Breviloquium
Bonaventure (1217–1274)
First published 1882
Bonaventure's Breviloquium, a concise systematic presentation of Christian theology in a prologue and seven parts. Latin transcription from the Quaracchi critical edition, Opera omnia, tomus V (1882), pp. 201-291.
Prologus
Caput I: De illis septem, de quibus est theologia, in summa.
Caput II: Quid tenendum est de trinitate personarum et unitate essentiae.
Caput III: De istius fidei intelligentia sana.
Caput IV: De istius fidei expressione catholica.
Caput V: De unitate divinae naturae in multiformitate apparitionum.
Caput VI: De unitate divinae naturae in multiplicitate appropriatorum.
Caput VII: De omnipotentia Dei.
Caput VIII: De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia.
Caput IX: De voluntate Dei et providentia.
Caput X: De productione mundi totalis.
Caput XI: De natura corporali quantum ad fieri.
Caput XII: De natura corporali quantum ad esse.
Caput XIII: De natura corporali quantum ad operari et influere.
Caput XIV: De modo describendi praedicta in sacra Scriptura.
Caput XV: De productione supernorum spirituum.
Caput XVI: De apostasia daemonum.
Caput XVII: De confirmatione bonorum Angelorum.
Caput XVIII: De productione hominis quantum ad spiritum.
Caput XIX: De productione hominis quantum ad corpus.
Caput XX: De productione hominis quantum ad totum coniunctum.
Caput XXI: De completione et ordinatione totius mundi consummati.
Caput XXII: De origine mali in communi.
Having thus briefly established certain points concerning the Trinity of God and the creation of the world, it remains now to touch briefly upon certain matters concerning the corruption of sin. Concerning it, one must hold in summary that sin is not any essence, but a defect and corruption, by which mode, species, and order are corrupted in the created will1; and hence the corruption of sin is contrary to the good itself, yet it has being only in the good and derives its origin only from the good, which is the free choice of the will; and this is neither supremely evil, since it can will the good, nor supremely good, since it can turn aside into evil.
The reason for understanding the foregoing is this: since the first principle is being from itself, not from another, it must be being on account of itself, and hence supremely good, having absolutely no defect. There is therefore nothing, nor can there be anything, that is first and supremely evil, because “first principle” signifies supreme completion, whereas “supreme evil” signifies the greatest defect. Therefore, since the first principle, as supremely being and complete2, can fail neither in being nor in operating, it is neither supremely evil nor any evil, nor can it in any way originate evil. — Yet since it is omnipotent, it can lead the good from non-being into being, even without the aid of any matter. And this it did when it fashioned the creature, to which it gave being, life, understanding, and willing; and since this creature came from the highest good according to the relation of a threefold cause3, it had to possess in its substance and will mode, species, and order. It was therefore born to perform its works from God, according to God, and for God, and this according to the mode, species, and order implanted in it.
But because it was from nothing and defective, it could fail from acting for God, so that it might do something for itself, not for God, and hence neither from God nor according to God nor for God; and this is sin, which corrupts mode, species, and order; and because it is a defect, it has not an efficient cause but a deficient one, namely, the defect of the created will4.
Since corruption exists, and only of the good, and every corruption is in a corruptible thing, it is therefore only in the good; and hence, since free will corrupts mode, species, and order in itself by falling away from the true good, every sin as such both comes from the will, as from its first origin, and is in the will, as in its proper subject. The will does this when, through its defectibility, mutability, and capacity to turn, scorning the indeficient and immutable good, it cleaves to mutable good5.
From these things it is gathered that «sin is not the appetite of evil things, but the desertion of better things»; and therefore in the appetite of the will it corrupts mode, species, and order, and hence is «so voluntary that, if it is not voluntary, it is no longer sin». — With these things understood beforehand, the impiety of the Manichaeans6 who posit a supremely evil first principle of all evils manifestly falls. It also appears what the origin of evil is, and what the subject of evil is.