Breviloquium
Bonaventure (1217–1274)
First published 1882
Bonaventure's Breviloquium, a concise systematic presentation of Christian theology in a prologue and seven parts. Latin transcription from the Quaracchi critical edition, Opera omnia, tomus V (1882), pp. 201-291.
Prologus
Caput I: De illis septem, de quibus est theologia, in summa.
Caput II: Quid tenendum est de trinitate personarum et unitate essentiae.
Caput III: De istius fidei intelligentia sana.
Caput IV: De istius fidei expressione catholica.
Caput V: De unitate divinae naturae in multiformitate apparitionum.
Caput VI: De unitate divinae naturae in multiplicitate appropriatorum.
Caput VII: De omnipotentia Dei.
Caput VIII: De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia.
Caput IX: De voluntate Dei et providentia.
Concerning the will of God, moreover, these things are to be held: that it is so right that in no way can it be bent aside; so efficacious that in no way can it be impeded; so one that nevertheless it can be signified in manifold ways.
For the divine will, which is the will of good pleasure, is signified through the will of sign according to five differences of signs, namely, precept, prohibition, counsel, fulfillment, and permission; according to these, whatever takes place in the universe is ordered by the will of good pleasure. « For the will of God is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing takes place visibly and sensibly in this exceedingly ample and immense republic of the whole of creation, which is not either commanded or permitted from the inner, invisible, and intelligible court of the highest Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions ».1
And because this will, regulated by reason, is called providence, hence it is that all things that take place in the universe are enacted and governed by divine providence, which is irreprehensible in all things, because it commands, prohibits, or counsels nothing except justly; it does nothing except well, and permits nothing unjustly.2
The understanding and reason of the aforesaid things is as follows. The first principle, since it is supremely noble, both has a will and has it in a noble mode. Since therefore will in itself signifies that according to which, in agents acting by purpose, the rule of rectitude and the efficacy of operation are considered, it is necessary that the will in God be most right and most efficacious: most right, because in God will and truth are the same; most efficacious, because in God will and virtue, or power, are altogether the same. — And because the divine will cannot lack truth, therefore it is not only right, but also the rule of rectitude. But because in no way can it lack virtue, therefore it is not only efficacious, but also the fountain and origin of all efficacy; so that nothing can be effected without it, nothing can be done against it, and there is nothing by which it can be impeded.3
And because it is most right, no one can be right unless he is conformed to it; but no one can be conformed to it unless that will becomes known to him: therefore it was necessary for the divine will to be made known to us as the rule of rectitude. Rectitude, however, is in one way a matter of necessity, and this consists in doing necessary good and declining evil; in another way it is a matter of perfection, and this consists in supererogating beyond what is owed; and according to this it is made known to us through a threefold sign, namely, precept, prohibition, and counsel. This signifies accepting the divine good pleasure as just: what is done according to the divine precept, what is declined according to the divine prohibition, and what is fulfilled according to the divine counsel. These signs are indeed infallible signs of the divine will insofar as it is the rule of rectitude.4
Again, because it is most efficacious, no one can effect anything unless it is operating and co-operating; no one can fail or sin unless it justly deserts.5 And according to this there are two signs of it, namely, fulfillment, which is the sign of the will as effecting; and permission, which is the sign of the will as justly deserting. It deserts justly, because it is just that it administer the things it founded in such a way as not to infringe the laws it imposed; and thus it co-operates with « the things it created, so as to let them perform their own motions »6 and therefore, if it lets free will, mutable toward either side, fall from the law of nature into evil, it permits this only justly.
Again, if through grace it anticipates and sustains, it does injury to none; therefore it does not act unjustly, nor altogether justly according to the exigency of merits, because merits do not suffice for this; but freely, mercifully, and in a certain way justly, insofar as this proceeds from the fittingness of its goodness. When therefore it damns and reprobates, it operates according to justice; but when it predestines, according to grace and mercy, which does not exclude justice.7 Because therefore all, insofar as they were of the mass of perdition, were liable to be damned, more are reprobated than chosen, so that it may be shown that salvation is according to special grace, but damnation according to common justice. No one therefore can complain about the divine will, because it does all things most rightly; indeed, in all things we must give thanks and honor the government of divine providence. — But if anyone asks why he lavishes the gift of grace on one sinner more than on another, here human loquacity must be silenced, and we must exclaim with the Apostle8: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments and unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor, or who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him and through him and in him are all things. To him be glory forever and ever. Amen.”