Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
The MASTER sent. 3. dist. 23., D. Thom. here, Albertus in 3. dist. 23. art. 5., Richard. art. 4. quaest. 1., and almost all the other Theologians, with whom D. Bonav. also is commonly cited, say that faith formed by charity is a true virtue, because it renders its acts perfect toward God: but that unformed faith is not simply a virtue, because it does not render its act perfect — with which D. August. lib. 4. cont. Iulianum cap. 3. seems to smile. See Pasqualigum disp. 36. sect. 2., Lugum disp. 15. sect. 2., Merac. disp. 22. sect. 1., Morandum tract. un. quaest. 12.
I ASSERT first; that Faith not formed by charity is most properly a virtue.
It is PROVED by D. Bonav. first from D. Augustine de vera innocentia, asserting it so.
SECONDLY, because about difficult things an art, or virtue, is necessary to the rational mind, from 2. Ethic. cap. 3.; but the articles of faith are difficult to believe, and are believed by sinners; therefore for this the art, or virtue, that is necessary is conferred on them. Not art: Therefore the virtue of faith.
THIRDLY. It is more difficult to believe the articles than to be held back from lust, but for this a virtue is necessary. Therefore also for that; and sinful man believes through unformed faith: therefore this is a virtue.
FOURTHLY. What is essentially opposed to vice and sin is a virtue; but the act of unformed faith is directly and essentially opposed to the vice of heresy and of infidelity: Therefore.
FIFTHLY. To what the specific ratio belongs, the generic belongs too; but to unformed faith belongs the specific ratio of faith, which is to captivate the intellect into the obedience of Christ: therefore also the generic ratio of virtue. Hence therefore S. Doct. deduces, and with him the rest, that unformed faith is a virtue essentially, though imperfect, because it has not the perfect operation through the defect of the extrinsic, that is, of charity, which makes one for merit — one, I say, physically accidental, but morally essential. And in this way also Cajetan and Aragon. speak, ad art. 4. D. Thomae.
I ASSERT secondly, in this sense, that unformed faith is not a perfect virtue.
It is PROVED by D. Bonav. first, because it is called dead in Iacobi primo, in the sense given in quaest. 20.
SECONDLY, because the perfect virtue is that which operates well and perfectly, from D. August. in the Master dist. 23.
Yet S. Doct. NOTES ad 4. that the ratio of unformed faith in a faithful sinner is not the same as that of partial faith in a heretic, who believes only some articles; for the latter falls short of the essence, since it has not the formal ratio, that is, the assent rendered to the articles under the ratio of the first truth speaking; for by denying even one attribute of God, it already denies God to be truthful.
S. Doct. SOLVES some arguments in quaest. 1. The first is: the extremes and the mean are in the same genus; for the mean shares the nature of the extremes. But faith is a mean between opinion and science, as Hugh says: therefore it is in the same genus with the extremes: but science and opinion are not virtues: Therefore neither is faith.
S. Doct. RESPONDS first, that faith is a mean between these as to certitude, but it is not on that account necessary that it be in the same proximate genus with the extremes.
He RESPONDS secondly, that the MAJOR is false in morals, for the mean is often a virtue, and the extremes are vices.
You OBJECT secondly. Habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects. Now virtue and science are distinguished in this, from Aristotle 6. Metaph. t. 8., that virtue is about the good, and science about the true. But faith is about the true under the ratio of the true: Therefore it is not a virtue. The MINOR is proved, because the act of faith is to assent to the first truth.
S. Doct. RESPONDS that the true is the object of faith as salutary unto eternal life; for since it is obscure truth, it demands another habit diverse from science; and because it is health-giving, it therefore orders directly to salvation, and so has the ratio of virtue, because it regards obscure truth, captivating the intellect, and orders it freely to salvation; therefore it is a virtue.
You OBJECT thirdly. It is blameworthy in a rational man to will anything without reason; but faith does not require reason: Therefore.
S. Doct. responds that the MAJOR is false, where authority supplies the reason; now faith believes God revealing, even if the object be obscure, and this indeed is praiseworthy and reasonable.
You OBJECT fourthly. The nobler the ratio an act has, the nearer it is to virtue: Therefore to believe by compelling reason looks more to virtue than to believe without reason; but necessary assent is not a virtue: Therefore much less will faith, which assents supported by no reason, be a virtue.
S. Doct. RESPONDS by denying the MAJOR, if we speak of credulity resting on natural reason, which often deceives; and so it is more to the purpose to believe without reason the first truth revealing, even if those things seem irrational. For many things have been revealed that are contrary to philosophy, as altogether to live continent, to beg, etc. Likewise to believe one essence in three Persons: two natures with one subsistence, etc.