Breviloquium

Third, it remains to discuss grace in comparison with the habits of the virtues, concerning which three matters are to be considered. First, how one grace branches into the habits of virtues; second, how it branches into the habits of gifts; third, how it branches into the habits of beatitudes¹.

Concerning the branching of grace into the habits of virtues, therefore, these things are to be held: although there is one grace that makes the soul pleasing, there are nevertheless seven gratuitous virtues by which human life is governed: three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity; and four cardinal virtues, namely prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, which in one respect is a common and general virtue, and in another a special and proper one. — Although these seven virtues are distinct and possess their proper excellences, they are nevertheless connected and equal to one another in the same subject; and although they are gratuitous and informed by grace, they can nevertheless be made formless through sin, with charity alone excepted, and again be informed through penance, when grace arrives, which is the origin, end, and form of the virtual habits².

The reason for understanding the foregoing is this: just as the productive principle, in its supreme perfection in giving life to nature, gives not only living as first act, but also as second act, which is operating, so it is necessary that the reparative principle grant life to the spirit in gratuitous being, both as to being and as to operating. And since, in one living thing according to one first life, there are many vital operations for the perfect manifestation of that life; since acts are diversified by objects, and the diversity of acts requires a distinction of habits³: hence, although there is one vivifying grace, it necessarily branches into various habits on account of various operations. — And since some moral works are primary, such as believing; some intermediate, such as understanding what is believed; and some last, such as seeing what is understood; and in the first the soul is rectified, in the second expedited, and in the third perfected: therefore grace that makes pleasing branches into the habits of virtues, whose function is to rectify the soul; into the habits of gifts, whose function is to expedite the soul; and into the habits of beatitudes, whose function is to perfect the soul⁴.

Again, since perfect rectitude of soul requires that it be rectified according to a twofold face, namely, the superior and the inferior, both in respect of the end and in respect of those things that are ordered to the end; therefore it is necessary that the soul, as to the superior face in which the image of the eternal Trinity consists, be rectified through three theological virtues, so that, just as the image of creation consists in a trinity of powers with unity of essence, so the image of recreation consists in a trinity of habits with unity of grace, through which the soul is borne rightly toward the supreme Trinity according to the three things appropriated to the three persons⁵; so that faith directs toward the supremely true by believing and assenting, hope toward the supremely arduous by leaning and awaiting, and charity toward the supremely good by desiring and loving.

It is necessary also that, as to the inferior face, the soul be rectified through four cardinal virtues. For prudence rectifies the rational power, fortitude the irascible, temperance the concupiscible, while justice rectifies all these powers in relation to another. — And because that other can specifically be one’s neighbor, the same person can also be compared to himself as to another, and it can also be God himself; hence justice is said to go around all the powers. It is called not only a cardinal virtue but also a general one, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is called “the rectitude of the will”⁶. Hence it comprehends not only the virtues that order one toward one’s neighbor, such as equity and liberality, but also those that order one toward oneself, such as penance and innocence, and those that order one toward God, such as latria, piety, and obedience.

Lastly, since all the rectitude of the virtues according to gratuitous being flows from grace as from its origin and root, and according to meritorious being is related to charity as to its origin, form, and end, hence the other gratuitous virtues are connected as to their habits and equal as to their meritorious acts. — Hence also the other habits of the virtues can be formless⁷, with charity alone excepted, which is the form of the virtues. For when they are possessed without grace and charity, in which the life of the virtues consists, they are formless. But when grace is superinfused, they are formed, adorned, and made acceptable to God; just as colors without light are invisible, but when light supervenes they become luminous, beautiful, and pleasing to the eye. Hence, just as from light and colors there is made one thing in the account of the motive, and one light suffices to illuminate many colors, so from grace and formless habits, when they are formed, there is made one thing according to the account of the meritorious and the gratuitous; and one grace nevertheless suffices for the informing and gratifying of diverse habits.