Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

What FIDES signifies, and what it is.

FIDES is said from fit (is made), and that is said to be made which is said. So St. Augustine, epist. 19, ad Hieronymum. He took this, however, from Tully, lib. 1, offic., where he says: Credimus, quia fiat, quod dictum est, appellatam fidem.

FROM this, ten modes have flowed forth in which Fides is taken according to St. Bonaventure. First it is taken for a Betrothal (Sponsio), in which sense the Apostle says of some, 1 Timoth. 5: Habentes damnationem, quia primam fidem irritam fecerunt — that is, the first faith owed by vow, because they vowed and did not render it, as St. August. explains, psalm. 75; and in the same sense, L. de Spiritu et lit. cap. 31: Aliter (he says) dicimus, non mihi habuit fidem: aliter autem, non mihi servavit fidem. Nam illud est, non credidit quod dixi: istud, non fecit quod dixit. Hence Fides is taken secondly for Fidelity in keeping a promise. Thus God is called faithful, Psalm. 144 and 1 Corinth. 10; the same, conversely, says of men, Hierem. 7: Periit fides in terra. Thirdly, Fides is taken for Conscience, Rom. 14: Omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Fourthly it is taken for the Sacrament of faith, or Baptism, in which sense St. August., epist. 23, ad Bonifacium, says: Non est aliud, parvulos habere fidem, quam habere fidei Sacramentum. Fifthly it is taken for the Assent to a conclusion proved by reason. In accordance with this Boët. says: Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae, faciens fidem. Sixthly it is taken for the Knowledge of comprehension. Thus it is said, Rom. 1: Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem. Gloss: In fidem spei, quae dicitur fides, quia fidentissima et certissima est. Seventhly it is taken for the Habit of unformed faith, James 2: Fides sine operibus mortua est. Eighthly, for the Habit of faith formed, Rom. 1: Iustus ex fide vivit. Ninthly, for the Act of faith, as St. Augustine says, Tract. 40 in Ioan.: Fides est credere, quod non vides. Tenthly it is taken for the Object of faith, as it is said in the Athanasian Symbol: Haec est fides Catholica. Apoc. 2: Non negasti fidem.

It is taken also more broadly for a good reputation: as when someone is said to be of no one's fides. Eccl. 17: Qui detegit arcana, fidem perdit; conversely, he is called worthy of credit (fide dignus) who is said to have obtained belief.

In these modes Fides is named by a certain analogy. But in this disputation we shall treat of Theological faith, which is a Habit belonging to the intellect, by which we believe infallibly, and without any misgiving, the things revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing; and it is the beginning of our Justification and the Root and Foundation of the remaining virtues.

FURTHER, that faith of which James, chap. 1, says, Postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans; and Matth. 14: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? and Marc. 11: Si habueritis fidem, dicetis monti huic, etc. — is rather reduced to Hope, and is confidence (fiducia), as Suarez admonishes, sect. 1, although Caspensis, disp. 1, sect. 1, wishes it to include Catholic faith, which I do not refuse. For this reason I judge the Apostle said: Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, etc., 1 Corinth. 13.

The definition of faith handed down, Heb. 11, shows faith conjoined with its Hope: Est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. It is called substantia, or subsistence of things hoped for, because it is the foundation of hope, for through it the things we hope for in some manner subsist in us, because it is proper to faith to buttress Hope and Confidence; for a man could not hope unless he believed. It is called argumentum, or conviction, because faith ought to be an assent no less firm from Divine authority than that evident assent is by which the intellect is convinced and induced by necessity. Non apparentium is added, because faith ought to be about things that are not seen. So it is expounded by St. Bonavent., quaest. 3, drawing on St. Augustine lib. 2 de peccatorum meritis et remiss. cap. 21 and other Fathers. Whence Erasmus, tastelessly and insolently, denies that this is a definition of faith. See the Holy Doctor, and Valencia disp. 1, quaest. 4, puncto 1, with St. Thom. quaest. 4, art. 1; Morandus, Tract. de fide, quaest. 12. To this agree the other definitions of faith adduced by the Fathers, some of which Tannerus reports, quaest. 7, dub. 5.

That this is the true definition of faith, all Theologians teach with the holy Fathers: Basil on psalm. 115, Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de vita Moysis, before the middle; Chrysostom, homil. 21 in epist. ad Heb.; Augustine, above; Hieron., in cap. 5 epistolae ad Galat.; Bernard, epist. 190. St. Thomas nevertheless confesses that it is not handed down in Scholastic terms.

It is proved, however, by St. Bonaventure that this definition is quidditative, to which St. Thomas and Richardus, 3 dist. 23, subscribe. For the Habit of a virtue can be made known from two heads, namely from the Object and the ultimate End; in the first way indeed a certain firm and certain intellectual habit is called the substance of the habit of virtue, which is the beginning and foundation of salvation, and hence the inchoation of eternal life. For just as substance is the prop of accidents, and the matter of the form and of the accidents themselves, so transumptively faith is called substance, because it is the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice; and therefore St. Damascene, lib. 4 de fide, cap. 11, defines it thus: Fides est hypostasis eorum, quae sperantur; et redargutio eorum, quae non videntur, as the Holy Doctor observes, ad 1.

¶ Then its essence is expounded from the acts and the object; for habits are distinguished, or even specified, by acts, and acts by objects. It therefore expounds its act concerning the ultimate end believed, that is, God, who is not yet possessed, but hoped for, and therefore it says: sperandarum. And that that assent concerning the ultimate end may be shown not evident, it says: non apparentium — for in this Faith is distinguished from science; and yet that that assent may be acknowledged most certain, it says argumentum, or convictio, as others read.

That the Apostle is there speaking of Theological Faith is evident from the Councils, which, to show the necessity of faith, bring forward testimonies from this passage of the Apostle. It is confirmed, for there, chap. 10, the Apostle adduces that word of Habacuc, Iustus ex fide vivit. See the Holy Doctor on several Martyrs, sermone 18.

You object first: No habit is a substance; Faith is a habit: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that faith is called substance transumptively, as I said.

You object secondly: No virtue is an argument. Faith is a virtue: Therefore. If you say that argument is taken transumptively: On the contrary; because it implies being an argument, and yet of things not apparent.

The Holy Doctor answers that argument is said in two ways, properly and transumptively. Properly it is taken in four ways. First, Ratiocination is called argument, which is divided into six principal species: Syllogism, Induction, Enthymeme, Example, Sorites, and Dilemma. Secondly, argument is called a brief collection of a prolix discourse. Thirdly, the argument is called the very medium, in which the strength of the argu­ing stands. Fourthly, the argument is called the very maximal proposition, in which consists the whole force of the illation. In all these ways faith is called argument, because it convinces and illuminates the mind to adhere firmly to the object. And it is called the argument of things not apparent: because it makes one adhere more firmly to the object believed than a Demonstration makes one adhere to the object demonstrated.

You object thirdly. This definition can also fit Hope, which is the substance of things hoped for and the argument of things not apparent; because through it we are certified that we shall have the things we do not see.

It is answered that Faith is the substance, or foundation, of all the virtues; but not Hope, which is neither an argument, etc., because it does not make one assent to the truth.

You object fourthly. To Faith it belongs to believe also the eternal punishments, which are not hoped for, but feared: Therefore it is not sufficiently called the argument of things hoped for.

The Holy Doctor answers that the punishments are contained under the things hoped for, as it were under the end, though not as under the object; for one believes eternal punishments precisely in order that he may attain the eternal goods to be hoped for.

You object fifthly. A thing prior ought not to be defined by things posterior and less known: But Faith is posterior to Hope, and better known than the things that are not apparent: Therefore.

St. Bonaventure answers by denying the Minor; For it is defined by the end and the object; and although the end of faith itself, which is the things hoped for, is posterior in execution, yet it is prior in intention. And although the object of faith, not apparent in truth, is unknown to the infidel man, yet it is known to the man having faith. And even if it is unknown what sort of thing it is, yet it is known that it does not appear, and thus the definition is not by the posterior and the less known, but by what is prior and known.

You object sixthly. For the clearness of a definition it belongs that prior things be set before posterior ones. If, therefore, cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is an argument, regards cognition, while insofar as it is the substance of things hoped for it regards affection: therefore the definition is confused, while it says first: substantia rerum sperandarum.

The Holy Doctor answers that the intellect follows the affection when it is inclined to assent to a thing by the command of the will, and in this way faith is a Virtue, because its assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore rightly the Apostle puts first that which regards the affection before that which pertains to the intellect.

You object seventhly. Faith is the foundation not only of Hope, but also of Charity, and of the whole spiritual edifice: Therefore it is the substance also of things to be loved, and not only of things to be hoped for; and the more it ought to have enumerated these, the more noble they are. Item, it is about things both past and future: Therefore it is badly defined as being only of things hoped for.

The Holy Doctor answers that faith is defined in order to the end toward which it tends; and therefore it is defined in order to the things to be hoped for, which are the end of the virtue, and of our whole expectation of beatitude in the wayfaring state, which stands in the vision and love of God.

You object eighthly. Unformed faith is true faith; and yet it is not the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore it is badly defined as formed faith alone.

The Holy Doctor answers in corpore that if foundation be taken for what is actual and sufficient, formed faith alone is understood, for unformed faith is still an unformed foundation. This same St. Thomas intends, quaest. 5, art. 7, ad 4, as Valencia notes, ad 3.

You object ninthly. A believer in despair has faith without hope.

Valencia answers: For this reason faith is said to be the foundation of the things to be hoped for, not hoped. From what has been said the definitions of Calvin and Kemnitius collapse — that faith is a certain credulity of the Divine benevolence and grace toward us. For these suppose that heresy, that we are held to believe that we ourselves are predestined, and in grace.