Breviloquium

Concerning penal sins, this is to be held: although the evil of fault and the evil of punishment are diverse kinds of evil, some things are nevertheless sins in such a way that they are also punishment for sin¹. For, in a special sense, those are called sins and punishments for sin which have pain and sadness attached, such as envy, accidie, and the like. — In a less special sense, those are called such which have attached either a mere corruption of nature or disgrace, as are those in respect of which the sinner is said to be handed over to a reprobate sense². — In general, those sins that “are between the first apostasy and the final punishment of Gehenna, and can be called both sins and punishment for sin,” according to what Gregory says, are crimes avenged by crimes³. — Although the same thing is called sin and punishment for sin, it must nevertheless be held that every punishment, insofar as it is punishment, is just and from God; but no fault is just or from God, but only from the free choice of the will. — Punishment which is punishment alone is inflicted by God; but what is fault, or inclines to fault, is either contracted or committed⁴.

The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since evil signifies a departure from the first principle through harming the good; and it harms the good only by taking something away from the good; but the good consists in mode, species, and order: there is no evil that is not corruptive of mode, species, and order⁵. But order is twofold, namely the order of nature and the order of justice. The order of nature is in natural good, the order of justice in moral good; and because natural good exists in every nature, while moral good has to consist in the will: therefore the order of nature is in every nature, but the order of justice consists in the elective will. And because the will “is an instrument moving itself”⁶, while nature is not at all; hence it is that the order of justice is an order not only made but also making, while the order of nature is an order made. Since, therefore, evil can deprive one of the order of justice and the order of nature, hence it is that evil is twofold, namely of fault and of punishment.

Again, because the order of justice is a voluntary order, hence it is that “the evil of fault is a voluntary affection, but the evil of punishment is an involuntary affection”⁷.

Lastly, because the order of justice, which is in the will, is an order that makes, therefore “the evil of fault, which is its privation, is the evil that we do, and the evil of punishment is the evil that we suffer.” And because there is no passion unless action naturally precedes it, nor any action that is not followed by some passion: hence it is that there is no punishment without the preceding merit of fault, nor any fault without some punishment accompanying it⁸.

And since what we do is from us, while what we suffer can be from us and from others, namely from a superior or inferior cause: therefore, although every fault is from us, not every punishment is from us; indeed, some are produced by our acts, some inflicted, and some contracted.

And because, when one who does what he ought not do suffers what he ought, it is just; therefore every punishment, insofar as it is punishment, is just and from divine providence, because it is ordered to fault and orders the fault itself.

But because that passion can occur through the taking away of natural good, or of moral good together with natural good, hence it is that some punishment is punishment alone, while some is punishment and fault; for moral good, which is justice, is not taken away except through injustice, which is fault. — The first punishment, therefore, is from God both insofar as it is punishment and according to what it is⁹: from God, I say, not as instituting but as avenging. The second, however, since it is fault, is not from God according to what it is, but only with respect to order. It is either acted, if it follows upon the actual, or contracted, if it follows upon the original.

If, therefore, evil is taken properly, insofar as it is privation of natural good, involuntary affection, and the evil that we suffer, it does not coincide with the evil of fault in the same thing, although it is annexed to it. But if it is taken broadly, so that what we suffer, whether from us or from elsewhere, whether in nature or in the will, is called evil, then they coincide in the same thing¹⁰, but not with respect to the same thing or according to the same aspect: because what is fault in itself is called punishment with respect to what precedes; or, fault by reason of action is said to be punishment by reason of passion. — And thus it is clear how, to what extent, and why something is at once called sin and punishment for sin.