Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Whether anyone can know with certainty that he has FAITH.
HAnc treats of this 1. 2. tract. 5. disp. 2. question 8., where I reviewed the opinions.
I assert with D. Bonaventure that someone can know with theological and moral certainty that he has the habit of faith.
It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure dub. 1. Whoever knows his acts by experience knows also the habit from which they come. A man can know his supernatural acts of faith: Therefore. The major is evident: for habits are known with certainty through acts, as Scotus teaches, cited p. 1. tract. 9. disp. 2. question 3. The minor is evident; for acts are known through objects, from Scotus loc. cit. Mastrius admits it in 3. dist. 6. question 14. num. 368. with Scotus 3. dist. 23. question unica, where they admit the major also. They confirm it with D. Bonaventure from the force of experience. For just as by experience I know that I believe a man narrating something; so (they say) we evidently experience that we believe the mysteries of faith, which have been revealed by God. Mastrius confirms it; for we clearly experience that we are not moved to that assent by the evidence of the object, since it is obscure to us, nor from anywhere else than from authority. And in this sense he says D. Augustine said with Scotus lib. 13. de Trin. cap. 1. Nothing is more certain to man than his faith. Yet these things conflict with what he adds from Scotus num. 369. that it cannot be evidently known whether we have this knowledge in act, from the divine revelation of the act alone.
It is PROVED secondly, that it is known with theological certainty. Whoever has a pious affect for believing the things that are of faith, knows that he assents to them from above. The faithful man experiences in himself this pious affect: Therefore. The major is certain, because that affect is the supernatural principle of the assent, as I showed 1. 2. Tract. 5. disp. 1. question 6. The minor is granted by Mastrius num. 373. conseq. recta. It is the argument of S. Bonaventure loc. cit. Observe the fallacy of Mastrius and Scotus, who infer that evidence cannot be had of the direct act and habit of faith by a reflected act; because the direct act is incuidens from its object, as I shall say presently.
It is PROVED thirdly from D. Bonaventure in his answer; for the faithful Christian knows that he believes in his mind the articles of the true faith; otherwise he could doubt whether he is a Christian.
Mastrius answers that one can know with certainty that he has faith objectively, that is, that he believes true things; but not that he formally elicits an act of faith.
CONTRA, from D. Bonaventure serm. 9. Hexaemeron. For the firmness of faith, from our attending, and indeed, with the object known from which the act is elicited, the act too is known to be natural or supernatural, because acts are specified, or known, through objects. This S. Doctor shows from that 2. Peter 1.: Having the more firm prophetic word: to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the morning star arise in your hearts. The Apostle wills the same 2. Cor. last chapter. Try your own selves, whether you are in the faith: prove yourselves.
Mastrius answers with Becanus that the faithful can be certain of the truth of the object through the assent of faith: but that he cannot be certain of the certainty of the assent except through a reflected act, which is fallacious. Contra, because although the direct act is obscure, since it is about the object of faith; nevertheless the reflected act, which bears upon its own present act, through which the habit becomes known with certainty, is not doubtfully recognized, as Mastrius admits, but in some way even evident, much less merely certain, as Scotus indicates loc. cit., as the Arretine thought disp. 23. question unica. art. 12.
It is confirmed by Mastrius himself num. 368. from experience. For we know that we are not moved to the assent of faith by the evidence of the object, since it plainly stands to us that it is in itself inevident, and that we believe from authority alone, namely divine revelation, by which I sense that I am moved to assent, as Mastrius says num. 367., which the following num. denies, discordant with himself, as I said.
You will OBJECT, that it is not certain that the habit of faith is given.
It is ANSWERED, that it is certain with theological certainty, even if some deny it. Therefore one knows it with a certainty somehow evident in experience, as Mastrius admits num. 375., saying this is commonly accepted among Scholastics.