Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
What is the proximate subject of HOPE.
I ASSERT that Hope is in the will, against some who follow Suarez disp. 1. sect. 2, saying that it is in the judgment of the intellect. So D. Thom. and D. Bonau., whom others follow in Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 2.
It is PROVED by the Holy Doctor, first from the Philosophers and the Holy Fathers.
SECONDLY. To hope belongs to the same power as to fear; but to fear is an affection: therefore.
THIRDLY. Opposites are about the same thing; but despair is in the affection: therefore also hope, its opposite. The major is Aristotle's in postpraed.
FOURTHLY, because in the rational and concupiscible power some directive rule must be placed, since they can go awry. Therefore in the Rational is placed Faith; in the Concupiscible, Charity: therefore in the Irascible, no less prone to err, the Virtue of Hope ought to be placed, ruling and directing toward God as toward an arduous good.
FIFTHLY it is proved by the argument used by Caspensis disp. 16. sect. 7., Valencia disp. 2. sect. 1. p. 1., Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 7.: A virtue that has for its object a good, as arduous, is in the will. Hope is of this kind: therefore. The minor is proved from what has been said. The major is certain; for good is the object of the will; the arduous is the object of the Irascible, which is part of the affective power. Hope indeed raises one up toward the supernatural end as arduous.
OBICTION first. Hope is called conscience in the Gloss ad primam Timot. primo.
THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Hope is called conscience in the manner of an effect, because it is expectation rising from grace and merits; but merits cannot exist except where the conscience is pure.
OBICTION secondly from D. Bernard in Cant.: God to come is the continuation of eternity in memory, which is called tension, corresponding to hope, namely.
THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that God will be the continuation of eternity, which continuation is in the memory mediately, inasmuch as it preserves the species of the retribution to come, never to be lost, and of the perpetual merits in the hope answering to it.
OBICTION thirdly. According to D. Augustine in the Books de Civitate Dei: Hope is the virtue by which one presumes that he will arrive at that which he believes: therefore to hope is to believe firmly, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore also Rom. 4: Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice, and there is added: Who against hope, believed in hope. Which authority the Sectarians abuse, so as to confuse Hope with faith.
THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Hope, taken broadly, signifies a kind of firm belief with respect to attaining some good. Thus Abraham is said to have believed in hope, because in faith in the promises of God he founded his hope against hope, which nature could supply; yet he does not will that to hope and to believe be the same. For to hope properly is to trust, and from that confidence, with a certain security, to tend toward the attaining of an arduous good; and these two, namely confidence and secure tending, St. Augustine understands by the word presuming. See Caspensem numero 42.
THAT the Apostle distinguishes there faith from Hope is proved from Bellarmine lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 5: He was not weakened in faith, nor did he consider his own body now dead, and the dead womb of Sara. He staggered not by distrust at the promise of God, but was strengthened by faith, giving glory to God: most fully knowing that whatsoever God has promised, he is able to perform. Therefore also it was reputed to him unto justice, where he speaks of justifying faith, as is clear from the last words; but what kind of faith that was he shows by the words denying: He did not consider; and by the words asserting: Most fully knowing. Which pertain to the understanding. But when he says: He staggered not by distrust; he signifies that his faith was outstanding and repelled all distrust, begetting hope. Next, distrust here signifies unbelief, for in the Greek you have ἀπιστία, as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 11. Hence Ephes. 3: In whom we have confidence and access in trust by his faith: If therefore we have confidence through faith; it follows that faith is the cause of confidence, and not confidence itself; for nothing causes itself.
ABSURDLY, however, does Kemnitius say in exam. that D. Bonaventure asserts Hope, as to its certainty, to belong to the intellect, and, as to expectation, to look to the will; for the Holy Doctor dist. 26. quaest. 5. asserts that Hope belongs to the will even as to its certainty; he does indeed grant that it is caused by the intellect, as Bellarminus also notes lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 6.
The Holy Doctor says moreover in the body of the text: It belongs to Hope to establish, and in a manner to make secure, the attaining of future beatitude; but establishment and confirmation pertain to the irascible power, which is part of the affective power. What could be clearer? But you will hear clearer things still.
Faith, however, is placed in the intellect, as I said Tract. de fide, disp. 1. quaest. 18. Therefore the Apostle secunda Cor. 10. says, The understanding is taken captive unto faith. And if they should always wish to take believing as, having confidence, they will infer things absurdly, as when Christ says: Do you not believe, because I am in the Father, and the Father in me? Act. 8: I believe that Jesus is the Son of God. Rom. 10: With the heart we believe unto justice, which they will explicate most unfittingly of confidence, saying: I have confidence that Jesus is the Son of God, etc.
OBICTION fourthly. The image of God is reformed by re-creation; but the essence of the soul is made deiform by grace; the powers, however, by the Theological virtues, of which faith restores the Intellect, Charity the Will: therefore Hope the Memory.
THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the Image is reformed by re-creation, as is fitting. But since the Image is according to natural things, therefore it is more in cognition, and accordingly two powers correspond to it, memory and Intellect; and one of the affective, the Will. But the Likeness is according to the will the more, whereby by aversion from God it is made unlike in the unbridled concupiscible and irascible; therefore two virtues are required: one, Hope, for reforming the irascible; the other, Charity, for the concupiscible; and one, Faith, for the intellect. But in truth Hope also reforms the memory (which has sympathy/conformity in retaining what it perceived) by reforming the irascible. This he says is according to the mind of D. Augustine.
But it reforms the irascible formally, and the memory efficiently, only in this second manner. See these things p. 1. tract. 10. disp. 1. quaest. 2.
Objection fifth. Certitude looks to the cognitive power; but Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude: therefore it is in the cognitive power.
The Holy Doctor answers again that the certitude of Hope does not look to the cognitive power, but rather to the affective power, which certitude is a kind of assurance, holding itself on the side of the irascible power. Do you hear this, deaf and mute Kemniti?