Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

The FIRST opinion denies that there can be, concerning the same thing, both science and faith. So D. Thomas here, where all Thomists follow him, as is seen among the Complutenses disp. 20. Logic, quest. 4. Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 2 and 3; Valentia cites Scotus too, 3. dist. 24. quest. unic. §. ad quaest. and §. sed si aliter.

The SECOND opinion is affirmative. So D. Bonaventure here, Alexander of Hales 3. p. quest. 79. memb. 3. Albert the Great 3. dist. 24. art. 9. Valentia disp. 1. quest. 1. p. 4. Suarez 3. p. Tom. 2. disp. 19. sect. 2. Vasquez p. p. disp. 4. Caspens. Tract. 15. disp. 7. sect. 10. Tannerus disp. 1. quest. 1. num. 169. Morandus Tract. unic. quest. 3. There follow Coninch, Arriaga, Amicus, De Lugo, and others as gathered by Mastrius disp. 6. quest. 4. and Tannerus above.

The THIRD opinion holds a middle course: actual faith cannot coexist with actual science; but habitual faith can. It is the common opinion of the Scotists, with Scotus 3. dist. 24. quest. unic., as gathered by Mastrius. Some, however, say that by the absolute power of God actual faith and actual science can exist together. So Poncius disp. 22. Log. quest. 2. Yet the opposite is held not only by the authors of the first opinion but also, commonly, by the Scotists.

I ASSERT first, that the habit of faith and the habit of science can be in the same subject in view of their acts.

It is PROVED first by D. Bonaventure from certain passages of Scripture, in which there are proposed things to be believed that fall under science, such as: that God is. Heb. 11: For he that cometh to God must believe that he is. Rom. 4: Abraham by faith held that God would stand to his promises, and Gen. 1; and in the Symbols it is proposed that God is to be believed to be one, and to be the Creator of heaven and earth. And Exod. 20 and Deut. 6: it is proposed that by faith one must believe there is one God. Yet these things can be demonstrated, as I showed above in Tract. 1, in the disputations on the Existence of God and on unity, and in Tract. 3 on Creation. Tannerus and others press this point.

The Thomists RESPOND that in the learned, or in those skilled in these demonstrations, the habit of faith does not remain for the sake of eliciting acts about these objects; it remains only materialiter.

CONTRA: for thus the condition of the learned would be worse than that of the unlearned, as Valentia and Tannerus infer, num. 171. Moreover, the Fathers propose these articles as to be believed to all, even to the wise: Cyril of Jerusalem, catech. 6; Chrysostom, homil. 2 on the Apostles' Creed; Augustine, book De fide et Symbolo cap. 1, and book 4 De civitate cap. 20; as gathered by Valentia.

That this habit has its act is proved by the holy Doctor in the body of the text, against the third opinion, which he reports: God and nature do nothing in vain; but they give the habit of faith to the wise even with respect to what they know scientifically, nor is the power impeded; therefore it has its acts even with respect to those things.

It is CONFIRMED by the holy Doctor: because these habits are not opposed, since they convince from different motives, and the habit of science is strengthened in its certitude by faith, which has a firmer prophetic word, as D. Peter says. Then, because the habit of science instructs imperfectly; for it does not show perfectly that the unity of God can be in several supposits.

MASTRIUS, num. 132, and Soto in the first book, dist. 2. q. 3, say that there is proposed to us to be believed by faith even something known, such as that God is: for these things must be handed on to the community of men, both on account of men's negligence in seeking the truth, and on account of the weakness of the intellect, and because of the danger to those who seek the truth by demonstrations, in which many false things are mixed in, as D. Augustine says, book 18 De civitate, cap. 41; and this is clear from the philosophers in error. Therefore authority was necessary for perfect certitude; for the motive of faith often supplies the defect of our intellect, as D. Bonaventure also teaches in this question, at the end of the body of the text.

Yet this doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor does not hinder me at all in this matter; for from it I rather argue against Mastrius, from the second argument of D. Bonaventure. When one act is ordered to perfecting another, there is no repugnance; thus he who has known by an a posteriori demonstration can, while the same cognition remains, come to know the same thing by an a priori demonstration; and this knowledge does not take away the preceding one, because it arises from a different motive, just as intellectual cognition supervening on sensitive cognition does not destroy the latter. But the cognition of faith supervening upon actual demonstrative cognition is related in just this way: therefore they can exist together. The whole argument is Mastrius's here, and so it contradicts his own second assertion.

WHY, the argument of St. Bonaventure in the body of the text is most powerful, which Suarez, Amicus, Caspens, and others use: that no implication is found here; because that evidence and non-evidence are not opposed; for the evidence of science is such that it can be increased by the certitude of faith from authority; and so they assist one another, as the holy Doctor and Amicus infer. From these you have that acts of faith and of science concerning the same object can exist.

I ASSERT second, that there cannot be intellectual vision and faith concerning the same thing.

It is PROVED by the holy Doctor in the body of the text and ad 2, from 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a glass in an obscure manner. But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Then thus: Things that expel one another cannot stand together: such is the vision of the fatherland, which expels faith; therefore.

Mastrius RESPONDS, num. 110, that this holds commonly even for intellectual cognition, viz. ...; Contra: for it would follow that the habit of faith would be evacuated by the habit of science, viz. ... The consequence is proved: Things opposed in the same degree exclude one another in the same degree; but the habits of faith and of science, viz., of themselves and in the same way and in the same degree are opposed, just as the habit of faith is opposed to the vision of God: therefore, just as faith is evacuated by the vision with respect to the habit, so it would be evacuated by the habit of science, against your first assertion. Moreover, that the habit of faith is evacuated in the fatherland is clear from the Apostle in the place cited, where he speaks of habits.

I ASSERT third, that even by the power of God the clear vision of the fatherland cannot stand together with faith. So St. Bonaventure, whom all the Thomists and almost all the Scotists follow: among recent authors, Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Turrianus disp. 8. dub. 5, and others against the current of the Recentiors: Suarez, Coninch, Granado, Amicus, Arriaga, Hurtado, and others, as gathered by Mastrius art. 2, quest. four.

It is PROVED first by many from the argument of D. Bonaventure, 2. dist. 24. dub. 1, which I brought forward in quest. 2 at the end. Of the nature of the assent of faith it is that it be free, as is said in Rom. 10: All do not believe the Gospel. So too it is read in Mark 16, John 12, Acts 20; and it is gathered from the Council of Orange 2, can. 5, and Trent sess. 6. cap. 6. But a free assent does not stand with an assent that is simply necessary. So also D. Thomas, quest. 1. art. 4.

Mastrius answers that an assent necessary from the motive of science does not exclude a free one from the motive of faith.

Contra, first, ad hominem: The same effect cannot come from two adequate causes, especially opposed ones, according to Scotus. The assent exhibited to the Gospel, an object proposed to us, is adequately from the beatific vision, necessitating immutably and most clearly. Therefore it cannot be produced by faith, which is contingently free and obscure, mutably. This is the argument of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, Heb. 11, as I showed in quest. 1 and 2, and it will be confirmed in quest. 6 ad 4.

Contra, second, from D. Bonaventure here: because the motive of faith cannot have the power to move the intellect freely in the presence of evidence and of vision, which moves necessarily, as Mastrius says, num. 111 and 117; and this holds even by the absolute power, as he confesses, num. 126, and as Cardinal Lugo notes, disp. 2. num. 81. For it is an essential repugnance; therefore, while the forms remain, it is not separable. Hence falls the response of Tannerus, num. 176, that this repugnance is only moral, and of decorum.

The second assertion is proved from D. Bonaventure, disp. 31. art. 2: Whenever the essential object is taken away, the habit is also taken away: But in the fatherland the essential object of faith is taken away, namely obscurity, which is placed in the definition of the Apostle, Heb. 11: Therefore. It is confirmed: for, once the evidence of the fatherland is posited, the motive of faith no longer remains, namely from mere revelation, to move the intellect; and there arrives an essential repugnance, as Cardinal de Lugo warns, disp. 2. num. 81.

Arriaga answers that the intellect can, from evidence, assent in the fatherland to that object, and yet leave to faith another motive; thus, because of several evidences, one can assent to the same thing.

Contra: Grant that because of several evidences the intellect can assent to the same thing; yet, if once it shall have assented most clearly, it can no longer be free to assent from an obscure motive.

Nor let Amicus say that God can, by his testimony, move the intellect above every certitude; for, if once the testimony of God seen shall have moved it, no place is left for a free assent on account of the obscure testimony of God.

Yet it is not the same with abstractive assent; for, as Cardinal de Lugo says, there is still left to abstractive cognition a place for greater clarity, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the body of the text against Mastrius, num. 129.

It is proved third from D. Bonaventure, in the same dist. 31, loc. cit., at the end, by the argument on which Vulpes relies, disp. 28. art. 2. The Light of faith is related to the light of glory as the Sun to the glow-worm; but the light of the sun overwhelms the light of the glow-worm and leaves it unable to appear. Indeed, while I see the Sun, and some Astrologer says to me: The sun shines; I am not moved at all by his word, even if I know that the Astrologer cannot err.

You will object first against the first assertion. As CHARITY is related to its object, so FAITH to its; but charity does not admit together with itself love of a creature above all things: therefore neither does faith the object of science.

St. Bonaventure answers that the truth known from the motive of science and the truth known from revelation are not opposed as the love of God and libidinous love are; for these are opposed: but those two cognitions are related as perfecting and perfected, and since they convince from different motives, not from supreme ones, neither are they opposed; for faith sanely believes from things obscure; but natural science does not altogether evacuate the obscurity of the mystery, even though it has evidence in its own genus. Hence the act of faith gives the principal assent, and science one less principal. Therefore those Samaritans said, John 4: Now we believe, not for thy word, that is, on account of human knowledge, but from faith in Christ attesting.

You will object second. The vision of the fatherland evacuates faith, 1 Cor. 13: therefore also our science.

The holy Doctor answers by denying the consequence: for vision excludes all hiddenness, not so natural science.

You will object third. The assent of faith is free, Rom. 10; but the assent of science is necessary, especially concerning first principles; for you cannot deny that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.

The holy Doctor answers that in science something of God lies hidden, to which Faith adds something; for instance, that God is of that infinite simplicity simply, which I expounded in tract. first, q. 1. That he is a Trinity; whence at once he begins: I believe in God the Father, etc.

You will object fourth. The same thing cannot be above reason and under it: Science is subject to reason; faith exceeds it: therefore.

St. Bonaventure answers that there is no implication in some object being under reason on one count, while on another it is above reasons; such is the object of faith, which in one respect is subjected to reason, as: that God is; yet it is above reason that he be so perfect as to be Three in persons, that one person be incarnate, etc. Indeed the Apostle said deservedly: God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish, for without faith it is insane.

You will object against the last assertion with Poncius: Faith and vision no more repugn than two bodies in the same place, or heat and cold, as octaves, in the same subject; but these can stand together by the power of God: therefore.

It is answered from D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. that this repugns more; because it repugns according to the intrinsic nature of the essence, since the formal object of vision destroys the formal element of faith: but heat and cold are opposed only according to contrariety in a subject, which can be overcome by God, as Mastrius says.