Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
The TRUE opinion is negative. So D. Bonaventure, whom all Scotists and Thomists commonly follow. And among the more recent, Card. de Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Turrian. disp. 8. dub. 5. Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 1.
The OPPOSITE, however, is held by Valentia p. 4. col. 62. where he says Bonaventure denies it without cause; Tanner. quaest. 1. disp. 6. Morand. quaest. 3. and very many others collected by Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 4. art. 2.
I ASSERT with D. Bonaventure that FAITH cannot be had concerning things that are clearly seen here.
It is proved first from S. Thomas, from D. Aug. on 14. Ioan. on these words: I go to prepare a place for you. Go away lest it appear; let it be hidden that it may be believed, and tract. 40. in Ioan. Faith is to believe what you do not see. And lib. 2. qq. Euang. cap. 39. Faith is the virtue by which things are believed that are not seen.
From D. Gregory homil. 36. in Euang. Things that are seen do not have faith, but recognition. And Chrysost. homil. 21. ad Hebr. says: He wishes to destroy faith, those who want to see the things believed. The Saints commonly think the same, as S. Thomas relates quaest. 3. in corpore.
It is proved secondly from S. Thomas. Faith will be evacuated in the fatherland, as is gathered from prima Corinth. 13. but bodily vision manifests the Humanity of Christ just as spiritual vision in the fatherland manifests the Deity: Therefore just as faith of the Divinity cannot be about things seen in the fatherland, so neither can faith of the humanity be in the way about a thing seen. Hence they deny the parity gratuitously, as Mastrius notes n. 110. who used this argument.
It is PROVED thirdly from S. Thomas. To believe is free Rom. 10. But to believe what I see is entirely necessary.
It is PROVED fourthly in corpore. That which repugns the essence of faith cannot stand together with faith: But sensible vision repugns: Therefore. The minor is proved; for from the Apostle loc. cit. Faith is obscure knowledge, and now AEnigmatic: but Vision is most clear; and these are contradictory. The Scotists and Thomists use this argument.
Nor does the response avail, that these are not contradictory, because they arise from different motives. For the argument resists just so much, because from the intrinsic formal side the object of FAITH must be obscure; whence, upon the arrival of vision, it no longer has anything obscure, concerning which it might render faith to the revealer; and the formal reason of the one, that is, of science, destroys the formal reason of the object of FAITH. Nor do they differ according to the perfect and the imperfect, as the adversaries think; but they differ according to their essentials, namely the positive and the privative; from which Card. de Lugo deduces disp. 2. num. 81. that, since this repugnance is formal and intrinsic, it convinces that vision and FAITH cannot stand together, even by the power of God. Vain also is the response of Valentia, that faith is of things not seen by faith itself; for, as Mastrius says num. 109. the Fathers and Scripture would have spoken ridiculously, and the sense would be to see nothing by an act of faith. Tanner. also errs num. 176. denying that these repugn.
You OBJECT first that Ioan. 20. it is said: Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed; therefore concerning this he had faith and vision.
D. Bonav. and Scotus RESPOND from D. Gregory homil. 26. in Euang. that: Thomas saw one thing, and believed another; He saw a man, and believed God. The same is the response of D. August. tract. 79. in Ioannem.
Arriaga INSTANCES that this exposition is not consonant with the text. First, because Christ did not speak equivocally, but of the same thing about which he said: You have seen, he also said you have believed. Then, if he believed what he did not see: Therefore he did not have less merit than the others, who, not seeing, believed, whom nevertheless Christ there prefers to Thomas. Thirdly, because there Thomas believed nothing about the Deity, but about the Resurrection, about which he doubted, which nevertheless he saw no less than I see Peter present; and yet you deny that vision can stand together with faith.
For in truth these things are frivolous against the exposition of the Fathers; Nor indeed did Christ speak equivocally, but with a mystery, so that the sense is: Because you have seen me raised from the dead, you have believed God, since a mere man cannot raise himself. Now just as you heard me: I have power to lay down my life, and to take it again, so now you have seen, and therefore you believe God. See S. Bonaventure in the sermon on S. Thomas.
From this the second objection falls: For the sense is, that there is more merit in those who neither saw me raised, and believed, without this miracle, that I am God.
To the third I say, that Thomas confessed: My Lord, and my God. For he doubted about the Deity while he saw him dead; nor did he believe until he saw him raised.
You OBJECT secondly from Prima Ioan. first: What we have seen, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life; But the Apostles also had faith concerning the same Christ.
D. Bonav. RESPONDS that the Apostles had faith concerning the mysteries seen; for although they saw the man die; nevertheless they believed him God. And so they had faith concerning This person, as he is God. Mastrius num. 133. prefers this exposition, Scotistically.
You OBJECT thirdly. The Blessed Virgin knew by sensible experience that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit, and nevertheless believed; Therefore Elisabeth says: Blessed are you, who have believed, etc.
S. Bonav. RESPONDS that the Blessed Virgin perceived that she had conceived without a man; nevertheless she did not perceive that she had conceived the Son of God. Thus Mastrius also responds.
You OBJECT fourthly. It would follow that the learned are of worse condition, and those who saw, as the Apostles.
It is RESPONDED with D. Bonav. that those who saw believed something else.
MASTRIUS responds from D. Bonav. quaest. 3. denying the sequel, as to the wise, who have science concerning the same thing, because they did not know perfectly through the sciences that God is, and that he is one, or that he is infinite simply speaking, to be in three persons, whence they lacked the light of faith, without which the Philosophers erred. He says this response is conformable to the doctrine of Scotus; whence it is clear how even the learned exercise supernatural acts of faith.
For in truth he does not remember that he said in the first assertion num. 108. that acts of faith and of science cannot be simultaneously about the same conclusion in the same intellect. Wherefore he abuses the doctrine of S. Bonaventure.
MOST FIRMLY therefore has our assertion been proved. It is confirmed by the principal argument of S. Bonav. in corpore, which Suarez uses disp. 3 sect. 9. Coninch. disp. 11. dub. 1. Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Vasquez disp. 53. et 62. Mastrius num. 115. where he teaches it to be a firm argument; for clear vision so ravishes assent, that not only is place denied to the liberty necessary for faith; but neither does the motive of assent remain; thus, while I see the Sun, however much someone may say to me that it is day, even if he were an Angel; I do not believe from authority, but because I see. Coninch. and Suarez render the reason; because, since the intellect has been actualized by the most perfect formal assent, no place is left for assenting by another form.
BUT they argue against this: for the Blessed have intuitive cognition of creatures, and nevertheless can also have abstractive. The same, the Theologians say, of the most holy Soul of Christ.
Mastrius RESPONDS from Scotus ad 3. that the reason is, because the medium of faith is impeded by the medium of vision, so that it may not move, and is rendered insufficient to move in its presence: for the medium of faith has no power to move, except when the intellect needs it, and because it does not otherwise have the truth. Lugo responds the same.
BUT the same difficulty is incurred which they opposed to Suarez, because the clear vision of creatures in God suffers its abstractive [cognition].
The REASON therefore is that which S. Thomas brings in corpore, because they are intrinsically opposed formally, whence, with the object clearly seen, it implies that faith is busied about that thing in vain, because it is intrinsically enigmatic, or at least obscure, and the obscure requires an obscure object.