Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

On HOPE.

The Seraphic Doctor, in his Diaeta, titulo 5, cap. 4, de spe, on that text Deuteron. 24: You shall not take in pledge the lower millstone, nor the upper, among the other virtues warns that hope and fear are not to be withheld from the sinner: for spiritual Hope is the lower millstone, and sustains the soul from below, and raises it upward, lest through excessive dejection it rush into despair. But Fear is the upper millstone, pressing the soul downward, lest it vanish through elation: between these millstones (says the holy Doctor) the best milling of the soul takes place, that is, the contrition of sin. Of the first millstone, namely of hope, we must treat here; but of fear I shall treat in the following disputation.

What HOPE is.

I do not treat of Hope as it is a passion, which is defined in lib. 2, Rhet. cap. 5 by Aristotle thus: Hope is a surmise of the supreme good, as the holy Doctor reports, 3. p. Coemil., sect. 39, and in 3. dist 26, dub. 2, but as it is a Theological virtue.

It is defined first by the Master, dist. 26, as cited by the Seraphic Doctor, in that dist., dub. 2: It is the virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, that is, awaited with confidence.

The holy Doctor observes, however, that Hope is here defined in order to the object, which is eternal and glorious good; but this is twofold: uncreated, which is God; and created, which is beatitude, to which grace, forgiveness, perseverance, and the other things leading to glory are also reduced. Therefore when spiritual goods are said, the generic object is touched; but when eternal is said, the specific object is touched.

It is defined secondly by the Master from Haymo, as the holy Doctor reports at the places cited: Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from the grace of God and from preceding merits. This definition is broad in order to the object and to the principle, as the holy Doctor notes there.

It is defined thirdly by D. Augustine, Lib. de civitate Dei, passim: Hope is the virtue by which one presumes that he will arrive at that which he believes. This definition is broad in order to the object and the habit.

¶ The holy Doctor distinguishes these definitions in ANOTHER way. The first is broad by genus and difference; and it is Formal. The second is Causal, broad by act and cause. The third is partly causal, partly formal, because it is given by the object of Hope and by the preamble virtue of faith.

Then in dub. 3 the holy Doctor considers that both Hope and faith are of invisible things, as the Master says; but faith is of invisible things inasmuch as they are not seen, whereas Hope is of invisible things as they are not possessed.

He observes also in dub. 4 that Hope, even as a passion and as a virtue, differs from joy and sorrow, because these are of a present object; but Hope is of the future, and by this Hope differs also from beatitude, while it agrees with love, which is also of the future.

But it differs from Fear, because fear is with respect to evil, whereas Hope is with respect to good. Wherefore if hope is sometimes said with respect to evil, it is said improperly, as when Cicero, Lib. 1, ad Atticum, speaks of the hope of evils, and Virgil, AEneid. 4:

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.

The holy Doctor notes this with D. Augustine, cap. 8, Enchiridii.

Our Hope, however, can thus be defined: *It is the Theological Virtue by which the will is borne toward God as our beatitude, arduous to attain, which nevertheless can be obtained by the help of God. It is called a Virtue, because it makes morally good the one having it; for this is the notable mark of virtue, from Aristotle, 2 Eth., cap. 6.

It is called Theological; for it is exercised about God, exceeding our natural capacity, as is said, 1 Corinth. 2: The eye has not seen, etc. That Hope is a gift of God is had in Rom. 15: Now the God of hope fill you with all joy, etc. that you may abound in hope, and in 1 Peter, first: Who has regenerated us unto a living hope. Therefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 7, defines that it is infused; and can. 3 says it is a gift of grace.

The remaining parts of the definition will be explained in the questions, when we shall examine the Object of Hope and discuss its subject. I gather this definition from D. Bonavent., at the places adduced, and in the little work Declaratio terminorum Theologiae, and in the Diaeta, tit. 5, cap. 4, where he most beautifully likens Hope to precious things, and in Lib. 5, Compend. Theologiae, cap. 2.

What the material object of HOPE is.

All AGREE that the primary matter of this virtue is eternal Beatitude, as we saw in the definitions of hope adduced from S. Bonavent., and it is deduced from that text, Rom. 5: We glory in the hope of the glory, etc., and 1 ad Titum: according to the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised.

The question is therefore raised, whether formal beatitude, which is the vision of God, and love, and fruition; or rather objective beatitude, that is, God himself, be the object of this virtue.

The FIRST opinion is that Hope is concerned proximately with formal beatitude; with God, however, remotely, and accordingly that this virtue does not attain God immediately in himself. Thus Durandus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. 2; Palud., ibi, and other older authors, among whom S. Bonavent. is also renewed by many.

The SECOND opinion, diametrically opposite, is that Hope is concerned proximately with God; the vision, however, being a mere expository condition.

The THIRD opinion, the middle one, is that Hope is concerned with God and with Beatitude as referred to God. Thus D. Thom., prima secundae, quaest. 1, art. 3, ad 3; Becanus, cap. 17, quaest. 1; Poncius, disp. 31, quaest. 2; Coninchyus, disp. 19, dub. 3; Mastrius, disp. 6, de virtutibus Theol. quaest. 17, num. 442; Caspens., disp. 1, sect. 1, num. 3; Morandus, Tract. unic. quaest. 15; Tannerus, disp. 2, quaest. 1, dub. 1, num. 16; Valentia, disp. 2, quaest. 1, puncto 1, and other recent authors commonly; and this same is the will of those who say that God is the object just as beatitude is to be attained, so that we attain God immediately. Thus Scotus, 2 dist. 26 and 27; Gabriel, dist. 26; Almainus, Tract. 2, cap. 7; Suarez, de spe, disp. 1, sect. 3, num. 4; Fagundez, in primum praeceptum Decalogi, Lib. 1, cap. 31; Tannerus, disputatione 2, quaestione prima, dub. 1, num. 14; Fuliens., lib. 3, cap. 7.

This surely is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in corpore, as is clear to one reading.

I ASSERT first, with this opinion, that not the vision itself alone, but God also, is the material object of Hope.

It is PROVED from the authors alleged, with D. Bonav., ex 15 Genes., where God says to Abraham: I am your protector, and your reward exceeding great. Hence D. Augustine, 22 de civitate, cap. ultimo: The reward of virtue will be he himself, who gave the virtue, and who promised himself to it.

Isidore, Lib. 8, Ethymolog. cap. 2, however, seems to intimate this when he says: Hope is said, as it were, the foot of advancing toward God.

And D. Gregory, Lib. 10, moral. cap. 12, when he says: Hope in God rises the more solid, the graver the things you have borne for him — as the holy Doctor reports in Pharetra Lib. 2, cap. 24.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonavent. given by Mastrius; for God, not only by reason of the vision, but also by reason of his intrinsic goodness, is our supreme good: Therefore, as such, love of concupiscence tends toward him; for he himself is given to us per se, and is joined to us, as is said Ioan. 14, Rom. 5, and this very thing is our greatest good.

It is confirmed by foundation 4: for the object of Hope is the same as that of delight, which succeeds hope, the thing already obtained; but the object of delight is God himself; for the will delights in the object known and possessed, as I showed in prima secundae, Tract. 1, disp. 2, quaest. 7.

It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise it would not be a Theological Virtue, since it would not attain God, as Mastrius infers from D. Bonavent., 3 dist. 26, art. 1, quaest. 3, and here at argument two, with the response.

I ASSERT secondly, that formal beatitude also enters into the reason of the object of this virtue.

It is PROVED first from S. Doct. at the places adduced of the Fathers, quaest. 1; he also brings forward many in Lib. 2, Pharetrae, cap. 24: D. Gregory, Lib. 6, moral. cap. 14, and Lib. 10, cap. 12; August., Lib 10, confess. cap. 43, and epist. 120; Bernard, Lib. de diligendo Deo, cap. 14.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonavent., by the reason which Morandus, Mastrius, and others use: for Hope tends toward its object because it is the good of those hoping; but it is the good of those hoping that the habit in beatitude, or beatitude itself, is a good for us: Therefore.

It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doct. at argument 3, with the response. The object is the same which we hope for and which we desire; but desire is of supernatural beatitude: Therefore so is Hope.

You will OBJECT. Love of concupiscence orders the thing loved to something else, as to an end; but to order God to another end is perverse: Therefore.

It is ANSWERED that what is loved with love of concupiscence need not be ordered to something else as to an end; but it suffices that it be willed for another; nor is it necessary that it be willed on account of that. Whence this love, by which we love God for ourselves, is good. Hence S. Augustine, manuali, cap. 10: Kindle in me, O Lord, your will, and your concupiscence, which is holy and good, and Psalm. 83: My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord.

The REASON is, because God is not compared as a lesser good, as something to be perfected; hence the reason of use, reproved by D. Augustine in Lib. 83, qq., quaest. 30 — Perverse is the love that uses what should be enjoyed — does not intervene; nor is our appetite ended in beatitude, but through the conjunction with the uncreated, whence finally the appetite terminates in God, as D. Bonav. acutely answers in primo, dist. 1, at the end of the cited quaest., and with him Arriaga, disp. 27, sect. 2; Mastrius, num. 448, with his Scotus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. unic.; Caspens., num. 5; and soon again, in setting out the third opinion of quaest. 1, I shall recall it: for Hope tends toward God as seen. Hence in the hymn Te Deum it is said: AEterna fac in gloria munerari, that is, with God.

What the formal object of HOPE is.

THREE opinions in this question as well are adduced from the holy Doctors cited above.

THE FIRST is, that beatitude is the formal object of Hope, as it is arduous. Henry, Richard, Durandus, Paludanus, D. Bonaventure and other ancients are alleged. Amicus follows it, disp. 19. sect. 1.

The SECOND opinion is, that the formal object of Hope is the aid of God's omnipotence, just as the testimony of the first truth is the formal object of faith. So Vasquez p. p. disp. 84. cap. 1. and disp. 139., whom Turrianus and Meracius follow, alleging D. Thom. qq. disp. quaest. de spe, art. 1. and here, art. 1. and 5.

The THIRD opinion is, that the object of Hope is God, as the highest good, lovable by the love of concupiscence, as it were for the lover's advantage; or that the formal object of Hope is objective beatitude, insofar as it is our good. So Scotus 3. dist. 26. quaest. unic. q. ad quaest., Suarez disp. 1. sect. 3., Coninchius, Arriaga as reported by Mastrius, Caspensis diff. 1. sect. 2. Mastrius loco cit., Morandus quaest. 15., Aragon quaest. cit. art. 2., Falsensis lib. 3. cap. 7., Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 1. num. 19., who at n. 20. carps at the holy Doctor, whom he reports mutilated, as I shall say.

HERE I halt: for Vulpius disp. 50. art. 4. denies that this is Scotus's opinion, but holds that God, under the absolute aspect of the Deity, is the formal object of Hope; not, however, as he is a good for us. Vulpius was moved because Scotus, in the body of the text, proposes this Instance: if it be said that to desire a good for me varies the formal aspect of the object, because it changes the good of honesty into the useful good. He answers that it is false, because that condition, or circumstance, For whom, is not a condition of the object per se; indeed such a condition can be added upon the object, the formal aspect of the object standing.

For indeed Lichetus and Arretinus expound these words thus, that the act of Hope, which is to desire the infinite good, is terminated first, and immediately, to that good under its absolute formal aspect; not that the act is terminated to such a good as in itself, and for itself, but to it as a good for me; a good indeed superabundant, and ultimately perfecting me, but in that mode whereby an object can perfect a power; because it perfects not intrinsically, but only extrinsically. The reason of this is, that if the will willed that good only as convenient to itself, that volition would not be right; it would be an illicit mercenary love, which Lichetus declares, bringing forward a notable doctrine of Scotus ex 1. dist. 6. quaest. 2. inf. L., where he says that to desire a perfect act, whereby the object may be more loved in itself, comes from the affection of justice; because from the fact that I love something in itself, thence I will something in itself; and thus the good Angels could desire beatitude, so that possessing it they might love the Highest good more perfectly, and that act of concupiscence for beatitude would be meritorious, because it does not use by enjoying, but enjoys it, because the good it covets for itself it covets for this, that it may love that good in itself the more. Mastrius reports this at n. 459. from D. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 1. quaest. ult., and refutes the opinion of Vulpius n. 458., against D. Bonaventure here, in its foundations, in which he shows that the formal object of Hope is not the goodness of God as such, against Vulpius.

The opinion of the holy Doctor is, that the formal object of Hope is God, the good appetible by the love of concupiscence, not as a good, but as a great, arduous good awaited by us; yet to be attained by divine liberality, truth, and omnipotence upheld. So he explains himself in the body of the text.

Therefore of the three opinions which I referred to above, he gathers and reconciles the diversity; and the Moderns accordingly report the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor mutilated, which frequently happens, because they allege the holy Doctor from others, not read in the fountain. Amicus, however, seems more faithful in interpreting the Seraphic Doctor rightly.

I ASSERT first, against Vulpius, that the formal object of Hope is not God as a good.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure first. Distinct virtues ought to have distinct objects; but the Theological virtues are three distinct ones, as is had in 1 Corinthians 13: And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three: but the greater of these is charity: Therefore their objects are distinct: But also Charity is borne toward God as a good: Therefore.

They answer that Hope regards the good, as good indeed, but future.

Against this St. Bonaventure says, that the good as future is loved by charity, much less merely desired.

I ASSERT second, that the formal object is rightly assigned by St. Bonaventure.

IT IS PROVED from him in the body of the text, that the aspect of the Arduous enters into the notion of the object. As the rational tends to the true, so the appetite to the good: but the appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible; now the concupiscible is borne toward the good as good, and the irascible toward the good as arduous and great; but both powers had to be ordained to God: therefore, as the rational is perfected by Faith, and the concupiscible by Charity, so the irascible by Hope.

IT IS PROVED second from the holy Doctor. Of contraries there is the same account; but hope and fear are contraries: now fear regards an evil as exceeding its power; therefore also hope regards a good as superexcellent and arduous.

IT IS PROVED third, because the office of Hope is to raise up the soul, as is indicated Isa. 64. and 1 Corinth. 2.: The eye hath not seen, the ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him. Heb. 6. he says, That we may have the hope: entering in even within the veil; and chapter 11. Faith is defined: the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

This arduous object is expressed almost always in the Scriptures whenever they name Hope, namely amid many difficulties, oppositions, and assaults, almost beyond belief as insuperable; thus Iob. 14.: There is hope for a tree: if it be cut down, it will green again. This is read everywhere in the Psalms. If armies should stand together against me, in this will I trust. Psalm 26. In thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded, etc. Psalm 90. And I will show him my salvation. Rom. 8. We ourselves also groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body. For we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience. Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity, etc. the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. The holy Doctor often brings forward that of Rom. 5.: Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope, and hope confoundeth not. He also brings forward in the body of the text that of Genes. 15.: I am thy reward exceeding great.

HENCE is solved the argument upon which Scotus, Mastrius, Caspensis, Suarez lay such weight: what is meant by the name Arduous. For I say that is meant the good as great and excellent, and to be obtained through many difficulties.

Caspensis, Suarez, and Mastrius object: For difficulties do not move to willing, but draw back; whereas Hope is a volition.

BUT they meet with a ready answer in the holy Doctor: for difficulty in a good is the object not of the concupiscible, but of the irascible, which rises up toward the impeded good, and toward removing obstacles; and Hope perfects the irascible.

There is also solved another objection of Suarez, Mastrius, and Caspensis, from Scotus dist. 26.: God, as good to me, is the object of some virtue, but not of charity; for this loves God for himself; not as a good to me; Nor does it belong to faith, as is evident; therefore to Hope.

IF Scotus and Mastrius had weighed their own remarkable doctrine reported above, they would have found that the love of concupiscence toward God does not change the object of the amity of friendship; for it tends to loving God for himself; and although it loves a good for itself, yet not on its own account; and so it pertains to the same charity; for he who loves one thing on account of another, loves with the same love, as the holy Doctor said, dist. 26. art. 2. quaest. 3. ad 3.

HENCE indeed the argument of St. Bonaventure presses the more: for the perfection of all the powers of the rational soul is necessary; but no other virtue is found perfecting the irascible in ordination to God besides Hope. For that Charity also regards the supernatural good matters nothing; for it does not regard it under this aspect, or under the aspect of the Arduous, but as a good; nor is it new that many habits should concur in one material object, and in our question all three Theological virtues regard God.

YOU HAVE also from what has been said, that the argument of Mastrius at num. 456. is feeble, by which with Coninchius he tries to show that the omnipotence, liberality, and fidelity of God do not pertain to the formal object, because that only looks to the formal object of the act of the will, which moves it to desire or shun some thing; but the aid of God does not move to beatitude: Therefore.

BUT since the object of Hope is beatitude as arduous, and the arduous does not move according to the adversaries, the divine power, liberality, and truth ought to excite and animate the pursuit of beatitude, as I shall soon say.

YOU WILL SAY with Tannerus: God is arduous even to Charity to attain. It is answered, that this belongs to the material object of Charity.

Whether a certain object is exhibited to HOPE, and hoped for.

FROM the definitions of Hope its certainty seems to be gathered; for it is called a certain expectation of beatitude. For indeed, since the outcome depends on the aids of God and our merits, and no one knows: Whether he be worthy of love or of hatred, Ecclesiastes 9, it does not seem that a certain expectation can be had, as D. Bonaventure notes in the opposing arguments.

OBSERVE that certainty pertains properly and formally to the intellect; for it is an effect of truth, which is the formal object of the intellect: but the will is said to be certain insofar as it can infallibly attain its end.

That Hope is most certain, all concede.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure first from the Apostle, who hoped for glory most certainly for himself, Rom. 8.: For I am sure that neither death, nor life, etc. will be able to separate us from the charity of God. And chapter 5.: Hope confoundeth not. And 1 to Timothy 1.: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that the just judge is able to keep my deposit. And Heb. 6.: That we may have the strongest comfort, who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope proposed to us, which we have as a sure anchor. Which passage the holy Doctor urges in Diata, tit. 5. cap. 4., where he notes that for this reason the Helmet is compared to Hope, 1 Thessal. 5., which is safe in battle; and Heb. 6. an anchor, which makes safe in a ship, as he notes also here on the last foundation. St. Thomas shows this most beautifully in Psal. 30.

HENCE in the little work on the seven gifts, on the Gift of piety near the end he notes that Hope is called full of immortality, Sap. 3. But more beautifully in the Commentaries. And Rom. 5.: We glory in the hope of the sons of God. Therefore session 6. cap. 13. the Council of Trent says all ought to place a most certain Hope in the aid and mercy of God. For God, unless his graces fail, will perfect as he began. Hence the holy Doctor asserts certainty thus here, and in Compend. Theolog. verit. lib. 5. cap. 22. From this it begins to appear in what this certainty consists.

The holy Doctor reports some saying that the certainty of faith gives to Hope all its certainty; but that it has no certainty of its own, just as particular science obtains all its certainty from universal science. For by faith man believes that all the good will be saved; but by Hope he believes that he himself in particular will be saved; whence he appropriates to himself what he believed universally; and since there is no certainty about singulars except insofar as they are referred to the universal, therefore hope does not appropriate to itself the certainty of faith absolutely, but under a condition, namely, if he shall have persevered unto the end. Whence they call the certainty of faith that of fidelity, because God cannot deny himself, since he promised salvation to those who persevere; but the certainty of hope is called that of confidence; and confidence is nothing else than a kind of fidelity turned upon oneself.

BUT this mode is not proved by the Seraphic Doctor, because Hope has its own certainty, as the Gloss on Rom. 5. says: Trial worketh hope, that is, the certainty of hope; otherwise it would not have its own proper aspect of a habit per se, but only a subaltern one, as Bellarmine also notes lib. 3. de Iustificatione, cap. 11. Therefore Hope has a proper certainty on the part of the will; another on the part of the intellect. On the part of the will, the certainty of hope is the firm adherence of the will to the thing hoped for, and this can be most great, even if on the part of the intellect man is not certain that he will attain that thing. Indeed, Hope seems not only not to require, but not even to be able to bear on the part of the intellect an absolute certainty: For what we certainly know we shall have, we do not properly hope for, but absolutely expect, as the holy Doctor hints argumento 4. opp. For in this way the souls of the blessed do not properly hope for the resurrection of the body, but only expect it, because on the part of the intellect they are most certain that it cannot be wanting to them. Hence Bellarmine infers that the sectary heretics, who require an absolute certainty on the part of the intellect about Justification and salvation, leave no place for Hope, properly so called.

HOWEVER, although Hope does not require an absolute certainty on the part of the intellect, yet hence it has also a twofold certainty. One arises from the primary foundation of hope, which is the promise of God. For we are certain that God cannot deceive. And indeed if nothing were required for our justification or salvation except the promise of God, we should have about these things an absolute and infallible certainty too; but because other things are also required, about which we are not so certain, therefore Hope does not expel all fear. The other certainty of Hope on the part of the intellect arises from charity, and by this it does not belong except to the just; for a friend can hope all good things from a friend, nor is he confounded, as is said Rom. 5.: And hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, etc. for charity is the form which perfects Hope.

Therefore Christian Hope has a certainty distinct from Faith, as the holy Doctor gathers: because faith is certain about this enunciation: I believe that there is eternal life; but Hope is borne toward eternal life incomplextly.

He proves this also from contraries; for one thing is opposed to one: but the certainty of faith is opposed to error and doubt; whereas the certainty of hope is repugnant to diffidence and despair.

But just as the certainty of faith in this life does not make it impossible that we fall into error against the truth believed, although it can overcome every error: so Hope does not make every diffidence impossible, although it carries with it a manly adherence.

Doubt can indeed befall our hope per accidens, on the part of the subject; if it does not take care to correspond to the grace of God by working faithfully. From this others deduce that the certainty of hope is conditional, which the Council of Trent seems to hint at, defining that the Just ought to hope for beatitude if they shall have persevered in well-doing unto the end. So they discourse at length in Bassaeus.

It is proved, because beatitude is to be hoped for in the same mode in which God promised it, but he promised conditionally, Rom. 8.: If so be that we suffer with him. And Matth. 8.: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: Therefore. So the holy Doctor runs through it in the body of the text, and ad 4.

Therefore what D. Thomas says at quaest. 18. art. 4. does not please him, that the certainty of hope is such as is the certainty of nature; but he adduces this as absolute in 3. dist. 26. quaest. 2. Nor does the argument of Caisensis press, namely, that we hope in God, whose power is insuperable, and whose will is ready to do good; and the certainty of hope is the determination of the inclination to its proper object.

These things are indeed frivolous; for the determination of hope to the object is, as it is proposed to us by faith, that we may be certain of beatitude if we persevere; to which end the inclination tends, desiring absolutely; but it does not hope absolutely, but with the due means, as the Council of Trent says.

Caisensis objects. If the certainty of hope were conditional, it could not fail; for as that truth cannot fail: He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved; so neither this: If I shall persevere, I shall be saved.

It is answered, by conceding that the conditional truth of Hope does not fail.

He objects secondly. Fear is opposed to Hope; but fear is not borne conditionally, thus: If I die in mortal sin, I shall be damned; for he is certain of this.

It is answered, that Fear is borne toward an imminent evil. Therefore it is borne conditionally. If therefore I do not do what I am bound to, I shall lose perseverance, without which I shall certainly not be saved.

From these the holy Doctor gathers first ad 2. that the certainty of Hope does not rest on the firmness of the will alone; but that the will rests on God, who is our firmness, as D. August. says, lib. 11. Confess. cap. 30.

He gathers secondly, that Hope has the certainty of order, because hope orders to salvation efficaciously and infallibly; but there is no certainty about the event, and thus even the foreknown are bound to hope, according to that: In him hath every congregation of the people hoped.

Caspensis says the Tridentine spoke of this certainty of the event, when he appends the condition: But the words of the Council mean something else; for it says: Let no man promise himself anything with absolute certainty; although all ought to place and repose in the aid of God a most firm hope.

He gathers thirdly lib. 5. Compendii Theolog. cap. 12. that the Hope of the souls in Purgatory, and of the Fathers in the Limbo, declined somewhat from the notion of Hope toward that which is the certainty of science. So, he says, the high faith of Paul to the third heaven declined; and that of Stephen, when he saw Christ, Act. 7.; and of Adam in the state of innocence.

The holy Doctor prefaces that Hope is sometimes taken for the affection: and thus the Philosophers and the holy Fathers say there are four affections of the soul: Joy, and Sorrow, Hope, and Fear. Sometimes it is taken for the thing expected, or hoped for, Tit. 2.: Waiting for the blessed hope. But it is taken thirdly for the habit directing the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be expected.

I assert first, that Hope is a Virtue.

It is proved from D. Bonaventure foundation 3. A habit repugnant to fault is a virtue; Hope is repugnant to Presumption and Despair: Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the holy Doctor foundation 4., by the argument which D. Thomas uses: A habit rectifying the soul is a Virtue: for Virtue is a habit regulative and confirmative of a power, which makes the soul rejoice in those things which are right, as the Philosopher says, 2. Eth. cap. 3. 4. and 6. and 2. Rhet. and 7. Eth. cap. 14. Hope is of this kind. But there is a twofold rule, or measure, of human acts: One proximate and homogeneous, that is, reason: Another supreme and exceeding, that is, God; and on this account every act reaching to reason and to God is good; but the act of hope reaches to God: for the object of hope is the arduous good, possible to be had: Now something is possible to us in a twofold way: First, by ourselves. Secondly, by others, as is evident 3. Eth. cap. 3. Therefore insofar as we hope for something possible by the aid of God, our Hope reaches to God himself, on whose aid it rests. Therefore Hope is a Virtue, and indeed a supernatural and gratuitous one.

I assert therefore secondly, that Hope is a gratuitous virtue.

It is proved from St. Bonaventure first. That which makes one attain to salvation is from grace. Such is Hope, as is said Rom. 8.: For we are saved by hope: Therefore.

It is proved secondly. That which renders acceptable to God is gratuitous: Such is Hope, Psal. 32.: The Lord is well pleased in them that fear him; and in them that hope in his mercy: Therefore.

It is proved thirdly. A habit directly repugnant to a fault which immediately attains God is a supernatural virtue. Such is Hope, repugnant to presumption of beatitude without merits, and to despair of the Divine mercy: Therefore.

It is proved fourthly. To expect that which is above every grasp of the natural appetite is as believing everything that is above every grasp of the intellect: But from this head Faith is a supernatural virtue: Therefore also Hope, which expects the things that transcend our heart, as is said 1 Corinth. 2.

Finally it is proved on the last foundation, and in the body of the text, by the argument made for the first assertion.

YOU OBJECT first. No passion is a virtue, ex 2. Eth. cap. 5. and lib. 3. where he says: In the soul there are three things, Powers, Passions, and Habits; but virtue is concerned among the habits. But hope is a passion ex Boët. de consol. Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that Hope is taken here as it is regulative of the passions, and it is a Virtue.

YOU OBJECT secondly. As it happens to expect future things, so to remember past things: But this is not a virtue: Therefore neither that; for Hope is either the expectation of future things, or arises from it.

He answers by denying the parity; for virtue stands more in regulating actions to be done than in acts. Moreover remembering stands in Cognition; but expectation in the Affective; and virtue regards more the regulating of the affect. Hence also the act of virtue is linked to remuneration, as it is joined to affection: for instance, that of prudence, or penance, or charity, insofar as it recalls past deeds done, that it may act better in the future; or past evils, that it may sorrow; or benefits, that it may give thanks.

YOU OBJECT thirdly. As it happens to hope rightly, so also to fear rightly: but the habit which directs the soul in fearing is not a virtue: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers by denying the parity, because Fear stands in recoiling; Hope in pursuing: and therefore Fear has more of passion; Hope indeed of action; and because the habits of the virtues direct the soul in those acts in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, whereby one lives rightly; hence it is that Hope is more in the genus of virtue than Fear. Hence also it is clear why the habit of virtue stands more about the affection of Hope than about the other three affections related above; for Joy, and Sorrow, because they have a conjoined object, stand more in sustaining; but the affection of Hope, among the others, stands more in acting; and therefore although, as it is a passion, it is not a virtue, yet as it is the stretching forth of the soul toward the thing hoped for, it is a virtue.

YOU OBJECT fourthly: Every moral virtue stands about the good and the difficult, ex Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 3. But in the expectation of the goods promised by God there is no difficulty, since God cannot lie: Therefore.

He answers, that as to believe the things which are naturally proved to us is easy, so also to hope for what is naturally obvious: But to hope for supernatural things, which neither sense nor intellect perceives, and to despise our goods for these, is arduous and worthy of great praise.

YOU OBJECT fifthly. No gratuitous virtue in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; but Hope in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; for it proceeds from imperfection that anyone serve God on account of a future retribution; because, as St. Bernard says de diligendo Deo, cap. 4.: Charity does not look upon the reward. But Hope makes one expect a future retribution for merits: Therefore it is not a gratuitous virtue.

The holy Doctor answers first, that the act of Hope does not diminish merit; but, as the Apostle says, it rises up from the perfection of merit: For the greater merits anyone has, the more firmly and more certainly does he hope. Nor is detracted from Charity the expecting of God himself, whom it loves, as the reward wherewith it may be united; for the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God. But this reward we hope for, as is had Genes. 15.: I am thy reward exceeding great. And the holy Doctor shows this a posteriori: for the true Saints, who expect beatitude, are little solicitous about themselves; much about God. Thus they despise all things, that they may be united to God in the fatherland.

MOREOVER, the mercenary Hope is evil in that it places the end in its own advantage, as Caspensis also says sect. 4.; but to serve God on account of a reward according to the Divine will, which declares that he wills to give it, Matth. 20.: Call the workmen, and pay them their reward; is not a defect, but an honest act, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 6. cap. 11. and can. 31.: If anyone shall say that the justified sins, while he does good works in view of an eternal reward; let him be anathema. The Fathers of the Council prove this from Psal. 118.: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications in eternity, on account of the retribution. And Hebr. 11. Paul reports that Moses, most holy, underwent most studious labors, because he looked upon the recompense. Therefore God often proposes the sweetness of the reward, Deuter. 11., Apoc. ult. For it is honest to seek one's own last end.

Hence against the Sectaries I hold that it is honest to expect eternal glory, as the crown of labors. For thus also Paul, 2. Timot. 4.: I have fought the good fight, etc. Therefore there is laid up for me a crown of justice. And Tobias 4.: Great will be the confidence before the most high God for alms to all those who do it. I add, that it is lawful to hope also from prayers, and studious works, for a temporal good, provided that in this the last end is not placed.

By the calculations of all Theologians it is established that Hope is a Theological virtue.

It is PROVED first by St. Bonaventure, because the Apostle places it in order with Faith and Charity, 1. Corinth. 13.

It is PROVED second by the Holy Doctor, because that virtue which is the end of the Cardinal virtues is Theological: Such is Hope; Therefore. The minor is proved, because it tends to God as the beatific object, to which the objects of the other virtues serve as means.

It is PROVED third by St. Bonaventure cap. 6. ad Hebr. where it is said, to have Hope entering even within the veil, that is, even to the hidden things of God, as Valencia also notes disp. 2. quaest. 1. puncto primo.

It is PROVED fourth by the Holy Doctor: it is of the same reason a mean between the extremes: But Hope is a mean between faith, which begins the spiritual building; and Charity, which completes it; for Hope raises one up to God: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the Holy Doctor: The image of creation is reformed through re-creation; but the image of creation requires three powers: Therefore also the image of re-creation requires three virtues. Since therefore the image is reformed through the Theological virtues: therefore they are three, but none other than faith, Hope, and Charity: Therefore.

Finally it is proved in the body from the object; because it regards God immediately, as the object to be acquired in beatitude. Therefore, just as faith is Theological because it leans on God revealing the truth; so Hope, because it leans on God promising great things.

It is proved also on the part of the subject; because the higher portion of the soul is reformed in order to God by the Theological virtues: But Hope is one of the reforming virtues; for just as the rational is reformed by faith, the concupiscible by charity, so the irascible is reformed by Hope. This is also shown, because the dowries of the soul in the fatherland correspond to the reformation. Thus to faith will correspond the vision, reforming the Rational; to charity the consummated Charity of the way, reforming the Concupiscible. Thus also to the third, corresponding to Hope, will correspond that which will reform the Irascible.

You will object first. No virtue, around whose act excess can be found, is Theological; for God is never believed too much, nor loved too much; but in Hope there can be excess, for some hope for more than their merits require: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that that virtue, in whose acts there is excessive intensity, is truly not Theological; but in the acts of Hope there is no excessive intensity; for no one hopes in the Lord too much; but the excess is not in the genus of hope, but of presumption, on the part of the subject, from a defect of the condition of hope, which requires that one hope in God in the manner revealed by God. Therefore excess of intensity cannot be in the acts of the Theological virtues, which have an infinite object; but in the object of the Cardinal virtues, which is finite and determinate, whence if the act, transgressing the limits, exceeds, declining to the extremes, it deviates into vices.

You will object second. A virtue which is a mean between two malices is Cardinal, not Theological: But Hope is a mean between despair and presumption: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that a virtue which is a mean between two malices, by participating in the extremes with respect to those things which are good, is Cardinal, or of the Cardinal species: Thus Liberality is a mean between avarice, participating in its material subject, keeping what is to be kept, and between prodigality, participating in its material subject, inasmuch as it gives what is to be given. But truly, if it is a mean only in an eliminative way with respect to each extreme, it can be Theological. Such is Hope, a mean between despair and presumption; for it frees from that twofold evil; just as faith concerning the Trinity and unity frees from the extremes, the error of Arius and the error of Sabellius.

You will object third. A virtue which is concerned with means to the ultimate end is Cardinal. Hope is concerned with grace, perseverance, and the other means of salvation: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that the genus or species of virtue is not determined by any object whatever, but by that object which has the character of motive; and although Hope is concerned also with means to salvation, nevertheless its motive object is God; as the ultimate end, beatitude, to which grace and the other means, which it hopes from him, are ordered.

If you say that also Latria and the whole virtue of Religion regard God; nevertheless it is not a Theological virtue, because it regards also a created thing as object, namely such worship.

The Holy Doctor answers that it is not similar, because Latria regards that created act as object; and thus does not regard God immediately, as Hope does.

You will object fourth. Habits are distinguished by acts: But the acts of hope and the acts of longanimity are the same, namely, to await good things: Therefore Hope and Longanimity are of the same genus; But Longanimity is Cardinal: Therefore also Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers that Hope awaits eternal goods, and those promised by God: But Longanimity, which is a part of Fortitude, awaits by constancy and strength of soul to triumph over afflictors; and therefore its object is of an inferior order.

You will object fifth. It belongs to Fortitude to strengthen against afflictors: But this also pertains to Hope, because it makes a man rejoice in adversities: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that an act can be of some virtue, either as eliciting, or as commanding, or as assisting. To endure terrible things is of fortitude, as eliciting; but of faith as commanding and dictating, as is said Hebr. 11. The Saints by faith conquered kingdoms, etc. They were made strong in battle, but of Hope and Charity, as assisting. For the love of God and the hope of beatitude greatly assist the virtue of Fortitude, that it may be able to bear all evils, according to that saying of B. Gregory: The hope of reward diminishes the force of the scourge.

I assert most certainly that Hope is at times unformed.

It is proved first by St. Bonaventure from St. Augustine de vera Innocentia, where he attributes being unformed to Charity alone.

Second, because just as formed Hope arises from formed faith; so unformed Hope ought to arise from unformed faith: But unformed faith is granted, as is said 1 Corinth. 13. Therefore.

Third. For thus Hope arises from faith in rewards, just as fear from faith in punishments: But fear can be unformed: Therefore.

Fourth. For many sinners hope that they will obtain mercy and glory; But this act ought to arise from some good habit, because it rectifies the power to the Divine rule, which most of all forbids despairing of the mercy of God. For thus also faith strengthens reason to believe the things revealed, even when stained by deadly sin. And the Holy Doctor concludes that those things which were said of unformed faith are to be applied to Hope.

You will object first. Hope is a certain expectation of glory proceeding from grace and merits; as is said in the definition of Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers in four ways that hope arises from grace and merits; Either as they are had in act, and this is the formed faith of the iusti emeriti: Or as they are had in proposal, and in root; but not in effect, and thus he who was lately justified has merits, has the root of grace, but has not yet exercised the virtues: Or someone hopes from merits in proposal; but not in effect, nor in the root of grace; and this is unformed faith: Or one hopes without merits even in proposal; and this is presumption. Since therefore Hope is defined expectation from merits, it is defined from merits, at least in proposal.

And by this he answers the second, opposing that Hope without merits is evil.

You will object second. With the proximate subject disordered, the virtue existing in it is taken away; but Hope is in the affect; therefore, this being disordered, Hope is taken away together with charity, which, if faith remains, this is because it has being also in the intellect.

The Holy Doctor answers that Hope remains even when Charity is destroyed, because it stands in awaiting eternal things; but this stands without Charity; just as it stands to believe the things revealed without sanctifying grace. Therefore the ratio of the subject is not adequate, because the affect disordered in loving can be with some order to hoping from merits, certainly in proposal.

You will object lastly. Faith is then formed, when it does not believe God, but believes in God, tending to him: Therefore Hope, which tends to God, is always formed.

The Holy Doctor answers that the perfect tendency is from grace; but this tendency is not in him who believes and hopes, while he is in sin.

Whether HOPE arises from merits.

Calvin, with impious mouth, lib. 3. Instit. cap. 2. §. last, against the Master and St. Bonaventure and others saying that Hope is begotten in us from the grace of God and merits, thus barks deeply: Who would not deservedly execrate such beasts? O a Master worthy of Tartarean disciples!

But Wicleph taught an error plainly contrary to this, following Pelagius. Bellarmine reports them lib. 5. de Iustificatione, cap. 7.

The Catholic Church teaches indeed that the principal Hope and confidence is to be placed in the grace of God; yet also some in merits from grace.

I assert first, that the confidence of the Saints is born also from good merits.

It is proved first by St. Bonaventure from the Scriptures, Rom. 5. Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; And hope confoundeth not. Thus the same Apostle speaks also 1 Timot. 3. They who have ministered well shall acquire to themselves a good degree, and much confidence. Hebr. 10. You had compassion on them that were in bonds, and took with joy the spoiling of your goods. Do not therefore lose your confidence. Thus Tobias 4. Great confidence shall there be before the most high God for them who do alms. Iob. 11. If thou shalt take away the iniquity that is in thy hand; and if iniquity remain not in thy tabernacle: then shalt thou lift up thy face without spot: and thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee, and shalt be buried in peace and shalt sleep secure.

This is confirmed by examples Psal. 17. Most holy David says: And the Lord will reward me according to my justice. The Holy Doctor observes this in the Commentary, that merit arises from faith, hope, and charity, but again hope, or confidence, from merit, by which charity also is increased.

The same Holy Doctor shows in the Bibliis, cap. 16. from other prayers of the Saints, of Ezechias: I beseech thee, O Lord, remember, I beseech thee, how I have walked before thee in truth; Isaie 38. Hester, cap. 14. Thou knowest my necessity, that I abhor the sign of pride, etc. Hear the voices of those who have no other hope, and deliver us.

It is proved also from the Fathers, by Cyprian serm. de eleemosyna: A splendid and Divine thing, a saving work, a bulwark of hope, etc.

Other Fathers have similar things with St. Bonav. lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 49. St. Gregory homil. 40. in Evang. on that of Luke 16. Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, where he says: If the heavenly patrimony is purchased by almsdeeds, the poor are to be entreated as patrons. See others there.

The Holy Doctor reports others in the same book cap. 24. thus St. Gregory, lib. 10. Moral. cap. 12. The firmer Hope in God rises, the heavier things for him each one has endured. St. Bernard. de diligendo Deo, cap. 14. From the faith of the precepts arises the hope of pardon, etc. You have very many testimonies in the same Book of the Seraphic Doctor, and the following.

It is proved second by the Holy Doctor from the definition of hope. It is the expectation of beatitude from grace and merits.

It is proved third by the argument which Bellarmine uses. From faith we have the promises of God, given to those who keep the law and love God, as is established by very many testimonies of Scripture, as I shall soon relate; Therefore our hope, just as it is from faith, is certain; but faith proposes the promises of God from works through grace; what difficulty therefore is there that we can hence hope?

I shall add the Example of the Seraphic Father St. Francis, whose last words were, as St. Bonav. reports and Bellarmine weighs: Bring my soul out of prison, that it may confess to thy name: the just await me, until thou reward me. The same Jerome reports of St. Hilarion, and Sulpitius of Saint Martin.

Truly those things which the adversaries oppose prove only that, on account of the uncertainty of our own justice and the danger of vain glory, we should rest safely in the bosom of the mercy of God.

That indicates that saying of Luke 17. When you shall have done all these things, say: we are unprofitable servants, as St. Bonav. observes in the Commentary, where he also gives other reasons why we ought thus to humble ourselves.

The first is, because the price by which we render our works precious and worthy of eternal life is not our own arbitrium; but grace, which was bought with a great price, namely the blood of Christ, as is said 1 Cor. 6. and 1 Peter 1. therefore we have all merits from the grace of God. Therefore he here reports that of James 1. Every best gift is from above. See ad 1. here.

Second, because whatever we give to God contributes nothing to him, Psal. 15. I said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods.

Third, because whatever we do is nothing compared with that which we are bound to do, Psal. 115. What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that he hath rendered to me.

Fourth, because what we work and suffer is not equal to the reward, Rom. 8. The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory, etc. Therefore he observes that the twenty-four Seniores Apoc. 4. cried out, casting their crowns before the throne of God and of the Lamb: Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour, and Daniel. cap. 9. Confusion of face is ours, O our kings, who have sinned. But to thee, O Lord, mercy and propitiation. See the Holy Doctor.

From these also you have that which I proved quaest. 5. ad 6. ultimam, that it is lawful to work with the intention and hope of reward. For God so promised it, Matth. 4. Do penance; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand: Matth. 5. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, etc. Hence John took the beginning of his preaching, Matth. 3. Hence Christ commanded the Apostles to begin the preaching Matth. 10. and therefore, 1 Corinth. 9. He who ploughs ought to plough in Hope: and he who threshes, in the hope of receiving fruit. See Bellarmine lib. 5. de Iustificatione, cap. 8.

From which it appears that Calvin, lib. 3. Instit. cap. 6. §. 3. and cap. 18., was scrupulously depraved to fear hence to begin sermons: Rather shall I say, he impiously lay in ambush against vital works.

But that you may perceive in what way the Hope of glory arises from merits, since merits suppose hope, and indeed even charity; The Holy Doctor observes in the body, that Hope sometimes names the habit of virtue; sometimes names the act; sometimes names the state; sometimes the term, or object. The virtue, which is a habit, does not arise from merits; but on the contrary, merits arise from it. The act of hope arises from the regard of merits; for no one hopes for beatitude except he who has served God, or who proposes to serve. Hope, as it names the state, has its origin from preceding and concomitant merits, and in this way the Apostle speaks Rom. 5. Tribulation worketh patience: and patience trial; and trial hope, where the Gloss has, certitudinem spei. But according as hope signifies the thing hoped for, it arises from preceding merits; and in this way the objection related is solved, and the other which the Holy Doctor adds: Just as despair arises only from demerits, so Hope from the merits alone of our will.

The Holy Doctor answers by denying the parity, because evil is from us only, since it is a defect; But the meritorious good, since it is a supernatural good, is from the grace elevating, as is said Iacob. 1.

Finally he notes lastly, that to hope from merits ought to be without elation; lest one say: Our own high hand, and not God, hath done all these things, Deuter. 32. and lest you say: For my justice the Lord hath brought me in, etc. But with humility; and in this way it was lawful for the Apostle, 1 Corinth. 15. More abundantly than they all I have laboured: yet not I, but the grace of God with me. Thus he admonishes Dan. cap. 9. Not in our justifications do we cast down our prayers. And the Church: O God, who seest that we trust in no action of ours: mercifully grant, that against all adversities we may be fortified by the protection of the Doctor of the Gentiles. And rightly the Doctor of the Gentiles is adduced in this, as I said.

The same the Holy Fathers admonish, Chrysostomus homil. 21. in Genes. and homil. 3. in id: Elatum est cor Oziae, and homil. 3. in Matth. August. lib. 3. cont. Cresconium, cap. 80. Bernardus serm. 9. in Psal. Qui habitat.

Hence St. Ambrose with Paulinus: I have not so lived that I should be ashamed to live among you, nor do I fear to die, because we have a good Lord. Which words St. August. was accustomed to praise and admire, as Possidonius and Ribadeneira in his life report.

From what has been said the question is now almost settled.

I suppose that Faith is first; for it belongs to the intellect, illuminating it, so that from it the appetite—which cannot be carried toward the unknown—may rise, by an elicited act, to hoping and loving: for just as the things we see and hold we do not hope for, so we do not hope for the things we do not understand, but only for things that are to come; whence a certain difference also arises between hope and faith; for faith is concerned with past evils and goods, whereas hope is concerned only with future goods, as D. Augustine teaches in Enchir. cap. 8, from which it is clear that the Sectarians wrongly confuse Faith with Hope.

Therefore Faith is prior by nature to Hope; for we hope because we believe. The same is held by the Holy Doctor lib. 5. Compendium Theologiae, cap. 22.

As for Charity, I say that it is posterior to Hope.

It is proved by St. Bonaventure, first from the Gloss, which adduces this.

Secondly, because the foundation is prior to the building and to its perfection: but faith is the foundation of the spiritual building; for it is the substance of things to be hoped for: therefore first is Faith, second Hope, which rises like a wall; and finally Charity, which is the bond of perfection.

Third. Because according to the order of nature, the imperfect precedes the more perfect; but Charity is more perfect than Faith and Hope, ex prima Cor. 13. Ergo.

Fourth: No one can love a good recognized as impossible to him: therefore he must first hope.

The Holy Doctor notes, however, in the body of the text, that the Habits of Hope and Charity are indeed infused together, but in respect of act Hope operates first, which prepares for the act of charity; for that which we would not hope to obtain would not be loved.

You will object first. Hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits; but merits are from grace: therefore grace is presupposed to Hope itself.

The Holy Doctor answers that there Hope is taken for the state, or for the thing hoped for, as I explained quaest. 8.

You will object secondly. Every affection arises from love, as D. Augustine says 14. de civitate, cap. 6. et 15. Therefore also Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers that imperfect love is the root moving all the affections; yet perfect love is the term of all of them, whence all the affections are ordered so that God may be loved perfectly: but Charity does not name just any love, but perfect love.

You will object thirdly. No one hopes for what he does not love; for what is not a good loved by me, I do not hope for; therefore the rectitude of love precedes the rectitude of expectation. But charity directs in loving; hope in expecting: therefore Charity is before Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers that nothing is loved except what is hoped for; thus, by the love of concupiscence, charity does not love God as a good for itself unless it hopes to obtain Him; likewise not by the love of friendship, unless it trusts in Him; even though no one hopes except what he loves imperfectly.

You will object fourthly. Fear and Hope are two affections running together; therefore they are called two millstones by the Gloss ad 24. Deuter. But every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every Hope: therefore gratuitous hope arises from gratuitous love.

The Holy Doctor answers that love of self is the origin of fear of punishments, but not so the love of God. Therefore it does not follow that the act of Charity precedes the act of Fear; rather from filial Fear arises Love, as the Council of Trent teaches.

You will object fifthly. That which is more common is prior, of which the converse does not hold; but loving is more common than hoping: therefore that is prior. The minor is proved; for everything to be hoped for is to be loved, not the reverse.

He answers that the Major is true of those things which essentially follow one another mutually; not of those which accompany one another; and thus it follows: If there is snow: therefore something white; not conversely; and yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the substance of snow. Therefore, since hoping and loving accompany one another, although the act of loving extends to more lovable things, it need not be prior in the order of nature.

Moreover, although Charity is more general on the side of the object, yet Hope is more universal on the side of the subject. For every wayfarer who has Charity has Hope; but not conversely; and therefore the act of hope precedes in origin the act of Charity with respect to the subject, from which both acts take their origin.

You will object sixthly. The order of virtue to virtue is the same as the order of dowry to dowry; but perfect tension, which is the dowry corresponding to Hope, follows perfect dilection, which is the dowry corresponding to Charity: therefore also in the wayfare Charity precedes Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers by denying the parity; because the dowries in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but in the wayfare Charity, in the respect of virtue, is greater than Hope, and therefore it does not follow that if in the wayfare expectation precedes some dilection, also in the fatherland tension should precede perfect dilection. For although the virtues are equal with respect to the reason of tending, yet the act of dilection is more perfect than that of Hope; but in glory it will be equally perfect to hold and to love; whence although in the wayfare the act of the Irascible precedes the act of the Concupiscible, it need not be so also in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation.

What is the proximate subject of HOPE.

I ASSERT that Hope is in the will, against some who follow Suarez disp. 1. sect. 2, saying that it is in the judgment of the intellect. So D. Thom. and D. Bonau., whom others follow in Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 2.

It is PROVED by the Holy Doctor, first from the Philosophers and the Holy Fathers.

SECONDLY. To hope belongs to the same power as to fear; but to fear is an affection: therefore.

THIRDLY. Opposites are about the same thing; but despair is in the affection: therefore also hope, its opposite. The major is Aristotle's in postpraed.

FOURTHLY, because in the rational and concupiscible power some directive rule must be placed, since they can go awry. Therefore in the Rational is placed Faith; in the Concupiscible, Charity: therefore in the Irascible, no less prone to err, the Virtue of Hope ought to be placed, ruling and directing toward God as toward an arduous good.

FIFTHLY it is proved by the argument used by Caspensis disp. 16. sect. 7., Valencia disp. 2. sect. 1. p. 1., Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 7.: A virtue that has for its object a good, as arduous, is in the will. Hope is of this kind: therefore. The minor is proved from what has been said. The major is certain; for good is the object of the will; the arduous is the object of the Irascible, which is part of the affective power. Hope indeed raises one up toward the supernatural end as arduous.

OBICTION first. Hope is called conscience in the Gloss ad primam Timot. primo.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Hope is called conscience in the manner of an effect, because it is expectation rising from grace and merits; but merits cannot exist except where the conscience is pure.

OBICTION secondly from D. Bernard in Cant.: God to come is the continuation of eternity in memory, which is called tension, corresponding to hope, namely.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that God will be the continuation of eternity, which continuation is in the memory mediately, inasmuch as it preserves the species of the retribution to come, never to be lost, and of the perpetual merits in the hope answering to it.

OBICTION thirdly. According to D. Augustine in the Books de Civitate Dei: Hope is the virtue by which one presumes that he will arrive at that which he believes: therefore to hope is to believe firmly, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore also Rom. 4: Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice, and there is added: Who against hope, believed in hope. Which authority the Sectarians abuse, so as to confuse Hope with faith.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Hope, taken broadly, signifies a kind of firm belief with respect to attaining some good. Thus Abraham is said to have believed in hope, because in faith in the promises of God he founded his hope against hope, which nature could supply; yet he does not will that to hope and to believe be the same. For to hope properly is to trust, and from that confidence, with a certain security, to tend toward the attaining of an arduous good; and these two, namely confidence and secure tending, St. Augustine understands by the word presuming. See Caspensem numero 42.

THAT the Apostle distinguishes there faith from Hope is proved from Bellarmine lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 5: He was not weakened in faith, nor did he consider his own body now dead, and the dead womb of Sara. He staggered not by distrust at the promise of God, but was strengthened by faith, giving glory to God: most fully knowing that whatsoever God has promised, he is able to perform. Therefore also it was reputed to him unto justice, where he speaks of justifying faith, as is clear from the last words; but what kind of faith that was he shows by the words denying: He did not consider; and by the words asserting: Most fully knowing. Which pertain to the understanding. But when he says: He staggered not by distrust; he signifies that his faith was outstanding and repelled all distrust, begetting hope. Next, distrust here signifies unbelief, for in the Greek you have ἀπιστία, as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 11. Hence Ephes. 3: In whom we have confidence and access in trust by his faith: If therefore we have confidence through faith; it follows that faith is the cause of confidence, and not confidence itself; for nothing causes itself.

ABSURDLY, however, does Kemnitius say in exam. that D. Bonaventure asserts Hope, as to its certainty, to belong to the intellect, and, as to expectation, to look to the will; for the Holy Doctor dist. 26. quaest. 5. asserts that Hope belongs to the will even as to its certainty; he does indeed grant that it is caused by the intellect, as Bellarminus also notes lib. 1. de Iustificatione, cap. 6.

The Holy Doctor says moreover in the body of the text: It belongs to Hope to establish, and in a manner to make secure, the attaining of future beatitude; but establishment and confirmation pertain to the irascible power, which is part of the affective power. What could be clearer? But you will hear clearer things still.

Faith, however, is placed in the intellect, as I said Tract. de fide, disp. 1. quaest. 18. Therefore the Apostle secunda Cor. 10. says, The understanding is taken captive unto faith. And if they should always wish to take believing as, having confidence, they will infer things absurdly, as when Christ says: Do you not believe, because I am in the Father, and the Father in me? Act. 8: I believe that Jesus is the Son of God. Rom. 10: With the heart we believe unto justice, which they will explicate most unfittingly of confidence, saying: I have confidence that Jesus is the Son of God, etc.

OBICTION fourthly. The image of God is reformed by re-creation; but the essence of the soul is made deiform by grace; the powers, however, by the Theological virtues, of which faith restores the Intellect, Charity the Will: therefore Hope the Memory.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the Image is reformed by re-creation, as is fitting. But since the Image is according to natural things, therefore it is more in cognition, and accordingly two powers correspond to it, memory and Intellect; and one of the affective, the Will. But the Likeness is according to the will the more, whereby by aversion from God it is made unlike in the unbridled concupiscible and irascible; therefore two virtues are required: one, Hope, for reforming the irascible; the other, Charity, for the concupiscible; and one, Faith, for the intellect. But in truth Hope also reforms the memory (which has sympathy/conformity in retaining what it perceived) by reforming the irascible. This he says is according to the mind of D. Augustine.

But it reforms the irascible formally, and the memory efficiently, only in this second manner. See these things p. 1. tract. 10. disp. 1. quaest. 2.

Objection fifth. Certitude looks to the cognitive power; but Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude: therefore it is in the cognitive power.

The Holy Doctor answers again that the certitude of Hope does not look to the cognitive power, but rather to the affective power, which certitude is a kind of assurance, holding itself on the side of the irascible power. Do you hear this, deaf and mute Kemniti?

D. Bonav. book 3, dist. 31, question 2. D. Thom. 1. 2. question 18, article 2.

The first opinion is that the habit of hope remains in the blessed: So Suarez disp. 1. sect. 8. Hurtado disp. 108. sect. 4. Poncius disp. 31. quaest. 4. Vulpes disp. 51. art. 1. Coninck disp. 19. dub. 10. Amicus disp. 22. Caspensis disp. 2. sect. 9. Arriaga disp. 26. sect. 4. Mastrius book 3. disp. 6. quaest. 18. who nevertheless says it does not remain under the denomination of hope. This was the opinion of Scotus book 3, dist. 31. §. Viso de fide, et spe, at the end. These concede that Hope remains even as to some act.

The second opinion is that the habit of Hope does not remain in the fatherland. So D. Bonaventure and D. Thomas and all the Thomists here, and it seems that of Scotus book 3, dist. 31, single question, where Lychetus, Tartaretus, Arretinus, and the other ancients agree. The Moderns nearly all agree, as gathered by Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 2. although some concede some act of hope in the blessed, as Suarez book 3, part T. 3. quaest. 7. art. 4. and de Spe disp. 1. sect. 8. Others give it to the blessed souls in relation to the resurrection, as Vasquez book 3, disp. 44. cap. 22.

I assert with this opinion that in the blessed hope does not remain.

It is proved first by D. Bonaventure. When the object is removed, the habit is removed; but from the blessed the object of hope is removed: Therefore. The minor is proved from Rom. 8, Hope that is seen is not hope: for what does a man see, why doth he hope for it? Therefore since the Blessed necessarily see God, they cannot hope.

Mastrius answers first, with Bassolio disp. 31, single question, art. 2. that it is per accidens that the object of hope is present or absent.

But D. Paulus is altogether amazed that anyone should want to hope for things he possesses.

Mastrius answers second, that Hope in the blessed has no act more known as desire, from which Hope is denominated; although they have an act of delight and joy, produced from hope.

But I have already shown quaest. 3. that there is no delight in the object of hope; for delight is about an object present, and thus the first response of Caspensis is blunted.

Caspensis answers second, that the blessed can have desire even for the beatitude of others.

But hope is only of good things, nor only of future things, and pertaining to the one who is said to bear the hope of them, as D. Augustine says in Enchir. cap. 8. cited by Caspensis sect. 3. Therefore to desire beatitude for another, as it is a good, is not an act of Hope; but of Charity, as Vasquez holds too book 3, disp. 45. cap. 2. and Caspens. there. It is confirmed; for by Hope the mind is roused to overcome the difficulties that stand in the way of attaining the good hoped for; but this affection cannot be had with respect to the beatitude of another, as Turrianus observes disput. 60. dub. 4.

You will say that the beatitude of another can be desired insofar as it redounds to an accidental beatitude for us.

It is answered first, that the object of Hope is still not had, which is God, as to be arduously attained by the blessed, as I said quaest. 3. and as the Seraphic Doctor observes ad 3. Hence accidental beatitude does not suffice for Hope, which is a Theological virtue, attaining God immediately.

It is proved second from this by D. Bonaventure. Hope is the expectation of our future beatitude, as the Gloss says on Rom. 5. But beatitude in the fatherland is present; Therefore.

It is proved third from 1 Cor. 13, Faith, hope, Charity, these three remain: but the greater of these is charity, where the Gloss: Charity, when Faith and Hope depart, shall remain increased. It is concluded, moreover, that it is greater for that very reason, that it alone is said never to fall away.

Mastrius and Caspensis respond that the Apostle does not say that Hope falls away, but only faith, prophecy, and tongues; or that it is evacuated as to its principal act, which is to hope.

On the contrary, because the Apostle says: But when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away, because, as the Seraphic Doctor urges, it is intrinsic to the notion of the object of hope that it be future, and that the soul rise toward it, so as to overcome difficulties.

It is proved fourth by the Seraphic Doctor. As Faith is related to what is not seen, so Hope to what is not possessed; but faith is necessarily done away when clear vision supervenes: Therefore also hope, when the attainment, or the most certain stretching toward it, supervenes.

Mastrius answers num. 481. by denying the parity, because faith can exercise no act in the fatherland; for all its acts denote an imperfection repugnant to the state of the fatherland; but not so hope, which has its imperfection, the absence of its object, in desire alone, but has other acts. So Maracius answers too disp. 34. sect. 3.

But Paul Rom. 5. denies that Hope is there where its object is possessed, which is God seen, the beatific object present; toward attaining and awaiting which hope raises the soul; But the blessed, since they already possess God, cannot await in desire what is absent and arduous.

Mastrius answers num. 479. that Hope then has no act of desire, but of tension and possession.

I am simply amazed that he says this: for the same virtue cannot be borne toward an object under notions of substance opposites.¹ But Hope, since it walks together with Faith as to the absence of the object, as is said Hebr. 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not; I do not see how it can have an act of tension and possession of the beatific object.

He answers second, with Arriaga, that neither the act of justice of rendering to each his own, nor that of fortitude for overcoming difficulties, is found in the blessed; and yet these habits remain, because they can have an act of complacency and joy about their proper object.

But even in the fatherland the blessed render to each his own, to God the honor of latria, and to the blessed the service due them; whereas the habit of Fortitude directly conflicts with the state of the blessed, as D. Bonaventure says dist. 26. quaest. 3. at the very end.

You will object first. In Sap. 3 it is said: Their hope full of immortality. The Gloss postills: It is itself effectual. If you say that Hope is there taken for the thing hoped for; on the contrary I prove it of the very act of hoping; for Christ was blessed, and yet had Hope, as the Gloss says on that Ps. 30, In thee, O Lord, have I hoped.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that Christ had hope not in himself, but in his members; in himself, however, he had a certain expectation of some spiritual benefit, which nevertheless is not hope, because it did not look to God as the object to be enjoyed immediately. Then neither was the glory of his body itself arduous for Christ, as Coninck thinks disp. 17. dub. 11. because it follows naturally from the glory of the soul, as Mastrius notes num. 470. although it was to be acquired through the cross under the title of merit.

You will OBJECT second. Where there is desire, there can be Hope; but in the Blessed there is the highest desire without end, as is said 1 Peter 1, Into which the Angels desire to look: Therefore. It is confirmed; for they can desire the continuation of their beatitude.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS that the desire of acquiring goes with Hope: but the desire of continuing a good that cannot be lost in no way goes with hope; because there is not there an expectation, or tending, toward an absent good. Therefore in the fatherland there is desire, in that he calls it ineffable delight and unendingness, never sated, but always with the highest delight. Wherefore vainly do some argue from the volition of the continuation of beatitude that there is hope in the blessed; for, as Mastrius candidly confesses num. 472. the continuation of beatitude is not arduous for the Blessed, but on the contrary easy and necessarily unfailing. By this reasoning he also confesses that Arduous is the formal reason of the object of hope, with which posited, Hope is posited; and with it lacking, removed. The Seraphic Doctor answers the same dub. 5. of the text.

You will OBJECT third with Vulpes, Morando, Caspensis, and others: The Blessed hope for and expect the future resurrection of bodies.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS that this argument errs in two ways. First, because the beatitude of bodies is not arduous for the Saints of the fatherland. But Hope is of the supreme good as arduous.

You will SAY with Amicus that it is arduous because excellent.

On the CONTRARY, because this is not what is arduous for hope, as I said quaest. 3.; otherwise the object would be the same for charity too; for its object is most excellent, as Mastrius notes num. 455. and 470.

SECOND the argument errs, because the act of expecting the resurrection does not look to the Theological virtue, because the resurrection of the body is not an uncreated good, which is the object of the Theological virtue; nay, it is not even necessary for attaining that good, as Arriaga loc. cit. and Mastrius num. 471. rightly observe too.

Amicus INSTANCES num. 20. that there is some participation of the uncreated good, inasmuch as with the beatitude of the soul it beatifies the whole man.

But these are pure words; for the beatitude of the soul is not intensified in relation to God immediately.

You will OBJECT fourth: The habits of opposites are opposite; but in the damned there is despair: Therefore in the blessed there is Hope.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS that it is not similar, because despair makes for the culmination of evil, and therefore ought to be in the damned; But hope denotes a defect of complement in the good, that is, the absence of that supreme good; hence it cannot be in the blessed, in whom all good things absolutely complete in every measure are heaped up.

You will OBJECT fifth. It is an act of hope to trust in the Lord; But the blessed trust in him: Therefore.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS that there is not in the blessed the confidence of Hope, which is with stretching, panting, and rising toward the arduous; but the confidence of the love of friendship in fruition.

You will OBJECT sixth. To hope pertains the certainty of beatitude; but this will be in glory: Therefore. Then the blessed expect beatitude as to succeeding times, for those who already have beatitude today do not yet have it tomorrow. And therefore in Apoc. 6. it was said to them that they should wait.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS that there is not there an expectation of a new good, or of an arduous one, but of a possession eternally unlosable, not to be acquired; nor is there there found a certainty of promise alone; but of tension and fruition, which is not of Hope.

You will OBJECT seventh. Because hope has some acts not repugnant to the fatherland, as to delight in, to rejoice in an infinite and agreeable good, which is the formal object of Hope. This is the Achilles of Scotus loc. cit. and of Mastrius num. 473.

The Seraphic Doctor ANSWERS in the body that the formal object of hope is the good of glory, as arduous and absent, as the Apostle says loc. cit. and that to delight in that good already acquired looks not to hope, but to charity; otherwise faith also ought to remain; for the blessed soul delights in the good believed on the way, and is beatified in it; for beatitude is joy concerning the truth, as D. Augustine says.

But WHY is the act by which I will for myself future beatitude not Charity, but Hope: The reason is, because, although I will it for myself, nevertheless the object is God, as beatifying, toward whom the ultimate act is ordered. Mastrius indicates this mode at the end, to the mind also of Cardinal de Lugo disp. 3. de Poenit. sect. 2. num. 41. But the beatitude desired is ultimately referred to God; otherwise it would be an inordinate appetite. Hence one good is constituted, although several goods are named in the definition of beatitude, whereby it is said: Hope is the virtue by which eternal goods are awaited; as the Seraphic Doctor explains dub. 1. litt. dist. 26. and Mastrius num. 487. The Seraphic Doctor indeed observes dub. 2. that the expectation of an absent good is of the notion of Hope. Moreover, expectation can materially denote rest, as when I sit awaiting a companion, yet it denotes a motion of the mind. The same he teaches in book 1, dist. 17. p. 1. quaest. 2. ad 3. Then dub. 3. the Seraphic Doctor explains how you are to understand the saying of Paul: What does a man see, why doth he hope? Hence hope is of invisible things; yet it is not confused with faith; for Faith is of things not seen as such; but Hope of things not seen insofar as they are not possessed.

He EXPLAINS dub. 4. that Hope cannot be of a present good, because of this there is Joy, which is an affection distinct from Hope, according to all the wise.

In the FIFTH doubt he treats this our question, and concludes that neither did Christ on the way have Hope, because he was not borne toward the beatific God as to be obtained, because the blessed enjoy the Supreme good, which is the object of Hope, and the beatific. Then, because Hope leans on Faith, which it has annexed; but Faith is essentially obscure knowledge. Such knowledge is removed by vision, and consequently, faith being done away, he does away with Hope.