Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

That we may find the most excellent definition and essence of FAITH, we must examine the object, from which the essence is taken, or at least is known a posteriori.

D. Bonaventure observes in the body of the text that a twofold object is assigned, one material, called the Quod (That which); the other formal, the Quo (That by which), concerning which see p. 1. tract. 1. quaest. 4. The material is the thing considered; the formal is the ratio by which, and under which, it is considered.

All concede that God is the principal Quod object of our faith, against Calvin, book 2. Institut. cap. 6., who holds that not God alone is the object of faith, but also Christ, as He is Man. So the Holy Doctor here, and D. Thomas here, and p. 1. quaest. 1. art. 7.; Alensis 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 6.; Albert. 3. dist. 23. art. 12.; Durand. ibi quaest. 1.; Capreolus in Prol. sent. quaest. 4. art. 2. around the fifth conclusion; Caiet. ad art. cit. of D. Thomas; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. punct. 1.; Caspens. tract. 15. sect. 1.; Morand. tract. unico in 2. 2. quaest. 1.; Scotus 3. dist. 23. quaest. un.; G. and his followers; Mastrius tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1.; Vulpes tom. 2. p. 3. disp. 30. art. 2.; Arriaga tom. 5. tract. 1. disput. 1. sect. 1.; Suarez disp. 2. sect. 1. and 2.; Cardinal Lugo tract. de fide disp. 3. sect. 2.; Amicus tom. 4. disp. 1. sect. 1. and following; Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2., who say it is the common view. Yet some deny that God is the object of attribution as God, but will have it to be God complexly, as willing to beatify. So Vulpes with Gregory quaest. 4. prol. art. 2. and other Nominalists. They rely on John 20. These things are written, that you may believe, and that believing you may have life in his name; but this opinion is refuted even by the Scotists; nor does it rest on Scotus, as Mastrius notes num. 8. Arriaga indeed grants that God is the principal object of faith; but he denies that He is the object of attribution; and Mastrius notes that many Recentiores stumble here, confusing the principal object with the object of attribution, which many call the adequate object.

OTHERS, however, distinguishing these two objects, assert that God is the object in both ways. So Morandus.

OTHERS distinguish the principal object, and the material object of attribution, from the adequate, as Caspensis with Suarez. These, however, are disputes of no great weight.

D. Bonaventure holds that the principal material object, and the object of attribution, is God; yet it is not the adequate material object. This is the common opinion, from Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2. and Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1.

I ASSERT first, that the principal object, and the object of attribution, of faith is God.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonav., because Faith is a Theological virtue, which has God for its object. For this reason Faith is often denominated from God: Mark 11. Have the faith of God. John 14. You believe in God, believe also in me. Ephes. 4. One Lord, one faith. From the unity of God note the unity of faith: 1 Thessal. 1. In every place your faith, which is towards God, has gone forth. Hebr. 6. Not casting aside again the foundation from dead works, and of faith towards God. Hebr. 11. He that comes to God must believe that he is. It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor from the Symbol: I believe in God. The same is taught by the Holy Fathers: Aug. lib. 4. de civit. cap. 20.; Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.; Irenaeus lib. 4. cap. 13.; and others. So argue Caspens. and others.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Every simple habit ought to have one object, to which all things are reduced; but faith is one habit, and has no other to which all objects are reduced than the Uncreated True, that is, God: Therefore. The major is clear. The minor is proved first from the Apostle, who often testifies that our faith is ordered to the knowledge of God. So Ephes. 1. Coloss. 2. and 3., as cited by Valentia; and from D. August. l. 1. de civitate, cap. 2. It is confirmed: for God is the most excellent object of faith.

I ASSERT second, that the adequate material object comprises many things besides God.

It is PROVED from S. Bonav. first from the Symbol, in which are proposed, besides God, the things to be believed: Creation, Incarnation, and other Mysteries of the Redemption, the Universal Judgment, the Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection, and eternal life.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Faith is of as great amplitude as charity; for we believe the things that are to be loved, and the things that are believed are loved supernaturally. Indeed faith believes even things not to be loved, as eternal punishments; but charity loves not only the Uncreated Good, but also our neighbor and other created things: Therefore.

It is PROVED third from the Holy Doctor, because no future thing is God. But future things are believed, namely eternal life, retribution, and the infliction of punishments: Therefore. The major is evident; for God is eternal.

It is PROVED fourth from the Holy Doctor. If anyone did not believe the histories of Scripture, even the smallest details, as that Saul sought the asses, 1 Reg. 9., or that Tobias's dog wagged his tail, he would be a heretic.

But Arriaga denies that these are ordered to God. Indeed Scotus, 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2., denies that the faith of such things is ordered to God. Yet surely these too are not proposed in vain to be believed on faith: For with the heart we believe unto justice: but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation: Roman. 10.

He ANSWERS, then, that such minutiae are ordered to God, who is truthful even in the smallest things. Moreover Saul's solicitude denotes his obedience, by which he made himself worthy of command; and the exultation of the dog indicates the Divine goodness, which sent forward even a rejoicing little creature as a messenger to the blind man FOR HIM. Nevertheless faith is denominated from the principal object, that is, from God and from Christ, because this is our faith properly so called. Hence Calvin is mocked.

It is PROVED finally, because prophecy accompanies faith; and that is concerning created good.

AS REGARDS the formal object, there is greater difficulty.

The FIRST opinion, which is ascribed to Aureolus 3. dist. 24. art. 2. and is defended by Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 1. art. 1., asserts that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of first truth in being, and consequently under the ratio of deity. Bannes seems to follow him here, Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1., Tann. num. 25., and others cited by him. These, however, call the formal object the Quod.

The TRUE opinion is, that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of the truthful revealer. So S. Bonav. in the body of the text, where he brings forward a similitude: For just as a Luminous body moves a power, as its object, when it is set before it either in Light, or as incorporated into earthly matter, as in the adamant and the carbuncle; so Divine truth moves the intellect in a twofold way, either as it is per se in the articles referring to God, or as united to a creature, as in the humanity of Christ, or in some other work. All the Thomists and Scotists follow him, with Scotus quaest. 1. Prol. and others as related by Mastrius num. 21., Tannerus dub. 3., Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1. §. 4., Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1., Bassaeus v. Fides.

VULPES, however, declines aside with a crooked nail, saying that God, as willing to reveal, is the formal object of faith. Surely He is believed because we have in fact that God has already revealed; yet we may say that faith embraces everything that God shall will to reveal, for we are bound to believe also what the Church is going to declare in a Council, Decree, or the like.

THEREFORE our opinion is also that of Alensis 3. p. quaest. 78. membr. 4.; Alberti 3. dist. 23. art. 7. and 12.; Altisiodor. lib. 3. summa, Tract. 3. cap. 1. quaest. 3.; Richardi 3. dist. 23. art. 4. quaest. 3.; Durand. ibi, quaest. 7. num. 12., and dist. 24. quaest. 1. and quaest. 2.; Capreol. dist. 24. quaest. unica, art. 1. concl. 4.; Gabrielis dist. 23. quaest. 2. art. 1.; Marsil. 3. quaest. 14.; Cani. Lib. 12. de locis Theolog. cap. 3.; and the rest cited above.

Soto 3. dist. 23. quaest. un. art. 2. and Gulielm. Paris. de fide DECLINE from it, saying that we believe God, not because He is truthful, or because what He says is true, but because He commands it to be so believed; and thus faith would be an effect of the obedience of the intellect exhibited to God.

I ASSERT with D. Bonaventure that the formal object of faith, the Quo, is the first truth revealing.

It is PROVED first from the Holy Doctor in foundation 4. In that is the formal ratio of faith by which we firmly assent to the articles and mysteries; but this is the Divine truth and authority revealing: Therefore. So argue Valentia, Mastrius, and the rest. The minor is proved: for Scripture testifies to this in 1 John 5., where He gives as the reason why we should believe none other than that: The Spirit is he who testifies; and he argues from the lesser: If we receive the testimony of men; the testimony of God is greater. 1 Thessal. 2. When you had received from us the word of hearing, that is, of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who works in you that have believed. And 1 Timot. 3. All Scripture inspired of God, etc. And 2 Peter 1. The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. The same is found in Matth. 16. Flesh and blood has not revealed it to you, but my Father. John 1. The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared it. 2 Corinth. 4. God has shone in our hearts, etc. Galat. 1. For neither did I receive it (the Gospel) of man, but by revelation.

The same holds S. Dion. cap. 7. de Divinis nominibus; Irenaeus libro 4. cap. 14.; Athan. in oratione, quod unus sit Christus; Chrysost. homil. 8. in secundam ad Corinth.; Ambrosius serm. 21.; Hieron. in cap. 1. ad Titum,; August. contra epist. fundam. capite 14. The Holy Doctor confirms it from Richard of S. Victor.

From these you have that the Divine truth entitatively in being is rather the Quod object, partial, of our faith. I know that the Divine truth in being is the first root of belief: for when I believe some revealed thing, I believe it because it is revealed by God, who cannot lie.

But a difficulty arises that twists exceedingly. For if the first root of our belief is the veracity of God, a circle follows: for when I ask, why do I believe the Incarnation? and answer, because God revealed it: and then am asked again: Why do you believe the revelation? and say: Because God cannot lie. Again, when it is asked: Why do I believe Him truthful? I answer: Because He Himself said and revealed that He is truthful. Behold a circle.

FURTHER, revelation is obscure, therefore it cannot of itself produce assent: so it must be reduced to human faith, so that I believe because it is revealed by the Church, which says that revelation was made to it by God; But whence do I know that this was revealed to it by God? Thus there will never be an end.

SOME seem to hold that our belief is reduced to human faith as its root. And this seems to be the view of Scotus, because at dist. 23. art. 1. he said with D. August. contra Manichaeos: I would not believe the Gospel, unless I believed the Catholic Church. But truly Scotus does not hold this, as Caspensis d. 1. sect. 3. and Mastrius num. 37. note very well; for Scotus knew that human faith is fallible, and therefore cannot be the basis of our belief.

It WILL seem, then, that our belief is resolved into God the truthful, who, however, since He is incidental to me, must become an evident revelation through something: Does another revelation then come forth? surely, and this too will be through another; and so to infinity: Or it is necessary that it rest in some revelation which first makes me certain; but every one is unevident unless some Light is added: Will there be a habit which carries us to assent? But surely then the assent would not be on account of the extrinsic authority of the one declaring; and so it will not be an act of Faith. Nor will it be a free act, but necessary. For thus a boy, arriving at the age of discretion, would be determined by an infused habit to the articles to be believed, the terms alone being foreknown; just as, the terms of natural principles being known, we assent to them. Scotus is agitated by these doubts, yet he inclines to our way of speaking, which resolves faith into the veridical revelation of God, as Smisingh, Aretinus, and Mastrius observe.

THEREFORE it must be known that the formal cause of my assent is the revelation of God the truthful declaring: but the material cause is the article itself; and among the articles, that one: I believe the holy Church, to which I believe, not simply moved by its bare attestation; for whence should I know that it cannot err? I am moved, therefore, dispositive by the Church: Because faith is from hearing: Rom. 10. It is, moreover, worthy of belief for many reasons: on account of the authority of so many wise men, on account of its integrity, on account of miracles which cannot be done by human power, etc. Nevertheless not even this suffices, but an efficient Light is required. Hence Ephes. 2. it is said: Faith is the gift of God, and John 6. No man comes to me unless the Father, who sent me, has drawn him. Thus, then, the Light of the Holy Spirit, with the infused habit also operating, inclines our will, so that it commands the intellect to give assent to the articles handed down by the Church, to which Church I believe as to a mistress of truth proposed to me by God, attesting, and dictating to me with His infallible truth, that she teaches the true faith. So D. Bonav. in 2. dist. 23. quaest. ult. and in 3. dist. 24. dub. 2. litt.

If, therefore, you are asked: Why do you believe the Symbol? Say: because God revealed it, who is truthful. By what means do you know this was revealed by God? Say: The Church tells me so. But whence do you know the Church does not err? Because the first Truth said that she is the mistress of truth; and this alone is the principle credible per se by divine faith, the divine light of the Holy Spirit operating, and the infused habit inclining. And thus one arrives at the root, which is the veracity of God; but this must be preceded by some disposition, lest a circle arise; and surely also by natural reason it is established that God is truthful, because He is the highest Being. See Valentia at the place cited; Artiagam disp. 1. sect. 4. num. 58.; Cardinalem de Lugo disp. 1. sect. 6.; Caspensem sect. 3.

From which it comes about that the Veracity of God is as it were the principle; but the Truth of revelation is the conclusion deduced, as Lugo shows sect. 7.

Nor indeed is the natural disposition for believing the veracity of God, and for inferring the truth of the articles, sufficient, but the concurrence of the supernatural is required.

HENCE a certain argument of Poncius is solved, disput. 27. quaest. 2. What connection (he says) has the veracity of God with the coming of Antichrist? For God would be truthful even if Antichrist were not to be: Therefore the veracity of God is not the formal object of faith. It is confirmed: for we believe even if we do not think about this veracity of God.

It is ANSWERED, that the Veracity of God, not entitative, but declaring, is the formal object of faith; and thus, although God could not reveal Antichrist, yet, revelation supposed, he is the material object, believed because revealed by God, whence arises the very formal ratio.

You will say with Vulpes, and the Author of the Controv. among the Scotists. If the ratio of belief is the Divine veracity, insofar as God willed to reveal. Therefore the will of God is the formal ratio of faith.

It is answered, that the will does not enter into the object of faith, but is supposed as a condition. From what has been said that question is almost solved: Whether revelation enters into the formal object of faith.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is a mere condition, that the articles be believed. So commonly the Scotists: Smisingh, Vulpes disp. 19. art. 1., Arretinus, and others, as cited by Meldula Tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 2. Suarez seems to approve this mode disp 3. sect. 2. et alii.

The SECOND opinion is, that it alone is the formal object of faith. So Poncius disp. 17. quaest. 2.

The THIRD opinion is, that the formal object of faith is the Divine Veracity declaring and revealing, and that in this way revelation is of the formal object of faith. So Suarez loc. cit.; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 1.; Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 2. at the end; Turrianus, Lugo, Coninch disp. 9. dub. 4.; Torres, Amicus, Arriaga, Tannerus, and other Recentiores, as cited by Meldula num. 54. The same is held by D. Bonav. at the very end.

It is proved from the Holy Doctor in foundation 6. That belongs to the formal ratio which constrains us to believe; but this is the article as revealed by God: Therefore. The minor is proved: for whenever there is talk of faith, it is expounded in reference to revelation, to testimony, and to the word, as is evident from the Scriptural testimonies alleged above.

Nor is it enough to say that this is a condition; for we are said through faith to receive the word of God; but surely we do not receive a condition, as Arriaga and another note.

Mastrius answers that we believe by the revelation of God insofar as He is truthful, or insofar as He is an infallible witness, and that this is understood tacitly in the Scriptures; therefore the formal ratio of our belief is the veracity of God; but revelation is a condition, as the application of fire is the cause of heat.

Against this: for from Mastrius num. 55., the sole internal speech of God does not suffice for the formal object of faith in complete act; but external revelation is required: therefore this enters into the formal object. And that the Veracity of God also intervenes is no obstacle; for it intervenes as declaring and revealing. Wherefore revelation does not stand to the assent of faith in the same way as the knowledge of the good stands to appetite, which is only a condition; for revelation is the connection of the Veracity of God with things, and it is the object of belief; for veracity entitatively is not the formal ratio, but in declaring, as Mastrius asserts num. 23. — surely not as asserting within itself, for that matters nothing, but as it says to me externally by revealing. Hence just as in a Syllogism not only the evidence of the premises is the cause of assent to the conclusion, but also the evidence of the consequence — for I assent to the conclusion because I see that it follows from the premises, which I know to be true — so also here. See Coninch. disp. 9. dub. 4. It is confirmed: for the external attestation of God has the same certitude as the first truth itself, as Amicus notes; and it unites the first truth with the object. Yet this question is of small moment.

From what has been said there also arises the question: Whether the formal ratio of the object of faith includes revelation as obscure, in such a way that it is not exposed to a clear instruction.

The FIRST opinion is that it pertains to the formal object of faith. So Suarez disp. 3. sect. 7.; Turrianus 2. 2. disp. 8. dub. 1.; Albertinus tom. 1. corol. quaest. 4. disp. 3.; and very many others; and it is D. Bonav., Foundation 3.

The SECOND opinion says it is only a condition. So Scotus 3. dist. 31. quaest. unica, C. ad 2., whom the Scotists follow, and Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 1. art. 6.; Bannes ibi, art. 4. disp. 1.; Durandus 3. dist. 24. quaest. 1.; Coninch. disp. 11. dub. 1.; Amicus disp. 2. sect. 4.; Bassol. 3. disp. 24. quaest. unic. art. 1.; Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 3. art. 1.

I ASSERT with the first opinion that obscure revelation enters into the formal ratio of faith.

It is proved most effectively by D. Bonav. loc. cit. That in which Faith differs from the other habits of the intellect pertains to the formal ratio; but faith essentially differs from science through inevidence: Therefore. The minor is proved: for that which is essentially destroyed when clear science arrives is opposed according to a difference; but this is obscurity: Therefore. The minor is proved: for when the vision of the fatherland arrives, faith is emptied out, 1 Corinth. 13. But even though there can be science and faith about the same object, as I shall say in quaest. 5., still faith retains its obscurity, because in believing it rests on an obscure authority, not on demonstration.

Scotus answers that the greater or lesser clarity comes from the greater or lesser approximation of agent and patient, which is a mere condition: thus from a greater nearness to the light, a body is more illuminated, and yet there is not another formal ratio of acting. So also Mastrius.

Secondly, Mastrius answers with Amicus by denying that the act of faith differs through obscurity, but through its proper formal object, which is the attestation of the truthful God declaring.

But these things are empty; for about the same object there is the science of vision and faith; and not only according to the material ratio, but even as revealed by God Himself, and yet faith, when vision arrives, is destroyed: therefore by an opposed difference. But what is it for faith to be from God revealing, or declaring, something different from what is revealed clearly in the fatherland, if not what I say? for that authority, conceived in the revelation of the way, will by no means cease, but will be seen evidently, the obscurity of the way being removed.

I know that the obscurity of the enigma is a condition added to the state of this blind man, as I said p. 1. tract. 4. disp. 5. quaest. 2. and tract. 10. disp. 1. quaest. 9.

Surely obscurity is handed down in the definition of faith by the Apostle, by whom faith is called the argument of things not appearing: Therefore. It is confirmed: for in this everywhere faith is expressly shown forth. But for this state 1. Cor. 13. calls it AEnigmatical. And 2 Peter 1. compares it to a lamp in a dark place. Hence D. August. Tract. 40. in Ioan.: What is faith? to believe what you do not see. It is confirmed by Suarez with the argument of D. Bonav. in the opusculo, Principium Scripturae, taken from D. August. lib. de utilitate credendi, cap. ult.: What we understand we must refer to reason; what we believe, to authority; but authority does not show the thing in itself: Therefore the obscurity of the object is of the ratio of faith.

Mastrius answers num. 83. that this is not a definition of faith, which he proves because the principal element in faith is omitted, that is, the authority of God.

But the Holy Fathers clearly say that it is a definition. I cited them in quaest. 1. That the authority of God is also posited there, Mastrius admits num. 64.

There arises, however, this doubt: Would there be an assent of faith concerning an obscure thing, if I knew evidently that it was so revealed by God, and thus that it was evident on the part of the revealer?

The FIRST opinion is the negative one: Durandi 3. dist. 23. quaest. unica; Suarez disp. 3. sect. 8. p. 3.; Turriani disp. 8. dub. 1.; Coninch. disp. 9. dub. 8.; Hurtadi disp. 27. sect. 1.; Lugo disp. 2. sect. 1.; Bannes ad articulum citatum of D. Thomas. And it is D. Bonav. 2. dist. 23. quaestione ultima.

Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 5. art. 1.; Ferrar. 3. cont. Gent. cap. 40.; Medina p. 2. quaest. 90. art. 1.; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 4., who cites S. Bonav.; Vasquez p. 1. disp. 135. cap. 3. and 3. p. disp. 53. cap. 1.; Amicus disp. 2. sect. 5.; and others AFFIRM it. And it is the opinion of Scotus 3. dist. 24. quaest. unic. §. sed si loquamur. His disciples follow him, and Mastac. disp. 3. sect. 4.; Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 1.; Tann. quaest. 5. art. 2., as cited by Mastrius, who subscribes disp. 6. quaest. 3. art. 2.; Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 5.; Morand. tract. un. quaest. 3., where he brings forward D. Bonaventure, Alensis, and Durandus. Indeed Tannerus and Mastac. bring forward D. Thomas quaest. 5. art. 2.; but there he speaks of the evidence of credibility, as Morandus weighs at the place cited, and Cardinal de Lugo in his tom. de fide, disp. 2. sect. 1. num. 46., who nevertheless says the former opinion is the common and truer one.

Becanus cap. 1. quaest. 5. and Arriaga disp. 4. sect. 4. seem to have followed the MIDDLE opinion, as I shall report in the arguments.

I CONFESS that in D. Bonav., where he is cited on 3. dist. 24. art. 2. quaest. 3., I do not find what is sought here, but only that faith can coexist with some scientific cognition. Yet he seems to indicate that opinion in the Hexaem. serm. 2. and 9.; but he teaches the opposite in the places to be cited.

I ASSERT with D. Bonav. that the evidence of the attester would put the thing outside the object of faith.

It is PROVED from Suarez with the argument of S. Bonavent. 3. dist. 24. dub. 1. litt. The assent of our faith is free, and hangs on the will. Hence Rom. 10. says: All do not believe the Gospel. But if there were evidence on the part of the revealer, so that we would clearly know that the revealer is God, who is the first infallible Truth; already the intellect would necessarily assent to the clear thing: Therefore it would not be an assent of faith. The minor is proved by this Syllogism, to which we necessarily assent. Whatever the first Truth reveals is true; but this the first Truth, by supposition, reveals, namely that God is Three: Therefore this is true.

RESPONDS Becanus, and Arriaga: the object of faith adequately includes not only revelation, but also the veracity of God. But when God the revealer is recognized, only the evidence of the revelation is clearly recognized, not the veracity of God; and therefore it is not evident according to the whole ratio of the formal object.

BUT the argument proved that the veracity of God is also clear, for when it is evidently known that the revealer is God, the first Truth is also known. Hence in the major is assumed: Whatever God reveals is true.

Responds Mastrius num. 91. that the consequence does not follow in that Syllogism, namely: Therefore it is evident that God is trine. But: Therefore it is true, is a testimony that the truth about the Trinity is true. Therefore the evidence is only extrinsically, not in the object.

Against this argues Suarez, for it is the same for this to be true, and for this to be so; for a proposition to be true is nothing else than for it to be so.

Mastrius answers, conceding that they are the same when cognition of the thing is had through intrinsic principles, or through effects intrinsically flowing from it; but not when cognition is had through an extrinsic principle, the attester. So he concludes with Amicus, that the known conclusion is deduced in the same way from known principles in the attester.

Cardinal de Lugo num. 9. protests that he cannot grasp this solution, and deservedly. Against it I argue thus: Every truth evident a posteriori infers an evident consequence; but this proposition: God, who is the first Truth, known evidently, has said that the Incarnation has taken place: Therefore it evidently follows that it has taken place; for this evidence does not arise from revelation alone, in the way in which this utterance: The Pontiff is ill, pronounced to me by a Notary, who can lie, and so the object is obscure to me, even though it is evident that he is a Notary of Rome; but in the evidence of the revealer the truth of the thing is included as evident, because God cannot lie. From this the argument of Mastrius num. 86. falls to the ground utterly. It can be evident that some witness asserts this, e. g. that Constantinople was burned, and yet remain unevident that the thing is so; for the ratio is disparate, as I said.

LET there be, therefore, this argument: It is evident that everything revealed by God is true, because God is the first Truth: but it is evident that this is a revelation of God: The Son of God is Incarnate: Therefore it is evident that it is true.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether a Syllogism consisting of one premise of faith and another naturally evident has a conclusion of faith.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it, for the conclusion follows the weaker part; but the weaker is natural truth than truth of faith. See Caspensem sect. 6. Valentiam puncto 2.