVED, therefore, by the Holy Doctor that the Object of Fear is arduous with respect to flight; for just as hope is borne toward the arduous in pursuit, so, in the opposite way, Fear ought to recoil from that arduous thing by flight, since it is disposed in the opposite manner. And just as Hope tends toward the arduous good, which is the object of pursuit, so fear [tends] toward the evil, which is the object of flight; but under the aspect of evil is included also the arduousness of the good, which will be explained in its place.

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Whether worldly Fear is always evil.

I ASSERT that such is the case.

IT IS PROVED from Cardinal Bonaventure, in the places adduced, and especially On the Seven Gifts; because worldly Fear arises from worldly love; but worldly love is iniquitous: Therefore. The major is proved from the definitions of Fear adduced; the minor is proved by the Holy Doctor, because such love prefers creatures to the Creator. Thus it is proved also by Cardinal Cusanus, disp. 2, sect. 2.

NOTE, however, that worldly love, from mere intensity in the absolute order of its own, is not sin, as Adrian thought, Quodlibet 2, question 2; for intensity, which is an increase according to more and less, does not vary the species: thus a growing love of self does not make the city of the Devil unless it arrives comparatively at contempt of God, as Cardinal Augustine has it, book 14, de civitate Dei, chapter 28. Thus also Christ suffered a fear most intense even unto death, and yet did not sin, as Cusanus warns, number 13, from Cardinal Bonaventure in the place cited, On the Seven Gifts.

It is therefore evil when it arrives at preferring a temporal good to God; and if indeed in that temporal good it constitutes the ultimate end, it will be mortal. But if it lightly prefer a created thing to God, for instance by lying, or by stealing two pence, it will be venial, as St. Augustine says, book 22, de civitate Dei, chapter 26; and in this sense St. Jerome also speaks against Jovinian.

YOU WILL OBJECT. We are bound to renounce all things, Luke 15 [actually Luke 14]: Everyone who does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple; but he who intensely loves creatures has not a mind prepared to despise them for Christ: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS, as to that passage, that there is a twofold discipleship of Christ: one of necessity, the other of supererogation, or perfection. Disciples by necessity are bound to renounce all things in affection — that is, to use worldly things, not to enjoy them, but to tend toward eternal things, so as not to wish to prefer temporal things to eternal, and so to offend God on their account, as Cusanus also notes, number 14.

But discipleship by perfection must renounce all things even in effect, and leave them. Hence Matthew 19: Behold, we have left all things, and have followed you.

YOU WILL SAY: Love, if it is intensified toward creatures, ought to be remitted toward God.

IT IS ANSWERED that intensity does not take away the appreciative love of God, as St. Bonaventure and Cusanus note, number 15.

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Whether servile fear is honorable, and a Gift of God.

I JOIN together these two questions of St. Bonaventure, because they have much in common and the one proves the other; for if it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, it is certainly a good.

I ASSERT, I ASSERT, that servile fear is honorable, and a gift of the Holy Spirit.

IT SEEMS defined in the Council of Trent session 14, chapter 4, where it teaches that Attrition, by which we detest sins for fear of eternal punishment, is a gift of God, and is brought about by the impulse of the Holy Spirit.

So too D. Bonaventure says, dub. 1. Fear indeed from grace is either from grace freely given, and so it is servile; or from grace that makes pleasing, inchoate, and so it is initial; or from perfect grace, and so it is filial. In this sense the Council of Trent also speaks, defining also session 6, canon 8: If anyone shall say that the fear of hell, by which we take refuge in the mercy of God grieving for sins, or by which we abstain from sinning, is itself a sin, or makes sinners worse; let him be anathema. Hence in question 1 he says it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, which the Alexians also assert part 3, question 76, member 2, and D. Augustine, and D. Gregory, to cite them.

IT IS PROVED by the Saintly Doctor from the authorities of Scripture and of the Fathers.

Isaiah 26: Like as a woman with child, when she draws near the time of her delivery, cries out in her pangs: so have we been in thy sight. Where St. Bonaventure reads according to the LXX: From thy fear, O Lord, we have conceived, and been delivered of the Spirit of salvation. Where by servile fear the prophets call the Spirit of salvation, says St. Jerome.

He also brings forward in the Diaeta that Psalm 118: Pierce my flesh with thy fear, according to the exposition of D. Augustine enarr. 25, related in question 2 and chapter 4, there; and here he brings forward that Ecclesiasticus 1: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, as St. Augustine expounds Tractate 9 on the epistle of John. Which the Saints also teach: Basil in the oration on the beginning of Proverbs; Bede on the first chapter of Proverbs; Gregory homily 19 on Ezechiel; Bernard homily 23 on the Song. The Master with the Scholastics dist. 34, and to Luke 12 St. Bonaventure brings forward that: Do not fear those who kill the body, and after that have not more that they can do; but fear him who after he has killed has power to cast into hell. Where he first turns away from worldly fear. Of which also Isaiah 51: Who art thou, that thou shouldst fear a mortal man, and the son of man, who shall wither like grass, and 1 Machabees 2: Fear not the words of a sinful man: for his glory is dung, and worms.

Next he urges holy servile fear: Fear, etc. So Jeremias 10: Fear them not, for they can do no evil, nor any good. And after: Who shall not fear thee, O King of nations? etc. the earth shall be moved at his indignation. And Psalm 32: Let all the earth fear the Lord: and let all the inhabitants of the world be moved at him. And Isaiah 8: Sanctify the Lord of hosts himself: and let him be your fear, and let him be your dread. And Jeremias 5: Will you not then fear me, saith the Lord: and will you not dread at my presence? He adds here that of Proverbs 15: In the fear of the Lord every one declines from evil.

Hence the Saintly Doctor in question 2 draws out, that it is a good, because the habit of this is a gift of God: Therefore also the act. The consequence is proved, because as the habits are, such are the acts; otherwise if its use were evil, it would not be from God.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Saintly Doctor from the Gloss on Romans 8: You have not received again the spirit of slavery, where it has: Take care lest, because he says the spirit of slavery and of adoption, you understand a different spirit, since it is one and the same spirit; but the Spirit of adoption is the gift of the Holy Spirit: Therefore. It is confirmed. For he teaches that the spirit of slavery was received divinely by the ancients, as Bellarmine notes. For God gave also the old law.

NEXT he proves it from D. Augustine on Psalm 127: Servile fear is good and useful, whereby the habit of justice is gradually formed.

IT IS PROVED thirdly by the Saintly Doctor questions 1 and 2 in the foundation, by reason. That which prepares for justice and grace is from the Holy Spirit: Servile fear is of this kind: Therefore.

This is the argument which the Council of Trent uses above, where it also declares that it is such only as excludes the will of sinning, in which way the Saintly Doctor also speaks in the places cited.

IT IS PROVED fourthly by the Saintly Doctor. To fear God is more than to believe: for many believe who do not fear; and holy fear arises from faith in life eternal, etc. But faith is a gift of God, as I showed in dispute one: Therefore.

IT IS PROVED fifthly. That which opens the heart, that we may receive God through sanctifying grace, is a gift of God; for the disposition is toward the supernatural form, and therefore must be of the same order: but servile fear is of this kind from the Council of Trent. Therefore: The minor is expounded by St. Augustine tractate 9 on the epistle of John, in D. Bonaventure question 3 in the body: If there is no fear, there is no one who enters into charity. As we see by the seta the linen thread is introduced, when anything is sewn, the seta first enters, but unless it goes out, the linen does not succeed; so fear first occupies the mind, but fear does not remain there, because it entered for this reason, that it might introduce Charity. For John expounds it: Perfect charity casts out fear. Then the minor is proved by D. Bonaventure from the opposite, in those words, Isaiah 63: You have hardened our heart, that we might not fear you: for God hardens by not giving grace, as Bellarmine notes from D. Augustine epistle 105.

IT IS PROVED sixthly by the Saintly Doctor. An act takes its species from its object; but the object of servile fear is an honorable good, namely eternal punishment, making sin displeasing from the motive of Divine justice, and through fear of those punishments man ceases from the perpetration of sins, though he does not altogether cease from the will, as the Gloss on Psalm 118 says, which is D. Augustine's above; which whole thing (says the Saintly Doctor) is from the divine gift. Whence he concludes that it is a gift of the Holy Spirit; and question 1 and question 2 he infers that it is a good, because by it sins are avoided.

For the understanding of these words note from D. Bonaventure question 2 that two quasi-degrees can be distinguished in holy servile fear. The first is, when it impedes the external work of sin, but because it is joined with an evil will, it does not beget Contrition, nor Attrition. The second is, when it not only impedes the external act, but also coerces the will, and this is the Fear of which the Council of Trent says it is the motive of attrition, and with the sacrament accompanying it justifies, as I related from the Council of Trent session 14, chapter 4, saying that Attrition disposes to justification, if it excludes the will of sinning: And it is the better.

Of the former, moreover, D. Augustine spoke sermon 25 on Psalm 118, on those words which he relates in question 1. The Saintly Doctor in the body, and question 2 ad 1: Pierce my flesh with thy fear: The fear by which justice is not loved, but punishment is feared, is servile, because it is carnal, and therefore does not crucify the flesh. For the will of sinning lives: which then appears in act, when impunity is hoped for. But when punishment is believed to follow, it lives hidden, yet it lives: for it would rather be lawful, and it grieves that it is not lawful, which the law forbids: because it does not spiritually delight in its good, but carnally fears the evil threatened. This is the Gloss which D. Bonaventure brings forward, who says that through this fear the will of sinning does not altogether cease habitually, though it ceases in some manner; whence it is evil; for if the will remains still actually resolved, such a will of sinning, if there were no punishment, would already be inordinate, as St. Bonaventure says question 2.

Therefore this Saintly Doctor thus receives the servile fear brought in above, and likewise concerning the seven gifts, in the place cited.

IT IS PROVED secondly by D. Bonaventure in the places cited, and in the Biblia Pauperum, chapter 38, for God himself therefore struck into the scriptures the terrors of punishments, that he might deter from sins: but surely God would not send an evil fear, as is plain, Exodus 14 and 20, when he gave the law. Whence also Job 31: I always feared God as waves swelling over me. Deuteronomy 32: A fire is kindled in my wrath, and shall burn even to the lowest hell. Psalm 7: Except you be converted, he will whet his sword. Isaiah 33: Who of you shall dwell with devouring fire? Jonas 3: Yet forty days, etc. Matthew 3: Every tree that does not bring forth good fruit shall be cut down, etc. Matthew 5. 13. 24. 25. Mark 9. Luke 12, and elsewhere.

LET THERE COME FORWARD the holy Fathers related by Bellarmine Book 2 on Penance, chapter 17, where he uses the same means as St. Bonaventure.

From these is washed away the error of Luther, who at the beginning of his perversion condemned this Fear, although the Lutherans now confess with us that it is useful. To these is added Calvin Book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 7.

YOU WILL OBJECT first. Every gift of the Holy Spirit stands with him himself; but while the Holy Spirit is infused through grace, servile fear is taken away: therefore. The minor is from D. Augustine above on the epistle of John.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that the Major is false concerning the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is a disposition and preparation to grace; such is servile fear, which upon the coming of Sanctifying grace is not altogether taken away, but is perfected. The Minor also is false.

YOU WILL OBJECT secondly. The gift of the Holy Spirit has a corresponding exemplar in God; but in God there is no exemplar of fear: Therefore.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that there exists an exemplar only as to those things which are said of perfection, as in fear it is to turn away from evil: for God turns away from evil.

YOU WILL OBJECT thirdly. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to raise up the soul to noble things; but servile fear rather depresses: Therefore.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that holy servile fear turns away from evil and raises up to good. For by it one begins to revere God.

YOU WILL OBJECT fourthly. Fear is related as love is: but to love God for temporal goods is not a gift of the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither to fear.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that love toward God on account of temporal things, inasmuch as they are ordered to him as a supernatural end, is holy: so also the fear of the Justice of God from eternal or even temporal punishments, as scourges for stirring up toward the justice of God to be reverenced, and him to be reverenced, is holy; not inasmuch as they regard precisely this life. Therefore he says, not always, etc.

YOU WILL OBJECT fifthly. To fear the gallows the robber has no need of a holy Gift: Therefore still less to fear heavier punishments. But these are equal, those who fear only punishments.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS by denying that they are equal; for the fear of God is from faith, and is of some goodness disposing to grace. Nor indeed is it unfruitful for this, but only for merit, as St. Bonaventure says at the end of the body, question 2. As of faith also St. Paul says 1 Corinthians 3: If I should have all faith, etc. Nor is it hypocrisy, because it is not made simulatedly, nor duplicity of heart with God turned away, as Luther feigns; indeed from this begins the conversion of the sinner. Nor is it evil, because it regards punishment more than fault, although the one having it, because he is a servant, still acts imperfectly; whence this malice is of the subject, not of the form, even if it itself be imperfect. See Bellarmine at the end. Nor is it from fear, though it is from fear; but fear, and pride, can be concomitant by reason of the subject, which is a sinner not yet justified. And in this sense D. Gregory says in D. Bonaventure: When punishment is feared, and the face of God is not loved, fear is from fear.

YOU WILL OBJECT fifthly. Every fear arises from love; for we fear lest the beloved good be snatched away, as D. Augustine teaches brought in above, question 2. But servile fear does not arise from Charity in the sinner, nor from natural love; otherwise it would be natural fear: Therefore from lustful.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that it does not arise from Charity; but from love of his own eternal good, which he fears may be snatched from him through hell, which he knows from faith; and so it is from natural and gratuitous love, arising from the supernatural knowledge of faith, though not from the habit of charity.

YOU WILL OBJECT sixthly. No act incompossible with Charity is good: The act of servile fear is of this kind: Therefore. The Major is evident, because Charity does not conflict with good. The Minor is proved from D. Augustine tractate 9 on the first epistle of John, and from the Apostle Romans 8, where the spirit of slavery is said to conflict with the spirit of adoption.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that the act which is from its intrinsic nature incompossible with charity is evil; but the act of servile fear is not intrinsically conflicting with charity, because a just man can fear God from the motive of hell: it conflicts indeed per accidens by reason of the subject; Whence it does not follow that it is evil.

YOU WILL OBJECT seventhly. As it is to love God, so also to fear; but to love God on account of temporal goods is evil: Therefore also to fear on account of punishments.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS by denying the likeness; for he who loves on account of temporal things only places the end in them, and therefore is depraved, while he enjoys what he should use; not so he who fears God on account of punishments, in the way said ad 4.

Then by another reason the parity is denied; for he who loves God on account of temporal things loves two things: but he who fears God on account of punishments fears one thing; for he who fears one holding a sword, fears at once the sword and the blow, as one and the same thing.

YOU WILL OBJECT eighthly. Servile fear is named from the slavery of sin: Therefore no one fears servilely without the circumstance of sin.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that the circumstance is placed in the subject, not in the act, which is not deformed by reason of the subject, since it takes its essence from the object, from which it is good.

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

The FIRST opinion is, that it is expelled as to the deformity attached to the subject of the man who is justified, not by reason of the gift itself.

The SECOND opinion is, that it is expelled formally, because it has an essential imperfection attached, which conflicts with Charity, namely, to act from the motive of punishment more than of some good; and this seems to be the sense of D. Augustine's words brought in in the preceding question, where he says that servile fear is related to charity as the awl-thread (seta) of the shoemaker to the thread, which introduces the thread, but is itself driven out by it.

The THIRD opinion, the third opinion is the middle one, distinguishes three things in servile fear. The first is material, namely, to fear eternal punishment. The second formal, which is to be moved principally by punishment. The third is attached, namely, to have a deformed will.

I assert first, That Fear is taken away as to the formal, upon the coming of grace.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure first from D. Augustine in the place cited, on those words of the first epistle of John, chapter 5: Perfect charity casts out fear.

Secondly, the Spirit of adoption and of slavery conflict, from chapter 8 of Romans. But grace is the Spirit of adoption; servile fear comes from the Spirit of slavery: Therefore.

Thirdly, because one who has charity is moved by love, not principally by fear of punishment: Therefore Fear is taken away as to this, upon the coming of Charity.

Fourthly. As love, which is before sanctifying grace, is related to infused charity, so also is servile Fear related to initial. But the love of charity is other than the love preceding justification: Therefore also fear: And since servile fear cannot become initial, or be changed into it: Therefore it is expelled.

Yet the SAINTLY DOCTOR answers by denying the parity, because Charity cannot be made formless and be transmuted, as is plain when someone falls from charity, and yet after the fall the fear of hell remains. And if you object, that love is the root of fear? Therefore it ought to run pari passu. It is answered that it does not avail, because it is likewise the root of Hope, and yet Hope can be formless and formed; and so it does not conclude that fear is altogether expelled, because it has something which can be together with Charity and without it; but Charity is wholly taken away.

I assert secondly, that fear is not taken away as to the material, that is, operating from fear of hell. This the arguments to be brought forward prove; which he nevertheless solves, because the material does not make a thing to be said to remain.

It is proved first; because as faith is related to grace, so also is the gift of fear; but faith is not taken away, but formed: Therefore.

Yet the SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that it is not alike, because faith remains as to its essence, namely, assenting to truths from revelation: But servile fear, upon the coming of grace, does not flee evil principally from the motive of punishments.

It is proved secondly. Nature stands further from sanctifying grace than sanctifying grace from grace freely given; but upon the coming of sanctifying grace, nature is not taken away: Therefore neither the gift of grace: Therefore neither holy fear.

Yet the SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that it is not alike, because nature is given as permanent, that it may be perfected by grace; but there are some graces which are given for a time, and therefore are taken away upon the coming of grace, as befitting an imperfect state.

It is proved thirdly: That which contains another, by adding something, does not destroy what is contained, but perfects it: Initial fear contains servile; for both operate from the motive of punishment: Therefore.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that that which adds an opposite difference does not perfect, but take away: thus filial fear adds a difference opposed to servile fear, which is to act not principally from the motive of punishment; Therefore it takes it away.

It is proved fourthly. Grace in itself conflicts only with sin. But servile fear is not a sin: Therefore it is not expelled by grace.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers; that servile fear regards punishment, which is from sin. Therefore grace, which is the dower of the sons of God, does not allow one to act principally from punishment, even though it allows punishments also to be regarded, because sons act in a different manner than servants not yet reconciled, but only tending toward reconciliation.

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

We must discern the object of each, that we may perceive the distinction of the habits.

Concerning the object of Initial Fear they say that its medium is between the object of servile Fear, which is punishment; and the object of filial fear, which is the reason of the offense of God. Therefore the object of Initial Fear is both offense and punishment; but offense the more principal. The object of filial Fear, moreover, has for its object the evil of fault, inasmuch as it is an offense of God, not simply, but attending to the supreme reverence of the Father.

It is proved by the Saintly Doctor on the seven gifts. On the Gift of Fear, and here dist. 36, art. 2, question 1, because it arises from filial charity, by which we love God with no respect had to our own advantage or disadvantage; and in this way it fears separation from God, as the Saintly Doctor shows dub. 3, the text being as follows: that it is not a fear of separation from God inasmuch as it is our good, as Durandus thinks dist. 3, dist. 34, saying that the pain of sense is regarded and fled from by servile fear; but the pain of loss by filial Fear; surely a fear of separation here would be from the love of concupiscence, and not from perfect Charity, that is, the love of friendship, as Caspensis notes disput. 2, sect. 1, num. 5.

Hence therefore I assert that these loves are divided into diverse ones, at least modally.

It is proved by St. Bonaventure first, because thus the Fears are divided by D. Augustine, by the Master, and by other Fathers into Initial, Filial, etc.

Next, because the principal objects are diverse, as I showed, for Initial regards punishment more principally than offense: But filial flees principally the offense of God.

You will object. If one of two opposites is not multiplied, neither is the other multiplied; but Hope, the opposite of Fear, is not multiplied: Therefore neither is Fear.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that the major is true of the division of univocals, as Aristotle testifies in the Post-praedamenta, chapter on opposites; and Metaphysics 3, tract 4. But hope and fear are not opposed univocally. Fear, moreover, is divided more than Hope, because the latter always tends toward one supreme good; but Fear flees from many evils principally, according to the diverse states, as I said.

You will object secondly. More and less do not vary the species: but initial and filial Fear differ as the less perfect from the more perfect: Therefore.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that there is not there on that account a specific difference; otherwise we should have to posit also another middle fear, that is, of the proficient. Then he answers that they do not differ only as the less perfect from the more perfect; but by the principal motive, although one in a certain way supposes the other, and what was formal with respect to the initial becomes material to the filial.

You will object thirdly. If it is pleasing thus to distinguish Fear; one can also distinguish Love, from which Fear remains, into Initial and Perfect: But Love is not distinguished in species by these differences: Therefore neither is Fear.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers by denying the parity, because love has no diverse motives, but is perfected only by reason of state.

You will object fourthly. As is the univocal cause, so is the effect; but both these Fears arise from gratuitous love, from D. Augustine Tractate 43 on John. Therefore.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers that love is not the univocal cause of Fear, whence from one love are generated not only diverse differences of Fears; but even three genera of affections, as D. Augustine teaches Tractate 9 on the epistle of John.

You will object fifthly. If there are several gratuitous Fears: therefore the gifts of the Holy Spirit are eight.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers, that one fear, which is the initial, is included in the other as to what is said of nobility; and therefore is included in the one Spirit of the Fear of the Lord.

You will object sixthly. If these Fears differ, because Initial flees also punishment, and Filial the offense of God: Then thus: In the offense there is to offend God, which is fault; and to be separated from God through enmity, which are diverse: Therefore two Fears.

The SAINTLY DOCTOR answers. That initial Fear regards two things; but principally one, consequentially the other: Similarly also the Filial; therefore there is one principal motive, diverse in both, whence the Fears ought to vary. The reason of the offense, inasmuch as it signifies the separation, which is a punishment, is less regarded by the Filial; and principally by the Initial.

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Whether Fear diminishes as Charity increases.

The holy Doctor reports many opinions on this matter. The first is that, as Charity grows with respect to the habit, Fear also grows with respect to the habit, because gratuitous habits are equal; but with respect to use, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes; and the more the use of charity presses forward, the less the use of Fear prevails, and this appears from experience: for at the beginning of his conversion a man does many things out of fear, but when he has tasted the Spirit of devotion and of sweetness, which is in love, as he draws near to the state of perfection he is now drawn more to act well by the generosity of love than he is spurred by the penalty of fear.

Yet in this manner the holy Doctor finds an inconsistency; for if the magnitude of a habit is discerned from the magnitude of its acts, then as the acts diminish, the habit too should be argued to diminish; or if the habit grows, the acts too should be intensified.

The second opinion is that Fear — not merely servile but even Initial — diminishes as charity grows, because that Fear shares with servile fear, operating also through fear of punishments; but filial Fear is not lessened as Charity grows; for the more one loves God, the more he flees offense against Him. This is the opinion of St. Thomas.

But the holy Doctor argues against it: because filial fear, whereby one fears to offend God, has pain, and the soul is much afflicted by that dread. Yet Blessed John chapter 4 says: Perfect charity casts out Fear, on account of its attached penal aspect.

The third opinion, therefore, is that there is a twofold use of gratuitous fear. One is whereby the heart of man is stirred from consideration of his own fragility; the other, whereby he is humbled from consideration of his own smallness and of the divine majesty; and the first use is diminished as charity is perfected, because confidence rises from the perfection of charity, so that man may then say the word of the Apostle: Who shall separate us from the Charity of Christ? But the other use grows as charity grows, like the habit of fear: hence the more one has of the Spirit of love, the more he has of the Spirit of fear.

I assert first, that as charity grows, Fear diminishes with respect to anxiety.

It is proved by the holy Doctor, from that passage of 1 John 4, and by St. Augustine Tractate 9, there.

It is proved secondly by the holy Doctor; for as charity grows in anyone, so much the more does he hope: Therefore he fears less to be separated from God, because he is bound more closely to God.

Finally, as love grows, delight grows: Therefore Pain is diminished.

I assert secondly, that as charity grows, reverential fear grows.

It is proved by the holy Doctor first. When the cause is increased, the effect is increased; but faith and love cause gratuitous fear: Therefore, as faith and charity grow, gratuitous Fear grows. St. Thomas uses this argument too, but St. Bonaventure moderates it, as above.

Secondly. The more one loves, the more tightly he holds a good and esteems it; and if it exceeds, he reveres it.

Finally. The more intense anyone's charity is, the greater his solicitude to serve God, lest he offend the will of God, according to that of Micah 6: I will show thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requireth of thee. And afterward: and to walk solicitously with thy God; and the greater the solicitude, the greater the fear of losing the good.

The holy Doctor answers that not all solicitude arises from fear: for the solicitude whereby one raises his soul to serve God arises from Charity.

You will say: One is solicitous also lest he offend.

The holy Doctor answers that this is a solicitude of diligence, which in perfected men has fear attached to it not so deeply, except for a time, while they are shaken in soul from consideration of the divine judgments.

From these he draws out another way of answering the question, namely that the use of any habit is said to grow or diminish in two ways: first in intensity; second in the number of acts. Therefore, as charity grows, filial fear diminishes with respect to the number of acts; because the perfected man does not need to be stirred so often as the imperfect man does, who is anxious both on account of a past fault, lest perhaps it still be unremitted, and on account of a future one, lest he relapse through frailty.

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Whether gratuitous Fear remains in heaven.

It is indeed difficult to admit Fear in the Blessed, however holy it may be; and yet all the Scholastics admit it, lest they strip them of a signal gift of the Holy Spirit; so much so that Valentia calls it erroneous to deny it to the blessed, disp. 2, quest. 2, point 5; for it is said even in the Mass: The powers tremble. There are various ways of speaking, so that the motive of filial fear may be saved, which is flight from the Divine offense; for the blessed are impeccable.

The FIRST way of speaking is that of Suarez, disp. 1, sect. 4, num. 20: the gift of Fear remains in the Blessed in the manner in which infused Temperance and the other virtues, which remain in them, remain not only as to the habits but as to the simple acts of the will, by which they take complacency in their objects and their goodness, and detest the opposed uglinesses; for the hatred of evil is formally and explicitly love of the contrary good, e.g. hatred of darkness is love of Light, as Hurtado says, disputation 113, sect. 9; Caspensis subscribes, disp. 2, sect. 1, num. 10. Since, therefore, fear is hatred of sin or of punishments, it is formally love of the absence of punishments or of sin, which absence the Blessed love, but as a thing not contingent, since they are impeccable.

The SECOND way is that of Medina, cited in Caspensis, cited disputation: the Fear of the Lord in heaven loses the name of filial Fear, because sin is no longer found to be feared, neither as separation from God nor as offense against Him, and it takes the name of reverential fear, because in a new way it tends toward God.

The THIRD way is that of Cajetan and Bannes, cited article of St. Thomas: the reverential Fear in heaven looks upon the omnipotence of God, as able indeed to inflict evil, whether of punishment, by inflicting it, or of fault, by permitting it; but not as that He will actually inflict it. For thus they are cast down with a certain reverential fear. To this Valentia smiles assent, to be cited below.

The FOURTH way is that that fear of the blessed is not a flight, since they are no longer in the struggle, but a reverential pursuit, arising from consideration of their own smallness and of God's magnitude and justice, which could have punished, and yet had mercy, and rewards beyond what is deserved; and thus they prostrate themselves in reverence. Nor is it admiration, as Caspensis infers, num. 10, but profound humiliation, even if with admiration. Thus think, with St. Bonaventure here, St. Thomas in the body of the text, Valentia disp. 2, quest. 2, point 5.

THEREFORE I assert first, that filial Fear is in the Blessed.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, first, from that passage of Psalm 18: The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring unto eternity of eternities.

SECONDLY, from that of Isaiah 11, where he says: The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him; the Spirit of Fear. But Christ was always a comprehensor.

THIRDLY, The fullness of wisdom is the fear of the Lord, Ecclesiasticus 1: therefore, since in the blessed there is the fullness of the perfection of wisdom, there will also be Fear.

FOURTHLY. As the highest love is owed to the highest goodness, so the highest reverential Fear is owed to the highest majesty.

FINALLY, in the body of the text, he hints at the testimonies of Scripture and of the Church asserting that this Fear is in the Angels. Thus in Apocalypse 14 and 15, Jeremiah 10, Job 26, and in the Preface of the Mass: The Powers tremble. Therefore our holy Doctors add, from St. Augustine 14 de civitate, chapter 9, and from Gregory, Book 7, Morals, chapter 15, to those words of Job 26: The pillars of heaven tremble, and are awed at his nod, that the filial fear of the way is different from that of heaven; and also that that fear in Christ was different from ours, which I shall show in Part 3, Tractate 1.

YOU OBJECT first. Hope is more perfect than Fear: but it does not remain in heaven: Therefore.

The holy Doctor ANSWERS that, with respect to the act of recoiling from evil, Hope is more perfect; but with respect to revering the supreme Majesty while recoiling into one's own smallness, the act of Fear is more excellent.

THE REST are resolved by the distinction between fleeing fear and revering fear.

MOST EXCELLENTLY, however, the holy Doctor discourses on this matter de septem Donis, On the Gift of Fear, chapter 2, where he also explains what fear is excluded from the perfection of charity on the way; he supposes, however, that word of the first John, chapter 4: Perfect charity casts out fear.

But he distinguishes the PERFECT of one sort by a perfection of necessity, who are in grace, of whom Deuteronomy 18: Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord; others by a perfection of excellence. St. Prosper distinguishes both, Book 3, de vita contemplativa, chapter 15. Those he calls perfect in excellence who hasten to the virtues with the greatest striving, of whom Bernard also says in his letters: And this Charity expels all their fear, which has pain. For what will Charity fear, says Gilbert, sermon 19 on the Canticles, of past offenses? For Charity covers a multitude of sins, from 1 Peter 4. What? The infirmity of conscience? It is strong as death, love, Canticles 8. What? Temporal troubles? Since even if they were eternal, consummated love could not be wearied or vanish? Not for this does Charity love, lest it perish, but rather it wishes the eternal to perish than to be deprived eternally of the use of internal love. If indeed a man shall give all his substance for charity, he shall as it were despise nothing of it; that is, substance.

He CONCLUDES that perfect and consummated Charity does not expel the most perfect filial fear, which is now almost love, since it has almost ceased to be fear, having nothing to fear, nor does it dread to offend. He says this fear is a reverence and a votive subjection; for there is a necessity of obeying, or of condition, but liberty of love knows no necessity.

SOME say, as Bernard, Book on the Love of God, toward the end, that filial Fear is increased as Charity is increased; and with Charity perfected, it will be perfected, and therefore it will have in heaven the very same act it now has; and they bring forward the authority of Augustine, Book 14, de civitate, chapter 9, where he says: That chaste Fear enduring unto eternity of eternities, if it shall be in the future age, will not be a fear terrifying from an evil that can happen, but holding itself in a good that cannot be taken away; and thus it will have another act than it now has. So St. Bonaventure. The reason of this is, that where the love of the good attained is immutable, certainly, if it can be said, the fear of avoiding evil is secure.

But MOST BEAUTIFULLY in chapter 3 he shows how the Fear of the Lord, like the Light of the first day, makes for us the Morning and the Dawn of the spiritual life, the Midday and the Evening, enduring unto eternity of eternities. See it.

NEXT, in chapter 4, he shows that the Fear of the Lord prepares for us a heavenly banquet, whence the psalmist exclaims, Psalm 30: How great is the multitude of thy sweetness, O Lord, which thou hast hidden for them that fear thee. Read it, I beseech thee, and thou shalt taste the delicacies of Paradise at his table.

But he relies on that of Ecclesiasticus 1 and Psalm 111: The beginning of wisdom, that is, of savory knowledge, is the Fear of the Lord; the Fear of the Lord shall delight the heart. See it.

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

The BEATITUDES are not habits distinct from the Virtues and the Gifts, but acts elicited from them. By poverty of Spirit, St. Augustine understands humility; because the humble man is not puffed up in Spirit. Ambrose, however, understands the renunciation of temporal things; and in both senses poverty of Spirit is elicited by filial Fear, as Caspensis notes, disp. 2, sect. 4, num. 26, and St. Bonaventure, Part 5, Breviloquium, chapter 6, and Part 3, Centiloquium, sect. 45 and 46, and opuscule on the seven gifts, chapter 3.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctor; for unto perfection one must first withdraw from evil, as it is said Psalm 33: Decline from evil, and do good. But from evil one is first deterred by the threats of punishments; then by initial fear, etc., as the Council of Trent also teaches, session 14, chapter 4; and because the root of evils is covetousness, 1 Timothy 6, therefore Fear disposes unto poverty, in which humility is at the same time joined with poverty, so that man may thus be removed far from the fountain of every fault, that is, covetousness, of which I have spoken, and from pride; for the beginning of all sin is pride. See there the holy Doctor speaking most excellently.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the holy Doctor, Book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 48, from St. Gregory, book 16, Morals, chapter 20: The poor in spirit are the humble, and they that fear God.

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

MANY holy effects there, chapter 59, of the Fear of the Lord does St. Bonaventure recount: to expel sin, Ecclesiasticus 1; to beget Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus 7; to steady the mind, Ecclesiasticus 27; to enrich with Spiritual riches, Psalm 32; to heap up good works, Ecclesiasticus 15; to delight the heart, Ecclesiasticus 1; to prolong life, Proverbs 10; to irrigate devotion, Proverbs 14; to reward eternally, Ecclesiasticus 1. He goes on to teach there that servile Fear is from the Holy Spirit, even if not with Him, but is cast out, as a she-ass by a hair of the eyelash, as St. Augustine says, Tractate 9 on the first Epistle of John. That Initial fear begins intrinsic perfection he proves in chapter 41, and that it perfects it he shows in chapter 42. See the holy Doctor.

MANY things, and those most excellent, the holy Doctor hands down about this beatitude on chapter 6 of Luke, in those words: Blessed are the poor in spirit, where he shows that by the Fear of the Lord heaven is opened to us: Blessed is he who is always in fear. Blessed is the man who feareth the Lord; in his commandments he desireth exceedingly, O truly golden words. Psalm 111, of which see the most excellent exposition of the Seraphic Doctor.

From the effects of the Fear of the Lord it is understood that there exists a precept. Thus Deuteronomy 10: What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God? He speaks of filial Fear; and of servile fear, Luke 12: Fear him, who after he hath killed the body, hath power to cast both body and soul into hell.

Caspensis ADDS at the end, num. 34, that these precepts of the fear of God are not special, and thus are not distinguished from the precepts of the other virtues, insofar as they require filial and servile fear, whereby man is held back from sins, both against charity and against the other virtues; and accordingly from a defect of fear one never commits a special sin that must necessarily be expounded in confession, as Valentia also observes, disp. 2, quest. 4, point 2, and Sanchez, Book 2, chapter 33, num. 4. And it is proved; because confessors learned in this do not ask about it, as Fagundez says, num. 19.

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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