Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
The SUN is not seen otherwise than by the light which it itself gives; nor does God suffer himself to be seen by another's light: Faith alone points the way from where it itself has come. This is that light created first in the first Microcosm, separating night from day, indeed the first-born of the heavenly virtues, and therefore to be set forth in the first place: On one side it shines forth, and on the other it darkens, like that pillar of cloud, bright indeed to the Israelites, but dark to the Egyptians: It is indeed a Mirror, veiled with much obscurity, yet with no stain of error, exhibiting the great in a small form: It is also that triangular Shield, which, showing God to us as three and one, extinguishes all the darts of the most wicked one: Taking it up in all things, we shall resist valiantly in faith, defending it with those reasons which it itself brings forth, in place of the virtues.
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
What FIDES signifies, and what it is.
FIDES is said from fit (is made), and that is said to be made which is said. So St. Augustine, epist. 19, ad Hieronymum. He took this, however, from Tully, lib. 1, offic., where he says: Credimus, quia fiat, quod dictum est, appellatam fidem.
FROM this, ten modes have flowed forth in which Fides is taken according to St. Bonaventure. First it is taken for a Betrothal (Sponsio), in which sense the Apostle says of some, 1 Timoth. 5: Habentes damnationem, quia primam fidem irritam fecerunt — that is, the first faith owed by vow, because they vowed and did not render it, as St. August. explains, psalm. 75; and in the same sense, L. de Spiritu et lit. cap. 31: Aliter (he says) dicimus, non mihi habuit fidem: aliter autem, non mihi servavit fidem. Nam illud est, non credidit quod dixi: istud, non fecit quod dixit. Hence Fides is taken secondly for Fidelity in keeping a promise. Thus God is called faithful, Psalm. 144 and 1 Corinth. 10; the same, conversely, says of men, Hierem. 7: Periit fides in terra. Thirdly, Fides is taken for Conscience, Rom. 14: Omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Fourthly it is taken for the Sacrament of faith, or Baptism, in which sense St. August., epist. 23, ad Bonifacium, says: Non est aliud, parvulos habere fidem, quam habere fidei Sacramentum. Fifthly it is taken for the Assent to a conclusion proved by reason. In accordance with this Boët. says: Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae, faciens fidem. Sixthly it is taken for the Knowledge of comprehension. Thus it is said, Rom. 1: Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem. Gloss: In fidem spei, quae dicitur fides, quia fidentissima et certissima est. Seventhly it is taken for the Habit of unformed faith, James 2: Fides sine operibus mortua est. Eighthly, for the Habit of faith formed, Rom. 1: Iustus ex fide vivit. Ninthly, for the Act of faith, as St. Augustine says, Tract. 40 in Ioan.: Fides est credere, quod non vides. Tenthly it is taken for the Object of faith, as it is said in the Athanasian Symbol: Haec est fides Catholica. Apoc. 2: Non negasti fidem.
It is taken also more broadly for a good reputation: as when someone is said to be of no one's fides. Eccl. 17: Qui detegit arcana, fidem perdit; conversely, he is called worthy of credit (fide dignus) who is said to have obtained belief.
In these modes Fides is named by a certain analogy. But in this disputation we shall treat of Theological faith, which is a Habit belonging to the intellect, by which we believe infallibly, and without any misgiving, the things revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing; and it is the beginning of our Justification and the Root and Foundation of the remaining virtues.
FURTHER, that faith of which James, chap. 1, says, Postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans; and Matth. 14: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? and Marc. 11: Si habueritis fidem, dicetis monti huic, etc. — is rather reduced to Hope, and is confidence (fiducia), as Suarez admonishes, sect. 1, although Caspensis, disp. 1, sect. 1, wishes it to include Catholic faith, which I do not refuse. For this reason I judge the Apostle said: Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, etc., 1 Corinth. 13.
The definition of faith handed down, Heb. 11, shows faith conjoined with its Hope: Est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. It is called substantia, or subsistence of things hoped for, because it is the foundation of hope, for through it the things we hope for in some manner subsist in us, because it is proper to faith to buttress Hope and Confidence; for a man could not hope unless he believed. It is called argumentum, or conviction, because faith ought to be an assent no less firm from Divine authority than that evident assent is by which the intellect is convinced and induced by necessity. Non apparentium is added, because faith ought to be about things that are not seen. So it is expounded by St. Bonavent., quaest. 3, drawing on St. Augustine lib. 2 de peccatorum meritis et remiss. cap. 21 and other Fathers. Whence Erasmus, tastelessly and insolently, denies that this is a definition of faith. See the Holy Doctor, and Valencia disp. 1, quaest. 4, puncto 1, with St. Thom. quaest. 4, art. 1; Morandus, Tract. de fide, quaest. 12. To this agree the other definitions of faith adduced by the Fathers, some of which Tannerus reports, quaest. 7, dub. 5.
That this is the true definition of faith, all Theologians teach with the holy Fathers: Basil on psalm. 115, Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de vita Moysis, before the middle; Chrysostom, homil. 21 in epist. ad Heb.; Augustine, above; Hieron., in cap. 5 epistolae ad Galat.; Bernard, epist. 190. St. Thomas nevertheless confesses that it is not handed down in Scholastic terms.
It is proved, however, by St. Bonaventure that this definition is quidditative, to which St. Thomas and Richardus, 3 dist. 23, subscribe. For the Habit of a virtue can be made known from two heads, namely from the Object and the ultimate End; in the first way indeed a certain firm and certain intellectual habit is called the substance of the habit of virtue, which is the beginning and foundation of salvation, and hence the inchoation of eternal life. For just as substance is the prop of accidents, and the matter of the form and of the accidents themselves, so transumptively faith is called substance, because it is the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice; and therefore St. Damascene, lib. 4 de fide, cap. 11, defines it thus: Fides est hypostasis eorum, quae sperantur; et redargutio eorum, quae non videntur, as the Holy Doctor observes, ad 1.
¶ Then its essence is expounded from the acts and the object; for habits are distinguished, or even specified, by acts, and acts by objects. It therefore expounds its act concerning the ultimate end believed, that is, God, who is not yet possessed, but hoped for, and therefore it says: sperandarum. And that that assent concerning the ultimate end may be shown not evident, it says: non apparentium — for in this Faith is distinguished from science; and yet that that assent may be acknowledged most certain, it says argumentum, or convictio, as others read.
That the Apostle is there speaking of Theological Faith is evident from the Councils, which, to show the necessity of faith, bring forward testimonies from this passage of the Apostle. It is confirmed, for there, chap. 10, the Apostle adduces that word of Habacuc, Iustus ex fide vivit. See the Holy Doctor on several Martyrs, sermone 18.
You object first: No habit is a substance; Faith is a habit: Therefore.
The Holy Doctor answers that faith is called substance transumptively, as I said.
You object secondly: No virtue is an argument. Faith is a virtue: Therefore. If you say that argument is taken transumptively: On the contrary; because it implies being an argument, and yet of things not apparent.
The Holy Doctor answers that argument is said in two ways, properly and transumptively. Properly it is taken in four ways. First, Ratiocination is called argument, which is divided into six principal species: Syllogism, Induction, Enthymeme, Example, Sorites, and Dilemma. Secondly, argument is called a brief collection of a prolix discourse. Thirdly, the argument is called the very medium, in which the strength of the arguing stands. Fourthly, the argument is called the very maximal proposition, in which consists the whole force of the illation. In all these ways faith is called argument, because it convinces and illuminates the mind to adhere firmly to the object. And it is called the argument of things not apparent: because it makes one adhere more firmly to the object believed than a Demonstration makes one adhere to the object demonstrated.
You object thirdly. This definition can also fit Hope, which is the substance of things hoped for and the argument of things not apparent; because through it we are certified that we shall have the things we do not see.
It is answered that Faith is the substance, or foundation, of all the virtues; but not Hope, which is neither an argument, etc., because it does not make one assent to the truth.
You object fourthly. To Faith it belongs to believe also the eternal punishments, which are not hoped for, but feared: Therefore it is not sufficiently called the argument of things hoped for.
The Holy Doctor answers that the punishments are contained under the things hoped for, as it were under the end, though not as under the object; for one believes eternal punishments precisely in order that he may attain the eternal goods to be hoped for.
You object fifthly. A thing prior ought not to be defined by things posterior and less known: But Faith is posterior to Hope, and better known than the things that are not apparent: Therefore.
St. Bonaventure answers by denying the Minor; For it is defined by the end and the object; and although the end of faith itself, which is the things hoped for, is posterior in execution, yet it is prior in intention. And although the object of faith, not apparent in truth, is unknown to the infidel man, yet it is known to the man having faith. And even if it is unknown what sort of thing it is, yet it is known that it does not appear, and thus the definition is not by the posterior and the less known, but by what is prior and known.
You object sixthly. For the clearness of a definition it belongs that prior things be set before posterior ones. If, therefore, cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is an argument, regards cognition, while insofar as it is the substance of things hoped for it regards affection: therefore the definition is confused, while it says first: substantia rerum sperandarum.
The Holy Doctor answers that the intellect follows the affection when it is inclined to assent to a thing by the command of the will, and in this way faith is a Virtue, because its assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore rightly the Apostle puts first that which regards the affection before that which pertains to the intellect.
You object seventhly. Faith is the foundation not only of Hope, but also of Charity, and of the whole spiritual edifice: Therefore it is the substance also of things to be loved, and not only of things to be hoped for; and the more it ought to have enumerated these, the more noble they are. Item, it is about things both past and future: Therefore it is badly defined as being only of things hoped for.
The Holy Doctor answers that faith is defined in order to the end toward which it tends; and therefore it is defined in order to the things to be hoped for, which are the end of the virtue, and of our whole expectation of beatitude in the wayfaring state, which stands in the vision and love of God.
You object eighthly. Unformed faith is true faith; and yet it is not the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore it is badly defined as formed faith alone.
The Holy Doctor answers in corpore that if foundation be taken for what is actual and sufficient, formed faith alone is understood, for unformed faith is still an unformed foundation. This same St. Thomas intends, quaest. 5, art. 7, ad 4, as Valencia notes, ad 3.
You object ninthly. A believer in despair has faith without hope.
Valencia answers: For this reason faith is said to be the foundation of the things to be hoped for, not hoped. From what has been said the definitions of Calvin and Kemnitius collapse — that faith is a certain credulity of the Divine benevolence and grace toward us. For these suppose that heresy, that we are held to believe that we ourselves are predestined, and in grace.
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
That we may find the most excellent definition and essence of FAITH, we must examine the object, from which the essence is taken, or at least is known a posteriori.
D. Bonaventure observes in the body of the text that a twofold object is assigned, one material, called the Quod (That which); the other formal, the Quo (That by which), concerning which see p. 1. tract. 1. quaest. 4. The material is the thing considered; the formal is the ratio by which, and under which, it is considered.
All concede that God is the principal Quod object of our faith, against Calvin, book 2. Institut. cap. 6., who holds that not God alone is the object of faith, but also Christ, as He is Man. So the Holy Doctor here, and D. Thomas here, and p. 1. quaest. 1. art. 7.; Alensis 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 6.; Albert. 3. dist. 23. art. 12.; Durand. ibi quaest. 1.; Capreolus in Prol. sent. quaest. 4. art. 2. around the fifth conclusion; Caiet. ad art. cit. of D. Thomas; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. punct. 1.; Caspens. tract. 15. sect. 1.; Morand. tract. unico in 2. 2. quaest. 1.; Scotus 3. dist. 23. quaest. un.; G. and his followers; Mastrius tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1.; Vulpes tom. 2. p. 3. disp. 30. art. 2.; Arriaga tom. 5. tract. 1. disput. 1. sect. 1.; Suarez disp. 2. sect. 1. and 2.; Cardinal Lugo tract. de fide disp. 3. sect. 2.; Amicus tom. 4. disp. 1. sect. 1. and following; Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2., who say it is the common view. Yet some deny that God is the object of attribution as God, but will have it to be God complexly, as willing to beatify. So Vulpes with Gregory quaest. 4. prol. art. 2. and other Nominalists. They rely on John 20. These things are written, that you may believe, and that believing you may have life in his name; but this opinion is refuted even by the Scotists; nor does it rest on Scotus, as Mastrius notes num. 8. Arriaga indeed grants that God is the principal object of faith; but he denies that He is the object of attribution; and Mastrius notes that many Recentiores stumble here, confusing the principal object with the object of attribution, which many call the adequate object.
OTHERS, however, distinguishing these two objects, assert that God is the object in both ways. So Morandus.
OTHERS distinguish the principal object, and the material object of attribution, from the adequate, as Caspensis with Suarez. These, however, are disputes of no great weight.
D. Bonaventure holds that the principal material object, and the object of attribution, is God; yet it is not the adequate material object. This is the common opinion, from Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2. and Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1.
I ASSERT first, that the principal object, and the object of attribution, of faith is God.
It is PROVED first from D. Bonav., because Faith is a Theological virtue, which has God for its object. For this reason Faith is often denominated from God: Mark 11. Have the faith of God. John 14. You believe in God, believe also in me. Ephes. 4. One Lord, one faith. From the unity of God note the unity of faith: 1 Thessal. 1. In every place your faith, which is towards God, has gone forth. Hebr. 6. Not casting aside again the foundation from dead works, and of faith towards God. Hebr. 11. He that comes to God must believe that he is. It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor from the Symbol: I believe in God. The same is taught by the Holy Fathers: Aug. lib. 4. de civit. cap. 20.; Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.; Irenaeus lib. 4. cap. 13.; and others. So argue Caspens. and others.
It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Every simple habit ought to have one object, to which all things are reduced; but faith is one habit, and has no other to which all objects are reduced than the Uncreated True, that is, God: Therefore. The major is clear. The minor is proved first from the Apostle, who often testifies that our faith is ordered to the knowledge of God. So Ephes. 1. Coloss. 2. and 3., as cited by Valentia; and from D. August. l. 1. de civitate, cap. 2. It is confirmed: for God is the most excellent object of faith.
I ASSERT second, that the adequate material object comprises many things besides God.
It is PROVED from S. Bonav. first from the Symbol, in which are proposed, besides God, the things to be believed: Creation, Incarnation, and other Mysteries of the Redemption, the Universal Judgment, the Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection, and eternal life.
It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Faith is of as great amplitude as charity; for we believe the things that are to be loved, and the things that are believed are loved supernaturally. Indeed faith believes even things not to be loved, as eternal punishments; but charity loves not only the Uncreated Good, but also our neighbor and other created things: Therefore.
It is PROVED third from the Holy Doctor, because no future thing is God. But future things are believed, namely eternal life, retribution, and the infliction of punishments: Therefore. The major is evident; for God is eternal.
It is PROVED fourth from the Holy Doctor. If anyone did not believe the histories of Scripture, even the smallest details, as that Saul sought the asses, 1 Reg. 9., or that Tobias's dog wagged his tail, he would be a heretic.
But Arriaga denies that these are ordered to God. Indeed Scotus, 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2., denies that the faith of such things is ordered to God. Yet surely these too are not proposed in vain to be believed on faith: For with the heart we believe unto justice: but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation: Roman. 10.
He ANSWERS, then, that such minutiae are ordered to God, who is truthful even in the smallest things. Moreover Saul's solicitude denotes his obedience, by which he made himself worthy of command; and the exultation of the dog indicates the Divine goodness, which sent forward even a rejoicing little creature as a messenger to the blind man FOR HIM. Nevertheless faith is denominated from the principal object, that is, from God and from Christ, because this is our faith properly so called. Hence Calvin is mocked.
It is PROVED finally, because prophecy accompanies faith; and that is concerning created good.
AS REGARDS the formal object, there is greater difficulty.
The FIRST opinion, which is ascribed to Aureolus 3. dist. 24. art. 2. and is defended by Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 1. art. 1., asserts that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of first truth in being, and consequently under the ratio of deity. Bannes seems to follow him here, Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1., Tann. num. 25., and others cited by him. These, however, call the formal object the Quod.
The TRUE opinion is, that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of the truthful revealer. So S. Bonav. in the body of the text, where he brings forward a similitude: For just as a Luminous body moves a power, as its object, when it is set before it either in Light, or as incorporated into earthly matter, as in the adamant and the carbuncle; so Divine truth moves the intellect in a twofold way, either as it is per se in the articles referring to God, or as united to a creature, as in the humanity of Christ, or in some other work. All the Thomists and Scotists follow him, with Scotus quaest. 1. Prol. and others as related by Mastrius num. 21., Tannerus dub. 3., Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1. §. 4., Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1., Bassaeus v. Fides.
VULPES, however, declines aside with a crooked nail, saying that God, as willing to reveal, is the formal object of faith. Surely He is believed because we have in fact that God has already revealed; yet we may say that faith embraces everything that God shall will to reveal, for we are bound to believe also what the Church is going to declare in a Council, Decree, or the like.
THEREFORE our opinion is also that of Alensis 3. p. quaest. 78. membr. 4.; Alberti 3. dist. 23. art. 7. and 12.; Altisiodor. lib. 3. summa, Tract. 3. cap. 1. quaest. 3.; Richardi 3. dist. 23. art. 4. quaest. 3.; Durand. ibi, quaest. 7. num. 12., and dist. 24. quaest. 1. and quaest. 2.; Capreol. dist. 24. quaest. unica, art. 1. concl. 4.; Gabrielis dist. 23. quaest. 2. art. 1.; Marsil. 3. quaest. 14.; Cani. Lib. 12. de locis Theolog. cap. 3.; and the rest cited above.
Soto 3. dist. 23. quaest. un. art. 2. and Gulielm. Paris. de fide DECLINE from it, saying that we believe God, not because He is truthful, or because what He says is true, but because He commands it to be so believed; and thus faith would be an effect of the obedience of the intellect exhibited to God.
I ASSERT with D. Bonaventure that the formal object of faith, the Quo, is the first truth revealing.
It is PROVED first from the Holy Doctor in foundation 4. In that is the formal ratio of faith by which we firmly assent to the articles and mysteries; but this is the Divine truth and authority revealing: Therefore. So argue Valentia, Mastrius, and the rest. The minor is proved: for Scripture testifies to this in 1 John 5., where He gives as the reason why we should believe none other than that: The Spirit is he who testifies; and he argues from the lesser: If we receive the testimony of men; the testimony of God is greater. 1 Thessal. 2. When you had received from us the word of hearing, that is, of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who works in you that have believed. And 1 Timot. 3. All Scripture inspired of God, etc. And 2 Peter 1. The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. The same is found in Matth. 16. Flesh and blood has not revealed it to you, but my Father. John 1. The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared it. 2 Corinth. 4. God has shone in our hearts, etc. Galat. 1. For neither did I receive it (the Gospel) of man, but by revelation.
The same holds S. Dion. cap. 7. de Divinis nominibus; Irenaeus libro 4. cap. 14.; Athan. in oratione, quod unus sit Christus; Chrysost. homil. 8. in secundam ad Corinth.; Ambrosius serm. 21.; Hieron. in cap. 1. ad Titum,; August. contra epist. fundam. capite 14. The Holy Doctor confirms it from Richard of S. Victor.
From these you have that the Divine truth entitatively in being is rather the Quod object, partial, of our faith. I know that the Divine truth in being is the first root of belief: for when I believe some revealed thing, I believe it because it is revealed by God, who cannot lie.
But a difficulty arises that twists exceedingly. For if the first root of our belief is the veracity of God, a circle follows: for when I ask, why do I believe the Incarnation? and answer, because God revealed it: and then am asked again: Why do you believe the revelation? and say: Because God cannot lie. Again, when it is asked: Why do I believe Him truthful? I answer: Because He Himself said and revealed that He is truthful. Behold a circle.
FURTHER, revelation is obscure, therefore it cannot of itself produce assent: so it must be reduced to human faith, so that I believe because it is revealed by the Church, which says that revelation was made to it by God; But whence do I know that this was revealed to it by God? Thus there will never be an end.
SOME seem to hold that our belief is reduced to human faith as its root. And this seems to be the view of Scotus, because at dist. 23. art. 1. he said with D. August. contra Manichaeos: I would not believe the Gospel, unless I believed the Catholic Church. But truly Scotus does not hold this, as Caspensis d. 1. sect. 3. and Mastrius num. 37. note very well; for Scotus knew that human faith is fallible, and therefore cannot be the basis of our belief.
It WILL seem, then, that our belief is resolved into God the truthful, who, however, since He is incidental to me, must become an evident revelation through something: Does another revelation then come forth? surely, and this too will be through another; and so to infinity: Or it is necessary that it rest in some revelation which first makes me certain; but every one is unevident unless some Light is added: Will there be a habit which carries us to assent? But surely then the assent would not be on account of the extrinsic authority of the one declaring; and so it will not be an act of Faith. Nor will it be a free act, but necessary. For thus a boy, arriving at the age of discretion, would be determined by an infused habit to the articles to be believed, the terms alone being foreknown; just as, the terms of natural principles being known, we assent to them. Scotus is agitated by these doubts, yet he inclines to our way of speaking, which resolves faith into the veridical revelation of God, as Smisingh, Aretinus, and Mastrius observe.
THEREFORE it must be known that the formal cause of my assent is the revelation of God the truthful declaring: but the material cause is the article itself; and among the articles, that one: I believe the holy Church, to which I believe, not simply moved by its bare attestation; for whence should I know that it cannot err? I am moved, therefore, dispositive by the Church: Because faith is from hearing: Rom. 10. It is, moreover, worthy of belief for many reasons: on account of the authority of so many wise men, on account of its integrity, on account of miracles which cannot be done by human power, etc. Nevertheless not even this suffices, but an efficient Light is required. Hence Ephes. 2. it is said: Faith is the gift of God, and John 6. No man comes to me unless the Father, who sent me, has drawn him. Thus, then, the Light of the Holy Spirit, with the infused habit also operating, inclines our will, so that it commands the intellect to give assent to the articles handed down by the Church, to which Church I believe as to a mistress of truth proposed to me by God, attesting, and dictating to me with His infallible truth, that she teaches the true faith. So D. Bonav. in 2. dist. 23. quaest. ult. and in 3. dist. 24. dub. 2. litt.
If, therefore, you are asked: Why do you believe the Symbol? Say: because God revealed it, who is truthful. By what means do you know this was revealed by God? Say: The Church tells me so. But whence do you know the Church does not err? Because the first Truth said that she is the mistress of truth; and this alone is the principle credible per se by divine faith, the divine light of the Holy Spirit operating, and the infused habit inclining. And thus one arrives at the root, which is the veracity of God; but this must be preceded by some disposition, lest a circle arise; and surely also by natural reason it is established that God is truthful, because He is the highest Being. See Valentia at the place cited; Artiagam disp. 1. sect. 4. num. 58.; Cardinalem de Lugo disp. 1. sect. 6.; Caspensem sect. 3.
From which it comes about that the Veracity of God is as it were the principle; but the Truth of revelation is the conclusion deduced, as Lugo shows sect. 7.
Nor indeed is the natural disposition for believing the veracity of God, and for inferring the truth of the articles, sufficient, but the concurrence of the supernatural is required.
HENCE a certain argument of Poncius is solved, disput. 27. quaest. 2. What connection (he says) has the veracity of God with the coming of Antichrist? For God would be truthful even if Antichrist were not to be: Therefore the veracity of God is not the formal object of faith. It is confirmed: for we believe even if we do not think about this veracity of God.
It is ANSWERED, that the Veracity of God, not entitative, but declaring, is the formal object of faith; and thus, although God could not reveal Antichrist, yet, revelation supposed, he is the material object, believed because revealed by God, whence arises the very formal ratio.
You will say with Vulpes, and the Author of the Controv. among the Scotists. If the ratio of belief is the Divine veracity, insofar as God willed to reveal. Therefore the will of God is the formal ratio of faith.
It is answered, that the will does not enter into the object of faith, but is supposed as a condition. From what has been said that question is almost solved: Whether revelation enters into the formal object of faith.
The FIRST opinion is, that it is a mere condition, that the articles be believed. So commonly the Scotists: Smisingh, Vulpes disp. 19. art. 1., Arretinus, and others, as cited by Meldula Tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 2. Suarez seems to approve this mode disp 3. sect. 2. et alii.
The SECOND opinion is, that it alone is the formal object of faith. So Poncius disp. 17. quaest. 2.
The THIRD opinion is, that the formal object of faith is the Divine Veracity declaring and revealing, and that in this way revelation is of the formal object of faith. So Suarez loc. cit.; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 1.; Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 2. at the end; Turrianus, Lugo, Coninch disp. 9. dub. 4.; Torres, Amicus, Arriaga, Tannerus, and other Recentiores, as cited by Meldula num. 54. The same is held by D. Bonav. at the very end.
It is proved from the Holy Doctor in foundation 6. That belongs to the formal ratio which constrains us to believe; but this is the article as revealed by God: Therefore. The minor is proved: for whenever there is talk of faith, it is expounded in reference to revelation, to testimony, and to the word, as is evident from the Scriptural testimonies alleged above.
Nor is it enough to say that this is a condition; for we are said through faith to receive the word of God; but surely we do not receive a condition, as Arriaga and another note.
Mastrius answers that we believe by the revelation of God insofar as He is truthful, or insofar as He is an infallible witness, and that this is understood tacitly in the Scriptures; therefore the formal ratio of our belief is the veracity of God; but revelation is a condition, as the application of fire is the cause of heat.
Against this: for from Mastrius num. 55., the sole internal speech of God does not suffice for the formal object of faith in complete act; but external revelation is required: therefore this enters into the formal object. And that the Veracity of God also intervenes is no obstacle; for it intervenes as declaring and revealing. Wherefore revelation does not stand to the assent of faith in the same way as the knowledge of the good stands to appetite, which is only a condition; for revelation is the connection of the Veracity of God with things, and it is the object of belief; for veracity entitatively is not the formal ratio, but in declaring, as Mastrius asserts num. 23. — surely not as asserting within itself, for that matters nothing, but as it says to me externally by revealing. Hence just as in a Syllogism not only the evidence of the premises is the cause of assent to the conclusion, but also the evidence of the consequence — for I assent to the conclusion because I see that it follows from the premises, which I know to be true — so also here. See Coninch. disp. 9. dub. 4. It is confirmed: for the external attestation of God has the same certitude as the first truth itself, as Amicus notes; and it unites the first truth with the object. Yet this question is of small moment.
From what has been said there also arises the question: Whether the formal ratio of the object of faith includes revelation as obscure, in such a way that it is not exposed to a clear instruction.
The FIRST opinion is that it pertains to the formal object of faith. So Suarez disp. 3. sect. 7.; Turrianus 2. 2. disp. 8. dub. 1.; Albertinus tom. 1. corol. quaest. 4. disp. 3.; and very many others; and it is D. Bonav., Foundation 3.
The SECOND opinion says it is only a condition. So Scotus 3. dist. 31. quaest. unica, C. ad 2., whom the Scotists follow, and Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 1. art. 6.; Bannes ibi, art. 4. disp. 1.; Durandus 3. dist. 24. quaest. 1.; Coninch. disp. 11. dub. 1.; Amicus disp. 2. sect. 4.; Bassol. 3. disp. 24. quaest. unic. art. 1.; Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 3. art. 1.
I ASSERT with the first opinion that obscure revelation enters into the formal ratio of faith.
It is proved most effectively by D. Bonav. loc. cit. That in which Faith differs from the other habits of the intellect pertains to the formal ratio; but faith essentially differs from science through inevidence: Therefore. The minor is proved: for that which is essentially destroyed when clear science arrives is opposed according to a difference; but this is obscurity: Therefore. The minor is proved: for when the vision of the fatherland arrives, faith is emptied out, 1 Corinth. 13. But even though there can be science and faith about the same object, as I shall say in quaest. 5., still faith retains its obscurity, because in believing it rests on an obscure authority, not on demonstration.
Scotus answers that the greater or lesser clarity comes from the greater or lesser approximation of agent and patient, which is a mere condition: thus from a greater nearness to the light, a body is more illuminated, and yet there is not another formal ratio of acting. So also Mastrius.
Secondly, Mastrius answers with Amicus by denying that the act of faith differs through obscurity, but through its proper formal object, which is the attestation of the truthful God declaring.
But these things are empty; for about the same object there is the science of vision and faith; and not only according to the material ratio, but even as revealed by God Himself, and yet faith, when vision arrives, is destroyed: therefore by an opposed difference. But what is it for faith to be from God revealing, or declaring, something different from what is revealed clearly in the fatherland, if not what I say? for that authority, conceived in the revelation of the way, will by no means cease, but will be seen evidently, the obscurity of the way being removed.
I know that the obscurity of the enigma is a condition added to the state of this blind man, as I said p. 1. tract. 4. disp. 5. quaest. 2. and tract. 10. disp. 1. quaest. 9.
Surely obscurity is handed down in the definition of faith by the Apostle, by whom faith is called the argument of things not appearing: Therefore. It is confirmed: for in this everywhere faith is expressly shown forth. But for this state 1. Cor. 13. calls it AEnigmatical. And 2 Peter 1. compares it to a lamp in a dark place. Hence D. August. Tract. 40. in Ioan.: What is faith? to believe what you do not see. It is confirmed by Suarez with the argument of D. Bonav. in the opusculo, Principium Scripturae, taken from D. August. lib. de utilitate credendi, cap. ult.: What we understand we must refer to reason; what we believe, to authority; but authority does not show the thing in itself: Therefore the obscurity of the object is of the ratio of faith.
Mastrius answers num. 83. that this is not a definition of faith, which he proves because the principal element in faith is omitted, that is, the authority of God.
But the Holy Fathers clearly say that it is a definition. I cited them in quaest. 1. That the authority of God is also posited there, Mastrius admits num. 64.
There arises, however, this doubt: Would there be an assent of faith concerning an obscure thing, if I knew evidently that it was so revealed by God, and thus that it was evident on the part of the revealer?
The FIRST opinion is the negative one: Durandi 3. dist. 23. quaest. unica; Suarez disp. 3. sect. 8. p. 3.; Turriani disp. 8. dub. 1.; Coninch. disp. 9. dub. 8.; Hurtadi disp. 27. sect. 1.; Lugo disp. 2. sect. 1.; Bannes ad articulum citatum of D. Thomas. And it is D. Bonav. 2. dist. 23. quaestione ultima.
Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 5. art. 1.; Ferrar. 3. cont. Gent. cap. 40.; Medina p. 2. quaest. 90. art. 1.; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 4., who cites S. Bonav.; Vasquez p. 1. disp. 135. cap. 3. and 3. p. disp. 53. cap. 1.; Amicus disp. 2. sect. 5.; and others AFFIRM it. And it is the opinion of Scotus 3. dist. 24. quaest. unic. §. sed si loquamur. His disciples follow him, and Mastac. disp. 3. sect. 4.; Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 1.; Tann. quaest. 5. art. 2., as cited by Mastrius, who subscribes disp. 6. quaest. 3. art. 2.; Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 5.; Morand. tract. un. quaest. 3., where he brings forward D. Bonaventure, Alensis, and Durandus. Indeed Tannerus and Mastac. bring forward D. Thomas quaest. 5. art. 2.; but there he speaks of the evidence of credibility, as Morandus weighs at the place cited, and Cardinal de Lugo in his tom. de fide, disp. 2. sect. 1. num. 46., who nevertheless says the former opinion is the common and truer one.
Becanus cap. 1. quaest. 5. and Arriaga disp. 4. sect. 4. seem to have followed the MIDDLE opinion, as I shall report in the arguments.
I CONFESS that in D. Bonav., where he is cited on 3. dist. 24. art. 2. quaest. 3., I do not find what is sought here, but only that faith can coexist with some scientific cognition. Yet he seems to indicate that opinion in the Hexaem. serm. 2. and 9.; but he teaches the opposite in the places to be cited.
I ASSERT with D. Bonav. that the evidence of the attester would put the thing outside the object of faith.
It is PROVED from Suarez with the argument of S. Bonavent. 3. dist. 24. dub. 1. litt. The assent of our faith is free, and hangs on the will. Hence Rom. 10. says: All do not believe the Gospel. But if there were evidence on the part of the revealer, so that we would clearly know that the revealer is God, who is the first infallible Truth; already the intellect would necessarily assent to the clear thing: Therefore it would not be an assent of faith. The minor is proved by this Syllogism, to which we necessarily assent. Whatever the first Truth reveals is true; but this the first Truth, by supposition, reveals, namely that God is Three: Therefore this is true.
RESPONDS Becanus, and Arriaga: the object of faith adequately includes not only revelation, but also the veracity of God. But when God the revealer is recognized, only the evidence of the revelation is clearly recognized, not the veracity of God; and therefore it is not evident according to the whole ratio of the formal object.
BUT the argument proved that the veracity of God is also clear, for when it is evidently known that the revealer is God, the first Truth is also known. Hence in the major is assumed: Whatever God reveals is true.
Responds Mastrius num. 91. that the consequence does not follow in that Syllogism, namely: Therefore it is evident that God is trine. But: Therefore it is true, is a testimony that the truth about the Trinity is true. Therefore the evidence is only extrinsically, not in the object.
Against this argues Suarez, for it is the same for this to be true, and for this to be so; for a proposition to be true is nothing else than for it to be so.
Mastrius answers, conceding that they are the same when cognition of the thing is had through intrinsic principles, or through effects intrinsically flowing from it; but not when cognition is had through an extrinsic principle, the attester. So he concludes with Amicus, that the known conclusion is deduced in the same way from known principles in the attester.
Cardinal de Lugo num. 9. protests that he cannot grasp this solution, and deservedly. Against it I argue thus: Every truth evident a posteriori infers an evident consequence; but this proposition: God, who is the first Truth, known evidently, has said that the Incarnation has taken place: Therefore it evidently follows that it has taken place; for this evidence does not arise from revelation alone, in the way in which this utterance: The Pontiff is ill, pronounced to me by a Notary, who can lie, and so the object is obscure to me, even though it is evident that he is a Notary of Rome; but in the evidence of the revealer the truth of the thing is included as evident, because God cannot lie. From this the argument of Mastrius num. 86. falls to the ground utterly. It can be evident that some witness asserts this, e. g. that Constantinople was burned, and yet remain unevident that the thing is so; for the ratio is disparate, as I said.
LET there be, therefore, this argument: It is evident that everything revealed by God is true, because God is the first Truth: but it is evident that this is a revelation of God: The Son of God is Incarnate: Therefore it is evident that it is true.
YOU WILL ASK: Whether a Syllogism consisting of one premise of faith and another naturally evident has a conclusion of faith.
IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it, for the conclusion follows the weaker part; but the weaker is natural truth than truth of faith. See Caspensem sect. 6. Valentiam puncto 2.
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
THEY treat this question in agreement with the Holy Doctors: Alens. 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 5. Albert. in 3. dist. 24. art. 5. Altisiodor. lib. 3. tract. 3. cap. 2. quaest. 2. Richard. dist. 24. quaest. 2. Durand. ibi, et alii; nor is there almost any difficulty.
THE FIRST opinion is that the object of faith is something Incomplex, as God, the Incarnation, etc. Thus, as regards God, the principal object seems to be a clear reality.
St. Bonaventure refutes this view, because, although God in himself is simple, he is nevertheless believed not incomplexly, but complexly, as Valentia also notes quaest. 1. p. 2. Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1. Caspensis sect. 1. num. 9. Since, therefore, the object must be taken not materially, as a thing; but under that aspect under which it is regarded by the habit, and by the potency, and the potency regards the object as complex; therefore it must be so enunciated.
The SECOND opinion is that the object of faith is about complex truth, not only because faith regards the object as enunciated, and our intellective potency does not grasp it except by way of composition; but also because it is objected according to some difference of time, as: The Incarnation has been made: The Judgment has not been made. And if you say that faith must be changed while the enunciables are changed at different times. The Nominalists respond that the enunciates are not changed, because it is the same true enunciate, you will run, you are running, you have run, despite the diversity of times. Then, even if the enunciables were changed; still they say that Faith is not changed.
Yet St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 41. quaest. ult. rejected this view, because the enunciate signifies not only the thing, but the mode of its being, and since one is the mode by which the Judgment will be; and another, by which it is; and then again, by which it was; the enunciation also varies, and its truth varies. And if, on account of the immutability of the account, the enunciations of faith are immutable; they will also be one article, because one is the reason of all believing.
Therefore the Holy Doctor ASSERTS that the object of faith, as it is regarded by the believer, according to assent, is complex.
IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, first from D. August. de praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 2. where he says: To believe is to think with assent.
SECOND, because faith regards the object as true, and therefore as to be asserted. It is confirmed, because faith is opposed to error; but error is about the complex, attributing to a thing what it does not have: Therefore.
FINALLY, if the object of faith were Incomplex, say the coming of the Messiah, or the Universal Judgment: Then the Jews would not err in saying that they believe the coming of the Messiah, but that it has not yet come: Nor would he err who said that the Judgment had already been made. Therefore the Holy Doctor notes that the explicit object of faith includes even the differences of time, so that, e. g., it be believed that the Incarnation has already taken place, etc.
I ASSERT, second, that some object of faith, as it is a thing, say God, is incomplex. So D. Thom. Valentia, Caspensis, Mastrius; nor does S. Bonav. disagree, for God is most simple in himself.
IT IS PROVED, second, by the Holy Doctor. For those who of old believed the Incarnation implicitly did not believe it necessarily under some difference of time, but were able to suspend judgment: whether he had been born; or not.
YOU WILL OBJECT against the first assertion. Hope and Charity are about incomplexes: Therefore also faith.
THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS by denying the consequence, because Hope and Charity are affections, and therefore regard things, say beatitude, God, etc. But faith deals in the intellect, composing, dividing, etc.
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
The theologians answer UNANIMOUSLY that falsity cannot underlie the object of faith. So the Holy Doctors here; Alens. 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 1. Albert. 3. dist. 25. art. 3. Altisiodor. lib. 3. tract. 3. cap. 2. quaest. 3. Richardus 3. dist. 24. quaest. 3. and all the others, in Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 5. where he has nearly everything from the Holy Doctors.
IT IS PROVED by D. Bonav. first. Faith in the way belongs only to that of which there will be vision in the fatherland; but falsity cannot underlie the vision in the fatherland: Therefore.
SECOND. As Charity is related to good, so is Faith to truth; but Charity does not desire except the good: Therefore Faith never makes one believe except the truth.
THIRD. Everything that falls under faith falls under revelation from the first Truth; but nothing false can fall into the first Truth: Therefore neither into Faith. The major is proved; for the first Truth, as revealing, is the formal aspect under which that of faith itself [is believed]; but nothing falls into any habit except under the formal aspect of its own object, nor even into any potency. For nothing is attained by the visual potency except under the aspect of the luminous. The minor is proved by D. Bonav. For the false fights directly with the first truth, and is opposed to it as evil to good; and not being to being. This is the principal argument by which nearly all the others proceed, as Valentia says quaest. 1. puncto 3.
YOU WILL SAY, many things revealed depend on human faith, e. g. the authority of Clement X. from the fact that he is canonically elected. The Council of Trent, that it is canonically convened, and the like.
IT IS ANSWERED, these depend on human faith as on a disposition; But the election is certain, because in Matth. 16. it is promised that the assistance of God will not be wanting to the Church.
It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor. For the cognition under which falsity can lie is rather deception than illumination; But faith is the illumination of the mind, as D. August. says lib. com. epist. fund. cap. 14.
It is confirmed second by the Holy Doctor; for the Theological Virtue is more certain than every art and science; But falsity cannot underlie the sciences: Therefore.
IT IS PROVED by S. Bonav. in the body [of the article], because our faith relies on Divine cognition; but God comprehends all things, so that he knows even future contingents with certainty: Therefore. Here the Holy Doctor, taking his occasion from the Minor of the third argument, settles that question: Whether God can deceive; which question he also treats in 2. dist. 37. art. 2. quaest. 1. and Cano examines it on purpose, quaest. 3. de Locis Theol.
For if God can deceive, the way will not lie open to us for knowing this or that infallible thing; since they cannot be reduced to the first truth.
IT is the most certain assertion of all Catholics that it is heretical to say that God, by himself or through another, ever taught falsity, or that by ordinary law he can teach it. So Valentia admonishes. It is against the Priscillianists, in D. August. de haeres. haeresi 70.
IT IS PROVED first by the Holy Doctor on 3. Ioan. He who receives his testimony hath set to his seal that God is true, and it is added on Rom. 3. But God is true: but every man a liar. Thence he deduces there also that whoever speaks the words of God, or in the name of God, is truthful, and thus God cannot deceive through another.
The Holy Doctor proves the SAME on cap. 8. Ioan. with those words: He that sent me is true. There he also elegantly solves the doubt: Why the Father is called Truthful: But the Son Truth: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Ioan. 14. And the Church sings in the office of the Most Holy Trinity Truthful the Father, Truth the Son. This doubt moved S. August. tract. 30. in Ioan. For since Truth says something more than Truthful, just as Piety says more than Pious; for pious is said from piety, not the other way around: Therefore truth ought to be appropriated to the Father, from whom is the Son.
S. Bonav. ANSWERS from D. August. that the Father is truthful, because he spoke the true Word, which is Truth. And so he is not called Truthful by participation.
The Holy Doctor shows the same on 14. Ioan. with those words of Christ: I am the way, the truth, and the life, and he brings forward the exposition of Chrysost. homil. 27. and of D. August. tract. 69. and serm. 54. de verbis Domini. He shows it also on 16. Lucae, from Psalm 116. The truth of the Lord endureth for ever, and Psalm. 118. Unto generation and generation thy truth, and of mediated truth: But he that doth truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God. Ioan. 3. and cap. 8. If you shall abide in my word, you shall know the truth, and the truth shall liberate you.
IT IS PROVED second. Whatever God can make has its exemplar in God; but a false enunciation, as false, has no exemplar in God: Therefore. The minor is proved; For truth is the ground of exemplarity.
IT IS PROVED third by the Holy Doctor. As goodness is related to malice, so is truth related to falsity; but from supreme goodness malice can in no way be: Therefore from supreme truth falsity cannot be. This argument is from proportion; for guilt repugns God more, although both intrinsically repugn the most perfect Being, as the Holy Doctor notes in the body.
IT IS PROVED fourth by the Holy Doctor. True and Being are convertible: But there cannot be from God anything that is not a being: Therefore neither can it be true1: But a false enunciation says the privation of the true: Therefore.
IT IS PROVED fifth. If he can say a false thing; either ignorantly, or knowingly; Not ignorantly, because God is of infinite wisdom; Nor knowingly, because thus he would lie; But to say that God lies is profane and impious against Scripture and the Fathers. Therefore: The subsumption is proved. Num. 23. God is not as a man, that he may lie. Psal. 5. Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.
The same the Holy Fathers proclaim with one voice: Athan. lib. de Incarn. Verbi. Chrysost. homil. in Symbolum Apostolorum, Cyrill. Alex. lib. 2. in Ioan. cap. 69. Ambros. lib. 6. epistolarum, epistola 57. where he brings forward that of Numer. 23. and Hebr. 6. It is impossible for God to lie. D. August. 22. de civit. cap. 25. and lib. 1. de Symbolo ad Cathec. cap. 1. Anselm. lib. 1. Cur Deus homo, cap. 22. Valentia cites them.
From these Fathers S. Bonav. extracts an argument. That which says imperfection is impossible to God; But lying says imperfection; likewise also deception through falsity; for it says the lack of truth: Therefore. This is the argument of these Fathers to the letter, who from the omnipotence of God gather, indeed, that he cannot lie; because to lie is to fail, not to be able.
YOU WILL OBJECT first with certain Scriptures fighting in words. Exod. 20. I am a mighty and jealous God, punishing the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the fourth generation. And yet in Ezech. 18. it is said: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.
LIKEWISE in Iob. 1. it is said: In all these things Job did not sin, nor did he speak any foolish thing against God. The contrary of which Iob 39. and 42. signifies. Similarly cap. 7. he says: I have sinned, what shall I do to thee; But cap. 27. For my heart hath not reproved me.
The Holy Doctor ANSWERS that these do not clash; and to that of Exodus he responds, in the sermon on the ten commandments, that God punishes with temporal inconveniences; (for, as regards these, the Son is part of the Father) but not with eternal punishments, and in this sense Ezechiel speaks.
To the places of Job I say that he sinned lightly, cap. 7. not gravely, cap. 37. and cap. 39. and 42. he confesses he spoke foolishly; yet did not sin. See D. Gregory lib. 32. Moral. cap. 1.
THEY OBJECT second with the Scriptures in which God seems to have deceived, which Melchior Cano reports at length lib. 2. de locis, cap. 2. Genes. 22. Abraham said: Stay you here, I and the boy: after we have worshipped, we will return; and yet he wished to immolate his son. That he spoke, however, by divine instinct, Ambr. asserts lib. 1. de Abraham, cap. 8.
The Holy Doctor ANSWERS 3. dist. 38. quaest. 2. that Abraham did not lie, because he thought that the son, once immolated, was to be raised again, as is said in Hebr. 11. and therefore would return. So D. August. expounds it serm. 71. and 72. de tempore. Gabriel 3. dist. 30. Carthus. on that place, and Valentia loc. cit. follow them.
THEY OPPOSE Genes. 27. where Jacob lied. I am Esau, which he yet said by the instinct of God, as Pope Innocent teaches, cap. Gaudemus extra, de divortiis.
The Holy Doctor ANSWERS 3. dist. 38. dub. 4. litt. that Jacob spoke the truth; for he was Esau not indeed in person, but by election to the primogeniture, of which he had been instructed by his mother, who had been taught that the elder would serve the younger, Genes. 25. Nor did he deceive by the garment, but he signified mysteries. So with D. August. contra mendacium cap. 10. and Ambrose de Iacob. Cano, Valentia, and others follow them. See Pererius and Ribeta on those places, on cap. 11. Hebr.
THEY OBJECT also Isa. 38. and 4. Reg. 20. where the Lord through Isaiah announced death to Ezechias; yet he did not die. So also Ninive was not overthrown, Ionae 2.
TO THIS, and the like, I responded p. 1. tract. 1. disp. 8. quaest. 1. from D. Bonav. lib. 1. compend. Theolog. verit. cap. 19. that Ezechias was to die according to natural causes, but God delivered him by a miracle. So also Ninive was to be destroyed according to its demerits, yet was delivered on account of penance, which, if it had not done, it would have perished.
THEY OBJECT also 3. Reg. 22. where the Lord says: Who shall deceive Achab? and there went forth a wicked spirit, which took upon itself to deceive all the prophets. And the Lord: Go forth, and do so. And the prophet subjoins: Behold the Lord hath given a lying spirit in the mouth of all the prophets.
The Holy Doctor ANSWERS in 2. dist. 10. dub. 1. and dist. 27. art. 2. quaest. 1. to the arguments, that by those words is not signified the command of God, but permission, which is often in the Scriptures expressed in the same manner of speaking as the command, as Ioan. 13. That which thou dost, do quickly, on which see S. Bonav. there, where he brings forward other expositions. On the same answer rely Morandus, Cano, Valentia, and the rest.
I ASSERT consequently, second, that no power can cause God to teach falsity. It is against Gabriel 3. dist. 38. quaest. unica Aliacum p quaest. 12. Hybernicum, and Adam, whom Gregory cites primo, dist. 42. quaest. 2. but it is the common [opinion] of the Theologians.
IT IS PROVED first. Hebr. 6. where it says: It is impossible for God to lie, which all the arguments of S. Bonav. prove, drawn from the nature of God, and strengthened with the Holy Fathers; For they deny that God can lie for this reason, because this is an imperfection simply repugning the nature, or the Divine perfection.
Hence the Holy Doctor argues: he, of whom all perfection is simply to be asserted, and authority, and all imperfection to be denied, cannot take on the imperfection of lying: But God has supreme perfection, and authority for persuading: Therefore lying repugns him.
IT IS PROVED by another argument by the Holy Doctor in the body, from the consequence of guilt. It is certain that God cannot be the author of guilt. It is also certain that it would be a most grievous thing for us, unless we believed most firmly all the things revealed by God that are of faith; for to doubt of them is heresy, or at least mortal sin; but to deny them is open heresy. But if God could lie, we should not be held to believe firmly the things revealed by God; indeed we could justly always doubt: whether God willed to lie, or to deceive us: Therefore. It is proved that this follows, for we could not be certified of the nature of God on the hypothesis that lying does not repugn him; Nor from ordinary law, because if he can lie, we are not certain: whether in some thing he willed to lie: Therefore. And so our credulity would not be reduced to the solid root of the truthfulness of God, as Morandus notes. This is the genuine argument of the Seraphic Doctor, if it be thoroughly pondered, and it is of such weight with Valentia that nothing further for persuading would be desired. For the argument of the Seraphic Doctor is not absolutely from the mere proportion of deception with guilt; as if, since God cannot sin, neither can he deceive; for to sin is graver than to deceive another by a word, as the Holy Doctor himself notes; But it is from the consequence inducing guilt. On account of these things the assertion is held to be of faith by Morandus T. VII. quaest. 2. Pasqualigo disp. 31. sect. 1. and others.
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
The FIRST opinion denies that there can be, concerning the same thing, both science and faith. So D. Thomas here, where all Thomists follow him, as is seen among the Complutenses disp. 20. Logic, quest. 4. Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 2 and 3; Valentia cites Scotus too, 3. dist. 24. quest. unic. §. ad quaest. and §. sed si aliter.
The SECOND opinion is affirmative. So D. Bonaventure here, Alexander of Hales 3. p. quest. 79. memb. 3. Albert the Great 3. dist. 24. art. 9. Valentia disp. 1. quest. 1. p. 4. Suarez 3. p. Tom. 2. disp. 19. sect. 2. Vasquez p. p. disp. 4. Caspens. Tract. 15. disp. 7. sect. 10. Tannerus disp. 1. quest. 1. num. 169. Morandus Tract. unic. quest. 3. There follow Coninch, Arriaga, Amicus, De Lugo, and others as gathered by Mastrius disp. 6. quest. 4. and Tannerus above.
The THIRD opinion holds a middle course: actual faith cannot coexist with actual science; but habitual faith can. It is the common opinion of the Scotists, with Scotus 3. dist. 24. quest. unic., as gathered by Mastrius. Some, however, say that by the absolute power of God actual faith and actual science can exist together. So Poncius disp. 22. Log. quest. 2. Yet the opposite is held not only by the authors of the first opinion but also, commonly, by the Scotists.
I ASSERT first, that the habit of faith and the habit of science can be in the same subject in view of their acts.
It is PROVED first by D. Bonaventure from certain passages of Scripture, in which there are proposed things to be believed that fall under science, such as: that God is. Heb. 11: For he that cometh to God must believe that he is. Rom. 4: Abraham by faith held that God would stand to his promises, and Gen. 1; and in the Symbols it is proposed that God is to be believed to be one, and to be the Creator of heaven and earth. And Exod. 20 and Deut. 6: it is proposed that by faith one must believe there is one God. Yet these things can be demonstrated, as I showed above in Tract. 1, in the disputations on the Existence of God and on unity, and in Tract. 3 on Creation. Tannerus and others press this point.
The Thomists RESPOND that in the learned, or in those skilled in these demonstrations, the habit of faith does not remain for the sake of eliciting acts about these objects; it remains only materialiter.
CONTRA: for thus the condition of the learned would be worse than that of the unlearned, as Valentia and Tannerus infer, num. 171. Moreover, the Fathers propose these articles as to be believed to all, even to the wise: Cyril of Jerusalem, catech. 6; Chrysostom, homil. 2 on the Apostles' Creed; Augustine, book De fide et Symbolo cap. 1, and book 4 De civitate cap. 20; as gathered by Valentia.
That this habit has its act is proved by the holy Doctor in the body of the text, against the third opinion, which he reports: God and nature do nothing in vain; but they give the habit of faith to the wise even with respect to what they know scientifically, nor is the power impeded; therefore it has its acts even with respect to those things.
It is CONFIRMED by the holy Doctor: because these habits are not opposed, since they convince from different motives, and the habit of science is strengthened in its certitude by faith, which has a firmer prophetic word, as D. Peter says. Then, because the habit of science instructs imperfectly; for it does not show perfectly that the unity of God can be in several supposits.
MASTRIUS, num. 132, and Soto in the first book, dist. 2. q. 3, say that there is proposed to us to be believed by faith even something known, such as that God is: for these things must be handed on to the community of men, both on account of men's negligence in seeking the truth, and on account of the weakness of the intellect, and because of the danger to those who seek the truth by demonstrations, in which many false things are mixed in, as D. Augustine says, book 18 De civitate, cap. 41; and this is clear from the philosophers in error. Therefore authority was necessary for perfect certitude; for the motive of faith often supplies the defect of our intellect, as D. Bonaventure also teaches in this question, at the end of the body of the text.
Yet this doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor does not hinder me at all in this matter; for from it I rather argue against Mastrius, from the second argument of D. Bonaventure. When one act is ordered to perfecting another, there is no repugnance; thus he who has known by an a posteriori demonstration can, while the same cognition remains, come to know the same thing by an a priori demonstration; and this knowledge does not take away the preceding one, because it arises from a different motive, just as intellectual cognition supervening on sensitive cognition does not destroy the latter. But the cognition of faith supervening upon actual demonstrative cognition is related in just this way: therefore they can exist together. The whole argument is Mastrius's here, and so it contradicts his own second assertion.
WHY, the argument of St. Bonaventure in the body of the text is most powerful, which Suarez, Amicus, Caspens, and others use: that no implication is found here; because that evidence and non-evidence are not opposed; for the evidence of science is such that it can be increased by the certitude of faith from authority; and so they assist one another, as the holy Doctor and Amicus infer. From these you have that acts of faith and of science concerning the same object can exist.
I ASSERT second, that there cannot be intellectual vision and faith concerning the same thing.
It is PROVED by the holy Doctor in the body of the text and ad 2, from 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a glass in an obscure manner. But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Then thus: Things that expel one another cannot stand together: such is the vision of the fatherland, which expels faith; therefore.
Mastrius RESPONDS, num. 110, that this holds commonly even for intellectual cognition, viz. ...; Contra: for it would follow that the habit of faith would be evacuated by the habit of science, viz. ... The consequence is proved: Things opposed in the same degree exclude one another in the same degree; but the habits of faith and of science, viz., of themselves and in the same way and in the same degree are opposed, just as the habit of faith is opposed to the vision of God: therefore, just as faith is evacuated by the vision with respect to the habit, so it would be evacuated by the habit of science, against your first assertion. Moreover, that the habit of faith is evacuated in the fatherland is clear from the Apostle in the place cited, where he speaks of habits.
I ASSERT third, that even by the power of God the clear vision of the fatherland cannot stand together with faith. So St. Bonaventure, whom all the Thomists and almost all the Scotists follow: among recent authors, Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Turrianus disp. 8. dub. 5, and others against the current of the Recentiors: Suarez, Coninch, Granado, Amicus, Arriaga, Hurtado, and others, as gathered by Mastrius art. 2, quest. four.
It is PROVED first by many from the argument of D. Bonaventure, 2. dist. 24. dub. 1, which I brought forward in quest. 2 at the end. Of the nature of the assent of faith it is that it be free, as is said in Rom. 10: All do not believe the Gospel. So too it is read in Mark 16, John 12, Acts 20; and it is gathered from the Council of Orange 2, can. 5, and Trent sess. 6. cap. 6. But a free assent does not stand with an assent that is simply necessary. So also D. Thomas, quest. 1. art. 4.
Mastrius answers that an assent necessary from the motive of science does not exclude a free one from the motive of faith.
Contra, first, ad hominem: The same effect cannot come from two adequate causes, especially opposed ones, according to Scotus. The assent exhibited to the Gospel, an object proposed to us, is adequately from the beatific vision, necessitating immutably and most clearly. Therefore it cannot be produced by faith, which is contingently free and obscure, mutably. This is the argument of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, Heb. 11, as I showed in quest. 1 and 2, and it will be confirmed in quest. 6 ad 4.
Contra, second, from D. Bonaventure here: because the motive of faith cannot have the power to move the intellect freely in the presence of evidence and of vision, which moves necessarily, as Mastrius says, num. 111 and 117; and this holds even by the absolute power, as he confesses, num. 126, and as Cardinal Lugo notes, disp. 2. num. 81. For it is an essential repugnance; therefore, while the forms remain, it is not separable. Hence falls the response of Tannerus, num. 176, that this repugnance is only moral, and of decorum.
The second assertion is proved from D. Bonaventure, disp. 31. art. 2: Whenever the essential object is taken away, the habit is also taken away: But in the fatherland the essential object of faith is taken away, namely obscurity, which is placed in the definition of the Apostle, Heb. 11: Therefore. It is confirmed: for, once the evidence of the fatherland is posited, the motive of faith no longer remains, namely from mere revelation, to move the intellect; and there arrives an essential repugnance, as Cardinal de Lugo warns, disp. 2. num. 81.
Arriaga answers that the intellect can, from evidence, assent in the fatherland to that object, and yet leave to faith another motive; thus, because of several evidences, one can assent to the same thing.
Contra: Grant that because of several evidences the intellect can assent to the same thing; yet, if once it shall have assented most clearly, it can no longer be free to assent from an obscure motive.
Nor let Amicus say that God can, by his testimony, move the intellect above every certitude; for, if once the testimony of God seen shall have moved it, no place is left for a free assent on account of the obscure testimony of God.
Yet it is not the same with abstractive assent; for, as Cardinal de Lugo says, there is still left to abstractive cognition a place for greater clarity, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the body of the text against Mastrius, num. 129.
It is proved third from D. Bonaventure, in the same dist. 31, loc. cit., at the end, by the argument on which Vulpes relies, disp. 28. art. 2. The Light of faith is related to the light of glory as the Sun to the glow-worm; but the light of the sun overwhelms the light of the glow-worm and leaves it unable to appear. Indeed, while I see the Sun, and some Astrologer says to me: The sun shines; I am not moved at all by his word, even if I know that the Astrologer cannot err.
You will object first against the first assertion. As CHARITY is related to its object, so FAITH to its; but charity does not admit together with itself love of a creature above all things: therefore neither does faith the object of science.
St. Bonaventure answers that the truth known from the motive of science and the truth known from revelation are not opposed as the love of God and libidinous love are; for these are opposed: but those two cognitions are related as perfecting and perfected, and since they convince from different motives, not from supreme ones, neither are they opposed; for faith sanely believes from things obscure; but natural science does not altogether evacuate the obscurity of the mystery, even though it has evidence in its own genus. Hence the act of faith gives the principal assent, and science one less principal. Therefore those Samaritans said, John 4: Now we believe, not for thy word, that is, on account of human knowledge, but from faith in Christ attesting.
You will object second. The vision of the fatherland evacuates faith, 1 Cor. 13: therefore also our science.
The holy Doctor answers by denying the consequence: for vision excludes all hiddenness, not so natural science.
You will object third. The assent of faith is free, Rom. 10; but the assent of science is necessary, especially concerning first principles; for you cannot deny that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.
The holy Doctor answers that in science something of God lies hidden, to which Faith adds something; for instance, that God is of that infinite simplicity simply, which I expounded in tract. first, q. 1. That he is a Trinity; whence at once he begins: I believe in God the Father, etc.
You will object fourth. The same thing cannot be above reason and under it: Science is subject to reason; faith exceeds it: therefore.
St. Bonaventure answers that there is no implication in some object being under reason on one count, while on another it is above reasons; such is the object of faith, which in one respect is subjected to reason, as: that God is; yet it is above reason that he be so perfect as to be Three in persons, that one person be incarnate, etc. Indeed the Apostle said deservedly: God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish, for without faith it is insane.
You will object against the last assertion with Poncius: Faith and vision no more repugn than two bodies in the same place, or heat and cold, as octaves, in the same subject; but these can stand together by the power of God: therefore.
It is answered from D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. that this repugns more; because it repugns according to the intrinsic nature of the essence, since the formal object of vision destroys the formal element of faith: but heat and cold are opposed only according to contrariety in a subject, which can be overcome by God, as Mastrius says.
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
The TRUE opinion is negative. So D. Bonaventure, whom all Scotists and Thomists commonly follow. And among the more recent, Card. de Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Turrian. disp. 8. dub. 5. Pasqualigo disp. 33. sect. 1.
The OPPOSITE, however, is held by Valentia p. 4. col. 62. where he says Bonaventure denies it without cause; Tanner. quaest. 1. disp. 6. Morand. quaest. 3. and very many others collected by Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 4. art. 2.
I ASSERT with D. Bonaventure that FAITH cannot be had concerning things that are clearly seen here.
It is proved first from S. Thomas, from D. Aug. on 14. Ioan. on these words: I go to prepare a place for you. Go away lest it appear; let it be hidden that it may be believed, and tract. 40. in Ioan. Faith is to believe what you do not see. And lib. 2. qq. Euang. cap. 39. Faith is the virtue by which things are believed that are not seen.
From D. Gregory homil. 36. in Euang. Things that are seen do not have faith, but recognition. And Chrysost. homil. 21. ad Hebr. says: He wishes to destroy faith, those who want to see the things believed. The Saints commonly think the same, as S. Thomas relates quaest. 3. in corpore.
It is proved secondly from S. Thomas. Faith will be evacuated in the fatherland, as is gathered from prima Corinth. 13. but bodily vision manifests the Humanity of Christ just as spiritual vision in the fatherland manifests the Deity: Therefore just as faith of the Divinity cannot be about things seen in the fatherland, so neither can faith of the humanity be in the way about a thing seen. Hence they deny the parity gratuitously, as Mastrius notes n. 110. who used this argument.
It is PROVED thirdly from S. Thomas. To believe is free Rom. 10. But to believe what I see is entirely necessary.
It is PROVED fourthly in corpore. That which repugns the essence of faith cannot stand together with faith: But sensible vision repugns: Therefore. The minor is proved; for from the Apostle loc. cit. Faith is obscure knowledge, and now AEnigmatic: but Vision is most clear; and these are contradictory. The Scotists and Thomists use this argument.
Nor does the response avail, that these are not contradictory, because they arise from different motives. For the argument resists just so much, because from the intrinsic formal side the object of FAITH must be obscure; whence, upon the arrival of vision, it no longer has anything obscure, concerning which it might render faith to the revealer; and the formal reason of the one, that is, of science, destroys the formal reason of the object of FAITH. Nor do they differ according to the perfect and the imperfect, as the adversaries think; but they differ according to their essentials, namely the positive and the privative; from which Card. de Lugo deduces disp. 2. num. 81. that, since this repugnance is formal and intrinsic, it convinces that vision and FAITH cannot stand together, even by the power of God. Vain also is the response of Valentia, that faith is of things not seen by faith itself; for, as Mastrius says num. 109. the Fathers and Scripture would have spoken ridiculously, and the sense would be to see nothing by an act of faith. Tanner. also errs num. 176. denying that these repugn.
You OBJECT first that Ioan. 20. it is said: Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed; therefore concerning this he had faith and vision.
D. Bonav. and Scotus RESPOND from D. Gregory homil. 26. in Euang. that: Thomas saw one thing, and believed another; He saw a man, and believed God. The same is the response of D. August. tract. 79. in Ioannem.
Arriaga INSTANCES that this exposition is not consonant with the text. First, because Christ did not speak equivocally, but of the same thing about which he said: You have seen, he also said you have believed. Then, if he believed what he did not see: Therefore he did not have less merit than the others, who, not seeing, believed, whom nevertheless Christ there prefers to Thomas. Thirdly, because there Thomas believed nothing about the Deity, but about the Resurrection, about which he doubted, which nevertheless he saw no less than I see Peter present; and yet you deny that vision can stand together with faith.
For in truth these things are frivolous against the exposition of the Fathers; Nor indeed did Christ speak equivocally, but with a mystery, so that the sense is: Because you have seen me raised from the dead, you have believed God, since a mere man cannot raise himself. Now just as you heard me: I have power to lay down my life, and to take it again, so now you have seen, and therefore you believe God. See S. Bonaventure in the sermon on S. Thomas.
From this the second objection falls: For the sense is, that there is more merit in those who neither saw me raised, and believed, without this miracle, that I am God.
To the third I say, that Thomas confessed: My Lord, and my God. For he doubted about the Deity while he saw him dead; nor did he believe until he saw him raised.
You OBJECT secondly from Prima Ioan. first: What we have seen, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life; But the Apostles also had faith concerning the same Christ.
D. Bonav. RESPONDS that the Apostles had faith concerning the mysteries seen; for although they saw the man die; nevertheless they believed him God. And so they had faith concerning This person, as he is God. Mastrius num. 133. prefers this exposition, Scotistically.
You OBJECT thirdly. The Blessed Virgin knew by sensible experience that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit, and nevertheless believed; Therefore Elisabeth says: Blessed are you, who have believed, etc.
S. Bonav. RESPONDS that the Blessed Virgin perceived that she had conceived without a man; nevertheless she did not perceive that she had conceived the Son of God. Thus Mastrius also responds.
You OBJECT fourthly. It would follow that the learned are of worse condition, and those who saw, as the Apostles.
It is RESPONDED with D. Bonav. that those who saw believed something else.
MASTRIUS responds from D. Bonav. quaest. 3. denying the sequel, as to the wise, who have science concerning the same thing, because they did not know perfectly through the sciences that God is, and that he is one, or that he is infinite simply speaking, to be in three persons, whence they lacked the light of faith, without which the Philosophers erred. He says this response is conformable to the doctrine of Scotus; whence it is clear how even the learned exercise supernatural acts of faith.
For in truth he does not remember that he said in the first assertion num. 108. that acts of faith and of science cannot be simultaneously about the same conclusion in the same intellect. Wherefore he abuses the doctrine of S. Bonaventure.
MOST FIRMLY therefore has our assertion been proved. It is confirmed by the principal argument of S. Bonav. in corpore, which Suarez uses disp. 3 sect. 9. Coninch. disp. 11. dub. 1. Lugo disp. 2. sect. 2. Vasquez disp. 53. et 62. Mastrius num. 115. where he teaches it to be a firm argument; for clear vision so ravishes assent, that not only is place denied to the liberty necessary for faith; but neither does the motive of assent remain; thus, while I see the Sun, however much someone may say to me that it is day, even if he were an Angel; I do not believe from authority, but because I see. Coninch. and Suarez render the reason; because, since the intellect has been actualized by the most perfect formal assent, no place is left for assenting by another form.
BUT they argue against this: for the Blessed have intuitive cognition of creatures, and nevertheless can also have abstractive. The same, the Theologians say, of the most holy Soul of Christ.
Mastrius RESPONDS from Scotus ad 3. that the reason is, because the medium of faith is impeded by the medium of vision, so that it may not move, and is rendered insufficient to move in its presence: for the medium of faith has no power to move, except when the intellect needs it, and because it does not otherwise have the truth. Lugo responds the same.
BUT the same difficulty is incurred which they opposed to Suarez, because the clear vision of creatures in God suffers its abstractive [cognition].
The REASON therefore is that which S. Thomas brings in corpore, because they are intrinsically opposed formally, whence, with the object clearly seen, it implies that faith is busied about that thing in vain, because it is intrinsically enigmatic, or at least obscure, and the obscure requires an obscure object.
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible.
I have treated THIS question sufficiently p. 1 tract. 1. disp. 1. quaest 9. with D. Bonav. in the sermons Hexaëmer. especially §. 9. and 10. and in the little work: Principium Scripturae.
The testimonies of God are exceedingly credible, as Psal. 92. proclaims. On which arguments see also Valentia disput. 1. quaest. 1. p. 4. Scotus quaest. 2. Proleg. sent. and the Scotists. Medina tract. de fide Poncius disp. 28.
The PRINCIPAL argument is taken from the excellence of Christ, on which Valentia relies disp. 17. drawn from D. Bonav. p. prima of the goads of Divine love, cap. 6. If Christ had falsely wished to arrogate to himself the name and dignity of the Son of God; he would assuredly have acted insanely, and wrongly; nor would God have confirmed his words with so many miracles, and his adversaries would have found follies and errors in his sayings, which they could not. But celebrated even among foreigners are his innocence, wisdom, and prophecy, miracles, etc. the efficacy of his words, etc.
The SECOND is the multitude of prophecies concerning our faith.
The THIRD is the firmness of the Church amid so many tempests.
The FOURTH is the victory over so many wise men, and Tyrants.
The FIFTH is the knowledge of the witnesses, and their illustrious fame.
The SIXTH, the marvelous constancy of so many Martyrs.
The SEVENTH, the concord of the witnesses, with the parts of so many lands divided; and with so many different times.
The EIGHTH is the unshaken firmness of those things which faith teaches.
The NINTH, the absurdities and nonsense of so many opposing sects.
The TENTH, the fruits which abound from this holiness of the law.
The ELEVENTH, the testimony of foreigners.
The TWELFTH, The unhappy end of those persecuting the Church. See there, and what I shall add in quaest. 11.
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged into articles.
D. Thomas says an article is named from ἄρθρον, which signifies the fitting together of the parts for motion: St. Bonaventure acknowledges this too, question 1. article 3. Calepinus, however, took the name from artus, a joint, because it is a particle into which the joints, or the members of the body, are resolved; and it is called articulus from arctando, constraining, a term applied both actively and passively to the mysteries to be believed: passively indeed, because it is a thing constrained, and just as the knots in the body are the parts into which the joints, or members, are resolved; so the articles are, as it were, the first principles into which the parts of the whole habit of FAITH are resolved: actively, however, because they constrain to belief.
HENCE St. Bonaventure gathers that the articles of faith are the first principles in faith, into which all the objects of belief are resolved, in the way that the joints are in the body, into which the members are resolved, even the tiniest of the fingers; and just as in the sciences, and in acts, there are first principles into which the conclusions are resolved, nor are those resolved into others, as Caspens also notes, disp. 1. sect. 12. Likewise they are the first distinguishers of the object of belief, in the way that the articles in Grammar distinguish the genders, and the cases. And in Rhetoric an article is called the distinction that is made in the science, and in the uttering. Since, therefore, the sciences, and the arts are the handmaids of Theology, as St. Bonaventure splendidly demonstrates in his opusc. On the reduction of the arts to Theology, for that reason it received the name of article, to signify the first heads, and principles into which all things believed are resolved, which are called the object of faith. Hence the Seraphic Doctor praises the definition of an article handed down by Richard of St. Victor: An article is an indivisible truth about God, constraining us to believe. It is called an indivisible truth, because things believed are ultimately resolved into the articles, for resolution stops at the indivisible. It is called constraining, etc., for it constrains, as a directive rule, toward all things to be believed. See Caspens, Cardinal de Lugo, Morandus, and others agreeing.
The Seraphic Doctor OBJECTS to himself against this definition, first, because an article is a divisible proposition.
HE ANSWERS that it is indivisible formally, because it is not divided into other articles, as credible things.
He objects second. If an article is an indivisible truth. Therefore it is one article, because truth is one. Then truth is God: Therefore it is not about God.
The Seraphic Doctor answers that an article is a truth as it is compared to something about God to be asserted, as that God is one; that there is a Trinity, etc.; and thus God is the subject of these truths.
He objects third. Among the articles there are some that are not about God, as the Resurrection of the flesh. It is answered that the resurrection of the flesh pertains to the Divine power.
He objects fourth. Because the articles of faith do not convince by reasonings: Therefore they do not constrain to believe. HE ANSWERS that they constrain the faithful who are enlightened, by the authority of the revealer; they constrain indeed not by compelling; but by removing every ambiguity: they constrain also by obliging; and by restricting, and by resolving into distinct principles the object of faith.
Presently the Seraphic Doctor, question 2., hands down another definition of the Article from D. Isidore. An article is a perception of Divine truth, tending to it. And he explains it thus: It is called a perception of Divine truth causally, because it is that by which we perceive the first truths of faith. It is called tending to God himself, whereby he shows that faith directs the will to God, to whom we are roused by the articles of faith. From this the Seraphic Doctor deduces the definition of the article, as it is the object of faith formed.
By this exposition the oppositions that are made against this definition collapse. See St. Bonaventure.
The ORDER of the things to be believed is given in the Symbol. Now the Symbol signifies a judgment, or mark, by which others may be distinguished from one another, and the bringing together of many into one, as D. Bonaventure notes, disp. 25. question 1. For the Symbol is said from Syn, which is together; and bole, which is opinion; hence a Symbol is the opinion of many, constituted out of several articles, by which the faithful are set apart from the unfaithful, like a watchword, as Valencia also notes, disp. 1. question 1. p. 5., from Rufinus in his exposition of the Symbol, and Cassian, book 6. de Incarn. to Leo the Pope. See also Tanner, disp. 8.
Now there is a THREEFOLD Symbol in the Church, as D. Bonaventure notes on the cited 5th question. The first is that of the Apostles, which is recited in the office. That it was composed by the twelve Apostles the old Fathers commonly assert; Clement I. epistle 1. Irenaeus book 1. chapter 2. Tertullian in the praescriptiones, Ambrose epistle 81. Rufinus in the exposition, Jerome epistle to Pammach. and on the errors of John of Jerusalem, Chrysostom homilies 1. and 2. on the Symbol, Augustine sermons 115. and 180. de tempore, Leo sermon 11. on the Passion of the Lord, and epistle 13. to Pulcheria, and with them St. Bonaventure and others.
The Seraphic Doctor adds, with Augustine and Leo above, that each Apostle set forth one article.
The SECOND Symbol is Athanasius's, which, as the Seraphic Doctor says, was drawn up chiefly against Arius. It is the one that is recited at the first Hour of Sunday. So testify Sts. Augustine on Psalm 120. in the enchiridion chapter 36. and book 5. on the Trinity, chapter 8. and epistle 174. and sermon 195. de Tempore. And St. Gregory Nazianzen on the praises of Athanasius; and, which is the chief point, the whole Church receives it. It is kept at Rome, written by him in Latin.
The THIRD Symbol is the Nicene, which is recited in the Mass with certain additions in the first Council of Constantinople: Toledo 8. and Florence; and separately by the Church there was added that clause: proceeding from the Son (Filioque), as we saw p. 2. tract. 1. disp. 10. question 2.
SUITABLY, however, the Seraphic Doctor shows that faith was ordered into articles first, that it might be Catholic, that is, a universal uniformity of faith among all peoples, which Irenaeus taught before, book 1. chapter 3.
SECOND, because Faith had to be handed on to all, even the simple, which would not be explicit enough in general terms, nor could they be instructed by profuse eruditions, as D. Augustine teaches, book on faith, and the Symbol chapter 1., Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.
Valencia adds, with D. Bonaventure, that it is useful, indeed most necessary, against heretics, to have a formula of faith, which, therefore, as heresies arose with the passage of the times, was enlarged, as I shall say in the following question.
The Seraphic Doctor shows, with D. Thom. question 1. article 8., that the articles are placed in a fitting order. He takes this order from the heads of things to be believed. First, then, the Divinity is to be believed: then the Trinity of persons: third the Humanity: fourth the Operations of the divinity; and last the works of Christ incarnate. As to the Divine essence, there is one article, just as the essence of God is most simple: I believe in God. As to the most holy Trinity, there are three articles. The first is: I believe in God the Father; the second is: In Jesus Christ, his son, etc.; the third: I believe in the Holy Spirit. As to the Operations of the deity, they are threefold. The first is the creation of nature, and it is noted when it is said: I believe in the Creator of heaven, and earth. The second is the bestowal of grace, and it is noted when it is said: I believe the Holy Catholic Church: the communion of Saints, the remission of sins. The third is the bestowal of glory: the resurrection of the flesh, life everlasting. And so there are seven articles concerning the divinity, looking to the divine essence itself: One looking to the Deity in itself; Three looking to the Trinity of persons, and the other three to the works of the Deity. Likewise concerning the humanity of Christ there are seven articles, according to the seven acts of the Redemption, which are ordered to our salvation. The first is the Incarnation, and on this is the article: Who was conceived of the Holy Spirit. The second is to be Born: Born of the Virgin Mary. The third is Redemption: He suffered under Pontius, and was crucified, dead, and buried. The fourth is the despoiling of hell: He descended into hell. The fifth is the triumph over death: On the third day he rose again from the dead. The sixth is the Ascension into heaven: He ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father. The seventh is the Coming to judgment: From thence he shall come to judge, etc. See the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 25. question 1., assigning to each Apostle his own article.
The Seraphic Doctor marvels that these fourteen articles are set forth in Apoc. 1., where Christ was seen among seven golden candlesticks, and he had in his right hand seven stars; now the stars are the heavenly articles of the deity: but the seven golden candlesticks, of earthly substance, yet precious, are the seven articles of the humanity. The same he teaches in Hexaemer. sermon 8. and in the Centilog. sect. 38. and in the Diaeta, chapter 5. title 3.
He notes, however, that the articles are reduced to twelve; for the first contains the Deity; and the first Person, who is the Fount of all the communications of the Deity; and the work of Creation, all of which St. Peter asserts; and so there are twelve articles in a broad sense. See the Seraphic Doctor.
Therefore the Seraphic Doctor proves the sufficiency of the Symbol first from Cassian book 6. de Incarn. to Pope Leo.
SECOND, because faith is concerned with God: Now God is regarded in two ways, either in himself, as One, and Three; or in the Humanity assumed. Again. The Deity is not known on the way, except through the works; now three of these are the chief ones, Creation, Gratification, and Glorification. But the works of the humanity are related in the Symbol, which, since it was composed by the Apostles, full of the Holy Spirit, there is no doubt that it is fitting; for they were the masters of the Catholic Church. And so, although fourteen can also be counted, as St. Bonaventure teaches, loc. cit., Scotus dist. 25. question 1., nevertheless they are reduced to twelve.
Valencia, however, loc. cit., Morand. q. 4., Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 4., observes that the Symbol is not Canonical Scripture, because it was composed by the Apostles, as a brief formula for professing the faith already possessed. You will wonder, here, that the Mystery of faith, that is, the Eucharist, is omitted. But it is included in the omnipotence. See D. Th. article 8. to 6. It is also enclosed in the Church.
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
The COMMON opinion of Theologians is that all the articles of faith have always been believed implicitly, though not explicitly: so D. Bonaventure and D. Thomas here, where the Thomists, and all the Sententiarii with the Master, 3. dist. 25., where also Albert. art. 1 to 1. Scotus question 1. Durand. question 1. Richard. art. 3. question 2. Valencia question 1. p. 6. et others in Suarez on Faith disp. 2. sect. 6. Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 5. Aragon. here. Tanner. disp. 1. q. 1. n. 101.
I ASSERT first, that the articles of Faith, as to implicit belief, have not grown.
It is PROVED by the Seraphic Doctor first, because the Christian Faith is contained wholly in the new law, and the new law was enfolded in the old, as the whole in the wheel, as is said Ezech. 1.
It is PROVED second by the Seraphic Doctor. When the object is changed substantially, the habit is changed: Therefore if faith had a new object, believing what it did not believe before, it would be changed; but Faith, according to the diverse times, has not been changed, from D. Augustine epistle 51., Irenaeus book 4. chapter 13., and other Fathers; and so indeed what we believe, the Fathers believed explicitly as to substance, at least implicitly, so that even the holy Doctors who use this term teach, that it has not been changed as to substance, but according to accident; because what was believed implicitly of old is now believed explicitly, and so these articles were contained in the ancient ones, as more remote and more distinct concepts in the universal ones, as Valencia notes.
It is PROVED third by the Seraphic Doctor. For in ancient times all expected the Redeemer; but that he was to be a God-man, not all knew. So of the remaining articles looking to the passion, resurrection, and Ascension of Christ. The Seraphic Doctor explains this more fully in the body. These are the arguments for the opposite, granted in this sense in the replies.
It is PROVED fourth. As the object of Charity grew, so also of Faith; but all things must now be loved explicitly, even enemies; in ancient times they were to be loved implicitly: Therefore.
I ASSERT second, that not all things that are now believed explicitly were believed in the same way in ancient times.
It is proved first by the Seraphic Doctor from that of Exodus 6. I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: and my Name Adonai I did not show them, that is, I did not impart to them a clear knowledge of my Simplicity, and Unity, as D. Thom. expounds, question 174. article 6.
It is proved second by the Seraphic Doctor. As the Evangelical Law is related to the Mosaic as to morals, so also the faith of the new law to the faith of the old as to things to be believed; but the Gospel adds many counsels above the old law: Therefore the new law adds more things to be believed; yet not otherwise than by unfolding the implicit, as is clear from the foregoing. It is almost the argument of D. Irenaeus, book 4. chapter 47.
It is proved third by the Seraphic Doctor. For the Mysteries of the Incarnation, the Sacraments, and other things believed in the Church were not believed explicitly of old.
It is proved fourth by the Seraphic Doctor. The new Church knows many things that lay hidden from the Angels, as is said Ephes. 3. Therefore much more did these things lie hidden from the men of the old law.
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Whether FAITH has grown as to light.
I assert that Faith has grown in light from the beginning of the world.
It is PROVED first by the Seraphic Doctor from D. Gregor. homily 16. on Ezech., where, expounding that of Luke 10. Blessed are the eyes that see the things which you see, he says: With the increases of the times the knowledge of the Saints, and of the spiritual Fathers, grew. And the nearer they stood to the coming of the Savior, the more fully they perceived the mystery of salvation: Therefore they knew with a fuller light; but not except by the light of faith: Therefore. D. Thom. means the same, question 1. art. 4. to 4.: those nearer, namely to Christ, were suffused with a greater light — not all, indeed, but some. Valencia adds another limitation, that this is true of the infused light; for by natural light Theologians now know more things. But we were already speaking of the infused light of Faith.
Tanner adds, disp. 1. question 1. number 206., that not even one of the Doctors, succeeding in the Church, received the mysteries of faith more explicitly than the Apostles.
But this is truly PROVED. John 14. The Paraclete will teach you all things; and chapter 15. All things that I have heard from the Father, I have made known to you. And chapter 16. When the Paraclete shall come, he will teach you all things, and at the end of Luke: Then he opened their sense, that they might understand the Scriptures, as the Seraphic Doctor observes in his commentaries. And 2 Corinth. 3. Beholding with unveiled face the glory of the Lord. The Seraphic Doctor adds that of Acts 2., where Peter admonishes the Jews, the prophecy of Joel, chapter 2., being now fulfilled: And it shall be in the last days I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh, and they shall prophesy, and shall see visions.
The Seraphic Doctor adds, to those words at the end of Luke, an argument from the Scriptures; For Christ has the key of knowledge, as is said Isa. 22. and Apoc. 5. The Lamb opened the Book of revelations, hidden before, and the four animals, which accompany the Evangelists, and the twenty-four elders standing about, saw the secrets. Therefore, the nearer the disciples were to Christ, the wiser they were.
But D. Bonan. on chapter 16. of John objects. How does he say, chapter 15. I have made all things known to you, when here he says: I have many things to say to you? He answers with D. August. Tract. 96. that he speaks of those things that were revealed at the coming of the Holy Spirit, to which they were not yet disposed. For all things, written with canonical authority before the coming of the spirit (says St. Augustine), who hears, or reads? And he puts the past for the future; and signifies, I have made known, that is, I shall make known so certainly that you may hold them as things possessed.
But the Seraphic Doctor has most splendid things on this, sermon 9. on the day of Pentec., where he observes that the Apostles are called heavens formed by the Holy Spirit, Iob. 26. The spirit of the Lord adorned the heavens. Psal. 116. The heavens show forth the glory of God. Psal. 32. By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power, as the Fathers expound: and he joins this with that of John 16. When he, the Spirit of truth, shall come, he will teach you all truth, and says: As the heavens are, in which is the fountain of light, and the Luminaries, so in the Apostles shone forth the most splendid Lights of faith. And as in the foundations there is the greater substance, so in the Apostles, who are called the foundations of the Church, Ephes. 2. Apoc. 21. And as the Holy Spirit is called the Fount of the water leaping forth, poured out, which Christ was to give; so they who were nearer to this Fount drank in more: Therefore the holy Apostles were endowed with a greater Light of faith. By these arguments this is proved by the holy Fathers: Cyprian epistle 74. Ambrose sermon 24. Augustine book 5. on Baptism, against the Donatists, chapter 26., in Valencia. And Morand. question 5., who observes with Aragon here art. 7. Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 5., that the Apostles had explicit faith of all those things which the faithful are now bound to believe; But Suarez book 2. sect. 6. num. 18. holds that this is true only of things looking to the substance of those times, not of contingents, for instance, that the Council of Trent was lawfully convened, which nevertheless was then of faith, but only now declared; so assert Vualdens. book 2. of the doctrinal faith, chapter 22. Lyrin. against heresies chapter 17. Therefore, say Cano, Castr., and others, we are not to expect a new revelation unknown to the Apostles.
Indeed Peter doubted about this great point: Whether the Gospel was to be preached to the nations. Acts 10. and chapter 11.; he is in some way reproved by Paul concerning the use of legal observances.
The Seraphic Doctor goes on to prove the excellence of our faith in the Evangelical law above the Mosaic; because, as the prophecies were ever made clearer even in the old law — whence David says Psal. 118. I have understood above the ancients, and he was esteemed a prophet above the earlier ones; so likewise the later ones were irradiated by the new light, as it were, of the day of grace approaching; so up to the Gospel, in which is the perpetual, resplendent day, the faith is more resplendent. For the Gospel is Light; and the old Law is a Shadow; and so the interior illumination is more resplendent, and the exterior instruction, and therefore the faith is adorned with a greater light.
You will object first. What is above time is not increased by time. Such is faith: Therefore.
The Seraphic Doctor answers that it is above time as to the moving reason, which is the first truth; but as to instruction it grew from night into day.
You will object second. That which shows a more hidden object is a more intense light; but the ancient faith showed the Redeemer to come, who was more hidden than now, since he has already come: Therefore.
The Seraphic Doctor answers first that it would be truer, if such light showed the hidden thing more intensely, and more clearly, by revealing more of it: But if it reveals less, it is denied: Hence the light of faith, although it shows God hidden on the way, is less than the light of glory, which exhibits more, by making God, who is hidden from us, clearer. So the light of the old faith, showing Christ obscure, was more remiss, because it uncovered little of him, and less than ours.
He answers second that the light which unfolds an object obscure in itself, and makes it appear clearer to the powers, is resplendent; But if it shows it in an obscuring cloud, it is not such. Now Christ was obscure in himself in ancient times; and as to the powers he was shown with little light, in shadowy manner; now, however, although he has already come, still objectively, in a natural way, he is little exhibited. For even if we know that there was in Judaea a famous man, called Jesus; and we read many things about him in the historians of the world; nevertheless we have received the knowledge of the Divine Person, of the truth of the doctrine, of the holiness, and of the miracles, by the light of faith, by which we believe the Gospels; and therefore the light that makes this hidden thing known to our minds is clearer than that light infused into the ancients. This reply contains, and explains the preceding one.
The same light suffused those who touched Jesus in the flesh; whence very many, although they saw the miracles, etc., did not believe, as D. Bonav. says, on 3.
You will object third. The light of faith that shows things to come is greater than that which shows things past: But the ancients saw things to come; We things past: Therefore.
The Seraphic Doctor answers that things above natural cognition are equally obscure whether they be past, and that of such things there is prophecy. Thus Moses prophesied, describing the creation of the world Genes. 1., and other past things. And Elizabeth Luke 1. says: Blessed art thou that hast believed, and of such things is faith, as that Jesus the son of God died, etc., which are not accessible to natural light.
You will object fourth. The illumination is greater where the communication of light is greater: But our faith is confirmed by the light even of the ancient Fathers: therefore it receives light from the ancients.
The Seraphic Doctor answers that this happens per accidens, insofar as those Fathers were set forth as lampstands for the posterity of the grace of the new law also. Thus the patience of Job, and of Tobias was set forth; the faith of Abraham, etc., that those first ones should be the exemplars of virtue, and that we, animated, might see what higher sanctity we are bound to climb in the testament of graces, to which indeed innumerable ones have flown over by the observance of the perfection of the counsels, although many have lain hidden under a bushel.
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Whether Faith has grown in certainty.
I assert first, that faith does not grow in the respect of its intrinsic certainty.
It is proved by D. Bonav. first, because it hangs on the first truth, which is immutable.
Second, because it hangs on the Divine foreknowledge, and decree, which are immutable.
Third, because it hangs on the divine predictions, which are always certain in the same way.
Fourth. That is more certain which is further removed from error, as that is whiter which recedes more from black, as Aristotle has it 3. Top. chapter 4.; but the ancient faith, and ours, are equally removed from all error: Therefore.
I assert second, that faith grows on the side of the believers, by reason of clearer instruction, and devotion.
It is proved by D. Bonav. first. For that is more certain which is made known by more means; but the mysteries have been expounded with new light, and in new ways: Therefore.
Second, because the mysteries of Christ, which were to come, are now rendered more certain from the fact.
Third, because faith abounds with many witnesses, namely, those who have received the Catholic faith. By which argument D. August. was moved, book against the letter of Fundam. chapter 4. and book on the profit of believing, chapter 14. How much more does the consensus of those who came after St. August. move? Surely so many men did not come to the faith for private advantages, but so many rich, so many wise, so many Princes ran to despoilings of their goods, to prisons, to martyrdoms, as St. Justin argues Apol. 2. to the Emperor. Behold even in our times so many Heroes turning the ribbons of the world into haircloth, and proud roofs into humble little cells.
Then there are the most splendid testimonies of so many martyrs triumphing amid torments, from which, even in our times, in England, and other northern regions, whence every evil is spread, by the cruelty, and unbelief of the sectaries, and Mahometans, have been produced men most wise, and most holy.
Fourth, of so many Kings, Emperors, flourishing with the torque of wisdom in the world, there are testimonies; I mean of those who came to the faith by most splendid conversions down to these very times.
Fifth, the assaults, wars, persecutions surmounted by the Church against heretical sectaries, who watered France, Germany, England with blood, that they might overturn the Catholic faith: Surely these seem to have far surpassed the savageries of the pagan Roman Caesars.
Sixth, the miracles multiplied down to these very times, even in the most remote Indians beyond the seas: By which argument Christ used Matth. 11. But if the miracles are not, and without miracles the Church stands, and grows; what greater miracle can there be? Thus argues St. August. 22. de civitate, chapter 5.: It is a great miracle that the Church navigates safe amid innumerable storms down to these times.
Seventh, even our enemies are witnesses Deuter. 32. Josephus the Hebrew book 18. antiq. chapter 9. the pagan Emperors in Eusebius book 4. Hist. chapter 13. and book 9. chapter 9. and Justin Apol. 2. to the Emperor.
Eighth, let them testify with the characters of blood, who assailed our faith. I pass over the ancients: Luther died suddenly: Calvin eaten by worms, and others: Adolphus King of Sweden crushed in war. But if in ancient times this was an incentive to faith, while they saw the pagan Caesars slain, Arius pouring out his bowels, Julian the Apostate struck by lightning, how much more ought it now to move, while we have beheld all the others suddenly snatched from the midst by a terrible death?
Let there come forward so many Councils of Wise men, and of Saints, so many prophetic oracles confirmed, so many arduous labors endured by the Confessors, so many wonders wrought in the Church, which now prevails with the highest majesty, and power: And there is the acclamation Math. 16. The gates of hell shall not prevail. How rightly Richard of St. Victor, book 1. on the Trinity, chapter 2. Lord, if we are deceived, thou hast deceived us; But that God cannot deceive I showed question 4. The Seraphic Doctor shows his indefectible perpetuity in Hexaëm. and Boët. in demonstr. 8.
At last the Seraphic Doctor proves that faith has been made more certain, or, let me say, more founded, by devotion, which fosters faith. Surely the devotion of our Church is marveled at everywhere in the ancient Canticles, as the Fathers expound. For now the army of Saints, the ranks of Martyrs, the choirs of Virgins abound, as St. Bonav. discourses most sweetly here, and in the sermons of the Hexaëmer., especially 8. and following.