Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
The holy Doctor prefaces that Hope is sometimes taken for the affection: and thus the Philosophers and the holy Fathers say there are four affections of the soul: Joy, and Sorrow, Hope, and Fear. Sometimes it is taken for the thing expected, or hoped for, Tit. 2.: Waiting for the blessed hope. But it is taken thirdly for the habit directing the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be expected.
I assert first, that Hope is a Virtue.
It is proved from D. Bonaventure foundation 3. A habit repugnant to fault is a virtue; Hope is repugnant to Presumption and Despair: Therefore.
It is proved secondly from the holy Doctor foundation 4., by the argument which D. Thomas uses: A habit rectifying the soul is a Virtue: for Virtue is a habit regulative and confirmative of a power, which makes the soul rejoice in those things which are right, as the Philosopher says, 2. Eth. cap. 3. 4. and 6. and 2. Rhet. and 7. Eth. cap. 14. Hope is of this kind. But there is a twofold rule, or measure, of human acts: One proximate and homogeneous, that is, reason: Another supreme and exceeding, that is, God; and on this account every act reaching to reason and to God is good; but the act of hope reaches to God: for the object of hope is the arduous good, possible to be had: Now something is possible to us in a twofold way: First, by ourselves. Secondly, by others, as is evident 3. Eth. cap. 3. Therefore insofar as we hope for something possible by the aid of God, our Hope reaches to God himself, on whose aid it rests. Therefore Hope is a Virtue, and indeed a supernatural and gratuitous one.
I assert therefore secondly, that Hope is a gratuitous virtue.
It is proved from St. Bonaventure first. That which makes one attain to salvation is from grace. Such is Hope, as is said Rom. 8.: For we are saved by hope: Therefore.
It is proved secondly. That which renders acceptable to God is gratuitous: Such is Hope, Psal. 32.: The Lord is well pleased in them that fear him; and in them that hope in his mercy: Therefore.
It is proved thirdly. A habit directly repugnant to a fault which immediately attains God is a supernatural virtue. Such is Hope, repugnant to presumption of beatitude without merits, and to despair of the Divine mercy: Therefore.
It is proved fourthly. To expect that which is above every grasp of the natural appetite is as believing everything that is above every grasp of the intellect: But from this head Faith is a supernatural virtue: Therefore also Hope, which expects the things that transcend our heart, as is said 1 Corinth. 2.
Finally it is proved on the last foundation, and in the body of the text, by the argument made for the first assertion.
YOU OBJECT first. No passion is a virtue, ex 2. Eth. cap. 5. and lib. 3. where he says: In the soul there are three things, Powers, Passions, and Habits; but virtue is concerned among the habits. But hope is a passion ex Boët. de consol. Therefore.
The holy Doctor answers that Hope is taken here as it is regulative of the passions, and it is a Virtue.
YOU OBJECT secondly. As it happens to expect future things, so to remember past things: But this is not a virtue: Therefore neither that; for Hope is either the expectation of future things, or arises from it.
He answers by denying the parity; for virtue stands more in regulating actions to be done than in acts. Moreover remembering stands in Cognition; but expectation in the Affective; and virtue regards more the regulating of the affect. Hence also the act of virtue is linked to remuneration, as it is joined to affection: for instance, that of prudence, or penance, or charity, insofar as it recalls past deeds done, that it may act better in the future; or past evils, that it may sorrow; or benefits, that it may give thanks.
YOU OBJECT thirdly. As it happens to hope rightly, so also to fear rightly: but the habit which directs the soul in fearing is not a virtue: Therefore.
The holy Doctor answers by denying the parity, because Fear stands in recoiling; Hope in pursuing: and therefore Fear has more of passion; Hope indeed of action; and because the habits of the virtues direct the soul in those acts in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, whereby one lives rightly; hence it is that Hope is more in the genus of virtue than Fear. Hence also it is clear why the habit of virtue stands more about the affection of Hope than about the other three affections related above; for Joy, and Sorrow, because they have a conjoined object, stand more in sustaining; but the affection of Hope, among the others, stands more in acting; and therefore although, as it is a passion, it is not a virtue, yet as it is the stretching forth of the soul toward the thing hoped for, it is a virtue.
YOU OBJECT fourthly: Every moral virtue stands about the good and the difficult, ex Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 3. But in the expectation of the goods promised by God there is no difficulty, since God cannot lie: Therefore.
He answers, that as to believe the things which are naturally proved to us is easy, so also to hope for what is naturally obvious: But to hope for supernatural things, which neither sense nor intellect perceives, and to despise our goods for these, is arduous and worthy of great praise.
YOU OBJECT fifthly. No gratuitous virtue in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; but Hope in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; for it proceeds from imperfection that anyone serve God on account of a future retribution; because, as St. Bernard says de diligendo Deo, cap. 4.: Charity does not look upon the reward. But Hope makes one expect a future retribution for merits: Therefore it is not a gratuitous virtue.
The holy Doctor answers first, that the act of Hope does not diminish merit; but, as the Apostle says, it rises up from the perfection of merit: For the greater merits anyone has, the more firmly and more certainly does he hope. Nor is detracted from Charity the expecting of God himself, whom it loves, as the reward wherewith it may be united; for the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God. But this reward we hope for, as is had Genes. 15.: I am thy reward exceeding great. And the holy Doctor shows this a posteriori: for the true Saints, who expect beatitude, are little solicitous about themselves; much about God. Thus they despise all things, that they may be united to God in the fatherland.
MOREOVER, the mercenary Hope is evil in that it places the end in its own advantage, as Caspensis also says sect. 4.; but to serve God on account of a reward according to the Divine will, which declares that he wills to give it, Matth. 20.: Call the workmen, and pay them their reward; is not a defect, but an honest act, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 6. cap. 11. and can. 31.: If anyone shall say that the justified sins, while he does good works in view of an eternal reward; let him be anathema. The Fathers of the Council prove this from Psal. 118.: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications in eternity, on account of the retribution. And Hebr. 11. Paul reports that Moses, most holy, underwent most studious labors, because he looked upon the recompense. Therefore God often proposes the sweetness of the reward, Deuter. 11., Apoc. ult. For it is honest to seek one's own last end.
Hence against the Sectaries I hold that it is honest to expect eternal glory, as the crown of labors. For thus also Paul, 2. Timot. 4.: I have fought the good fight, etc. Therefore there is laid up for me a crown of justice. And Tobias 4.: Great will be the confidence before the most high God for alms to all those who do it. I add, that it is lawful to hope also from prayers, and studious works, for a temporal good, provided that in this the last end is not placed.