Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Whether one doubting concerning the articles of FAITH is a heretic.
The FIRST opinion is negative. Cited by Cano lib. 12. de locis cap. 9. Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 5. num. 83. Diana follows it primo Tom. 2. p. tract. 2. miscell. resol. 53. Many say the same with these, concerning one suspending the act of judgment. Sanch. consents T. 1. lib. 2. cap. 7. Portel addit. ad dub. Reg. v. Haeresis, Puteanus 2. 2. quaest. 21. art. 2. disp. 2. Ballaeus num. 3.
BUT the common opinion proclaims as a heretic him who voluntarily and pertinaciously doubts concerning the faith, judging that thing to be doubtful, or that it can be otherwise, (which judgment Sanchez, Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 65. and Tannerus loc. cit. with Maldeno call wrongly reflexum; for an actus reflexus has another act for its object, as Coninch. notes disp. 18. dub. 7. num. 86. and Card. Lugo disp. 17. sect. 5. num. 85. but these judgments have the thing itself for their object, saying that that matter of faith is uncertain. Villalob. consents tom. 2. tract. 1. disp. 10. Sylu. 2. 2. quaest. 1. Faber de Sacr. ord. disp. 3. cap. 4. num. 112. Homob. de exam. Eccl. p. 2. tract. 12. cap. 16. Molf. 1. 1. tract. 8. cap. 8. Lara 2. 2. quaest. 11. art. 3. disp. 42. and sixteen others cited by Sanch. Therefore D. Thom. and others proclaim this voluntary judgment pertinacious [to be] heresy, whom Suarez follows disp. 19. sect. 3. Hurtad. disp. 80. sect. 4. §. 21. Coninch. dub. cit. num. 102. Lorca disp. 42. Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. num. 9. and others besides these, with whom Card. Lugo subscribes disp. 20. sect. 1. num. 17. Fulienfis lib. 3. de fide, cap. 7.
I suppose from D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 17. dub. 3. that doubt is properly called the indifference of the judgment of reason, with respect to either part of the contradiction, so that it prefers neither to the other.
I SUPPOSE secondly, from the same D. Bonau. in 4. dist. 13. dub. 4. that Heresy, so called from eligere, is that in which a false opinion is deliberately elected. From which he deduces that to opine is not heresy; just as neither is to doubt. And so he seems [to side] with the former opinion.
S. Doct. also TEACHES in opusc. de profectu religios. cap. 3. that certain doubts about the faith are often assailed by the devil, which are rather to be despised; because, the more we are indignant with ourselves, and dispute with them, the more their rage is kindled. Gerson attends to this admonition tract. de foeda tentatione, alph. 62. lit. O. usque ad T. Sanchez lib. 2. decal. cap. 7. num. 13. and all the others also of the second opinion.
I ASSERT first, with D. Bonau., that one doubting concerning matters of faith is not properly a heretic.
It is PROVED first by the authors of the prior opinion, by the argument of D. Bonau. loc. cit. in 4. taken from D. August. lib. de utilitate credendi, cap. 1. and it is cited cap. Haereticus, 24. quaest. 3. and by D. Hieronymo cap. 5. ad Galat. et ad Tit. 3. and it is cited cap. Haeresis, 24. quaest. 3. and D. Thom. also uses it 1. Corinth. 11. lect. 4. et 2. 2. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 3. Of the nature of heresy is the pertinacious election of doctrine contrary to the faith: but one doubting precisely does not elect, etc. but is suspended: Therefore.
It is CONFIRMED; for heresy is an error contrary to the faith; but error implies assent, or dissent. It is confirmed, because heresy is opposed to faith; but doubt is a mean.
I ASSERT secondly, that one doubting is an infidel privatively, because he is deprived of the certainty of assent, necessary for retaining the habit of faith.
It is PROVED; for in this sense cap. 1. de haereticis it is said, that one doubting in the faith is an infidel, not contrarily, as if he had an assent contrary to the faith, but privatively, because he lacks the necessary assent. Thus doubt of the faith can be condemned, just as those are condemned who deny that the soul is the form of the body, or doubt about it, as is found Clem. 1. §. Porro; and those who doubt of the immortality of the soul are condemned by Leo X. in Conc. Later. In the same sense the Fathers spoke, whom Franciscus Suarez adduces num. 12. Lorca num. 5. From which the text cap. 1. de haeret. remains exposed [to objection], which is of Pope Stephen, to whom others answer, that one doubting in the faith is called an infidel with respect to the external forum.
A third opinion of OTHERS says, that it is true when he reflects upon his own doubtful thought, and in fact elicits an erroneous judgment concerning matters of faith, so that he may judge them only probable. But these men confound the questions.