Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
What the material object of HOPE is.
All AGREE that the primary matter of this virtue is eternal Beatitude, as we saw in the definitions of hope adduced from S. Bonavent., and it is deduced from that text, Rom. 5: We glory in the hope of the glory, etc., and 1 ad Titum: according to the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised.
The question is therefore raised, whether formal beatitude, which is the vision of God, and love, and fruition; or rather objective beatitude, that is, God himself, be the object of this virtue.
The FIRST opinion is that Hope is concerned proximately with formal beatitude; with God, however, remotely, and accordingly that this virtue does not attain God immediately in himself. Thus Durandus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. 2; Palud., ibi, and other older authors, among whom S. Bonavent. is also renewed by many.
The SECOND opinion, diametrically opposite, is that Hope is concerned proximately with God; the vision, however, being a mere expository condition.
The THIRD opinion, the middle one, is that Hope is concerned with God and with Beatitude as referred to God. Thus D. Thom., prima secundae, quaest. 1, art. 3, ad 3; Becanus, cap. 17, quaest. 1; Poncius, disp. 31, quaest. 2; Coninchyus, disp. 19, dub. 3; Mastrius, disp. 6, de virtutibus Theol. quaest. 17, num. 442; Caspens., disp. 1, sect. 1, num. 3; Morandus, Tract. unic. quaest. 15; Tannerus, disp. 2, quaest. 1, dub. 1, num. 16; Valentia, disp. 2, quaest. 1, puncto 1, and other recent authors commonly; and this same is the will of those who say that God is the object just as beatitude is to be attained, so that we attain God immediately. Thus Scotus, 2 dist. 26 and 27; Gabriel, dist. 26; Almainus, Tract. 2, cap. 7; Suarez, de spe, disp. 1, sect. 3, num. 4; Fagundez, in primum praeceptum Decalogi, Lib. 1, cap. 31; Tannerus, disputatione 2, quaestione prima, dub. 1, num. 14; Fuliens., lib. 3, cap. 7.
This surely is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in corpore, as is clear to one reading.
I ASSERT first, with this opinion, that not the vision itself alone, but God also, is the material object of Hope.
It is PROVED from the authors alleged, with D. Bonav., ex 15 Genes., where God says to Abraham: I am your protector, and your reward exceeding great. Hence D. Augustine, 22 de civitate, cap. ultimo: The reward of virtue will be he himself, who gave the virtue, and who promised himself to it.
Isidore, Lib. 8, Ethymolog. cap. 2, however, seems to intimate this when he says: Hope is said, as it were, the foot of advancing toward God.
And D. Gregory, Lib. 10, moral. cap. 12, when he says: Hope in God rises the more solid, the graver the things you have borne for him — as the holy Doctor reports in Pharetra Lib. 2, cap. 24.
It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonavent. given by Mastrius; for God, not only by reason of the vision, but also by reason of his intrinsic goodness, is our supreme good: Therefore, as such, love of concupiscence tends toward him; for he himself is given to us per se, and is joined to us, as is said Ioan. 14, Rom. 5, and this very thing is our greatest good.
It is confirmed by foundation 4: for the object of Hope is the same as that of delight, which succeeds hope, the thing already obtained; but the object of delight is God himself; for the will delights in the object known and possessed, as I showed in prima secundae, Tract. 1, disp. 2, quaest. 7.
It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise it would not be a Theological Virtue, since it would not attain God, as Mastrius infers from D. Bonavent., 3 dist. 26, art. 1, quaest. 3, and here at argument two, with the response.
I ASSERT secondly, that formal beatitude also enters into the reason of the object of this virtue.
It is PROVED first from S. Doct. at the places adduced of the Fathers, quaest. 1; he also brings forward many in Lib. 2, Pharetrae, cap. 24: D. Gregory, Lib. 6, moral. cap. 14, and Lib. 10, cap. 12; August., Lib 10, confess. cap. 43, and epist. 120; Bernard, Lib. de diligendo Deo, cap. 14.
It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonavent., by the reason which Morandus, Mastrius, and others use: for Hope tends toward its object because it is the good of those hoping; but it is the good of those hoping that the habit in beatitude, or beatitude itself, is a good for us: Therefore.
It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doct. at argument 3, with the response. The object is the same which we hope for and which we desire; but desire is of supernatural beatitude: Therefore so is Hope.
You will OBJECT. Love of concupiscence orders the thing loved to something else, as to an end; but to order God to another end is perverse: Therefore.
It is ANSWERED that what is loved with love of concupiscence need not be ordered to something else as to an end; but it suffices that it be willed for another; nor is it necessary that it be willed on account of that. Whence this love, by which we love God for ourselves, is good. Hence S. Augustine, manuali, cap. 10: Kindle in me, O Lord, your will, and your concupiscence, which is holy and good, and Psalm. 83: My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord.
The REASON is, because God is not compared as a lesser good, as something to be perfected; hence the reason of use, reproved by D. Augustine in Lib. 83, qq., quaest. 30 — Perverse is the love that uses what should be enjoyed — does not intervene; nor is our appetite ended in beatitude, but through the conjunction with the uncreated, whence finally the appetite terminates in God, as D. Bonav. acutely answers in primo, dist. 1, at the end of the cited quaest., and with him Arriaga, disp. 27, sect. 2; Mastrius, num. 448, with his Scotus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. unic.; Caspens., num. 5; and soon again, in setting out the third opinion of quaest. 1, I shall recall it: for Hope tends toward God as seen. Hence in the hymn Te Deum it is said: AEterna fac in gloria munerari, that is, with God.