Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
An Ignorance excuses from Heresy, and What Kind of Ignorance.
THE DIFFICULTY is, because heresy means error with pertinacity, whether ignorance includes pertinacity, and what that may be.
THE FIRST opinion is, that no gravely culpable ignorance excuses from heresy. So Sotus 4. dist. 22. quaest. 2. art. 3. Lopez 2. part of the Instructorius, where he treats of excommunication, cap. 20. Palacius 3. dist. 25. disp. 2. and Lorca disp. 41. de fide, having abandoned the contrary opinion he had taught in the prima secundae, disp. 33. membr. 2. ad 3. The same seems to be the mind of D. Bonav. here, as Sanchez reports num. 19. in the place to be cited.
THE SECOND opinion asserts the same thing, when the ignorance is exceedingly gross and easily vincible. So Sayrus, and Valentia thinks it probable.
THE THIRD opinion admits it, when the ignorance is affected. So Cano, Navar, Corduba, and Torrensis, whom Suarez reports disp. 19. sect. 3. and Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 15. p. 1. diffic. 4.
THE FOURTH opinion distinguishes regarding affected ignorance; for if it is affected out of a false opinion against the Church, as if the proposition of the Church were of small moment, or with a view to erring more freely in faith, it does not excuse from heresy: But if it is affected only out of negligence and weariness of learning, or from any other cause, it does not make one a heretic. So Thomas Sanchez lib. 2. in decal. cap. 7. num. 33. citing Vasquinus prima secundae, disp. 126. cap. 2. Zumel prima 2. quaest. 76. art. 4. disp. 1. and nearly Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 8. disp. 5. who adheres to this partly with Soto and Valentia.
THE FIFTH opinion is, that any ignorance at all, both gross and affected, excuses from heresy. So Sylvester v. haeresis, Azorius t. 1. lib. 8. cap. 9. quaestio. 8. Bannes, Aragon. quaest. 11. art. 2. Conchinchius, and others, whom Castro Palao cites and follows, tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. num. 5. Suarez in the said sect. 3. num. 9. Hurtad. disp. 81. §. 10. where others assert the same; and Card. Lugo disp. 16. de poenit. sect. 4. §. 6. and disp. 17. de fide, sect. 4. and disput. 20. sect. 6. Diana p. 1. tract. 5. Resol. 1. Fagund. lib. 1. cap. 4. saying this is the view of D. Bonav. and D. Thom.
I ASSERT therefore, first, that the first opinion is probable, which the holy Doctor indicates with a single word in the cited dubium.
IT IS PROVED first by the authors of the first opinion, with D. Bonav., from D. August. epist. 162. which is found in decret. 24. quaest. 3. cited there; the Apostle said, where he says: Those who defend their own opinion, however false and perverse it may be, with no pertinacious obstinacy, but seek the truth with careful diligence, ready to be corrected when they shall have found it, are not to be reckoned among heretics.
With these words of D. August. he excuses from the plague of heresy only those who diligently seek the truth; not those who neglect to find it, and much less those who deliberately flee lest they find it.
Card. Lugo RESPONDS num. 176. that Augustine excuses indeed those who seek the truth; but others he neither excuses nor declares heretics; what was certain he decided; what was less certain, about that he did not dispute.
But Lugo TWISTS the authority, because S. August. lib. contra Manichaeos, reported in cap. Qui in Ecclesia, 24. quaest. 3. declares as heretics only those who, admonished that the Church teaches the contrary, still resist pertinaciously: Who in the Church, he says, hold some diseased and perverse sentiment, if corrected so as to hold what is sound and right, resist contumaciously, and are unwilling to amend their pestilential and deadly dogmas, but persist in defending them, are heretics. The same he teaches in lib. 4. de Baptismo, contra Donatistas, cap. 16. saying: The one who through error believes the same as Photinus is first a heretic when, the doctrine having been made manifest to him, he prefers to resist the Catholic faith, and chooses to hold what he held. Fulensis urges this in lib. 3. cap. 6.
Yet these things avail Lugo nothing: For in the former passage I would have him find where S. August. has the particle only. He puts it well that pertinacious persons knowingly are heretics; but in the passage alleged by us he assigns all the conditions lest anyone be a heretic for any cause, and therefore there it is extended more broadly.
In the other passage he evidently speaks of one who is invincibly ignorant, for he says: Let us suppose two men, one of whom holds about Christ what Photinus held, and is baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church: but the other holds the same, yet is baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it to be the Catholic faith. Him I do not yet call a heretic, unless, the doctrine having been made manifest to him, he should prefer to resist the Catholic faith.
MOREOVER Lugo concedes it to be certain that one who ignorantly, with inculpable ignorance, is ignorant of the articles is not a heretic, because he seeks the truth; and that it is an opinion, uncertain, which says that those ignorantly culpable are not heretics.
It is proved secondly by D. Bonavent. in 2. dist. 22. art. 2. quaest. 2. in corpore. In all other matters sin from ignorance and sin from knowledge share the same malice and belong to the same species (although one offending from knowledge may offend more gravely within the same species;) thus he who kills knowingly and he who kills from culpable ignorance is guilty of homicide, and so of the rest: Therefore also he who falls into heresy from such ignorance is a heretic. This argument is commonly used.
They heap up many responses of no weight, which are refuted by Hurtado disp. 82. §. 56. and Lugo in the place cited de Poenitentia, who also refutes the responses of Hurtado.
Lugo responds that they do not differ indeed in species, yet have different effects, just as casual homicide and voluntary homicide; for this latter has joined to it a graver irregularity; thus neither do they damn the heretic from ignorance and the heretic from mere malice with the same punishments.
Lugo is mistaken; for first he concedes that heresy is that of one who offends from ignorance; and consequently that before God he is guilty of this crime, and that is what I ask. But since the heretic is condemned by the Church with excommunication, it follows that this man is condemned, since he is a heretic. Hence, by saying that this man is not punished by the Church, even if it be conceded that he is a heretic, the principle is begged and a contradiction involved.
It is proved thirdly by D. Bonavent. from foundation 3. on which the others principally rely, as Lugo says n. 182. To know what is to be believed and done belongs to faith, as its acts: Therefore the opposite, namely to be culpably ignorant, belongs to infidelity: But it does not belong precisely to Paganism or Judaism, since the confession of the Christian Religion is still retained: Therefore it belongs to heresy; for there are no other species of infidelity. Nor let them say that it belongs incompletely to heresy; for since it is a most grave sin, it ought to be in some species as a complete individual, as Lorca num. 16. and Lugo num. 182. concede; nor does he solve it by saying that it is a sin against faith; yet not heresy, Paganism, or Judaism, since it is also a proper infidelity, which is divided into three heads. For the contrary is true, because one must find the species under which this sin stands.1
It is confirmed by D. Bonavent. because for the other species of infidelity, namely Judaism and Paganism, culpable ignorance suffices.
It is proved fourthly most effectually by D. Bonavent. in corpore, for since it is necessary for salvation not to be ignorant of the things of faith, certainly all are bound to know them, and few are they who deliberately refuse to know, by affecting ignorance; but for the most part they are ignorant; and if heretics are only those who know and affect ignorance, very few will be heretics; for, as I have seen by experience, disputing with heretics, they labor under great gross ignorance, as the Most Eminent Lugo concedes num. 194.
Hence culpable ignorance rightly does not excuse in the external forum, as Castro Palao notes, Tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. and Menochius, Farinacius, Peña, Simancas, Albertinus, and others, cited by Diana 4. p. Tract. 7. resol. 36. Yet sometimes it helps to diminish the punishment; yet not entirely, as these assert. But all these things are true much more of affected ignorance.
You will object. One sinning from ignorance can have a universal will of eliciting acts of faith, and of believing all things that are sufficiently proposed: But heresy essentially is pertinacity.
D. Bonavent. responds in the places cited that such a man has lost faith. For truly in the cited dubium he admits this argument.
I assert therefore, secondly, that the fifth opinion is probable. It is evident from the argument adduced.