Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

It is the most certain assertion among all Theologians that faith is in the intellect as its proximate subject, as Valentia notes quaest. 6. p. 2., Caspensis disp. 4. sect. 1., Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 6. num. 8. The Seraphic Doctor, probing the nature and acts of faith more acutely, does not at once concede that Faith exists in the intellect alone.

THEREFORE he sets out three opinions on this matter.

THE FIRST is that faith is in the speculative intellect. So D. Thomas quaest. 4. art. 2. and Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 6. dub. 2.

IT IS PROVED first. The speculative intellect is that which tends to the true, under the aspect of the true: Now faith makes one believe the articles under the aspect of the true, not because they are good; for thus one believes the damnation of the wicked just as one believes the clarification of the good.

IT IS PROVED second. Diverse virtues have diverse objects; but Charity, which is a virtue distinct from faith, as the Apostle says 1 Corinth. 13., tends to God as good: Therefore faith does not tend to him under this aspect of good, but tends under the aspect of the first truth speaking and revealing, as I showed quaest. 2. Therefore Faith regards its object as true; but this belongs to the speculative intellect: Therefore.

ANOTHER is the opinion which asserts that faith is in the Intellect, without defining whether in the speculative or the practical; and this is the common one. Another says it is in the Intellect eminently: so each of Cajetan and Aragon here, Valentia quaest. 4. p. 2., Suarez tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 1. cap. 2.

The former opinion is PROVED from the foundations laid by S. Thomas out of D. Augustine cap. 2. de praedest. Sanctorum, where he says: To believe is to think with assent. That this is faith he says in Tract. 40. in Ioan., and serm. 14. de verb. Apost., and 4. de CIVI. cap. 20.

THEN he proves it from the Gloss on Rom. 10., which is S. Gregory's lib. 1., for that Gloss, expounding the words Fides ex auditu, says: It gives understanding, while it illuminates the mind concerning the things heard. So Cyril lib. 11. Ioan. cap. 16., and Cyril of Jerusalem Cat. 5.

IT IS PROVED third from S. Thomas. The Theological Virtues are for reforming the image with respect to the powers, the cognitive and the appetitive: But the appetitive is reformed with respect to the concupiscible by charity, and with respect to the irascible by Faith: Therefore faith presides over the cognitive.

IT IS PROVED fourth. In the same faculty there is both a gratuitous virtue and the dower that succeeds it in the fatherland. But the vision, which succeeds faith, is in the cognitive power, as is evident: Therefore so is Faith.

IT IS PROVED from S. Thomas fifth. A virtue is in that power of the soul as in a subject, around whose act it unfolds and removes the difficulty in operating; for a habit is placed in that power whose work it enables; but by faith the intellect is captured into obedience to Christ: Therefore faith expedites the act of the intellective power itself.

THE THIRD opinion is that Faith is in the practical intellect.

But S. Thomas observes out of Aristotle 2. de anima, cap. de movent. et. 49. that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension. Now it happens in three ways that the intellect is extended: either by its conjunction with the affection by which it is inclined; or by the conjunction of itself with the affection to which it inclines; or by its conjunction with the operation which it directs. But in all these ways it happens that faith is placed in the extended, or practical, intellect, according to the various states of faith itself. For faith simply so called, whether formed or unformed, which makes a man believe God in things he does not see, is in the intellect itself insofar as it is inclined by the will itself; for he would not believe unless he willed. But formed faith, by which one believes in God, is in the intellect itself insofar as it inclines the affection. For one to believe in God through formed faith, it is necessary that he tend to him by loving, as is had in the text. But perfect faith, insofar as it operates through love, is in the intellect inasmuch as, through the medium of affection, it directs the work.

The FIRST reason, however, is from Aristotle and Tully, who say that the virtues are in practical intelligence.

The SECOND reason is. A habit about which there is praise or blame is voluntary: But about faith there is praise: Therefore.

The LAST opinion is that faith is materially in the cognitive power; but formally in the appetitive, because the formal ratio of virtue is to make the act laudable. For virtue is defined by D. Augustine de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15: Est amor ordinatus — it is ordered love. This is the opinion of Hugh lib. de Sacramentis.

SECOND, it is proved from S. Thomas. No virtue is in a power simpliciter which can be coerced; but the cognitive power can be coerced: Therefore.

THIRD it is proved. Virtue is formally in that power which is the principle of the act and operation due to that virtue; but no one assents to the truth not seen unless because he wills: Therefore if the principle of the act of seeing is from the will, faith will be in it formally.

S. Thomas OBSERVES, for laying bare the truth: virtue is a habit according to which praise and merit consist, just as a bad habit and fault are those according to which blame consists, as all the Moralists teach. Whence it follows that it must be placed in that power which is the principle of the first laudable work; but this power is free choice. Indeed it is necessary that the habit be placed in that subject in which there is difficulty for acts; but this is the intellective power with respect to faith, which is ordered to capturing the intellect into obedience to Christ, to assenting to the first truth; and in this way it is in the speculative intellect; but since the intellect is inclined to believe the first truth not according to its own judgment, but according to the command of the will, therefore faith does not regard the intellect according to its purely speculative being, but as extended and inclined by affection. And since the very willing to believe is essential to faith, hence it is that that habit regards the affection as well.

But that these things may be perceived, certain doctrines and questions must be discussed. First must be deferred that question: Whether every assent of faith depends necessarily on the will.

For the NOMINALES, whom some of the Recentiores follow, deny it.

The second opinion is that of D. Bonaventure here, whom the Thomists follow, affirming that the first assent of faith depends on the will commanding explicitly; but that the following acts are from the will not refusing, but virtually and freely willing. It also seems to be Scotus's 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2.

But that D. Bonaventure so understood it is evident from the body of questions, where he places the habit of faith in the intellect to remove the intellect's difficulties, with the will moving; whence it comes about that, the difficulties removed and the intellect captured, the explicit will is not necessary.

But this dependence is proved by D. Bonaventure from D. Augustine above, alluding to Rom. 10. Corde creditur ad iustitiam. The same I shall soon prove from D. Augustine.

S. Thomas adds, to confirm this, serm. 1. de pluribus Martyribus, and Act. 15. Fide purificans corda. But it is proved by him there, and in this quaest. arg. ultimo, because the object proposed obscurely and in an enigma, such as the object of faith is, is not sufficient to determine the intellect not yet convicted; nor is the intellect determinative of itself, being a free power: Therefore it needs the extrinsic command of the will determining it to believe what it does not see, but which is obscure to it, as Scotus observes above, as do Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 8. num. 237. and Coninck disp. 13. dub. 4., who use this reasoning.

It is proved third from S. Thomas fundamento 2. et argumento 4. ad oppositum, where he brings forward that saying of D. Augustine, Tract. 26. in Ioan.: Multa potest facere homo, non volens; credere autem non potest, nisi volens — Man can do many things unwillingly; but he cannot believe unless he wills. Which he puts together in the body: That which is the disposition of virtue to the supernatural gifts, and to grace and merit, is from the will: Such is the act of faith, for by its act sinners are disposed to justice, while, stirred by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing that the things revealed are true, as the Council of Trent says sess. 6. cap. 6. The major is proved; for since such things are laudable, they are from a power capable of praise, which is free; for this is the object of praise, inasmuch as it freely performs studious acts. D. Augustine has the same in de spir. et litt. cap. 35.

It is confirmed from the Council of Orange cap. 5., where it teaches that affectum credendi, esse initium fidei, quo in eum credimus, qui iustificat impium — the affection of believing is the beginning of faith, by which we believe in him who justifies the ungodly. The reason is, as D. Bonaventure says in corpore, that, since it directs to the supernatural work of congruous justification, as S. Thomas taught 1. dist. 41. quaest. 1. et in 4. dist. 15. p. 1. quaest. 5., it must also be from the will, even mediately, with respect to merit; for God did not justify you without you. The same is gathered from the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 5. et 6.

Then I say that, speaking regularly, the will determines the intellect in the assent of faith, not only with respect to exercise, but also with respect to the specification of the act. It is the opinion of S. Bonaventure here, and the common one, as with Coninck cit., Arendt 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2., Poncius disp. 27. quaest. 2., Mastrius disp 6. num. 239., Tanner num. 9., Albertinus T. 1. princ. 3. coroll. 5., Bouëtius dem. 2. Symb. art. 6.

It is proved from S. Thomas in corpore, et argumento ultimo, because regularly men are not moved to believe the articles so as to be determined to the species of act concerning what they believe about divine truth; for some believe the pastors or parents teaching them, which motive does not suffice for the specification of the act. I said regularly, because the motives of authority and revelation can be so firm that it need not be determined by the command of the will to explicit specification, but only to exercise, since it is not yet of such evidence as to compel exercise.

I say third, that the believer, already grounded in faith, does not need in each individual act the command of the will in order to assent, but only in order to be applied to thinking about the things of faith. So Suarez disp. 6. sect. 7., and we often experience this; unless you say with Arriaga disp. 7. sect. 1. that the will only makes obedience easier to find in the intellect, while yet always commanding.

You will object. The will is not occupied with the true, and accordingly it belongs to the intellect to determine itself concerning its proper object.

It is answered, that the motives of credibility are not such as to have absolute force of determining, but only dictate that they should prudently be assented to; but it belongs to the will to command that it obey; and in this the adversaries also agree, who for the assent of faith require at least that the will not resist. Therefore the command of the will is required extrinsically, moving the intellect. For many reject the faith, as is said Act. 13.; nor does anyone believe unwillingly, as D. Augustine says de spir. et litt. cit. 31. et tract. 26. in Ioan., noting that: Credere non poterant, and lib. 1. ad Simpl. quaest. 2. et contra. 2. epist. Pel. cap. 19.; Cyril of Jerusalem Procat.; Chrysostom homil. 34. in cap. 13. ad Hebr.; and D. Gaudencius, Bishop of Brescia tract. 6. Exodi.

Hence arises the question: Whether the pious affection of belief is from faith, and therefore also resides in the will; or whether there is in it another habit for commanding the acts of faith.

Scotus in 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2., with the followers of his School, seems to deny that any habit is required, especially a supernatural one, but that the natural command of the will suffices; because, the supernatural truth having been known, the will can move the intellect instructed by habit.

The second, opposite opinion is that some habit is required. But these are divided. For some will this habit to be the virtue of obedience; others, studiousness; others say it is a peculiar habit inclining to these acts. So Suarez, Arriaga, Coninck, and the other Recentiores.

The opinion of D. Bonaventure is that the habit of faith itself supplies this. So in ultimo argumento, et in corpore Alens. 3. p. quaest. 66. memb. 8.

We must suppose that affection of the will for believing to be supernatural. So the Council of Orange declares 2. can. 2. 5. et 6., where it defines that the pious affection of belief, which it calls the beginning of faith, is a gift of the grace of God. And although can. 5. speaks of the first act of converts to faith, nevertheless in can. 6. it speaks of all, inasmuch as for all the acts of the virtues it teaches that a gratuitous will is presupposed, and preventing aid is required, in order to justification and merit. And the Council of Trent defines the same sess. 6. cap. 6., where it teaches that man is freely moved by the grace of God to faith. Nor does Scotus refuse it, but only says that, by a natural act of the will's impulse, one can apply oneself to considering the matter of faith, and afterwards, by the infused habit, exercise the act of believing without another motion of the will, as Mastrius observes disp. 6. num. 265. The Council of Toledo 4. cap. 55. says the same with us, as related by Gratian cap. de Iudaeis, dist. 45.

But that this pious affection of believing ought to be supernatural is proved by D. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 28. art. 2. quaest. 1. fundamento 3. A disposition must be proportioned to the form to which it disposes; for a disposition is in some way the cause of the form. Since therefore faith is a disposition to grace and holiness, inasmuch as it is free, by the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 6. et 7., and is not formally free except by the command of the will, it follows that the natural command of the will is not a proportioned disposition.

I say therefore that the habit of faith gives the will its virtue, that it may command its acts to the intellect.

It is proved 1. from S. Thomas out of D. Augustine loc. cit., Hugh lib. 1. de Sacram p. 10. cap. 2. He confirms it from the definition of faith given Hebr. 11.: Est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium — the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not — where substantia, or the true foundation, regards the intellect; and rerum sperandarum, for which affection is required.

It is proved second, because no habit is a virtue unless it rectifies the will: Therefore neither faith. It is confirmed by S. Thomas; for even prophecy illuminates the intellect concerning divine things, and yet is not a virtue, because the will does not cooperate in that illumination.

You will object with Vulpes dispm. 33. art. 4., Mastrius disp. 6. num. 278.: A habit cannot operate outside the power in which it inheres, nor inhere in several powers; but faith is in the intellect: Therefore it cannot be also in the will, or, existing only in the intellect, operate also in the will. It is confirmed because faith regards God; but that habit by which it commands the will is the very created act of faith, or its uprightness, whence it cannot be from a Theological virtue.

S. Bonaventure saw this argument well here and resolved it. He answers therefore that free choice embraces both appetite and reason, as D. Augustine teaches t. 2. de Trinit. cap. 8.; and therefore it is not inconvenient that every virtue which is placed in one of these powers be placed in free choice, insofar as it is virtue and the principle of merit.

Similarly. There is no inconvenience in positing one habit in reason and will, such that it regards one of those powers as to the material act, the other as to the formal. Thus the habit of science, as to the retention of species, regards memory; and, as to the facility of recollection, regards intelligence, and yet it is one simple habit. For although the powers are distinct, they are not really but formally distinct, and they are continued in one subject, by reason of which there can be in them a unity of property, just as one health is posited in many members of the body inwardly, and one uprightness in many outwardly. From these he draws the general rule about the subject of any virtue or vice. Similarly faith, insofar as it is a meritorious virtue, is in free choice; yet insofar as it is a habit rendering the power facile, it must be placed in the cognitive power, as Hugh teaches. Therefore by D. Augustine it is called: Amor ordinatus. From these the knot of the whole question is untied. Gather from what has been said that Calvin lies, 3. Instit. cap. 2., in saying that F. [faith] is mere knowledge: For assent is also required. See Bouërius loc citato.