Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
From what has been said the question is now almost settled.
I suppose that Faith is first; for it belongs to the intellect, illuminating it, so that from it the appetite—which cannot be carried toward the unknown—may rise, by an elicited act, to hoping and loving: for just as the things we see and hold we do not hope for, so we do not hope for the things we do not understand, but only for things that are to come; whence a certain difference also arises between hope and faith; for faith is concerned with past evils and goods, whereas hope is concerned only with future goods, as D. Augustine teaches in Enchir. cap. 8, from which it is clear that the Sectarians wrongly confuse Faith with Hope.
Therefore Faith is prior by nature to Hope; for we hope because we believe. The same is held by the Holy Doctor lib. 5. Compendium Theologiae, cap. 22.
As for Charity, I say that it is posterior to Hope.
It is proved by St. Bonaventure, first from the Gloss, which adduces this.
Secondly, because the foundation is prior to the building and to its perfection: but faith is the foundation of the spiritual building; for it is the substance of things to be hoped for: therefore first is Faith, second Hope, which rises like a wall; and finally Charity, which is the bond of perfection.
Third. Because according to the order of nature, the imperfect precedes the more perfect; but Charity is more perfect than Faith and Hope, ex prima Cor. 13. Ergo.
Fourth: No one can love a good recognized as impossible to him: therefore he must first hope.
The Holy Doctor notes, however, in the body of the text, that the Habits of Hope and Charity are indeed infused together, but in respect of act Hope operates first, which prepares for the act of charity; for that which we would not hope to obtain would not be loved.
You will object first. Hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits; but merits are from grace: therefore grace is presupposed to Hope itself.
The Holy Doctor answers that there Hope is taken for the state, or for the thing hoped for, as I explained quaest. 8.
You will object secondly. Every affection arises from love, as D. Augustine says 14. de civitate, cap. 6. et 15. Therefore also Hope.
The Holy Doctor answers that imperfect love is the root moving all the affections; yet perfect love is the term of all of them, whence all the affections are ordered so that God may be loved perfectly: but Charity does not name just any love, but perfect love.
You will object thirdly. No one hopes for what he does not love; for what is not a good loved by me, I do not hope for; therefore the rectitude of love precedes the rectitude of expectation. But charity directs in loving; hope in expecting: therefore Charity is before Hope.
The Holy Doctor answers that nothing is loved except what is hoped for; thus, by the love of concupiscence, charity does not love God as a good for itself unless it hopes to obtain Him; likewise not by the love of friendship, unless it trusts in Him; even though no one hopes except what he loves imperfectly.
You will object fourthly. Fear and Hope are two affections running together; therefore they are called two millstones by the Gloss ad 24. Deuter. But every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every Hope: therefore gratuitous hope arises from gratuitous love.
The Holy Doctor answers that love of self is the origin of fear of punishments, but not so the love of God. Therefore it does not follow that the act of Charity precedes the act of Fear; rather from filial Fear arises Love, as the Council of Trent teaches.
You will object fifthly. That which is more common is prior, of which the converse does not hold; but loving is more common than hoping: therefore that is prior. The minor is proved; for everything to be hoped for is to be loved, not the reverse.
He answers that the Major is true of those things which essentially follow one another mutually; not of those which accompany one another; and thus it follows: If there is snow: therefore something white; not conversely; and yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the substance of snow. Therefore, since hoping and loving accompany one another, although the act of loving extends to more lovable things, it need not be prior in the order of nature.
Moreover, although Charity is more general on the side of the object, yet Hope is more universal on the side of the subject. For every wayfarer who has Charity has Hope; but not conversely; and therefore the act of hope precedes in origin the act of Charity with respect to the subject, from which both acts take their origin.
You will object sixthly. The order of virtue to virtue is the same as the order of dowry to dowry; but perfect tension, which is the dowry corresponding to Hope, follows perfect dilection, which is the dowry corresponding to Charity: therefore also in the wayfare Charity precedes Hope.
The Holy Doctor answers by denying the parity; because the dowries in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but in the wayfare Charity, in the respect of virtue, is greater than Hope, and therefore it does not follow that if in the wayfare expectation precedes some dilection, also in the fatherland tension should precede perfect dilection. For although the virtues are equal with respect to the reason of tending, yet the act of dilection is more perfect than that of Hope; but in glory it will be equally perfect to hold and to love; whence although in the wayfare the act of the Irascible precedes the act of the Concupiscible, it need not be so also in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation.